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This dissertation explains how the Republic of China (ROC), overseas Chinese (huaqiao), and the 
Philippines, sometimes but not always working with each other, produced and opposed the threat 
of Chinese communism from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s. It is not a history of US-
led anticommunist efforts with respect to the Chinese diaspora, but rather an intra-Asian social and 
cultural history of anticommunism and nation-building that liberates two close US allies from US-
centric historiographies and juxtaposes them with each other and the huaqiao community that they 
claimed. Three principal arguments flow from this focus on intra-Asian anticommunism. First, I 
challenge narrowly territorialized understandings of Chinese nationalism by arguing that Taiwan 
engaged in diasporic nation-building in the Philippines. Whether by helping the Philippine military 
identify Chinese communists or by mobilizing Philippine huaqiao in support of Taiwan, the ROC 
carved out a semi-sovereign sphere of influence for itself within a foreign country. It did so through 
institutions such as schools, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist 
League, which functioned transnationally and locally to embed the ROC into Chinese society and 
connect huaqiao to Taiwan. Through these groups, the ROC shaped the experiences of a national 
community beyond its territorial boundaries and represented itself as the legitimate “China” in the 
world. 
 Second, drawing upon political theory, I argue that the anticommunist relationship between 
the ROC, the Philippines, and the Philippine Chinese constituted a form of what I call shared, non-
territorial sovereignty. Nationalist China did not secure influence over Chinese in the Philippines 
  
 
by exerting military or economic pressure, as a neocolonial regime might. Vast disparities in power 
did not obtain between Manila and Taipei, as they did between them and Washington. Rather, for 
reasons of law, culture, linguistic incapacity, and ideology, the Philippines selectively outsourced 
the management of its Chinese residents to the ROC. In turn, both depended on the Chinese being 
able to govern themselves with state support, coercive and otherwise. The Philippine Chinese, as 
in colonial times, were thus semi-autonomous actors who participated in the construction of shared 
sovereignty after World War II by forging ties with states to advance their anticommunist agenda. 
This three-way relationship provides a framework for thinking about postcolonial sovereignty in 
East Asia that focuses on relations of relative equality between states and the relative autonomy of 
the Chinese as a minority population, rather than between dominant and dominated or in terms of 
territory.  
 Nationalist China and the Philippines’ nation-building projects had profound consequences 
for the Philippine Chinese. While these peoples were in many respects acted upon by the ROC and 
Philippine states through legal and coercive means, they by no means lacked agency. Rather, they 
performed their agency as consensual participants in making anticommunism. In focusing on them, 
the dissertation shifts from international and transnational history to social and cultural history and 
the history of civic life. Existing scholarship, whether in the social sciences or Sinophone Studies, 
largely depicts the postcolonial hua subject as a non-ideological businessman or cultural producer. 
I argue, by contrast, that the overseas Chinese could be eminently ideological and politically active. 
From informing on suspected Chinese communists to the ROC and Philippine states to proclaiming 
their loyalties to the ROC and Chiang Kai-shek, anticommunist social practices enabled Philippine 
huaqiao to come to terms with being legally disadvantaged and ideologically suspect minorities in 
their country of residence. Unlike racial and cultural Chineseness, which they could or would not 
  
 
give up, they could and did choose to behave ideologically; and in doing so, they legitimized their 
community to the Philippine state and Filipino society. 
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coffee, and meals, he familiarized me with the professional study of Southeast Asia, supported my 
research since before this project was conceived, and opened more doors for me than I can count. 
Very early on in my research, Mike introduced me to Carol Hau. She knows my dissertation better 
than anyone else does as one of the few specialists in the world on the Chinese in the Philippines, 
and having read and provided perceptive and timely feedback on multiple drafts of all my chapters. 
I am still astounded at how quickly she returned these drafts to me with comments. In mentioning 
her, I must also thank Michael Szonyi for agreeing to serve as the second external member of the 
committee despite his many administrative responsibilities and the two of us having met for only 
a few minutes at the Association for Asian Studies meeting in 2017. 
 Others from far and wide have commented on different aspects of the dissertation over the 
last seven years, including Wen-Qing Ngoei, Clark Alejandrino, James Lin, Leow Wei Yi, Masuda 
Hajimu, Richard Chu, Taomo Zhou, Donald Nonini, Dominic Yang, Julia Strauss, Chu Hong-yuan, 
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Tian, Henry Chan, Wang Gungwu, Teresita Ang-See, Go Bon Juan, and Benito Lim.  
 Research funding was provided by the History Department at Columbia, Weatherhead East 
Asian Institute, Sasakawa Young Leaders’ Fellowship Fund, Association for Asian Studies’ China 
and Inner Asia Council, and Confucius China Studies Program. Writeup fellowships from WEAI 
allowed me to finish the dissertation in a timely fashion, as did the warm welcome that I received 
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at Johns Hopkins University, where I have spent the last one and a half years as an uninvited guest 
of the History Department. My thanks in particular to Tobie Meyer-Fong for taking me under her 
wing. In the Philippines and Taiwan respectively, the Institute of Philippine Culture at Ateneo de 
Manila University and the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica served as institutional 
bases for research in 2014-2015. While my research in Fujian in the fall of 2016 proved frustrating 
and yielded little, Shen Huifen and Nie Dening at the Research School for Southeast Asian Studies 
at Xiamen University were warm and gracious hosts. 
 My parents have always afforded me the freedom to pursue my interests and provided me 
with the emotional and financial support needed to do so. In Singapore, Ooi Say Hien has been an 
inexhaustible source of intelligent conversation on pretty much everything since 1996. I would not 
have become interested in Southeast Asia if not for three and a half years at Raffles Institution and 
the amazing students whom I had the privilege of teaching there. Lastly, I must thank Xiaoqian Ji 
for coming into my life five years ago and then for having a late-night coffee with me on September 
20, 2013, at the Hungarian Pastry Shop. Her love, companionship, and encouragement sustain me 
and help me believe in myself. At Columbia, I received an education, produced a dissertation, and 





Some ten years after the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the American 
journalist and Hong Kong correspondent for Newsweek Robert S. Elegant raised the grim prospect 
of a Chinese communist takeover of Southeast Asia in a book titled The Dragon’s Seed. In vividly 
Orientalist prose, he warned that Chinese communities in the region were the conduits for what he 
believed was the expansion of “modern Chinese imperialism.” The PRC was “capturing the close-
knit Chinese communities abroad and deploying them as vanguards for the spiritual aggression of 
the Marxian-Maoist creed and as skirmishers for the armed aggression of the ‘People’s Liberation 
Army’ and its auxiliary units,” he declared. Indissolubly bound to China by culture and blood and 
estranged from indigenous Southeast Asians, the overseas Chinese, or huaqiao 華僑, were willing 
accomplices in Beijing’s campaign to achieve “physical and spiritual dominion” over Nanyang. In 
fact, he went so far as to assert that the “Communists have nearly taken the hua-chiao” because of 
Western inaction and the preoccupation of regions governments with other problems.1 
Elegant was not alone in positing a conspiracy by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to 
penetrate Southeast Asia’s Chinese communities and undermine the sovereignty of states that had 
just won their independence from Western and Japanese colonial rule. US Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles wrote in December 1958 that the PRC, in league with the Soviet Union, was “bearing 
down hard on the free Asian countries with its massive weight of numbers, its rising military power, 
and its infiltration among overseas Chinese.”2 The United States’ allies in East and Southeast Asia 
were equally alarmed. In the Philippines, intelligence briefings from the late 1940s and early 1950s 
                                                 
1 Robert S. Elegant, The Dragon’s Seed: Peking and the Overseas Chinese (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1959), 5-
6, 12.  
 
2 John Foster Dulles, “Policy for the Far East,” The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 39, No. 1017 (Washington, 





teem with fears of local Chinese as “fifth columnists,” reports of CCP agents and propaganda being 
smuggled into the country, and wildly inaccurate estimates of number of Chinese communists and 
their sympathizers residing there.3 Most vociferous of all in claiming that the CCP was expanding 
into Nanyang was the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. In the decades that followed its flight 
from the mainland, the Nationalist state churned out a steady stream of propaganda that sought to 
unmask what one short tract from 1954 called the Communist Bandits’ Plot Against the Overseas 
Chinese (Gongfei dui huaqiao zhi yinmou 共匪對華僑之陰謀). In it, ROC propagandists accused 
the PRC not only of crimes against overseas Chinese who had returned to the mainland, or guiqiao 
歸僑, but also of conspiring with Russian imperialists (E di 俄帝) to corrupt Chinese living abroad 
and, through them, destabilize Southeast Asian nation-states from within.4 
We know today that American, Southeast Asian, and Nationalist China’s fears of a rampant 
Maoist neocolonialism and of huaqiao as fifth columnists, working to advance the PRC’s agenda, 
were vastly overblown. Many overseas Chinese, it is true, regarded the PRC highly, most famously 
the Singaporean businessman Tan Kah Kee, who returned to China in 1950 and contributed much 
to the economic and educational development of Fujian. Pro-communist factions and newspapers 
were to be found in most Chinese communities outside China, particularly in Sukarno’s Indonesia, 
but also in Thailand. And in Malaysia, of course, local Chinese were at the forefront of the Malayan 
Communist Party’s (MCP) decades-long insurgency, starting in 1948, against first the British and 
then the postcolonial government. But the MCP’s allegiances lay with Malaysia, rather than China. 
It had no ties to the PRC and was swiftly marginalized as a genuine threat to security by the British 
                                                 
3 See, for example, File 007, Box 5, Folder 7: National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (1948), Elpidio Quirino 
Papers, Filipinas Heritage Library [FHL], Ayala Museum, Manila.  
 





and conservative Chinese in the peninsula.5 Support for the PRC among Southeast Asia’s huaqiao 
was almost everywhere contested and circumscribed by some combination of rival Chinese groups, 
Taiwan, colonial and postcolonial states, and the United States. Mao’s China did not even exercise 
sustained influence over the Chinese in North Vietnam, except when it was given great latitude to 
organize Chinese education from 1954 to 1958.6 Far from seeking to subvert new Southeast Asian 
nations, the PRC was keen to strengthen its relations with them in the name of solidarity with the 
global South. This meant explicitly encouraging huaqiao to become citizens of their countries of 
residence, adopt integrative practices such as intermarriage, and limit their pro-PRC activities by 
the end of the 1950s.7 As the PRC turned inwards and towards domestic mobilization, it likewise 
disengaged from the Chinese diaspora, and, in one scholar’s words, “decolonized” from Southeast 
Asia.8 It did not so much have a policy towards huaqiao living overseas as towards guiqiao, whom 
it often struggled to incorporate into the socialist body politic.9 
Pending fresh archival discoveries, scholars of modern China in the world will likely search 
in vain for evidence of the Chinese abroad as fifth columnists acting on behalf of the PRC, or of 
anything close to the sort of influence over huaqiao which anticommunists believed that the PRC 
enjoyed. From the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, the Chinese state with the strongest and 
                                                 
5 On the nonexistence of ties between the MCP and CCP, see Karl Hack and C. C. Chin, Dialogues with Chin Peng: 
New Light on Malayan Communist Party (Singapore: NUS Press, 2004).  
 
6 E. S. Ungar, “The Struggle Over the Chinese Community in Vietnam, 1946-1986,” Pacific Affairs 60.4 (1988): 
600. 
 
7 Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking’s Changing Policy, 1949-1970 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 135, 141-143. 
 
8 Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, 74. For a similar view from a leading PRC scholar of the overseas 
Chinese, see Zhuang Guotu 庄国土, Huaqiao huaren yu zhongguo de guanxi 华侨华人与中国的关系 (Guangzhou: 
Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), 251-252. 
 






most unchallenged ties to any huaqiao community in Southeast Asia was, ironically, the ROC on 
Taiwan. Nationalist China had itself been a victim of Western and Japanese imperialism and was 
a tenacious and vituperative opponent of supposed Maoist subversion. A client of the United States 
after 1949, it survived because of US military and economic aid. Yet its history and vulnerability 
did not inhibit its willingness to become involved in overseas Chinese affairs so much as stimulate 
it. Displaced from mainland China, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime laid claim to persons whom it 
considered “Chinese nationals” by law, culture, and blood, regardless of where they resided, in the 
name of protecting their rights and interests and in the hopes of securing their support in its quest 
to counterattack the mainland.  
Nowhere else in Southeast Asia – quite possibly the world – was overseas Chinese support 
for Nationalist China more visible and entrenched than in the Philippines. By the end of the 1940s, 
with the CCP on the verge of victory in the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese communist movement 
in the former US colony was all but over, its leaders mostly driven out of the country and back to 
China. Henceforth, even as an indigenous communist insurgency – the Hukbalahap Insurgency –
swept Central Luzon, the Philippine-Chinese community came to be dominated by the local branch 
of the KMT and, through it, the ROC. Collaboration between local Chinese, ROC officials and the 
Philippine military – but not the United States – facilitated the arrests of Chinese Red suspects and 
their deportation to Taiwan as ROC nationals under the Philippines’ 1940 Immigration Law. And 
unlike elsewhere in Southeast Asia, schools, newspapers, chambers of commerce, and other civic 
organizations in the Philippines after 1949 were not contested between leftist and rightist Chinese 
factions until after Manila recognized Beijing in 1975. Instead, pro-Taiwan institutions such as the 
KMT – which historians usually associate only with China and Taiwan – Philippine-Chinese Anti-




Li Po papers, and Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry multiplied, 
connecting the Philippine Chinese to the ROC. Overlapping in function and membership, they 
structured civic life, suppressed heterodox views, and helped generate a uniform, civic-ideological 
identity for the community. In 1958, the Deputy Chairman of the ROC’s Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Commission (Qiaowu weiyuan hui 僑務委員會, or OCAC) Li Pusheng 李樸生 hailed the KMT’s 
branch in the Philippines as among the most energetic and its members as the most committed to 
anticommunism in the world.10 Notwithstanding the alarmist propaganda that OCAC churned out 
for the purposes of legitimizing Taiwan, his was a view shared by many ROC officials at the time.  
 This dissertation explains how the ROC, overseas Chinese, and the Philippines, sometimes 
but not always working with each other, produced and opposed the threat of Chinese communism 
from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s. It is not, as this synopsis makes clear, a history of 
US anticommunist efforts with respect to the overseas Chinese. It is, rather, an intra-Asian, social 
and cultural history of anticommunism and nation-building that liberates two close US allies from 
US-centric historiographies and juxtaposes them with each other and the huaqiao community that 
they claimed. Three central arguments flow from this focus on intra-Asian anticommunism. First, 
I challenge narrowly territorialized understandings of Chinese nationalism by arguing that Taiwan 
engaged in diasporic nation-building in the Philippines. Whether by helping the Philippine military 
identify Chinese communists or by mobilizing Philippine huaqiao in support of Taiwan, the ROC 
carved out a semi-sovereign sphere of influence for itself within a foreign country. It did so through 
institutions such as schools, the KMT, and the Chinese Anti-Communist League, which functioned 
transnationally and locally to embed the Nationalist state into Chinese society and connect huaqiao 
                                                 





to Taiwan. Through such groups, the ROC shaped the experiences of a national community beyond 
its territorial boundaries and represented itself to the world as the legitimate “China.” 
 Second, drawing upon political theory, I argue that the anticommunist relationship between 
the ROC, the Philippines, and the Philippine Chinese constituted a form of what I call shared, non-
territorial sovereignty. Nationalist China did not secure influence over Chinese in the Philippines 
by exerting military or economic pressure, as a neocolonial regime might. Vast disparities in power 
did not obtain between Manila and Taipei, as they did between them and Washington. Rather, for 
reasons of law, culture, linguistic incapacity, and ideology, the Philippines selectively outsourced 
the management of its Chinese residents to the ROC. In turn, both depended on the Chinese being 
able to govern themselves with state support, coercive and otherwise. The Philippine Chinese, as 
in colonial times, were thus semi-autonomous actors who participated in the construction of shared 
sovereignty after World War II by forging ties with states to advance their anticommunist agenda. 
This three-way relationship provides a framework for thinking about postcolonial sovereignty in 
East Asia that focuses on relations of relative equality between states and the relative autonomy of 
the Chinese as a minority population, rather than between dominant and dominated or in terms of 
territory.  
 Nationalist China and the Philippines’ nation-building projects had profound consequences 
for the Philippine Chinese. While these peoples were in many respects acted upon by the ROC and 
Philippine states through legal and coercive means, they by no means lacked agency. Rather, they 
performed their agency as consensual participants in making anticommunism. In focusing on them, 
the dissertation shifts from international and transnational history to social and cultural history and 
the history of civic life. Existing scholarship, whether in the social sciences or Sinophone Studies, 




I argue, by contrast, that the overseas Chinese could be eminently ideological and politically active. 
From informing on suspected Chinese communists to the ROC and Philippine states to proclaiming 
their loyalties to the ROC and Chiang Kai-shek, anticommunist social practices enabled Philippine 
huaqiao to come to terms with being legally disadvantaged and ideologically suspect minorities in 
their country of residence. Unlike racial and cultural Chineseness, which they could or would not 
give up, they could and did choose to behave ideologically; and in doing so, they legitimized their 
community to the Philippine state and Filipino society. 
 
The Philippine Chinese: ethnicity, culture, and nationality 
 In the context of the period from 1945 to around 1970, I use “Philippine Chinese” to refer 
to residents of the country who regarded themselves as culturally Chinese and / or were perceived 
as such by Filipinos.11 More often than not, they were nationals of the ROC, although some could 
be Philippine citizens. Being Chinese in the Philippines, in other words, was partly about ethnicity 
culture and partly about nationality. It involved self-identification, but also how one was identified 
and categorized by Filipinos and the Philippine and ROC states: one could see oneself as a Filipino, 
and yet be seen by Filipinos as Chinese. According to one estimate, 85 percent of them were either 
born in southern Fujian (Minnan 閩南) in the late 19th and early 20th century or traced their ancestry 
there, while the other 15 percent were from Guangdong. In turn, 90 percent of those from Minnan 
were from Jinjiang, Nan’an, and Hui’an counties in Quanzhou prefecture, with those from Jinjiang 
                                                 
11 Jacques Amyot, The Manila Chinese: Familism in the Philippine Environment (Quezon City: Institute of 
Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, 1973), 1; Richard T. Chu, The Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of 





outnumbering those from the other two by an almost two-to-one ratio.12 No Chinese dialect group 
was as dominant in any other Southeast Asian country.13 Consequently, a modified version of the 
Southern min dialect, Minnanhua or Hokkien, served as the lingua franca for the whole community, 
with many Cantonese speaking it.14 Language aside, Chinese were distinguishable from Filipinos 
by the civic organizations that they were a part of such as their unique dual-language schools, clan 
associations, and chambers of commerce; and customs such as ancestor worship and endogamous 
marriage. In emphasizing the capacity of persons to identify themselves as Chinese, my definition 
can also include Chinese mestizos, persons of mixed Chinese and Spanish or Filipino blood whom 
the Spanish colonial state considered “Chinese,” at a time when the number of “pure” Chinese was 
small. Over the 19th century, growing numbers of new Chinese immigrants, mostly from Minnan, 
slowly drove these mestizos out of wholesaling and retailing. American colonial rule then legally 
recategorized mestizos as “Filipinos” to enable the implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 
which targeted the new Chinese immigrants. Mestizos, therefore, were Philippine rather than ROC 
citizens. However, they could choose to play up the Chineseness of their identity, especially when 
interacting with other Chinese.  
                                                 
12 Chinben See, “Chinese Clanship in the Philippine Setting,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 12.1 (1981): 225. 
These figures correspond closely with those in Edgar Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898 (Quezon 
City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 172. 
 
13 See G. William Skinner, “Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia,” Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far 
Eastern Studies, Cornell University, December 1950, 80. Skinner places the number of Philippine Chinese in 1950 
who were from Fujian at a mere 70 percent, but this figure is still the highest among all dialect groups in different 
countries in the region. The 1996 Quanzhou City Overseas Chinese Gazetteer has the proportion of Philippine 
Chinese from Fujian province in 1939 at 80 percent and from Quanzhou at 75 percent. See Quanzhou shi huaqiao 
zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Quanzhou shi huaqiao zhi 泉州市華僑志 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 
1996), 11. 
 





Ethno-cultural distinctions between “Chinese” and “Filipinos,” especially in Manila, grew 
wider during the late 19th century and the decades of US colonial rule. Chinese Exclusion, although 
unable to prevent Chinese migrants from entering the country,15 kept them occupationally separate 
from Filipinos and reinforced the association between ethnicity and economic occupation. Unlike 
the Spanish, US colonialists also discouraged intermarriage between legally defined racial groups 
to create a homogeneous Filipino nation that was loyal to the United States.16 Filipino and Chinese 
nationalisms both had a similarly delineating impact on ethno-cultural categories. While Filipino 
nationalists mostly targeted the Spanish state, they also opposed “alien” domination of the colonial 
economy. Widespread stereotypes of the Chinese as wealthy, corrupt businessmen, but also opium 
smokers, secret society members, and petty criminals crystallized during the late 19th century, were 
reinforced under US rule, and continued into the postcolonial period. Efforts by the Chinese state 
(imperial and republican), reformers, and revolutionaries to forge closer ties with overseas Chinese 
communities throughout this period reinforced how the Philippine Chinese understood themselves 
vis-à-vis Filipinos. In response to developments in both states, Philippine-Chinese elites adopted 
what Edgar Wickberg has called a “policy of organization and signification of their community.” 
Considered a community by others, he writes, “so they considered themselves.”17  
 Ethnically and culturally distinct from Filipinos, most Chinese in the Philippines after 1946 
were also citizens of the ROC and remained so until the late 1970s, regardless of where they were 
born. Throughout Southeast Asia, the transition from colonial empire to nation-state necessitated 
                                                 
15 See Chu, The Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila, 292-294, on how Chinese found creative ways around the 
Chinese Exclusion Act in order to enter the Philippines.  
 
16 Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 201.  
 





that new states draw clear-cut, legal distinctions between nationals and non-nationals within their 
territories. Everyone had to have a nationality and those categorized as nationals be made to adhere 
to the cultural and civic norms of the dominant ethnic group. The largest non-indigenous minority 
community in these new nations posed a unique problem because of their economic status, ties to 
China, and cultural distinctiveness. How were they to be incorporated into the nation? Should and 
could they be?  
 All Southeast Asian states provided pathways to citizenship for the Chinese and sought, to 
varying extents, to integrate or assimilate them into new national communities. In British Malaya, 
for example, Chinese politicians’ bargaining efforts ensured that the constitution of 1957 laid down 
clear provisions for citizenship for all local Chinese.18 In Thailand, postwar anti-Chinese measures 
were replaced by nationality, electoral, and military service legislation after 1956 that reaffirmed 
the state’s historical commitment to the political integration and cultural assimilation of its Chinese 
population.19 Postwar Philippine governments, however, were much less willing and able to push 
for such measures until the 1970s. Chinese schools, for example, a common target for all states in 
the region, were relatively untouched in the Philippines. Underpinning Manila’s non-intervention 
in Chinese cultural affairs was its treatment of the Chinese as foreign aliens in accordance with the 
ROC’s 1929 Nationality Law. Based on the principle of jus sanguinis (bloodright) and in effect in 
Taiwan until 2000, it categorized practically anyone born to a Chinese father, dead or alive, or to 
a Chinese mother and unknown or dead father as a “Chinese national.”20 For instance, the children 
                                                 
18 Lee Hock Guan, “Shades of Citizenship: Betwixt the Civic and the Ethnic,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2013): 179-
182. 
 
19 G. William Skinner, “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 321 (1959): 140. 
 
20 On the Nationality Law, see Shao Dan, “Chinese by Definition: Nationality Law, Jus Sanguinis, and State 





of a Filipino woman and Chinese man were categorized as such. In April 1947, Manila signed a 
Treaty of Amity with Nanjing that, in defining the rights and privileges of Philippine and Chinese 
nationals in each other’s territories, signaled the Philippines’ implicit acceptance of its Chinese as 
citizens of the ROC. In September, the Supreme Court affirmed the Philippines’ commitment to 
jus sanguinis citizenship in its ruling on the case of Jose Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor. 
Born in San Pablo, Laguna in 1915 to a Chinese father and Filipina mother, Tan Chong had been 
denied entry into the Philippines in 1940 after spending the previous 15 years in China. Set to be 
deported, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus and secured his release from the Secretary of Labor, 
only for the Solicitor-General to appeal the decision on the eve of World War II. After the war, the 
Court took up this appeal and reversed its earlier decision, arguing that despite being born in the 
Philippines, Tan Chong was a Chinese national because he had not spent his youth in his country 
of birth and thus lacked intangible, cultural attributes of citizenship such as “knowledge and pride 
of the country’s past.” Citizenship was a “political status” and something that the citizen had to be 
proud of.21 The Court thus legitimized the same principle of jus sanguinis that formed the basis of 
how the ROC defined nationality.        
Considerable obstacles stood in the way of the average Chinese resident becoming a citizen 
of the Philippines under the provisions of the 1939 Revised Naturalization Law. The naturalization 
process was “prohibitively complex, costly, unsure, and slow,” one critic wrote in 1974. It required 
the applicant, whether born in the Philippines or not, to not only be able to “speak and write English 
or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages,” but also own real estate worth not 
less than 5,000 pesos, or “must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.” 
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Those who, during their residence in the country, had “not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or 
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of 
the Filipinos,” among other subjective criteria, were not allowed to be naturalized. Applicants were 
required to file a declaration of intent to become a citizen with the Bureau of Justice a year before 
petitioning the Court of First Instance in his province. The petition had to be approved by multiple 
government agencies and the petitioner was questioned extensively by the court before he obtained 
his certificate of naturalization.22 Wealthy Chinese usually bribed their way through this process; 
those without the means to do so had little incentive to seek naturalization. The majority of Chinese 
thus remained nationals of the ROC until after President Ferdinand Marcos simplified the process 
of naturalization, nationalized Chinese private schools, and established relations with the PRC by 
decree in 1975.  
 
Rethinking anticommunism in Cold War Asia: intra-Asian relations, society, and culture 
Except for those on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), studies of Cold 
War anticommunist relations in East and Southeast Asia largely examine the United States’ ties to 
countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. 
While histories of these states show that Asian actors such as the KMT opposed communism long 
before the postwar era, indigenous anticommunism movements are mostly treated as national(ist) 
phenomena that had neither an interest in nor the capacity for organizing across territorial borders. 
In this conventional narrative, it is US military and developmental aid, cultural programming, and 
counterinsurgency techniques that “regionalized” anticommunism and successfully contained the 
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Cold War enemy throughout most of Southeast Asia, except in Indochina. We might label this the 
“hub-and-spokes” model of anticommunism, which hews closely to Odd Arne Westad’s definition 
of the Cold War as a global contest for ideological supremacy between the United States and Soviet 
Union.23 While scholarly works based on this model have long ceased to treat those at the end of 
the spokes as passive clients of the United States, they remain focused on explaining the American 
impact on Asian states and societies.24  
There is, of course, little denying the political, economic, and cultural scope of the US Cold 
War project in Asia and the close ties between the United States and the ROC and the Philippines. 
We know, too, that the United States was actively involved in propagandizing against communism 
among Southeast Asia’s Chinese.25 Yet US hegemony in the region did not preclude the existence 
of relationships between Asian actors (as opposed to between Asian actors and the United States). 
Neither was such hegemony quite as all-encompassing and uniform as the concept suggests. In the 
postwar Philippines, the United States was fixated on the Huk problem. But there is little evidence 
from either US or ROC archives to show that it played an active role in the affairs of the Philippine 
Chinese, even when it came to prosecuting communists. In December 1952, the arrest of some 300 
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Chinese communist suspects by the Philippine military came as a great surprise to the United States, 
which played no role in the operation (it turned out that practically all those arrested were innocent). 
One reason for US non-involvement in Philippine-Chinese society was its small size – an estimated 
270,000, or 1.2 percent of the Philippine population of 22.3 million, in 1959.26 A second was that 
the Chinese were scarcely involved in the Huk movement and had no track record of being a threat 
to social and political order. Though not uninterested in the Chinese, the United States was content 
to monitor them from a distance and allow the Philippines and ROC to manage them.  
 The dissertation then, dispenses with the US-centric, hub-and-spokes model in favor of an 
intra-Asian understanding of Cold War-era anticommunism. In doing so, it draws inspiration from 
a growing body of scholarship on the PRC in Asia and the transnational practices of socialist and 
non-aligned actors – on, for example, Vietnamese revolutionary networks in Thailand, PRC-North 
Vietnam ties, and Indonesian intellectuals’ relations with the PRC.27 Animated by anticolonialism, 
notions of working-class solidarity, and internationalism, left-wing states and movements (broadly 
defined) lend themselves naturally to understanding intra-Asian connections in a postcolonial and 
Cold War setting. The right, conversely, is usually associated with the nation-state, whose integrity 
it sought to protect against deracinated, cosmopolitan transnationals. Yet if the left operated across 
borders, it stands to reason that their enemies did so as well, mimicking and opposing them at the 
same time. Underpinned by institutions such as the KMT, anticommunism, I show, was a powerful 
driving force for international and transnational organizing in support of nationalism.28  
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 Decoupling Asian anticommunism from the United States shifts our focus away from the 
Cold War as a US imperial project and calls attention instead to the agency and ambitions of states 
such as the Philippines and Taiwan and communities such as the Philippine Chinese. In this regard, 
my work resembles that of Edward Miller’s on South Vietnamese Premier Ngô Đình Diệm, whom 
Miller argues sought to modernize Vietnam along Confucian and Catholic lines and relied less on 
the United States to consolidate his power than his family’s established political networks.29 Diệm 
and his regime derived material resources from the United States and broadly aligned themselves 
with US Cold War goals in the country. Yet he was fundamentally interested not in advancing US 
interests, except when the coincided with his, but in implementing his idiosyncratic vision of what 
a modern and democratic Vietnam, neither liberal nor communist, should look like, even if it meant 
conflict with his Cold War patron. Comparable motivations drove other allies of the United States 
in the wider East Asian region, from South Korea to Taiwan to Indonesia. For these reasons, they 
entered into relationships with each other.  
 This dissertation also departs from standard Cold War narratives by focusing not on inter-
state relations, high diplomacy, and geopolitics. Rather, building on a rich body of scholarship on 
the social and cultural history of the Cold War in Asia, I explore the effects of ROC and Philippine 
intervention in the Philippine-Chinese community in pursuit of anticommunist goals and how, in 
Masuda Hajimu’s words, “the ‘reality’ of the Cold War was produced and consolidated, and why 
numerous people joined in.”30 The anticommunism that I examine assumed two dimensions. As a 
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form of coercion, it revolved around the detention and deportation of suspected or actual Chinese 
communists by the Philippine state, whether in collaboration with ROC officials and local Chinese 
actors – or not. From KMT members to criminals, such actors played important roles in campaigns 
against Chinese by forging intelligence and informing on them to the authorities, whether for profit 
and status, because of personal vendettas, or in response to perceived violations of the ideological 
status quo. Anticommunism was also characterized by the transformation of Chinese associational 
life in the Philippines along ideological lines, with Nationalist China coming to play a leading role 
in shaping it. This entailed the creation of institutions aimed at propagating anticommunism, such 
as the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League; the reorienting of existing ones, from schools 
to the Chinese community’s governing organizations, in support of this ideology; and coordination 
between Chinese groups, the ROC and Philippine states, and Filipino and global anticommunists. 
It encompassed the circulation of propaganda as well as the staging of propagandistic rituals such 
as visits to Taiwan and ideologically-charged theatrical performances. In consuming and enacting 
anticommunism, Philippine-Chinese actors learned to think and feel in certain ways about Taiwan, 
China, and being Chinese, and adapted themselves to life in the Philippines. 
  
Diasporic nation-building: Nationalist China, the KMT, and huaqiao 
 From the late 1920s to the postwar decades, the ROC can claim to be an intra-Asian actor 
par excellence because of the attention it paid to diasporic nation-building and the institutions that 
it possessed to do so. Nationalist China had long regarded the Chinese in the Philippines and other 
huaqiao as members of a deterritorialized Chinese nation in order to fashion itself to the world as 
the legitimate representative of these peoples. The KMT had been ejected from mainland China in 




the United States, the regime was corrupt and dysfunctional, and lacked legitimacy in the eyes of 
many among the “free” world. Part of improving its reputation involved a wholesale reorganization 
of the party, local-level political reforms, and land reform and community development – all of 
which took place on Taiwan,31 and was made known worldwide. To enhance its standing, and not 
just among states, the ROC also persisted in seeking the loyalties and material resources of persons 
whom it identified as huaqiao to the Nationalist cause; in return, it would provide them with legal, 
financial, and cultural support, and protect them from the discriminatory policies of foreign states. 
Chinese reformers had coined the neologism huaqiao (“Chinese sojourner”) in the late 19th century 
to emphasize belonging to a transnational ethno-cultural hua community, temporary displacement 
from an imagined Chinese motherland, and thus sojourners’ basic affinities for China, rather than 
the localities where they happened to reside.32 The Qing government’s 1909 Nationality Law, upon 
which the ROC’s 1929 law was based, gave legal expression to the racial and cultural assumptions 
inherent in the term. Reformers and nationalists persisted in employing it in their quests to realize 
a future China. They recognized, as Prasenjit Duara argues, that while territorial nationalism is the 
sole legitimate expression of sovereignty in the modern world, it is an inadequate basis for enabling 
identification with the nation-state. All nationalisms therefore make use of more exclusive or wider 
narratives of historical community, based on common race, language, or culture, to create affective 
identification between the people and the nation.33 In this way, Chinese abroad, previously branded 
traitors to the dynasty, were rehabilitated as members of the nation.  
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 Officials narratives of the ROC depict overseas Chinese communities and the anti-imperial 
precursors of the KMT such as the Tongmenghui that they established as playing a central role in 
the formation of the new Republic.34 For this reason, Sun Yat-sen, himself a Chinese sojourner, is 
supposed to have described huaqiao as the “mother of the revolution” (geming zhi mu 華僑革命
之母) – a phrase that persists to this day in both China and Taiwan.35 Such mythologizing became 
a prominent feature of the KMT’s efforts to cultivate the overseas Chinese after it was reorganized 
along Leninist lines and came to power in 1927. During the Nanjing Decade (1928-37), branches 
of the KMT were established across Southeast Asia and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission 
(Qiaowu weiyuan hui 僑務委員會, or OCAC) formed as a ministry-level agency to promote closer 
affinities between huaqiao and the ROC, especially by shaping overseas Chinese education along 
party-approved lines, and encouraging investments in China. If diplomatic ties between China and 
Southeast Asian governments constituted a formal sphere of relations between one Asian state and 
others, then branches of the party and the schools, newspapers, and persons affiliated to it belonged 
to an informal, transnational sphere of interactions that connected the state to huaqiao communities. 
The Nanjing years, then, laid down an essential infrastructure for diasporic nation-building, while 
also helping to generate a vocabulary with which the state framed its approach to overseas Chinese 
affairs, or qiaowu, in the decades to come. Conflict between the KMT and CCP during this period 
also paved the way for the Civil War and the ROC’s mobilization of Chinese peoples in opposition 
to the PRC after 1949.  
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 The Second Sino-Japanese War was a watershed moment for diasporic nation-building and, 
despite the United Front between the KMT and CCP, anticommunism. Huaqiao such as Tan Kah 
Kee became a crucial source of material and propaganda support for the ROC as it sought external 
Asian allies in its struggle against Japan.36 The overseas Chinese would remain a core constituency 
for the ROC after 1945 and 1949, as the state sought to transform huaqiao opposition to Japan into 
antipathy towards the CCP, which it depicted as both an internal problem of “bandits” seeking the 
overthrow of legitimate authority and a “puppet” of the Soviet Union. The War of Resistance also 
sharpened legal and cultural distinctions between friend and enemy for the KMT and CCP. It was 
during the war that the Nationalists enacted what Yun Xia describes as a “body of politically and 
morally charged laws against hanjian [漢奸; literally, traitors to the Han race] and mobilized the 
people to identify and strike down those judged likely to betray the nation.”37 Hanjian referred to 
Chinese who had collaborated with the Japanese and included huaqiao. After 1945, as Xia shows, 
Chiang Kai-shek described Mao Zedong and Zhu De as the “greatest and most characteristic of all 
hanjian.”38 Nationalist attitudes forged during one war transferred easily to the next. Partly for this 
reason, the period from 1937 to the 1950s in first China and then Taiwan can be considered a single 
“long war,” to use Rebecca Nedostup’s expression, rather than a series of discrete conflicts.39 
 Understanding the ROC’s promotion of anticommunist nationalism among huaqiao after 
1949, I suggest, requires a longer-term historical perspective than this “long war.” For most of its 
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existence until it relinquished any pretenses of counterattacking China, the ROC was a territorially 
incomplete and partially sovereign state threatened by Western, Japanese, and Soviet imperialists 
from without and warlords, hanjian, and communists from within. During the Sino-Japanese War 
and prior to the Northern Expedition, the party controlled only part of the mainland; after 1949, it 
controlled none of it. Qiaowu and the institutional presence of the KMT abroad helped to remedy 
this incompleteness. In effect, the state compensated for a chronic lack of Westphalian sovereignty 
by claiming popular sovereignty over members of a Chinese nation that it imagined transnationally. 
In postcolonial countries such as the Philippines that tolerated the ROC’s involvement in overseas 
Chinese communities, anticommunist qiaowu constituted an expansion of Nationalist sovereignty 
in non-territorial terms and thus represented a fundamental continuity with prewar nation-building 
policies.  
 Recognizing these continuities and the historical importance that the ROC assigned to the 
overseas Chinese can help scholars rethink what it means to study the KMT and China in the world, 
in addition to challenging US-centric narratives of Cold War Asia. Histories of the party emphasize 
its nation-building efforts in China during the Nanjing Decade and Taiwan after 1945 and 1949.40 
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But, except for a handful of works on qiaowu, the KMT in Malaya and Australia, and former KMT 
troops in the Sino-Burmese borderlands, scholars tend not to treat the party as an overseas Chinese 
or transnational actor.41 Meanwhile, narratives of the PRC’s diplomatic and cultural relations with 
the socialist bloc, Third World, and United States, and of Maoism and the Cultural Revolution as 
global phenomena, dominate the study of China in the world.42 Yet, as we have seen, the “China” 
that was most active in cultivating ethnic Chinese abroad was the ROC. For more than two decades 
after 1949, “China” was a contested and plural signifier for states and Chinese peoples across the 
world. Scholars should eschew, as literary theorist Christopher Lupke has argued, “a hypostasized 
and positivistic notion of ‘China’ as synonymous with mainland China.”43 “China” has not always 
stood for the PRC, as it has since the PRC entered the United Nations on October 25, 1971. In fact, 
until then, Nationalist ideologues in Taiwan, the Philippines, and globally rejected any association 
between a polity that they denounced as the “communist bandit regime” (gongfei zhengquan 共匪
政權) and Chineseness, whether in terms of citizenship, culture, or nation-statehood. They sought 
to ensure instead that these individual and civilizational qualities of Chineseness inhered solely in 
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the Nationalist party-state, in the hopes that it might someday reclaim the mainland from the CCP. 
The notion of China as their homeland remained foremost in the cultural imaginaries of many who 
believed themselves as displaced from it. That their desires for a counterattack were never realized, 
that Taiwan became ultimately marginalized in international affairs, and that a distinct Taiwanese 
consciousness has emerged should not blind historians to how the ROC and its diasporic loyalists 
produced their own meanings of China and Chineseness well before the rise of the PRC to global 
preeminence in our time. In the 1950s and 1960s, just as in the early 20th century, rival ideological 
movements, operating in a climate of political crisis, proffered divergent visions of an ideal China 
and sought to actualize them with the support of the overseas Chinese. This transnational struggle 
to define China and Chineseness and the ROC’s role in it can be said to exemplify modern Chinese 
history. 
 
Shared, non-territorial sovereignty: the Philippine state and its Chinese population 
 Of the few scholars who have commented on the ROC’s ties to the overseas Chinese, two 
have explicitly characterized it, in passing, as a version of colonialism. In 1972, Stephen Fitzgerald 
argued not only that the PRC “decolonized” from Southeast Asia with respect to the Chinese there, 
but also that the “nearest approach to a simple colonial position on China’s relations with Chinese 
in Southeast Asia was represented by the policies of the Kuomintang, which regarded jurisdiction 
over Chinese abroad as a right and responsibility of the Chinese government; in effect, a question 
of the internal affairs of China.”44 Decades later, Philip Kuhn cited Fitzgerald to make an identical 
claim about the KMT’s “attempt to exercise a kind of colonialism” through its overseas branches.45 
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Neither, however, substantiated his claim. Perhaps both had in mind here similarities between the 
KMT’s position on the overseas Chinese and Western colonial powers’ assertion of extraterritorial 
rights in Chinese treaty ports from the mid-19th century onwards.  
 Did Nationalist China, despite its anti-imperialist rhetoric, exercise (neo)colonial influence 
in the Philippines after 1945? In Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah’s definition of the term, a 
society under neocolonialism is in theory independent and possesses “all the outward trappings of 
international sovereignty”; in reality, though, “its economic system and thus its political policy is 
directed from outside.”46 President Sukarno’s broadsides against the Dutch over Irian Jaya and the 
British over the formation of Malaysia and his mobilization of the Indonesian military against both 
states also show that accusations of neocolonialism were a powerful rhetorical device in the hands 
of politicians at the time. It has proven a versatile category of scholarly analysis as well. It is well-
established, for example, in scholarship on Taiwanese identity as a “nationalist” response to KMT 
“mainlander” rule after 1945 and CCP rule in Xinjiang and Tibet.47 Cultural theorist Kuan-Hsing 
Chen argues that President Lee Teng-hui’s 1994 call for Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia 
manifested “an inchoate ideological desire for a Taiwanese subempire” that state-driven capitalist 
expansion in in the region in the 1980s had fueled.48 In the Philippines, neocolonialism commonly 
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refers to American military bases, meddling in elections, and control over trade policy after 1946.49 
Capitalism, territoriality, the loss of sovereignty, and unequal relations of power characterize this 
phenomenon. 
 Evaluated in relation to these features, Nationalist China’s presence in the Philippines and 
role in the creation of anticommunism were in no way (neo)colonial. Unlike in the 1980s, the ROC 
was not an expansionist capitalist power in the period under scrutiny; it neither hoped nor was able 
to induce any major transfers of wealth from the Philippines to itself in partnership with Philippine-
Chinese capital. Whatever successes it enjoyed at land reform and export-oriented industrialization 
did not translate into influence over the Philippines’ economic policy. Needless to say, there were 
no Taiwanese equivalents of Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base – or the extraterritorial enclaves 
that characterized Western colonial rule in treaty-port China. However much the KMT was capable 
of imposing itself over Taiwan and the offshore island chains of Quemoy, Matsu, and Penghu, the 
ROC was weak internationally. Having been recognized by the United States and United Nations, 
it could project influence beyond Taiwan’s borders as a legitimate state, as it did, for example, by 
promoting agricultural development in Southeast Asia and Africa beginning in the 1960s.50 But to 
describe its influence over the Philippine Chinese as “neocolonial” diminishes the agency, first, of 
the Philippines in negotiating with the ROC the nature and extent of this influence and, second, of 
the Philippine Chinese themselves as semi-autonomous non-state actors. Anticommunist relations 
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between these actors were thus premised, ironically, on the same spirit of equality and ideological 
solidarity that characterized the PRC’s ties with North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, and India.  
 My dissertation adapts political scientist Stephen Krasner’s concept of shared sovereignty 
to explain the anticommunist relationship between the ROC, the Philippines, and huaqiao society. 
Krasner uses it to describe a voluntary agreement between recognized national political authorities 
and an external actor such as another state or a regional and international organization. It is not, he 
emphasizes, something to be imposed. As historical examples, Krasner cites the Ottoman Empire’s 
creation of a Council of the Public Debt in 1881 to share management of its internal revenues with 
its Western European creditors; as well as how West Germany voluntarily gave the NATO powers 
expansive authority over their troops on its own territory in exchange for being able to arm itself.51 
The postcolonial Philippines might be added to this list of cases. There remains some debate as to 
whether the Philippine state was “weak” vis-à-vis a powerful oligarchy of landed elites,52 but more 
relevant here was its limited capacity to intervene in Chinese society because of language and law. 
Its coercive organs lacked knowledge of the Chinese language and thus were unable to interrogate 
Chinese communist suspects, read Chinese sources (such as supposed CCP propaganda), regulate 
schools (which it feared as breeding grounds for communism), and propagandize to local Chinese 
without “outsourced” help. These limitations, its designation of the Chinese as aliens, and a shared 
anticommunist world view, meant that it was appropriate and necessary to allow the ROC to exert 
significant influence over the Chinese.  
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 None of this is to imply that the Philippines adopted a non-interventionist approach towards 
the Chinese question. It could not, given the importance of Chinese affairs to its national security 
and identity. In December 1952, as mentioned previously, the Philippine military arrested around 
300 Chinese communist suspects without consulting the ROC beforehand. Nationalistic politicians 
were particularly keen on curbing what they regarded as Chinese dominance of the economy; they 
achieved success in this regard in 1954, with the passing of legislation that “Filipinized” the retail 
trade. There was a comparable but – until the advent of martial law in 1972 – unsuccessful attempt 
to nationalize Chinese education and bring private Chinese schools into the ambit of the state. The 
ROC objected to all three measures. While Nationalist China and the Philippines may have shared 
sovereignty over Chinese society, the boundaries between their spheres of influence were unclear 
and, the Treaty of Amity aside, minimally defined by law: here, I diverge from Krasner’s legalistic 
understanding of shared sovereignty.53 The susceptibility of the bureaucratic and legal process in 
the Philippines to political pressures ensured that there was always space for bargaining between 
Taipei and Manila over issues related to Chinese society, as we will see when examining how the 
December 1952 episode was eventually resolved.  
 More than this, we must account for the Philippine Chinese as non-state participants in this 
three-way relationship. Their importance to the postcolonial state and relative autonomy from state 
control can be traced to colonial-era arrangements. From the Malay states to the Dutch East Indies 
to the Spanish Philippines, weak and understaffed colonial regimes lacked the personnel and skills 
to directly exploit native populations economically. They thus delegated the collection of taxes for 
goods, services, and markets (especially those related to gambling, liquor, prostitution, and opium) 
                                                 





to monopolistic Chinese tax farms that guaranteed part of what they collected to the state.54 In the 
Philippines, US rule abolished these revenue farms and curbed Chinese migration. But Exclusion 
also institutionalized the colonial state’s legal and cultural understanding of non-mestizo Chinese 
as foreigners and thus as largely the responsibility of their elites and the Chinese Consul in Manila. 
It facilitated Chinese domination of key trade and occupational sectors such as retailing, and both 
reinforced kinship-based migration patterns and reengineered them to fill specific market niches. 
The US authorities, unlike their British or French counterparts, also adopted a more lenient attitude 
towards Chinese political organizations such as the Tongmenghui and KMT. In the same way that 
the Americans favored cooperation with established Filipino elites, so too did they seek to cultivate 
huaqiao elites to ensure the profitability of the colonial economy.55 Consequently, Chinese society 
developed governing institutions such as the General Chamber of Commerce to manage their own 
affairs and connect elites to the colonial state and China. The postcolonial and the Cold War period 
witnessed more extensive attempts at state intervention in this society, especially in commerce and 
trade. But, perhaps more so than anywhere else in Southeast Asia, it was also marked by continuity. 
Much like the United States before it, the independent Philippines persisted in treating the Chinese 
as aliens, leaving their governing organizations intact, recognizing the Chinese state’s sovereignty 
over them, and outsourcing important state functions to the Chinese themselves and their political 
representatives. At the same time, it reserved the right to intervene in Chinese society in the name  
of national interests. This society was, in other words, a space of overlapping, contested, and non-
territorial sovereignty within a territorialized nation-state.  
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Ideology and self-representation among the Philippine Chinese 
 The Philippine Chinese are this dissertation’s third principal actor. In focusing on them, I 
argue that anticommunism was integral to Chinese civic life and how they represented themselves 
to the Philippine and ROC states and their fellow Chinese. In the context of postcolonial and Cold 
War Southeast Asia, the Chinese “identity” that I am interested in was thus ideological in the sense 
of being attuned towards the politics of the Cold War and the China-Taiwan split; and performative 
and institutionalized as opposed to a matter of personal belief. 
 Conventional scholarly wisdom holds that enthusiasm for China-centered politics among 
huaqiao increased during the Nanjing Decade, peaked during the Second Sino-Japanese War, and 
then declined thereafter because of the Civil War, which sowed confusion among nationalist ranks; 
the disruption of migration networks connecting China to Southeast Asia; and the assimilationist 
policies of states that also weakened political and cultural affinities between huaqiao and China.56 
For these reasons, scholarship on the Chinese in postwar Southeast Asia tends to assume that they 
lost interest in China-centered politics. It focuses instead on their responses to state-sponsored anti-
Chinese policies and efforts to forge “ethnic identities appropriate to pluralist polities,” usually in 
“some sort of hybrid formulation,” in the words of Adam McKeown.57 Studies on the Philippines,  
are no different, written as many of them have been by social scientists and civil activists seeking 
to integrate “Tsinoys” (Chinese-Filipinos) into mainstream Philippine society.58 
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 The emergence of Sinophone Studies, a subfield of Chinese literary studies that examines, 
in part, Sinitic language communities and cultures outside China, has contributed much to how we 
understand the construction of Chineseness beyond China’s borders.59 Yet Cold War politics and 
ideology remain incidental to how scholars of the Sinophone approach cultural production and to 
historians and social scientists of the diaspora in postcolonial Southeast Asia. For the latter group, 
the basic figure of interest, as multiple works on the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, the preeminent Chinese organization in the country from 1954 onwards,60 
remains the merchant capitalist. The Chinese businessman, in the words of anthropologist Donald 
Nonini, have been elevated to “the status of the ne plus ultra” figure required for the understanding 
of “overseas Chinese culture.”61 His class interests are depicted as synonymous with those of the 
entire community, to the exclusion of other social actors such as intellectuals or professionals. He 
was political only to the extent that he sought positions of leadership within the community and to 
forge mutually beneficial ties with local politicians that enhanced his business interests. While he 
may have engaged in Chinese nationalist politics in the early years of the Republic and the War of 
Resistance, the times had changed. Returning to mainland China, where he faced persecution as a 
member of the capitalist bourgeoisie, was out of the question. Recognizing that his future lay with 
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his country of residence, he sought to cope with the discriminatory and nationalist policies toward 
his family and community that his new political masters had implemented. 
 My dissertation revises this composite portrait of the stereotypical overseas Chinese subject. 
If Nonini’s response to the scholarly overemphasis on businessmen is to focus on Chinese workers, 
mine is to look also at intellectuals, diplomats, military officials, politicians, teachers, war veterans, 
and even criminals, loosely bound together by a commitment, authentic or not, to anticommunism 
and supporting the ROC. Far from being indifferent to the ideological politics of China vs. Taiwan, 
these diverse social actors exploited it in response to anti-Chinese sentiment and legislation. If, as 
Caroline Hau argues, the Chinese in the Philippines were racially territorialized as aliens loyal to 
China under US colonial rule,62 then their racial and territorial foreignness assumed an ideological 
dimension after 1945, especially after the outbreak of the Huk Rebellion and the CCP’s victory in 
the Civil War. Filipino elites identified communism as an “un-Filipino” and foreign ideology that 
was hostile to democracy and inclined towards violent authoritarianism. Discriminated against for 
their economic success and cultural and ethnic distinctiveness, the Chinese were also suspected of 
ideological heterodoxy and vulnerable to being blackmailed, arrested, and deported on charges of 
communism. As nationals of one state and residents of another, they thus aligned themselves with 
the ideologies of these states to fashion themselves as “good Philippine residents and good Chinese 
citizens.”63  
 Ideology was thus more than a question of individual belief and unbelief, and Chineseness 
more than a matter of ethnicity and culture, narrowly defined. Numerous Philippine Chinese, KMT 
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members in particular, were true anticommunists and believers in the ROC, despite its setback in 
1949; others were not. What matters is that they acted in ways that signaled to their fellow Chinese, 
Filipinos, and the ROC the right beliefs, irrespective of how deeply-held these beliefs were. Ethno-
cultural aspects of being Chinese such as one’s physiognomy, customs, and language were difficult 
if not impossible to shed. Ideology, by contrast, was performative. Anticommunist practices, from 
creating civic institutions to organizing fundraising drives in support of the ROC to informing on 
alleged Chinese to the state helped Chinese mitigate Filipino racial and cultural prejudices toward 
them by emphasizing their civic credentials; they could also elevate certain individuals’ or factions’ 
reputations within the community, frequently at the expense of others’. 
 Anticommunist civic activism among the Chinese in the Philippines mostly entailed shows 
of support for Nationalist China and criticisms of the “bandit regime” on mainland China. In this 
manner, the Philippine Chinese were unlike their counterparts in countries such as Malaysia, where 
the anticommunism of the Malaysian Chinese Association was rapidly localized after the banning 
of the KMT in 1949 and not oriented towards the politics of China and Taiwan.64 In the Philippines, 
integrationist policies were limited, which meant that the Chinese there were foreign nationals and 
thus officially disbarred from domestic political activities such as running for office. (Needless to 
say, this was no obstacle to political lobbying and relationships of convenience between Chinese 
leaders and Filipino politicians.) China-centered politics thus lasted longer there than elsewhere as 
the only politics that the Chinese could legally participate in. Furthermore, such politics served the 
needs of the community as defined by its business as well as intellectual elites. For example, the 
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ROC’s promotion of “traditional Chinese culture” as an ideological bulwark against communism 
appealed to conservative educators seeking to resist the Filipinization of Chinese schools and youth. 
Identifying with a particular Chinese government, historian Andrew Wilson writes, reinforced the 
community’s Chinese identity, legitimized its elites, and promoted community cohesion in the face 
of rising anti-Chinese sentiment in the Philippines and uncertainty over the future of China.65 He 
was describing the turn of the 20th century, but his insights on the importance of external sources 
of authority to local Chinese leaders apply just as much to the period after 1945, when comparable 
conditions obtained. 
 
Structure of the dissertation 
 This dissertation explores the three-way anticommunist relationship between the ROC, the 
Philippines, and the Philippine Chinese across seven chapters, each of which develops one or more 
of the arguments on diasporic nation-building, shared, non-territorial sovereignty, and ideological, 
performative Chineseness.  
 Chapter 1, “The Making of Shared Sovereignty,” examines the conflict between right-wing 
and communist Chinese factions in the first three years after World War II, as both sides sought to 
come to terms with the Japanese occupation, the Chinese Civil War, and the politics of the newly-
independent Philippines. While such tensions were not unique to this country, they persisted longer 
elsewhere in the region. In the Philippines, they were resolved by late 1948 in favor of the KMT-
dominated right, a vanguard for the consolidation of Nationalist Chinese sovereignty in the country. 
I explain how this came about, focusing first on the different constituencies within the Philippines 
that each faction sought to mobilize and the different ways in which the Chinese left and right were 
                                                 





connected to China. I then turn to the left’s concurrent conflicts with the KMT and Philippine state 
from mid-late 1945 onwards that coalesced into a collaborative relationship between the latter two 
against the first. The chapter ends by explaining how the signing of a Treaty of Amity between the 
two countries in 1947 legitimized Nationalist China’s influence in the Philippines.   
 Chapter 2, “In the Name of Anticommunism,” builds on scholarship by social and cultural 
historians of the Cold War by explaining how three groups of Chinese actors – the first associated 
with the KMT, the second involved in the Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of 
Anti-Communist Movement, and the third a gang of criminals employed by the Philippine military 
– exploited the anticommunist and Sinophobic political climate in the Philippines in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. With Chinese communism there all but over as an organized movement, Chinese 
anticommunism became more than about identifying and rooting out subversives, supporting the 
ROC, and ideological authenticity. I argue that it also consisted of a diverse and flexible repertoire 
of practices, from crime to civic associationism, that Chinese elites and their challengers employed 
to bolster their reputations, enrich themselves, ingratiate themselves with the Philippine authorities, 
and pursue personal vendettas against their alleged communist enemies. By examining Philippine-
Chinese efforts at what I call ideological accommodation within the contexts of the Cold War and 
Philippine nation-building, this chapter shows how Chinese integrated ideology into their identities 
as minorities in a newly-independent Southeast Asian state after World War II. 
 At the heart of Chapter 3, “Making Communists,” are two interconnected episodes in the 
early-mid-1950s involving the detention and trial of local Chinese on charges of being communists: 
the December 1952 jinqiao an 禁僑案, which saw around 300, mostly innocent, persons arrested; 
and the Cebu “reading club” affair from the mid-1950s involving a group of high school students 




intelligence on huaqiao communist suspects and rendering them legible to the Philippine and ROC 
states was susceptible to disinformation and manipulation. In the jinqiao an, the Philippine military 
relied on the inadequate and flawed evidence gathered by its main Chinese operative, and also the 
intentionally misleading testimony of the person whom she helped apprehend. In the Cebu reading 
club case, the ROC struggled to reconcile the inconsistent and self-exculpatory testimonies of the 
students, who downplayed their participation in the reading club and attempted to shift the blame 
to others in the hopes of mitigating their sentences. The deportation process was equally vulnerable 
to political maneuvering by the ROC and Chinese elites, who, caught unaware by the jinqiao an, 
mounted an extensive legal battle and lobbying campaign from 1953 to 1961 to secure the release 
of the innocent. 
 The next two chapters examine manifestations of social and cultural anticommunism and 
the ROC’s ties to Philippine-Chinese institutions. Chapter 4, “Networking Ideology,” argues for a 
structural and networked understanding of the ideological uniformity that came to characterize the 
Philippine-Chinese community from the mid-1950s onwards. Starting in 1954 with the formation 
of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, leaders consolidated 
the social foundations of anticommunism in response to developments such as the jinqiao an and 
the Philippine government’s efforts to regulate Chinese education and commerce. Governance of 
the community was henceforth concentrated in five institutions and in the hands of a small group 
of elites who defined its priorities. High among these priorities was propagating anticommunism, 
a potent centripetal force and worldview that Filipinos, local Chinese, and the ROC could identify 
with. The chapter first explains the establishment of the Federation and the restructuring of Chinese 
society in the mid-1950s. It then focuses on two institutions – Chiang Kai-shek High School and 




Chinese in the Philippines to Nationalist China, and, in the case of the latter, integrate Philippine-
Chinese anticommunists into networks of like-minded ideologues in the Philippines and globally. 
 Chapter 5, “Experiencing the Nation-State,” examines the group visits which Chinese civic 
institutions in the Philippines organized to Taiwan, more of which came from the Philippines than 
from any other country. I argue that these visits were a means by which the ROC projected itself 
to the world as a sovereign polity and recreated aspects of being a “homeland” to diasporic Chinese. 
For the ROC state, the visits were a form of what I call experiential nationalism, whereby huaqiao 
immersed themselves in the culture and traditions of this substitute homeland, beheld firsthand the 
progress towards modernity and democracy that it was making, matched descriptions of Taiwan 
with a carefully curated reality, and internalized particular ways of knowing and feeling about the 
Chinese nation. Similar to the anticommunist rallies, rituals, and public performances that huaqiao 
in the Philippines participated in, these visits were a type of discursive practice that integrated the 
vocabulary of ideology with its material forms to shape perceptions of the ROC, China, and being 
Chinese. By focusing on three such visits, I also argue that those who organized and went on them 
understood them in different ways and manifested diverse understandings of patriotism and what 
the ROC stood for. As highly publicized community events in the Philippines and Taiwan, these 
visits were displays of Chinese elites’ and non-elites anticommunist and patriotic credentials. Yet 
many who visited Taiwan truly believed in the historical mission of the Nationalist regime, despite 
and because of the Civil War. For Chinese educators, the ROC’s promotion of Chinese culture as 
an ideological bulwark against communism also aligned with concurrent efforts by Chinese in the 
Philippines to defend the autonomy of their schools and improve Chinese education in response to 
Filipinization. Taiwan was attractive to them not as a bastion of anticommunism, but as a source 




 The final chapters constitute a two-part history of the most infamous episode in relations 
between Nationalist China and the Philippines: the Yuyitung affair. On May 4, 1970, Quintin and 
Rizal Yuyitung, the Publisher and Editor respectively of the Chinese Commercial News (Huaqiao 
shangbao 華僑商報, or CCN), were arrested and deported to Taiwan on charges of printing pro-
communist propaganda in their newspaper, despite still being on trial before the Deportation Board. 
No episode illustrates more vividly how Nationalist China and the Philippines shared sovereignty 
over Philippine-Chinese society to construct the “Chinese communist.” Chapter 6, “A Government 
Within a Government,” explains how the Yuyitungs were the victims of a secret campaign against 
them orchestrated by the Philippine military and a “Nationalist Chinese bloc” that comprised KMT 
ideologues and ROC officials in both Taiwan and the Philippines. This bloc collected, forged, and 
interpreted evidence to assist the military in making a legal case for the deportation of the brothers 
as pro-communist. I argue further that despite the Yuyitungs’ innocence, most, if not all, anti-CCN 
actors not only employed anticommunism as a strategy to oppose the paper, but also truly believed 
that it supported communism. In the context of a society in which anticommunism had become the 
ideological status quo, the paper’s centrist and independent editorial policy came across to hardline 
rightists as intolerably leftist. 
 Chapter 7, “A Humane Sovereignty,” focuses on the ROC’s public relations campaign in 
reaction to the deportation of the Yuyitungs to Taiwan and their trial there on August 14, 1970. In 
sentencing Quintin to only two years of reformatory education and Rizal to three, the ROC hoped 
to signal its responsiveness to international public opinion and shore up its position in the world at 
a critical time in its history. In doing so, however, it satisfied neither the hardline Philippine KMT, 
who believed that the sentences were too lenient, nor Taiwan’s most vocal critic, the International 




of press freedom and human rights. Although what mattered most to Nationalist China in the early 
1970s were its United Nations seat and ties with the United States, it also valued its membership 
of international civil society and relations with smaller states and overseas Chinese societies. I use 
the ROC’s attempts to appease the Philippine KMT and the IPI to explain how the ROC exploited 






The Making of Shared Sovereignty: 
Chinese Intracommunal Conflict and the Rise of the KMT in the Early Postwar Philippines 
 
 Decades after leaving the Philippines for China, a man named Xie Dezhou 謝德周 recalled 
the years that he had worked as an employee of the Modern Bookstore at the junction of Magdalena 
and Soler Streets in Manila’s Chinatown. Founded by two former anti-Japanese resistance leaders, 
“Modern” specialized in progressive, patriotic, and internationalist literature, from translations of 
Shakespeare, Tolstoy, and other Western classics to works by contemporary Chinese authors such 
as Lu Xun, Guo Moruo, Mao Dun, Ba Jin, Marxist philosopher Ai Siqi, and world historian Zhou 
Gucheng. Through its contacts in Shanghai, the bookstore provided its readers with Soviet texts in 
Chinese translation and overseas Chinese newspapers from the United States, Cuba, and Singapore. 
During the Chinese Civil War, it imported pro-communist publications from Hong Kong exposing 
the corruption and reactionary activities of the KMT and extolling the achievements of the CCP in 
the “liberated areas” of northern China. Journalists, students, and patriotic businessmen flocked to 
the store to purchase periodicals and had them delivered to their homes; several female high school 
students even returned to China after being inspired by a short book that they had bought there. By 
the end of 1948, however, this bookstore and the social and cultural organs of Chinese society that 
had sustained it were no more. Facing persecution by the Philippine authorities and the KMT, most 
communist huaqiao leaders and many of their followers had departed for or been deported to their 
homeland. Xie Dezhou was one such participant in this ideological exodus, although we know not 
the timing or circumstances of his leaving.1 
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 The flight of Xie and others in the late 1940s brought to a close a brief, vicious, and poorly-
understood period of conflict between the Chinese communists and the KMT in the early postwar 
Philippines. From the end of World War II there in March 1945 to late 1947, the Chinese left was 
openly active in the islands, emboldened by its resistance to the Japanese and the difficulties faced 
by the Philippine state in reconstituting itself. As in China, it came to blows with the KMT, which 
likewise had faced down Japan and was seeking to expand its influence in the country. Yet in 1948, 
with the Hukbalahap rebellion and Chinese Civil War well underway, Chinese communism in the 
former US colony was all but spent as a political force. Several Chinese radicals went underground 
in the Philippines, throwing in their lot with the Huks; most left for the more propitious ideological 
climes of Hong Kong or China. Conversely, while the KMT would be driven from mainland China 
the following year, it had established a sovereign foothold in the state closest to its future base of 
operations in Taiwan. 
 How did this come about? This chapter begins by exploring the prewar origins of the KMT 
and Chinese communist movement that emerged from the Japanese occupation of the Philippines 
to contest each other for influence. Caroline Hau describes members of the latter as “revolutionary 
cosmopolitans.” Animated by what they called the “spirit of internationalism,” they ranged across 
the colonial world in support of national liberation movements and to promote solidarities between 
leftist forces, even while privileging the long-term project of radical revolution in China that they 
ultimately committed themselves to in the late 1940s.2 Theirs was a Chinese nationalism inflected 
by Marxist notions of working-class solidarity, anticolonialism, and internationalism, rather than 
vice-versa. I adopt this framework to explain Chinese leftists’ engagement with the politics of both 
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China and the Philippines after 1945, while modifying its insights into the transnational workings 
of Chinese revolutionaries to describe the KMT. Informed by a conception of the Chinese nation 
as transcending China’s territorial boundaries, KMT activists sought to mobilize overseas Chinese 
communities in support of what they considered the true Chinese revolution, likewise centered on 
China. In the Philippine context, these “right-wing cosmopolitans” differed from their communist 
adversaries in two ways, however. First, they focused exclusively on mobilizing local Chinese and 
were not affiliated to Filipino social actors, as Chinese leftists were to Filipino labor and the Huks. 
Second, whereas KMT branches and chapters overseas were institutionally connected to the party- 
state in China, the Chinese communist movement abroad was driven by individuals who identified 
with the CCP, rather than being a CCP-sponsored project. 
 Chapter 1 then turns to the Chinese left’s concurrent conflicts with the KMT and Philippine 
state from mid-late 1945. The communists’ extrajudicial pursuit of supposed Chinese collaborators, 
many of whom were KMT members or supporters, precipitated a violent struggle between the two 
sides for influence over Chinese society. Simultaneously, Chinese leftists’ perceived interference 
in Philippine domestic politics in opposition to anti-Chinese legislation and to the administration’s 
tolerance of collaboration antagonized the future President of the country and his supporters. The 
KMT exploited the communists’ clash with the state and the anti-Chinese political environment in 
the country to its advantage by positioning itself as a force for social stability – the “right” kind of 
Chinese – and collaborating with the Philippine authorities to construct and oppose the “Chinese 
communist problem” from late 1945 to mid-1946. Starting in the fall of 1946, the campaign against 
them intensified, causing Chinese leftist institutions to shut down and forcing their leaders to leave 
the country. The chapter ends by explaining how the signing of a Treaty of Amity between the two 




We know much about how left and right Chinese militia organizations resisted the Japanese, 
but much less about how they clashed with each other after it during a period that connects the end 
of World War II, the messy transition from Japanese to American to Filipino rule, and the start of 
the Cold War.3 As Xie’s recollections suggest, this was a vibrant time for Chinese newspapers and 
periodicals on the left and right, even though many were financially strapped and thus short-lived. 
But with little attempt having been made to preserve them, only their fragments have survived and 
most have been lost to humidity and neglect. English-language publications from this period, such 
as the tabloid newspapers that trafficked in lurid tales of crime and violence involving the Chinese, 
are similarly lacking. To reconstruct the oftentimes bloody conflict between the KMT and Chinese 
communism in the Philippines, therefore, this chapter relies on party records and the reminiscences 
of former guerrillas, in particular those compiled by Gong Taoyi 龚陶怡, the General Manager of 
the leading communist newspaper after the war, the Chinese Guide (Huaqiao daobao 華僑導報);4 
it supplements them with insights from existing scholarship and sources such as American military 
records and the remains of newspapers and periodicals from this period. To do so requires coming 
to terms with a mediascape that is often as vague about the details of this struggle as it is bifurcated 
between narratives of a heroic and innocent Chinese left and predatory right on the one hand and 
a terroristic communism and triumphant KMT on the other. 
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Right-wing cosmopolitans: the KMT in the Philippines before 1945 
 On March 2, 1947, the KMT’s headquarters (zongzhibu 總支部) in the Philippines was re-
opened, following its destruction during World War II, to a gathering of 1,200 people at Benavidez 
Street in Manila’s Chinatown. Presiding over the re-opening ceremony, the Chinese Consul (later 
Ambassador) Chen Chih-ping 陳質平 stressed the inseparability of the KMT and overseas Chinese, 
hailing the latter as “vanguard troops” (xianfeng budui 先鋒部隊) of the former and calling upon 
those present to preserve the party’s glorious history, propagate the Three Principles of the People, 
and “carry forward [the Sanminzhuyi] into the world” (hongyang yu shijie 弘揚於世界). The next 
speaker was the founder and Principal of Chiang Kai-shek High School (Zhongzheng zhongxue中
正中學, or CKSHS) and KMT Central Executive Committee (CEC) member Ong Chuan Seng 王
泉笙. Then 61, Ong recalled that he had been present at the formation of the zongzhibu on October 
10, 1921, the tenth anniversary of the founding of the ROC. Looking backwards, he traced the 
history of the KMT in the Philippines to the creation of Tongmenghui reading clubs in the country 
before 1911; reflecting on the work to be done, he described the KMT’s nation-building project as 
entering its third stage, that of creating a constitutional government. To commemorate the occasion 
and remind the attendees of their responsibilities to the Chinese nation, Chiang personally issued 
an “instructional phrase” (xunci 訓詞) exhorting them to “collectively encourage loyalty” (tong li 
zhongcheng 同勵忠誠).5 
 The ceremony, the genealogies and ideas it invoked, and those present at it – from Chen to 
Ong to Chiang – remind us that the KMT’s leaders conceived of the Chinese nation as transcending 
                                                 





the territorial boundaries of China itself and that its loyalists beyond these borders were connected 
to China by language, culture, and also bureaucracy. Yet overseas KMT branches were not simply 
extensions of the party-state in China. Despite the close ideological affinities between the “center” 
(zhongyang 中央) and periphery and the guidance provided by one to the other from the late 1920s 
onwards, party organs in states such as the Philippines enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from 
centralized control. Founded and run by businessmen and intellectuals, many of whom would end 
up assuming positions of leadership within the central KMT apparatus, party branches abroad were 
simultaneously embedded in local politics and society and oriented towards Nanjing or Chongqing 
Geographically removed from the center, they strove to implement its guidelines and doctrine, but 
could also exploit their separation from China to consolidate their own spheres of influence, and 
were also frequently constrained by the sovereignty and laws of foreign states.  
 With its reorganization along democratic centralist lines in the mid-1920s, the KMT began 
mobilizing huaqiao communities in support of its campaign to unify a country riven by warlordism 
and instability. By the party’s Second Congress in 1926, zongzhibu had been established in French 
Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and Burma, the Philippines, and Siam, with 300 
smaller branch offices (zhibu) and chapters (fenbu 分部) under them and a membership of 31,000. 
These institutions constituted a pyramidal structure that, on paper, connected Chinese communities 
in all but the smallest towns to Nanjing. After capturing the state in 1927, the KMT intensified its 
efforts to strengthen ties between the center and periphery chiefly through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and Overseas Party Affairs Department. By 1934, 




members in Southeast Asia had doubled.6 In the Philippines, where the US colonial state tolerated 
its presence, the KMT was afforded the freedom to entrench itself in Chinese education, a system 
of dual-language private schools that local party members supported with subsidies from Nanjing.7 
Following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, wealthy huaqiao businessmen 
formed the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement to boycott Japanese goods, invest in 
China, and raise funds for the war effort. Despite being one of the smallest Chinese communities 
in Southeast Asia,8 the Philippine Chinese contributed more per capita to National Salvation from 
November 1938 to October 1939 than their fellow Chinese elsewhere in the region, including those 
in Malaya.9 The War of Resistance, as the party branded it, also brought about a surge in efforts to 
mobilize students in China and abroad through organizations such as the Three Principles’ Youth 
Corps (Sanminzhuyi qingnian tuan 三民主義青年團, or SQT), whose members swore an oath of 
allegiance to the Generalissimo himself.10 CKSHS had been founded in 1939 for the same purpose. 
 The three principal KMT-affiliated groups that were created prior to or during the Japanese 
invasion of the Philippines from late 1941 to April 1942 reflected the multiplicity of connections 
between Philippine-Chinese society and the party in China, as well as the persistence of factional 
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differences within the party in shaping these relations.11 In May 1941, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched 
the Zhangzhou-born Lin Tso-mei 林作梅 to Manila to establish the Philippine branch of the SQT, 
the Philippine Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services Corps (Feilübin huaqiao qingnian zhanshi 
tebie gongzuo zongdui 菲律賓華僑青年戰時特別工作總隊), whose members were mostly drawn 
from KMT-controlled high schools in Manila such as CKSHS. The second of these organizations, 
the Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia (Huaqiao zhanshi Xuegan tuan 華僑戰時血幹
團, or COWHM), was founded in March 1942 as the “Loyal Soul Fraternity” (Huaqiao zhonghun 
she 華僑忠魂社) by several Philippine-Chinese men who had undergone basic military training at 
the 13th Reserve Officers Training Camp in Nanping, Fujian; it came under the nominal leadership 
of Lin’s second-in-command in the Tebie zongdui, Lee Hai-jo 李海若, in July 1944.12 Both these 
groups focused on anti-Japanese propaganda during the occupation, but the COWHM also engaged 
in active combat alongside US forces during the battle for Manila.13 Third, there was the Chinese 
Volunteers in the Philippines (Feilübin huaqiao yiyongjun 菲律賓華僑義勇軍, or CVP). Founded 
in 1937 as the military wing of the zongzhibu, the CVP was commanded by Shih I-Sheng 施逸生, 
a graduate of the Central Political and Military Academy in Chongqing who arrived in the islands 
in the mid-1930s to train the CVP. Shih became a Standing Committee member of the zongzhibu 
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and its Secretary-General a few years after the war. The CVP was supported by the ROC Consulate 
in Manila and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.14 
 Ideological similarities between these three groups notwithstanding, important differences 
existed between them that illuminate the structural complexity and factionalism of the organization 
that historians refer to using the collective term “KMT.” The COWHM was essentially a grassroots 
militia group. Despite Lee’s becoming its commander in July 1944, Loyal Soul’s founder retained 
effective control of the organization. The other two groups were affiliated to separate and rivalrous 
constituencies within the party, resulting in competition between them for influence. Lin Tso-mei’s 
Tebie zongdui and its parent SQT had had comparatively little grounding in local Chinese society 
compared to the CVP and Philippine KMT. As Lin explained in 1993, when the CEC sent him to 
the Philippines to establish the Youth Corps, it covered all his expenses for three years to guarantee 
that the Corps was financially independent and did not have to rely on local Chinese businessmen 
for support. Lin was backed by Ong Chuan Seng, but did not consider himself an overseas Chinese 
and was not welcomed by the zongzhibu despite being Chiang’s representative. Legitimized by the 
ROC Consul and the Chamber of Commerce, Shih and his CVP colleague Koa Chun-te 柯俊智, 
the zongzhibu’s first postwar Secretary-General from 1945 to 1948, had built up a power base of 
their own in the country and resented Lin for usurping what they saw as their rightful prerogative 
of preparing Philippine-Chinese youth to fight the Japanese enemy.15 
 Shih and Koa, who had both recently arrived in the Philippines from China, were members 
of a KMT faction that the SQT had been establish to supplant. In 1936, Mah Soo-Lay 馬樹禮, an 
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Accounting student at the University of Santo Tomas, founded a branch of the Renaissance Society 
(Fuxingshe 復興社), a satellite group of the secretive, “Confucian fascist” Forceful Action Society 
(Lixingshe 力行社), in Manila.16 Mah, born in Jiangsu and previously a journalist and educator in 
Malaya, returned to China in 1939, but not before “laying the foundation for today’s work in the 
Philippines,” as he wrote in his unofficial memoirs many decades later. Among those inducted into 
the Philippine Fuxingshe in 1936 were Shih, Koa, and other younger KMT members frustrated by 
what they considered the conservatism of older party leaders such as Ong Chuan Seng at the time.17 
Two years later, to resolve infighting within the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek established the SQT and 
dissolved the two main factions that stood in the way of party unity, the CC Clique and Blue Shirts. 
Soon after, the Blue Shirts officially disbanded their front groups such as the Lixingshe.18  
The Lin-Shih rivalry, which the underground struggle against Japan had briefly put on hold, 
was resolved in favor of the latter when Chongqing recalled Lin to China in May 1945. (Lin spent 
most of the next three decades in Taiwan, but returned to the Philippines following his retirement 
in 1974 to work in Davao, first as a Taiji teacher and then a principal.19) With Manila still in ruins, 
the Overseas Party Affairs Department sent an agent to Manila to oversee the reconstruction of the 
party around a core group of members who had fought the Japanese. By mid-late June, KMT zhibu 
in the Manila area and Luzon, together with the fenbu under them, had been reestablished. A ten-
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man reorganization committee had been formed that included Shih and Sy En 施性水, who would 
soon become President of the Chamber of Commerce. Shih and two businessmen, Say Kok Chuan 
史國銓 and Chua Lamco 蔡功南, were appointed to serve as Standing Committee members of the 
zongzhibu; Koa became Secretary-General.20 All five men – Shih, Koa, Say, Chua, and Sy – were 
members of the Fuxingshe cell that Mah had founded in 1936.  
Many problems remained for the KMT as it sought to reestablish itself in Chinese society 
in the months following the liberation of Manila in March. The ROC Consulate was understaffed 
and the acting Consul unpopular among Chinese, while the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was 
yet to recover fully from the war. Fires and looting had caused major losses of property for Chinese 
shop owners, who, in the absence of leadership from either the ROC or the Chamber of Commerce, 
had few means of seeking compensation from the American military authorities. Within the party, 
tensions persisted between the three main anti-Japanese groups. An intelligence report from April 
described them as boasting about their wartime achievements through their respective print organs 
and vying against each other for leadership of the party and to win over local Chinese. Worse still 
was that three of its members had collaborated with the Japanese during the occupation, including 
Justo Cabo Chan 曾廷泉, the zongzhibu’s prewar propaganda chief and a leading supporter of the 
anti-Japanese boycott movement in the late 1930s.21 Cabo Chan had served as the President of the 
puppet Chinese Association (Huaqiao xiehui 華僑協會, or CA) and was accused by the zongzhibu 
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of forming a Chinese special forces group to hunt down Shih, Koa, and others.22 Lastly, there were 
the Chinese communists.  
 
Revolutionary cosmopolitans: the Chinese left between China and the Philippines 
Much like for the right, the Sino-Japanese War marked a turning point for the Chinese left 
in the Philippines. Earlier initiatives by Chinese workers and intellectuals to organize themselves 
had proven ineffectual in extracting concessions from a colonial state and capitalist class (Filipino,  
American, and Chinese) that were deeply hostile to labor movements; establishment suppression  
of the left was especially acute and successful following the collapse of the first KMT-CCP united 
front in 1927 and the formation of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) in 1930. Within the 
Chinese community, tensions between employers and employees were inhibited by the extension 
of the Chinese Exclusion Act to the Philippines in 1902, which critically affected the demographics 
and dynamics of Chinese society in the country.23 In barring Chinese laborers, the Act limited the 
inflow of “working-class” Chinese to persons who gained employment as clerks and shopkeepers’ 
assistants of their kinsmen already in the Philippines. For this reason, Yung Li Yuk-wai has argued 
that Chinese society there lacked an genuine proletarian base upon which to build an effective and 
large-scale communist movement and that kinship ties helped smooth over class relations between 
Chinese merchants and their employees.24  
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The War and formation of the second KMT-CCP united front in 1937 allowed the Chinese 
left to operate more openly in the Philippines, while also channeling its energies toward opposing 
Japan rather than capitalism. The PKP, which had been banned in 1931, was legalized in 1937. On 
Labor Day the following year, Chinese leftists established the Philippine-Chinese United Workers 
Union (Feilübin huaqiao ge laogong tuanti lianhehui 菲律賓華僑各勞工團體聯合會, or Lo Lian 
Hui), which joined the Congress Proletario di Filipinas, or COF (Proletariat), the same trade union 
congress from which the PKP was birthed in 1930.25 Uniting over forty smaller groups under one 
umbrella organization, the Lo Lian Hui avoided confrontations with the state and capital, focusing 
instead on anti-Japanese propaganda, raising funds for the (CCP’s) war effort, and encouraging its 
members to return to China to fight.26 
  Chinese leftist leaders were mobile nationalists similar to the likes of Mah Soo-lay, Shih 
I-Sheng, and Lin Tso-mei. Whether born in China or the Philippines, they moved readily (though 
often illegally) between one and the other in the period leading up to Japan’s invasion of Southeast 
Asia in 1941. Some were part of an even wider socialist network that encompassed East Asia and 
the non-Asian world, and used what they learned from more established communist parties to build 
revolutionary capacity throughout Nanyang. Lee Yungshaw 李永孝, also known as Li Bingxiang 
李炳祥, was a Manila-born Cantonese who served as Soviet adviser Mikhail Borodin’s interpreter 
during the first KMT-CCP united front from 1924 to 1927, after whose collapse he fled to Manila.27 
Lee’s comrade, Co Keng Sing 許敬誠 (Xu Li 許立), had been at the forefront of overseas Chinese 
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labor organizing in the Philippines for over a decade when he and Lee helped establish the Lo Lian 
Hui in 1938. Born in 1905 in Jinjiang, Co spent his formative years in Hong Kong before beginning 
work in Manila in 1925. He was never tied to the Philippines and the left’s institutions there. From 
1930 to 1935, he traveled between Manila, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Xiamen, Malang in East Java, 
and the Soviet Union, where he spent four months taking intensive classes in Marxism. Three days 
before the Japanese captured Manila, Co and 400 other Chinese leftists evacuated the city with the 
help of Filipino peasant leaders for the mountains of Central Luzon, where they organized the anti-
Japanese resistance.28 
 Yet while the leaders of the Chinese left and right may have moved back and forth between 
China and the Philippines, the organizations they belonged to reflected the different forms assumed 
by Chinese nationalism beyond the mainland and their different social bases. No institutional links 
existed between the Lo Lian Hui and the CCP, which in its struggle for survival in China had few 
resources to commit to overseas Chinese mobilization. If the Philippine KMT was part of a larger, 
vertically-organized transnational institution, nominally bound to a higher leadership in China, and 
backed by the Chinese state, the Union derived only inspiration and ideological precepts from the 
CCP. Individuals such as Co and Lee Yungshaw literally embodied the ties between the China and 
the overseas Chinese left. In the Philippines, the KMT was a pillar of Chinese society, integrated 
as it was into two key community institutions: schools, most of which it controlled, and chambers 
of commerce, which financed the party. The Lo Lian Hui did not lack for an institutional presence, 
but it counted only a few businessmen and the secretive Hongmen 洪門 organization as its Chinese 
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supporters.29 Through the COF (Proletariat), it was connected more to Filipino communism than 
to Chinese society. 
 By late 1942, three guerrilla organizations had emerged from the Chinese labor movement. 
The first and most famous of them, the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese Force (Feilübin huaqiao 
kangri zhidui 菲律賓華僑抗日支隊 or Wha Chi), was affiliated to the peasant-based Hukbalahap 
movement in Central Luzon and commanded by Wong Kiat 黃傑.30 The second, closely linked to 
first, was the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps (Feilübin huaqiao kangri chujian 
yiyongjun菲律賓華僑抗日鋤奸義勇隊, or Kang Chu), a Hongmen organization led by Kho Chi 
Meng 許志猛. Finally, working mostly underground in Manila but with a significant presence in 
Iloilo was the organization that Co Keng Sing commanded, the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese 
and Anti-Puppets League (Feilübin huaqiao kangri fanjian da tongmeng菲律賓華僑抗日反奸大
同盟, or Kang Fan). Based in the capital, the Kang Fan and Wha Chi’s Manila unit were especially 
active in attacking members of the CA.31 From mid-late 1945, Chinese resistance groups on the 
left and right demobilized under the watchful eye of the US military authorities. The COWHM did 
so in April, for instance, becoming a veterans association; the Wha Chi stood down in September.32 
For the Kang Fan, demobilization meant politics by other means. In September, it renamed itself 
the Philippine-Chinese Democratic League (or Alliance) (Feilübin huaqiao minzhu da tongmeng 
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菲律賓華僑民主大同盟) to indicate its integration into the larger, Huk-led political coalition, the 
Democratic Alliance (DA).33 Its wartime propaganda organ, the Chinese Guide, began publishing 
openly on February 9.34 
 
Chinese intracommunal conflict and the problem of collaboration  
 For Chinese resistance organizations on the left and right, Japan’s defeat in the Philippines 
in early 1945 and the power vacuum in Chinese society that it created was an opportunity to expand 
their influence and settle old scores through new means. Tensions between the KMT and Chinese 
left in were nothing new, but they now assumed social forms free from the constraints of colonial 
rule. From 1937 to 1941, during a period in which the Nationalists and communists were supposed 
to be working together against Japan, the Lo Lian Hui persisted in attacking the KMT government 
for corruption. Legal disputes between communist leaders and the KMT had also broken out, most  
when the Lo Lian Hui printed leaflets accusing Shih I-Sheng of intending to disrupt its Labor Day 
celebrations in 1941. Shih took this case to court and accused Co Keng Sing of libel. The case had 
not been settled when the Japanese invaded.35 After the occupation, conflict between the KMT and 
Chinese left was reignited, beginning on Labor Day in 1945. 
 The participants in this conflict and their memorializers represent the events of the day very 
differently. Co Keng Sing’s official biography, published in 1995 by the Quanzhou-based Xu (Co) 
clan association of the Philippines on the 90th anniversary of his birth, describes in hyperbolic and 
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vague language the mass rally that the Kang Fan organized to mark the occasion. The parade that 
followed is described as celebrating the Philippines’ retrocession and manifesting the “formidable 
strength of anti-Japanese progressive forces” (kangri jinbu liliang de qiangda 抗日进步力量的强
大). It was the “grandest of its kind since the founding of the Philippine nation” (Feilübin jianguo 
yihou zui shengda de yici 菲律宾建国以后最盛大的一次) and an unforgettable occasion for those 
involved.36 The Philippine KMT’s official representation of events, by contrast, was written after 
1949 and retroactively incorporated them into an expansive, righteous narrative of anticommunism 
going back to before the Civil War. In a lengthy report to the Seventh National Party Congress in 
October 1952, the zongzhibu traced the beginning of its “period of bloody struggle” (xuedou shiqi
血鬥時期) with the communists in the Philippines to that day. Kang Fan and Wha Chi protesters, 
it said, openly called for the murder of ROC consular officials, prompting the CVP and COWHM 
to stage a counter-protest in their defense.37 A CVP member and future KMT zongzhibu Secretary-
General wrote in his memoirs that the communists affixed a cartoon of two caged turtles with their 
heads in their shells to the doors of the Consulate to mock the Consul for lying low during the war, 
after which they loudly demanded that all “turtles be overthrown” (dadao wugui 打到烏龜).38 
 This imaginative insult points to one of the main sources of friction between the KMT and 
communists in the early post-occupation period: wartime behavior – in this case, the ROC Consul’s 
apparent inaction – that the left perceived as insufficiently patriotic and in some cases tantamount 
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to collaboration, but that the right did not. Official responsibility for identifying and apprehending 
Chinese collaborators lay with the US military’s Counter-Intelligence Commission (CIC) and their 
sentencing, after their deportation to China, with the ROC. By July 1946, a total of 146 Chinese 
residents in the country had been detained and scheduled for deportation as “undesirable aliens.”39 
Communist groups in particular, however, were able and willing to bypass these legal procedures 
in pursuit of retributive justice on their own terms. To complicate matters further, the incorporation 
of KMT members or individuals affiliated with the party such as Cabo Chan and the ROC Consul 
into the category of “collaborator” blurred the distinction between anti-collaborationism and anti-
rightism. This brought the left into direct conflict with the KMT, giving each faction an opportunity 
to contest the other for influence within the community.  
 As they had during the occupation, communist groups after it persisted in targeting persons 
they believed to be collaborators for assassination, including many members of the KMT. At least 
two people, including a former member of the Japanese military police, were killed in such a way 
immediately after liberation, as a wave of violence, kidnappings, and blackmailing began to sweep 
Chinese society.40 Contrary to the KMT, however, such disorder can hardly be attributed solely to 
the communists acting in concert against innocent Chinese. The postwar Philippines was awash in 
nearly a million infantry weapons from the occupation and the bloody US campaign to retake the 
country. Unable to recover most of these loose firearms, the state ceded its coercive capacities to 
provincial warlords, peasant guerrillas, and street thugs and struggled to prevent the country from 
becoming embedded in wider arms-trafficking networks that supplied buyers as far away as Israel 
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and Argentina.41 Chinese resistance fighters and criminal elements seized upon these weapons and 
the absence of a functioning police force to carry out individual acts of retribution and exploit the 
vulnerability of members of Chinese society.  
 To purge collaborators, the Chinese left also established, on May 30, an Anti-Collaboration 
Commission, which they described to the US military as a body to “help the government authorities 
to distinguish the Chinese traitors under the Japanese regime from that of loyal ones.”42 Cabo Chan 
was summoned to appear before this body shortly after. During the occupation, he had led a small 
guerrilla group in the mountains of Luzon until the Japanese threatened his family and forced him 
out of hiding in November 1943. He then became President of the CA a year later and in December 
1944, nearly suffered the fate of his predecessor when the Kang Fan attempted to assassinate him.43 
A second Chinese leader that the Commission sought was Yu Khe Thai 楊啟泰, owner of Yutivo 
and Sons, one of the largest Chinese hardware companies in the Philippines.44 Though not a KMT 
member, Yu had been at the forefront of the National Salvation Movement before 1941 like Cabo 
Chan and in 1939 was had helped finance the founding of CKSHS. He was among the first Chinese 
to be arrested and jailed at the start of the occupation. On the Emperor’s birthday in April 1943, 
Japan granted Yu and several other Chinese leaders amnesty in return for a public show of gratitude 
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towards Japan and promise to cooperate with the regime.45 Yu was forced to become the secretary 
of the CA after his release and was also threatened by the Kang Fan. Both Cabo Chan – who was 
in the custody of the CIC at the time – and Yu did not attend their trial before the Commission.46    
 Fearing communist attacks on its members and supporters, the KMT adopted a flexible and 
pragmatic approach to the issue of collaboration, in effect anticipating the arguments of historians 
who have called for an understanding of the phenomenon based on the “choices and consequences 
of local actors in the changing political, normative, and material contexts of a conquered society.”47 
For communists, for whom even non-resistance deserved opprobrium, those such as Yu and Cabo 
Chan who had surrendered to the Japanese during the occupation automatically forfeited their right 
to return as community leaders, even if they had acted under duress. This moral binary, if enforced, 
would have sapped the foundations of KMT influence in the Philippines by delegitimizing – if not 
entirely eliminating – some of its key financial supporters. The KMT, through its own Committee 
for the Investigation of Collaborators and the Maintenance of Peace and Order, argued that only 
those who had caused or sought to cause harm or death to their fellow Chinese ought to be regarded 
as collaborators.48 Based on this definition, Yu was deemed innocent for having used his position 
of leadership within the CA to protect the community. On April 15, 1945, Ong Chuan Seng wrote 
to the Secretary-General of the CEC, Wu Tiecheng 吳鐵城, describing Yu as a patriot who should 
be rewarded for his contributions to the War of Resistance and conveniently omitting any mention 
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of his involvement in the CA.49 Cabo Chan was a trickier case. Rightly or wrongly, party members 
considered him guilty, but they were content to allow the US authorities to try him. When the CIC 
released him on the grounds that it lacked the evidence to convict and deport him, he was allowed 
to simply retreat from public life.  
The KMT focused instead on the communist problem, as its struggle with the left expanded 
and intracommunal conflict in the Philippines began increasingly to resemble the situation in China. 
To counter the Anti-Collaboration Commission, which it blamed for acts of violence and blackmail 
against numerous Chinese, including the politically-motivated murder of the manager of the party 
newspaper, the Great China Press (Dahua ribao 大華日報), the party formed a paramilitary group 
under the auspices of the CVP.50 Clashes between the Chinese left and right began erupting beyond 
Manila. Following the establishment of a branch of the Anti-Collaboration Commission in Iloilo, 
for example, the KMT assisted local authorities in October 1945 in arresting the entire leadership 
of the Iloilo Kang Fan on charges of disturbing the peace, and it was only after the legal testimony 
of fellow Kang Fan member Chen Qinghai 陈清海 that were they released.51  
 For its part, the CIC quickly grew frustrated with what it perceived as the communists and 
KMT’s usurpation of its authority and the violence that had erupted from the clashes between them. 
On July 18, 1945, seeking an end to killings carried out by secret assassination squads in Manila’s 
Chinatown, the CIC’s Chinese Section convened a meeting of representatives from both parties’ 
anti-collaboration commissions along with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Homicide Squad, 
and Provost Marshal’s Office. It stated that while it did not “sponsor, encourage or recognize” any 
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Chinese organization over the other, it was the “only one duly authorized and constituted authority 
for the investigation, apprehension and incarceration of Japanese collaborators” in Manila. Local 
Chinese should turn over information on collaborators to the CIC and not publish accusations of 
collaboration or conduct any investigations themselves. All present, including Kho Chi Meng on 
the left, Chua Lamco and Lee Hai-jo on the right, and the Chamber of Commerce’s representative 
Sy En, signed these provisions.52 
However, the meeting did little to stop violence from continuing or the communists from 
continuing to pursuing collaborators. In August, the CIC reported that despite being warned not to 
conduct its own investigations, the Anti-Collaboration Commission had put Yu Khe Thai (again) 
and Say Kok Chuan on trial. Like Yu, Say had been imprisoned by the Japanese and then released 
in 1943 on the condition that he thank the Emperor and cooperate with the occupying regime. The 
trial of the two men did not go ahead after the CIC and military police broke up the proceedings. 
In response, the Chinese Guide and Chinese Commercial Bulletin (Qiaoshang gongbao 僑商公報, 
the Kang Chu’s newspaper) denounced the CIC as “fascistic” and “Japanese Kempeitai-like,” even 
accusing it of taking bribes.53 In December 1945, KMT member Vicente Dy Sun 李峻峰 received 
a letter from the Commission that demanded 200,000 pesos, or else he would be killed.54 He hired 
a bodyguard, reported the threat to the police, survived, and rose through the ranks of the Chamber 
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of Commerce to become its President many years later. That same month, a bomb exploded at the 
New England Hotel and Restaurant in Manila, whose owner had earlier been threatened by KMT 
elements for employing communists. The party’s headquarters officially denied any responsibility 
for the bombing and declared that its members had been instructed to act in a law-abiding manner 
in accordance with the central government’s instructions.55   
 
The Chinese left and Philippine domestic politics after the war 
For the Chinese left, seeking to expand its influence in the Philippines, the state presented 
as enticing a target as the KMT in the early postwar period. Anti-Chinese nationalism, a perennial 
problem for Chinese society, resurfaced immediately after the occupation. At the very first postwar 
special session of Congress from June to July 1945, the House of Representatives introduced two 
bills (House Bill [H.B.] Nos. 100 and 160) aimed at “nationalizing” the retail trade by restricting 
putative “alien” (i.e. Chinese) dominance of the domestic economy. Its Committee on Commerce 
and Industry consolidated them into a single bill, H.B. No. 355, which it unanimously approved 
on July 13 and that reached the Senate on August 20. On September 15, after minor changes, the 
bill was sent to President Sergio Osmeña for his approval.56  
As the left’s attacks on the CIC suggest, collaboration was just as much a source of friction 
between Chinese communists and the Philippine and US authorities as it was between them and 
the KMT. Despite the CIC’s arrest of prominent collaborators such as Jorge Vargas and Jose Laurel 
along with the cabinet members of Laurel’s Second Philippine Republic (1943-45), many of these 
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politicians had eluded justice in the eyes of the left and simply resumed their political careers after 
the war. The most prominent offender was Senate President Manuel Roxas, who had briefly served 
as Laurel’s “food czar” in 1944 after resisting earlier entreaties by the Japanese to join the colonial 
administration.57 Roxas, Osmeña’s main political rival within the divided Nacionalista Party after 
the war, would contest and defeat Osmeña in the first postwar elections in April 1946 to become 
the first President of the independent Philippines. But he was only able to do so because he never 
went on trial for collaboration. After arresting them in the spring 1945, the CIC transferred Roxas 
and other members of Laurel’s wartime cabinet over to the Philippine government. In accordance 
with Washington’s policy on collaboration, a People’s Court was established to try them. However, 
Roxas was personally pardoned by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander 
in the Southwest Pacific Area, contravening his own government’s legal protocol. With MacArthur 
having undermined Osmeña’s authority, Roxas and his congressional supporters were able to sap 
the functioning of the People’s Court by denying it the funding and officials needed to ensure its 
effectiveness. Roxas was also under attack for being soft on collaborators because two of his sons 
were implicated in pro-Japanese activities during the war.58 
The left’s anger at what it perceived was the establishment’s failure to deal effectively with 
collaborators was compounded by the arrest in late February of 16 Huk leaders, including the top 
two commanders Luis Taruc and Casto Alejandrino, for allegedly failing to cooperate with the US 
military in San Fernando, Pampanga.59 Demonstrations in support of the arrested Huk leaders and 
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in opposition to Osmeña government multiplied. The largest, involving over 20,000 protesters and 
sponsored by the newly-formed DA, took place on September 23, 1945 in Manila, scarcely a week 
after H.B. No. 355 had reached Osmeña’s office. Waving red flags and Maoist and Stalinist slogans, 
the demonstrators marched to Malacañang Palace and demanded that the President release Taruc, 
Alejandrino, and the remaining Huk leaders, and take action against “traitors.” Among them were 
around 1,000 Chinese, who demanded “the removal of collaborators from Congress which caused 
a strain in Philippine-Chinese relations by passing anti-Chinese laws,” according to the Daily News 
tabloid. During the rally, Co Keng Sing spoke in English, exhorting Chinese workers and peasants 
to unite against what he called the remnants of fascism in the country. He conflated the Chinese 
left’s anti-fascism and opposition to anti-Chinese legislation, attacking Congress for “doing what 
Hitler did to the Jews.”60 
A week later, Co expounded on his remarks in an article entitled “We Demand Justice” in 
the New China Review, the Chinese Guide’s English supplement. Co claimed that there were only 
25 non-collaborators out of 95 congressmen. Roxas, he said, despite being a cabinet member under 
Laurel and concurrently head of the economic planning board, had not only regained his position 
as a congressmen, but also had the “nerve” to run for President of the Philippines. To distract the 
people from their wartime activities, Congress and the Senate, with the aid of the pro-Roxas Daily 
News, had launched an anti-Chinese campaign to “please those who have racial prejudice so that  
they can maintain their political positions. This method is similar to what Fuehrer Hitler tried on 
the Jews.” Although the Chinese, as foreigners, had no right to interfere in Philippine politics, they 
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had the right to demand justice against collaborators because they had suffered during the war and 
played their part alongside Filipinos in fighting the Japanese. Co also criticized the United States 
for rehabilitating collaborators. The article ended by calling for unity in Chinese society, which, it 
declared ominously, could only be obtained by “wiping out Chinese collaborators.”61 
Roxas and his allies in Congress and in the media wasted no time in striking back against 
Co’s speech and Chinese participation in the protests. On September 25, the front page of the Daily 
News featured the headline “1,000 Chinese in Huk Parade.” Its editorial excoriated these Chinese 
for interfering in the domestic political affairs of the Philippines, labeled them “undesirable aliens,” 
and demanded that the President arrest and deport them immediately. Osmeña, who had apparently 
“received them on the grounds of Malacañan and kowtowed to them,” was denounced by the same 
paper the following day as the “Chinese puppet leader.”62 Roxas himself demanded the expulsion 
of Chinese “who are not needed in the country” and the House formed a committee to investigate 
Chinese involvement in the protests. Co, however, was nowhere to be found when the sergeant-at-
arms of the House went searching for him on September 29, and did not show up at the committee’s 
hearings the next day. On October 10, Co reemerged and was subpoenaed to attend the hearings – 
but did not. To the dismay of Roxas’s supporters and the KMT, nothing came of the investigation. 
Frustrated by Manila’s inadequate efforts to prosecute collaborators, according to a November 19 
KMT report on the protest and its aftermath, the United States refused to support the committee.63 
Filipino anti-Chinese nationalists, meanwhile, were dealt a setback when the President vetoed H.B. 
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No. 355 on October 16, citing the incompatibility of protectionist measures with the Philippines’ 
membership of the United Nations and commitment to internationalism.64 
 
The “Chinese communist problem,” crime, and state-KMT collaboration  
 By late 1945, Co’s repeated evasions of the state and the Kang Fan’s involvement in the 
September 23 protests would have crystallized in Roxas’s mind the emerging “Chinese communist 
problem” and how it figured into his own political ambitions. The DA, a political coalition of Huks 
and various leftist groups, including the Kang Fan, endorsed Osmeña for the Presidency. Despite 
reservations about the incumbent President, DA leaders saw Roxas as a fascist and collaborator.65 
Conveniently for Roxas, therefore, any future anticommunist initiatives would double up as an act 
of retribution against Osmeña’s supporters, among whom were Chinese leftists. 
As Senate President, he was not lacking for sources of information on the Chinese left and 
its ties to Filipino communists. Sometime after September 23, Roxas received a document entitled 
“Big Head of the Chinese Communist Party.” In it were the names of eight Chinese communists, 
including Dy Eng Hao, the “Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (Cantonese)” who “Speak 
[sic] Chinese, English, Tagalog & Spanish”; Wong Kiat of the Wha Chi; the Chinese Guide’s Smin 
Chang; and Co Keng Sing, “Alias Gam Kim Seng,” who “Delivered speech of Sunday against the 
Congress of the Philippines at Malacañang. Has a case before the war not yet finished up to now. 
Charges brought to him by the Chinese Nationalist Party.”66 The Guide and Commercial Bulletin 
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were also listed. The oddly ungrammatical English of this typewritten and anonymously authored 
text seem to indicate that it was composed by a non-native speaker, very likely a Chinese person.  
In the same box as this document in the Roxas Papers at the University of the Philippines 
is a letter entitled “Deport Undesirable Chinese.” Its author, one Chua Peng Leong, claimed to be 
representing “Chinese neutrals and residents of Manila,” and his missive was intended for the US 
authorities. The letter is typewritten in excellent English on plain paper, and has no return address 
or date. “1945” and the acronym “MIS” have been added by hand in its margins, which suggests 
that the Philippines’ Military Intelligence Service forwarded it to Roxas (or vice-versa). It begins 
with a powerful thesis: the “Real disturbers of the peace,” it claims, are the Chinese communists, 
who were not only participating actively in local politics, but committing kidnapping, robbery, and 
murder, “sometimes in connivance with Filipino gangsters and hoodlums.” Chua accuses them of 
collaborating with Japan and deceiving the CIC into thinking that they were fighting the Japanese. 
Unsurprisingly, leading Chinese Reds were also in league with the Huks, and had connections with 
the Soviet Union and the CCP. Having collected one million pesos thus far through means such as 
kidnapping and extortion, local Chinese Reds had “extended their power and influence” over the 
Huks and together with them formed the DA to transform the Philippines into an “instrument of 
communism.” This organization was “sowing the seeds of discontent, terrorism, and banditry, with 
murders here and there.” The letter ends with a plea to the American authorities, on behalf of “all 
law-abiding and peaceful Chinese and Filipino citizens,” to act swiftly against this menace.67 
What are we to make of this letter? On the one hand, it contains just enough factual details, 
such as the names of Chinese communist leaders and their organizations (the “Hua Chee,” “Khong 
                                                 






Huan,” and “Khong Thu”), as well as a list of the various secret societies they were in league with, 
to persuade the reader of its author’s familiarity with Chinese affairs. Besides this, however, much 
of the intelligence in this letter is exaggerated, dubious, or impossible to corroborate. Its principal 
effect was to play to Filipino and American prejudices toward the local Chinese population while 
attributing its illegality and criminality to a specific ideological faction, thus distinguishing clearly 
between “good” and “bad” Chinese. For example, while there is nothing to suggest that the Chinese 
communists collaborated with the Japanese or controlled the Huks, these assertions resonated with 
perceptions of the Chinese as self-serving and stoked fears of communism as a “foreign” influence. 
Similarly, by claiming that the communists engaged in kidnapping, robbery, and murder and were 
linked to Filipino and Chinese gangsters, the letter reinforced stereotypes of the Chinese as inclined 
towards criminal behavior. Whether or not Chua, whose signature features at the end of the letter, 
was an actual person or not is unclear. Declaring themselves to be law-abiding “neutrals,” in effect, 
distanced the author and those he represented from communal politics and framed their letter as  
born of mere civic-mindedness.  
As its conflict with the Chinese left worsened, the KMT sought increasingly to prove itself 
useful to the coercive organs of the Philippine state and pin the blame for criminal behavior on the 
communists. While the provenance of this letter is unknown, its blurring of the distinction between 
communism and gangsterism and its provision of intelligence to the authorities are consistent with 
this broader trend. By early 1946, incidences of kidnapping and blackmail in Manila’s Chinatown 
had reached epidemic proportions, much to the frustration of the metropolitan police. On March 2, 
the Philippines Free Press, the country’s oldest news weekly, reported that wealthy Chinese were 
being blackmailed into handing over large sums of money to Chinese gangsters. Pretending to be 




Japanese and informed their intended victims that only by contributing to the resistance could they 
“redeem” themselves. If their targets failed to do so within a day, they would be shot, or kidnapped 
and then killed.68 One such person to be kidnapped was KMT member and the deputy manager of 
the Great China Press, Cai Yunqin 蔡雲钦, who was allegedly told by his kidnappers that he was 
a “reactionary by nature” (fandong chengxing 反動成性) and deserved to be killed. He was set to 
be drowned, but remarkably, although we know not how, escaped to tell his tale.69 
For the KMT, an organization committed to protecting the interests of Chinese abroad and 
seeking to expand its influence in the Philippines, it was politically expedient not just to help the 
police tackle criminal activities, but also to attribute such behavior to communism. Chinese society 
was something of a black box to law enforcement officials. Linguistic and cultural barriers between 
Filipinos and Chinese made crimes involving the former uniquely difficult to solve. As Manila’s 
exasperated Chief of Police Angel Tuazon explained to the Philippines Free Press in May 1946, 
in response to the kidnapping spree, “Tracking down Chinese criminals, particularly the murderers, 
in Manila is like chasing the legendary will-o’-the-wisp. It is next to impossible to get them for the 
simple reason that both the victims and their relatives – even if they personally know the culprits 
– refuse to talk. Mortal fear of violent reprisal from the killer or killers grips them and keeps their 
lips closed.” Unable to understand Chinese, policemen usually faced what he called a “blank wall” 
when investigating Chinese suspects and witnesses, who insisted on speaking Chinese even if they 
knew Tagalog well.70 The KMT helped bridge this informational divide by reorganizing one of its 
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special forces teams and establishing a communications network with the authorities in opposition 
to Chinese criminals and communists.71 In this manner, the KMT rendered Chinese society legible 
to its host government and insinuated itself into the coercive apparatus of the state. 
KMT intelligence reports and propaganda from mid-late 1946 give us a sense of how party 
members assessed the threat of communism during a critical period in both Chinese and Philippine 
history that spanned Roxas’s election to the Presidency and the outbreak of the Civil War in China 
and armed conflict between the Philippine state and the Huks. Chinese communists were believed 
to be providing the Soviet Union with confidential military and political information, encouraging 
the Huks to adopt Sinophobic attitudes, and establishing base areas in Central Luzon to retreat to 
in difficult circumstances.72 In October, three months after Chiang Kai-shek launched a large-scale 
attack on the CCP in north China, the zongzhibu relaunched its occupation-era publication, Dahan 
hun 大漢魂 (Soul of the Great Han) as a monthly news magazine. In its inaugural issue, Secretary 
General Koa Chun-te warned that where once hanjian had operated covertly, the new hanjian were 
behaving boldly and ostentatiously and using democracy as a cover to propagate their “treasonous 
theory” (maiguo lilun 賣國理論). With the ROC having failed to demobilize “bandit special agents” 
(feite 匪特), a “Red disaster” (chihuo 赤禍) and “new imperialism” (xin diguo zhuyi 新帝國主義) 
were menacing all corners of the globe and threatening World War III. The party had thus revived 
Dahan hun to confront this new enemy of the Chinese nation.73  
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Koa’s richly suggestive language here suggests that the KMT was grappling with how to 
define its communist enemy. It dovetailed with contemporaneous fears of communism as a global 
threat and anticipated the Cold War. It also evoked the KMT’s revolutionary, anti-imperial heritage 
and earlier struggles against Western and especially Japanese colonialism: Koa employed the same 
term used to describe Chinese collaborators during the War of Resistance – hanjian – to represent 
the communists. Finally, he described the communists as fei, a term that the KMT attached to the 
CCP during the Nanjing Decade and resurrected during the Civil War to serve as the main signifier 
of Chinese (and Russian) communism in its propaganda.74 (The CCP likewise described the KMT 
after 1949 as fei.) In using it, Koa drew comparisons between the CCP and anti-dynastic “bandits” 
from imperial times such as the Taiping rebels to delegitimize the former and legitimize the ROC. 
Like Chua Peng Leong’s letter to Roxas, he constructed a link between crime and communism that 
informed the KMT’s collaboration with the state to police Chinese society. It was no coincidence 
that the same issue of the magazine featured articles on how the COWHM had helped capture 13 
kidnappers (bangfei 绑匪) and on Cai Yunqin’s kidnapping by a separate gang of fei. Both pieces 
heavily implied that the fei in question were communists: the former declared fei (not bangfei) to 
be the biggest enemy of both wealthy and poor Chinese, while the latter, as we have seen, described 
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The September 5 Incident and the decline of the Chinese left 
As fears of communism grew, the ideological climate in the Philippines shifted decisively 
rightwards and in favor of the KMT. Relations between the Filipino left and the state deteriorated 
swiftly following the presidential and congressional elections in April 1946. At the new President’s 
orders, Huk leader Luis Taruc and five other DA candidates were prevented from taking their seats 
in the House on charges of electoral fraud and terrorism. Subsequently, clashes between the Huks 
and the police in Central Luzon, which served as Roxas’s pretext for banning Taruc and the others 
from Congress, worsened. Anti-Chinese sentiment was also on the rise, the failure of earlier efforts 
to nationalize the retail trade only serving to galvanize populist politicians such as Senator Vicente 
Sotto of Cebu, who alleged that Chinese economic practices such as remitting money to China and 
black marketeering were making the Philippines a “weak nation.” Sotto also protested the growing 
number of Chinese entering the islands illegally following the start of the Civil War, believing it 
to be “one of the gravest national problems today.”76 
The fall of 1946, recalled the daughter of Kang Chu leader Young Ching-tong 楊靜桐, saw 
“reactionary forces starting to intensify” (fandong shili kaishi xiaozhang 反动势力开始嚣张) and 
marked the beginning of the end for Chinese communism in the Philippines.77 For both sides, the 
turning point was what the KMT later called simply as the “September 5 Incident.”78 It had been 
a long time in coming. In May, while visiting Washington, Roxas told the ROC’s Ambassador to 
the United States that there were many Chinese communists in his country who were functioning 
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as intermediaries between Moscow and the Huks and were using terrorist methods to attack other 
Chinese. The President and the ROC Consul in Manila Tuan Mao-lan 段茂澜 sought cooperation 
between their states against these Reds, in the interests of protecting the ROC’s overseas citizens. 
Roxas, on his part, believed that it would not be difficult to find legal reasons to deport the Reds.79  
The arrests that took place on September 5 followed swiftly on the heels of the “pacification” 
campaign that Roxas had launched against the Huks in Central Luzon in August.80 That evening, 
military policemen raided the offices of the Chinese Guide and Chinese Commercial Bulletin, as 
well as Union High School, the Chinese Labor Federation, the Hong Kwong Institute, and several 
other sites of (supposed) communist activity. The entire circulation staff of the Chinese Guide was 
detained, as was Young, who was teaching at the Hongmen-run Institute. Around 61 persons were 
arrested over the next two days and their residences and shops searched. However, this operation 
proved unsuccessful. While its underlying intent was to identify communists for deportation, mere 
communist sympathies, as evidenced for example by the editorial policies of the newspapers, were 
insufficient grounds for doing so at this point in time before Roxas outlawed the Huks in 1948. To 
prosecute and deport the arrested, the state required evidence of active interference in the internal 
politics of the Philippines, such as involvement in the Huk movement, or of other violations of the 
law and forms of criminal activity. For this reason, those arrested were questioned about ties to the 
Huks, the organizations they belonged to, whether or not they had legal residence papers, and what 
they had done during the occupation. Its agents found no such evidence, forcing Roxas into halting 
the arrests and ordering those arrested released. The Palace subsequently explained that the raids 
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were conducted in response to complaints that “lawless elements,” some involved in a kidnapping 
ring, were regular visitors at the places raided, and stressed that it had no desire to become involved 
in political disputes within Chinese society so long as they did not touch on domestic affairs.81 
All signs point to Shih I-Sheng and the CVP’s direct role in the raids. Witnesses identified 
Chinese agents involved in them as active KMT members, while according to Chinese Commercial 
News reporters, Shih was present at military police headquarters after the arrests.82 Detainees who 
were released a few days later told the Manila Times that they had been subjected to third-degree 
torture by those agents, among whom was a member of the “Overseas Chinese Volunteer Corps.”83 
Shih denied any role in the raids in response to accusations in the left-wing Chinese media.84 Six 
years later, in summarizing its achievements to the Seventh National Party Congress, the zongzhibu 
smugly described the incident as a KMT “plot” (yinmou 陰謀) against the communists.85 
September 5, although an embarrassing climbdown for the Roxas government at the time, 
in hindsight represented for Chinese communists the start of what they described as a campaign of 
“White Terror” against them.86 Two days later, in what appears to have been an unrelated episode, 
a Chinese Democratic League member and schoolteacher in the provinces, Wang Jiawai 王家外, 
was seized and killed by the authorities in a raid on the local League headquarters, sparking calls 
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for justice and protests against the authorities from the League, Lo Lian Hui, and Chinese Guide. 
Wang’s body was shipped to Manila, where an autopsy proved that he had been shot. A week after 
his murder, he received a martyr’s funeral in Manila, at which the Lo Lian Hui’s Secretary-General, 
Shen Fushui 沈福水, angrily denounced the KMT and Philippine government for collaborating to 
oppress local Chinese. The legal case that Wang’s supporters brought before the courts was never 
settled, according to Shen’s account, our only extant record of what happened. But it drove home 
to the Chinese left that they had to be on their guard going forward.87 While Shen provides no hard 
evidence of KMT involvement in Wang’s death, party records make it clear that armed force was 
used to purge communists from the schools.88 
Violence against leftists aside, the KMT also consolidated its hold over the school system 
by providing funding, through businessmen affiliated with the party, for the building of facilities, 
and by assisting schools in vetting applicants for teaching jobs at the start of each academic year.89 
Where appropriate, it also assisted the state in its legal prosecution of alleged Chinese supporters 
of the Huks. In 1947, the Principal and four members of the Board of Directors of Kipsi Primary 
School (Jishi xiaoxue 及時小學) in Batangas City were arrested and charged with aiding the Huks 
and organizing communist activities at the school. All five men were connected to the Lo Lian Hui 
and Kang Fan. At their trial before the Deportation Board in Manila, one of the witnesses for the 
prosecution was the KMT’s Huang Dingming黃鼎銘, whom Shen described as a collaborator. In 
his account of the “Five Chinese communists” (Wu huagong 五華共) case, Shen denounced KMT 
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members in Southern Luzon for having either gone into hiding during the Japanese occupation or, 
in Huang’s case, thrown in their lot with the enemy. Its reputation there low, the party thus sought 
to claim the region from the left by collaborating with the state. But the trial did not go as planned. 
Lawyers for the defendants succeeded in appealing the Board’s initial guilty verdict to the Supreme 
Court, delaying the outcome of their trial. When, in July 1949, they were finally deported to KMT-
controlled Xiamen, the Lo Lian Hui worked out a deal with a KMT official and former Philippine 
resident who realized that his party’s demise was nigh and was looking to switch sides. To prove 
his new loyalties, this official agreed to identify the five men not as huagong, but as KMT members 
who had fallen victim to an intra-party feud. Four swiftly left Xiamen, but the fifth remained and 
was soon re-apprehended by a KMT special agent and sent to Taiwan before the CCP captured the 
city in October.90 
Growing fears of being killed, harassed, or arrested and then deported into the hands of the 
KMT in China limited the spaces for Chinese communist activity and led many leftists during this 
period to leave the Philippines of their own accord. In the spring of 1947, Gong Taoyi traveled to 
Hong Kong in his capacity as General Manager of the Chinese Guide to meet Co Keng Sing, who 
had relocated there in September 1946, and other communist leaders.91 The Guide was struggling 
financially. Its subscribers and advertisers were being intimidated into pulling their support for the 
paper, according to Gong. Advice from Co, fellow resistance fighter Du Ai 杜埃, and their contacts 
among Hong Kong’s left-wing newspapers on how best to save the Guide was not lacking. Upon 
returning to Manila, Gong implemented some of their suggestions to cut operating costs and boost 
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its subscriptions and advertising revenue, ensuring that the newspaper survived until its five-year 
anniversary in April. Later that year, however, the Philippine authorities, supported by the KMT, 
stepped up their harassment of Gong’s wife, Huang Wei 黃薇, who had become the paper’s editor-
in-chief after her predecessor Smin Chang 張思明 left for China. Accused of being a communist 
and Soviet surrogate and faced with deportation to Xiamen, Gong and Huang decided to shut down 
the Guide. On October 30, shortly after its final issue had gone to print, Philippine military police 
came to the Guide’s offices searching for the couple, but were told that they had left the building. 
Both left the country for Hong Kong shortly afterwards.92 The Chinese Commercial Bulletin, the 
left’s other main media organ, closed down in that same year as well.93  
 As anticommunism in the Philippines intensified and the Chinese Civil War tilted in favor 
of the CCP after 1947, most Chinese communist leaders fled the Philippines for China, usually via 
Hong Kong, as Gong has documented. He, Huang, and Co all departed Hong Kong for China in 
early 1949, on the eve of the CCP’s victory, and went on to serve as members of the CCP’s United 
Work Front Department while living within the same residential compound in Beijing. During the 
Cultural Revolution, they and other returned overseas Chinese from the Philippines were accused 
of counterrevolutionary behavior and persecuted for their cosmopolitanism. A Gang of Four agent 
in Fujian compared the Wha Chi to a “lychee tree which bore fruits with red skin, white meat, and 
black hearts.”94 Huang and Gong were taken into custody for investigation by the CCP, with Gong 
allowed to return home during the evenings and on Sundays to care for their young child. Co Keng 
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Sing suffered the most. Denounced as a reactionary for having cooperated with Filipinos and the 
US military during the war, he fell ill and was admitted to hospital, where Gong would secretly go 
to see him. In 1968, after being discharged and despite not having recovered completely, Co was 
sentenced to hard labor in first Heilongjiang and then Henan. In 1973, Gong was in Beijing when 
he found out that Co had passed away two years earlier on August 8.95  
 
Conclusion: citizenship, diplomacy, and the consolidation of shared sovereignty 
 Around half a year after the KMT’s headquarters reopened in Manila and Gong Taoyi fled 
the Philippines for Hong Kong, the party’s “bloody struggle” with the Chinese left was effectively 
over, and never again would it have to confront an organized Chinese communist movement there. 
That Philippine political and military elites were anticommunist only partially explains the KMT’s 
ascendancy and subsequent dominance of civic life among local Chinese. More important was that 
the establishment tolerated and in some cases welcomed the presence of this foreign political party 
on its soil. Comparisons with Malaysia are instructive here. From 1948 onwards, the colonial state 
confronted an anticolonial insurgency led by ethnic Chinese communists. Yet in May 1949, Britain 
banned the KMT from the country, judging the party’s goal of promoting closer ties between local 
Chinese and China as inimical to the creation of a Malayan civic consciousness.96 A year later, it 
even switched recognition from the ROC to the newly-founded PRC. Fearing foreign involvement 
in Malayan Chinese affairs, the British were determined to combat Chinese communism on their 
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own terms without having to rely on the KMT. Having developed its capacity to surveil and police 
Malaya’s large and strategically important Chinese population over more than a century of colonial 
rule, Britain had little need for the party. 
 Far fewer Chinese lived in the Philippines, by contrast: 270,000 to peninsular Malaya and 
Singapore’s total of 3.3 million in 1959, by one estimate.97 Partly because of its own immigration 
policies, the American colonial state had little need for specialized institutions akin to the Chinese 
Protectorate in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca to manage Chinese society in the Philippines. Its 
postcolonial successor thus lacked the linguistic resources and expertise to combat what appeared 
to be the growing Chinese communist problem in the aftermath of World War II. For these reasons, 
it willingly outsourced part of its intelligence-gathering and coercive capacities to the KMT (and, 
as we will see, not only the KMT). More fundamental to this sharing of sovereignty was the state’s 
inaction on questions of citizenship and integration. Save for the few who had successfully become 
naturalized citizens of the Philippines, the majority of ethnic Chinese in the country, regardless of 
their place of birth, were ROC nationals. It thus followed that the ROC and its ruling party should 
enjoy sovereignty over persons that were both perceived as ethno-culturally distinct from Filipinos 
as well as citizens of a foreign state by law.  
 Following World War II, the KMT served as a vanguard for the consolidation of Nationalist 
Chinese influence in the Philippines; subsequent diplomatic developments between the two states 
created the legal basis for such influence. While the KMT as an overseas institution was not a mere 
appendage of the ROC, its fortunes were intimately connected to those of the Nationalist state and 
thus affected by the diplomatic relationships that the ROC entered into. It is not a coincidence that 
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the three Southeast Asian countries that the KMT was the most active in after World War II were 
the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam, all of which not only were anticommunist but also 
recognized the ROC. Following the establishment of formal ties between them immediately after 
the Philippines’ independence on July 4, 1946, the two states began negotiating a Treaty of Amity 
to “re-assert the friendly relations of the two nations” and “define the rights and privileges of one 
in the territory of the other,” as one ROC diplomat put it.98 On April 18, 1947, Roxas and the new 
ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping陳質平 signed this Treaty, a short statement of principles that 
both countries’ legislatures later ratified and that was meant to guide the relationship going forward. 
The first paragraph of the sixth of its ten articles read: 
The nationals of each of the high contracting parties shall be accorded, in the territories of 
the other, the liberty to establish schools for the education of their children, and shall enjoy 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association, of publication, of worship and religion, of 
burial and building cemeteries, upon the same terms as the nationals of any third country 
in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other.99 
 
In effect, Article 6 reproduced US colonial policy by legitimizing the autonomy of Chinese schools 
in the Philippines from state interference. Since the vast majority of these private institutions were, 
as they had been before the war, run by the KMT in conjunction with provincial Chinese chambers 
of commerce, it also implicitly legitimized the party’s de facto hegemony over Chinese education. 
As an institution that promoted the interests of “Chinese nationals,” the KMT was itself legitimized 
by this article’s guarantees of freedom of assembly and association for such nationals, as were the 
other civic anticommunist organizations that Nationalist China sponsored. 
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In the Name of Anticommunism: 
Chinese Practices of Ideological Accommodation in the Early Cold War Philippines 
 
On January 28, 1954, The Bullseye newspaper in Manila printed a letter to President Ramon 
Magsaysay from a “group of non-political but patriotic local Chinese merchants” who had resided 
in the islands for over 20 years and come to regard the Philippines as their “second mother country.” 
Its author, Lim Tian Seng, said that the purpose of the letter was to point out “bad elements among 
the local Chinese who have utilized convenient facilities accommodated to them by some corrupt 
government officials to enrich themselves.” He singled out two individuals for special blame. The 
first he did not name, but described simply as a “naturalized alien whose citizenship is even now 
under question and whose notoriety is so well-known to the Filipinos as well as the Chinese that 
no further introduction is necessary.” Lim identified the second man as the former KMT Secretary-
General in the Philippines, Sy Yek Sheng. This was of course none other than Shih I-Sheng, whom 
we last encountered helping Philippine military police raid suspected communist institutions on 
September 5, 1946. Lim proceeded to describe how Shih blackmailed wealthy Chinese. According 
to Lim, Shih simply picked up the telephone and called someoned whom he knew to be well-off. 
Exploiting his KMT credentials, he claimed to have connections with the Philippine military and 
told his victim that someone had reported to the authorities that he was a communist or communist 
sympathizer. Shih then offered to clear this person’s name if he paid Shih 10,000, 30,000, or 50,000 
pesos, depending on how wealthy he was. Shih had made, by a “very conservative estimation,” no 
less than half a million pesos from this scheme and, though no longer the party’s Secretary-General, 
remained in the country as “head of the Chinese Volunteers of the Philippines Fraternity.” 
Lim also claimed that during the previous week, “thousands of local Chinese commercial 




envelopes allegedly issued by the ‘Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party in the 
Philippines.’” Reasoning that such a large quantity of propaganda could not have been mailed by 
actual Chinese communists because of the government’s “relentless” anticommunist policies and 
Chinese Reds’ lack of organization in the country, he concluded that the materials must have been 
forged. The real culprits, he conjectured, were “well-organized racketeers” who hoped to deceive 
the state into believing that Chinese communists were active again and profit from any arrests that 
it might make. “We have reasons to believe,” he said, that there were many “Chinese operatives” 
in the Department of National Defense (DND) who were in league with these racketeers and had 
been feeding their Filipino superiors “biased and inaccurate or even false and malicious” reports 
on the activities and ideological leanings of local Chinese. The letter then mentioned the Philippine 
military’s mass arrests of over 300 Chinese on December 27, 1952, on charges of communism. At 
least 170 detainees had been released, revealing that the DND was relying on flawed intelligence. 
In concluding, Lim modestly hoped that no further arrests would be made unless they were well-
supported by substantial evidence.1 
Lim had more in common with Shih and the “Chinese operatives” who had infiltrated the 
DND than his letter to the newly-elected President condemning them suggests. Blackmail, forgery, 
rumor-mongering, and similar criminal or ethically questionable behavior aimed at tearing down 
the reputation of men like Lim by having them identified as communists. In a twisted way, Shih 
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and these operatives were practicing anticommunism in the name of Filipino national values. Until 
exposed, they were perceived as anticommunists or as helping anticommunism. Similarly, Lim’s 
carefully worded letter was a performance of his ideological affinities. By informing on his fellow 
Chinese to the public, which was not a common occurrence at the time, Lim was playing to Filipino 
prejudices toward the Chinese and proved that he was a “patriotic” Chinese merchant who regarded 
the Philippines as his “second mother country.” Lim understood “patriotism” as a civic disposition, 
unrelated to his place of birth or nationality, neither of which we know. He might not have spoken 
Tagalog or been able to pass off as racially Filipino. But, in exposing the criminal methods of Shih 
and the operatives, he was enacting his opposition to corruption and strengthening the Magsaysay 
administration’s capacity to distinguish between genuine and fake Reds.  
 The practices that I describe above were a response to and component of the anticommunist, 
anti-Chinese political, cultural, and social environment in the early post-independence Philippines. 
Most Chinese there, unlike Filipinos, did not experience the struggle against communism as direct 
US intervention in their daily lives. As the anthropologist Heonik Kwon suggests, the global Cold 
War manifested itself as multiple, locally specific historical realities, from material and symbolic 
forms such as fallout shelters to less materially tangible and more socially diffused forms such as 
kinship relations.2 For local Chinese, the ideological bifurcation that characterized manifestations 
of this global reality was imbricated with Sinophobia. In a climate thick with fears of communism, 
the Chinese, and Chinese communism, but largely devoid of actual Chinese Reds, anticommunism 
for the likes of Lim and Shih was more than about rooting out subversives, ideological authenticity, 
and believing in Chiang Kai-shek. It was, in many instances, a flexible repertoire of practices, from 
crime to civic associationism, that traditional Chinese elites like Lim and their challengers such as 
                                                 





Shih employed to enhance their reputations as “anticommunists,” pursue vendettas against alleged 
communists, and come to terms with being Chinese in the Philippines from the late 1940s to early 
1950s.  
 By examining Philippine-Chinese practices of what I call ideological accommodation in 
the contexts of the Cold War and Philippine nation-building, this chapter shows how local Chinese 
integrated ideology into their identities as minorities in a newly-independent Southeast Asian state 
after World War II. My concern in this chapter is not with issues such as citizenship, education, or 
the informal arrangements between Chinese businessmen and native political elites which enabled 
the former to flourish despite discriminatory economic legislation; nor do I focus exclusively on 
elites. A narrow focus on elite responses to the legal and policy frameworks that enabled economic 
and cultural “anti-Sinitism” risks overlooking the roles of extra-legal phenomena and the political 
environment in molding Chinese strategies of adaptation. Ideological accommodation frequently 
drew upon familiar practices such as the cultivation of patron-client relationships between Chinese 
and Filipino politicians; it also gave rise to distinctively “anticommunist” practices such as rumor-
mongering and the forging of communist propaganda to incriminate innocent individuals and one’s 
enemies. In all instances, Chinese actors evinced a clear awareness of social power structures, the 
Philippines’ alignment and relations with the United States, and the similarly intimate ties between 
Chinese in the country and the ROC. 
 By “accommodation,” I do not mean that anticommunism was only reactive and that those 
involved were at the mercy of the Philippine government or international forces. Rather, it was a 
productive strategy, in which members of Chinese society competed with each other to accumulate 
anticommunism as a kind of resource and achieve social prominence. The Philippine state figured 




of patronage. Yet as we will see, it also depended on these actors for intelligence and, consequently, 
was often the one being manipulated.    
The chapter begins by describing how anticommunism and Sinophobia became intertwined 
in the Philippines during a period when the “Cold War” as a social and cultural reality was being 
constructed and consolidated globally.3 Fears of Chinese communism preoccupied the Philippine 
state and Chinese society; anticommunism and anti-Chinese sentiment were becoming integral to 
official ideas of Filipino identity. The Chinese therefore sought accommodation with this identity: 
by adopting ideologically correct positions, they created opportunities for social and political gain 
and lessened Filipinos’ suspicions of them. I then examine the ideological practices of three groups 
of actors that represented different institutions, factions, and classes within Chinese society. First, 
I discuss the Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement, 
which Chinese elites such as the businessmen Alfonso Sycip established to raise funds and conduct 
propaganda activities in support of anticommunism. The next sections describe individuals whose 
practices mimicked the elite’s and each other’s and threatened the established social order: Shih I-
Sheng and a Korean-Chinese doctor named Edward Lim, both of whom derived their social status 
from their affiliation with the KMT; and a gang of “Chinese operatives,” led by one Antonio Chua 
Cruz 蔡彬慶, which the DND had employed to gather intelligence on the Chinese community. 
 
Anticommunism and Sinophobia in the early Cold War Philippines 
As Chapter 1 has explained, the Chinese communist movement in the Philippines declined 
rapidly in influence from September 1946 to the end of 1947. By 1948, faced with an increasingly 
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unfavorable political environment there, its leaders had mostly left the country to wage the Chinese 
Civil War. Where once left-wing organizations such as the Kang Fan and Lo Lian Hui had operated 
in the open, only a small and secretive fragment of the movement remained. Yet precisely because 
Chinese communism had disappeared from public life, fears of this phenomenon in the Philippines 
persisted. Communism in general appeared to be in the ascendancy throughout Asia from the late 
1940s to early 1950s, not least in the Philippines, where the Huk insurgency had been in full swing 
since 1946. Communist uprisings, some more short-lived than others, erupted in Malaya, Burma, 
and Indonesia in 1948, seemingly at the instigation of the Soviet Union through the Calcutta Youth 
Conference in February.4 In Vietnam, the French colonial state had been at war with the Vietminh 
since 1946. In China, the CCP was on the verge of winning the Civil War against the KMT. When 
the PRC entered the Korean War in 1950, therefore, Chinese communism had become a distinct, 
territorialized, and racialized subset of the global Red threat.  
In the Philippines, Filipino fears of Chinese communism in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
were inseparable from anxieties over the country’s porous borders and immigration policy. State 
officials and politicians feared that communists lurked among the 2,700 or so Chinese “overstaying 
temporary visitors” who had entered the islands during the Civil War and then refused to leave for 
China after their three-month visitor visas had expired.5 Reports from the period by the National 
Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) lay bare the state’s fears that pro-communist Chinese 
smugglers and corrupt local officials were facilitating the inflow of CCP propaganda, together with 
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gold, drugs, and similar contraband into the country and the outflow of foreign exchange and illicit 
arms to China. CCP agents were believed to have entered the country to join up with local Chinese 
communists and the Huks and to infiltrate Chinese society. Immigration Commissioner Engracio 
Fabre testified to the House Committee on Un-Filipino Activities (CUFA) in October 1948 that of 
the 561 known communist agents in the islands, at least 50 were Chinese, some of them “prominent 
socially and in business.”6 In language that typified Filipino fears of the Chinese as fifth columnists, 
an intelligence report declared that “if nothing is effectively done in advance” to stop the “Chinese 
Menace,” the Philippines “may later become a “Little China.”7 A similar report asserted, without 
supporting evidence, that “Of the officially estimated 200,000 Chinese residents in the Philippines, 
36,000 have been identified as communists and communist sympathizers. This figure exceeds even 
the native communist forces.”8 In 1951, Magsaysay, then Secretary of National Defense, reduced 
this figure to a still alarmingly high 30,000.9 
 Officials perceived Chinese communism as a subset of the wider “Chinese problem” in the 
country. Sinophobia and anticommunism were distinct but overlapping phenomena that the Cold 
War and Filipino nationalism helped join together, thereby compounding fears of “alien” economic 
dominance, moral degeneracy, and insularity – stereotypes going back to US colonial times.10 In 
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Filipino eyes, the Chinese were racially “passive and individualistic in temperament,” but capable 
of being “energized by propaganda,” and hence susceptible to indoctrination.11 Local Chinese had 
“nurtured their ties with the motherland, operate cohesively as a race, and in many instances claim 
dual citizenship.” Their “unassimilability and their financial or commercial influence make them 
effective instruments of probable aggressive Chinese foreign policy,” wrote NICA in 1948.12 The 
“Chinese problem,” then, was not only inseparable from the “China problem,” but in many respects 
– contra Philip Kuhn’s view – essential to it.13 Race and nationality became inseparable aspects of 
Chineseness in the eyes of Filipinos.  
Populist expressions of these frequently inconsistent anti-Chinese prejudices took multiple 
forms. Politicians and journalists frequently inveighed against Chinese in the newspapers to drum 
up support for their election campaigns and boost their readership respectively. On the legislative 
front, congressmen and lobbying organizations such as the Filipino Retail Merchants Association 
and Filipino Economic Emancipation Organization persisted with their campaign to curb perceived 
Chinese dominance of the Philippine economy. In 1954, despite countervailing efforts by Chinese 
merchants, the President enacted Republic Act No. 1180, the Retail Trade Nationalization Act. By 
forbidding non-Filipinos or corporations not wholly owned by Filipinos from engaging in the retail 
business, the Act dealt a blow to Chinese commerce, most of which was concentrated in the retail 
sector.14   
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Political violence against Chinese after the war did not manifest itself in the form of anti-
Chinese riots and intercommunal conflict, the likes of which had happened under Spanish rule and 
would occur in Indonesia and Malaysia. Rather, individual Chinese were frequently the targets of 
corrupt, unscrupulous, or simply clueless representatives of the state. The metropolitan police were 
known to raid Chinese commercial establishments, carrying with them search warrants and small 
quantities of opium, ammunition, and Chinese communist propaganda. If the merchants refused to 
pay them off, the police pretended to have found such contraband on their premises and proceeded 
to arrest them.15 Intelligence agencies and the police were also ignorant of the Chinese language 
and thus subcontracted the gathering of intelligence on Chinese society to local Chinese, rendering 
themselves vulnerable to inaccurate or fabricated reports on alleged communists. Because of their 
legal status as citizens of the ROC, Chinese arrested by the state, if found guilty by the Deportation 
Board, were deported as foreign nationals to China or, after 1949, Taiwan. Police criminality was 
such a serious matter that it went all the way up to the ROC Foreign Minister George Yeh himself, 
who complained to a Philippine official in Taipei in April 1951 that the police “act in such a way 
that the Chinese people live in a constant fear. They have instilled a feeling of insecurity among 
the Chinese nationals and a reign of terror spread among them.”16  
 The prospect of being extorted, arrested, and even deported by the state was among a host 
of fears for Chinese the time. From the 1950s onwards, an external threat manifested itself in the 
form of what local Chinese believed were demands for money from communist officials in China. 
In response to a foreign exchange crisis, the Philippine Central Bank imposed controls on foreign 
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exchange in December 1949, which forbade the remitting of money to one’s relatives in China – 
a prohibition that Chinese circumvented by channeling the remittances through third-party brokers 
in Hong Kong.17 It became increasingly common after the disruption of these remittance networks 
and the onset of CCP rule for Chinese to receive letters from their relatives in China, written at the 
instigation of CCP officials, asking for further sums, either small amounts on a regular basis or an 
immediate large lump-sum.18 At least half of those who had received such threats, a KMT member 
informed the US Embassy in Manila, acceded to these demands, fearing for their relatives if they 
did not.19 Reporting them to the Philippine authorities was not an option because of the illegality 
of remitting money overseas and the charges of aiding the CCP that could easily be leveled against 
them for doing so.  
From the late 1940s onwards, it thus became expedient for Chinese to adopt anticommunist 
positions in their everyday lives. As the actions of anti-Chinese politicians, corrupt policemen, and 
Chinese communists suggests, opportunities abounded from the late 1940s onwards for individuals 
or groups – even from beyond the country – to profit from the social instability caused by Filipino 
anti-Chinese prejudices and fears of communism. In the absence of authentic Chinese communist 
threats to national security, anticommunism became a new and valorized ideological resource that 
Chinese competed with each other to accumulate and transform into social and political gains. For 
them, practicing anticommunism signaled to the state their conformity, despite being foreigners, 
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to a national identity that this state had redefined in ideological terms. As anti-Chinese legislation 
and institutions such as CUFA made abundantly clear, to be Filipino during this period was to not 
be Chinese or communist. ROC citizenship and ethno-cultural markers of Chinese identity such as 
language, customs, and physical features were difficult if not impossible to shed. Ideology on the 
other hand was a positive quality of being Filipino and easy to show off.   
 
Chamber, party, and embassy: centers of influence in postwar Chinese society 
By the early 1950s, commercial elites had regained their leadership of Chinese society and 
were eager to jump onboard the anticommunist bandwagon. Communism, whose proponents had 
sought and failed to persecute these elites for their supposed collaboration with the Japanese during 
the war, had made no ideological inroads among them for this reason. More clear-cut instances of 
collaboration had been dealt with by the US and Philippine authorities and guilty persons deported 
to China. Seemingly little had changed about the composition and leadership of the elite. As before 
the war, commercial wealth, generated in sectors such as banking, insurance, manufacturing, and 
particularly retailing, remained the leading criterion of social status. Except for those who had died 
during Japanese rule, nearly all of those who had held leadership positions before the war within 
the community’s governing organization, the Philippine Chinese General Chamber of Commerce 
(Feilübin Minlila zhonghua shanghui菲律賓岷里拉中華商會), had been reinstated after the war, 
including its President, Alfonso Sycip 薜芬士.20  
Founded in 1908, the General Chamber had long been dominated by what political scientist 
James Blaker calls “traditionalists”: men such as Sycip and his brother Albino 薜敏老, for whom 
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leadership was chiefly about maintaining a single organization for arbitrating internal community 
disputes, mediating between the community and Philippine government, and preserving traditional 
Chinese values. Insofar as they identified themselves as “Chinese” and retained ties to China, they 
did so primarily in a cultural sense, and in order to enhance their own influence and prestige within 
the Philippines. While he errs in describing these “traditionalists” as apolitical – for what could be 
more political than the maintenance of power within a given community? – he draws an important, 
if overly schematic, distinction between them and their “nationalist” competitors. This latter group, 
comprising KMT members, was politically and economically oriented towards China and sought 
to leverage the financial and political resources of Chinese society to affect the mainland.21 
By the late 1940s, traditionalism and the avoidance of nationalist politics were increasingly 
unviable options for Chinese leaders like Sycip. Business as usual was no longer possible. The rise 
of anti-Chinese nationalism, seemingly inexorable, threatened the livelihood of Chinese merchants 
and, by extension, called into question the ability of their representatives to protect their interests 
and negotiate effectively with the state. The ubiquity of anticommunist discourse in the Philippines 
incentivized elites into taking sides in what was, in 1949, very much an ongoing conflict between 
the KMT and CCP for China’s future. In this environment, the Chamber could not prevent itself 
from yielding influence to the KMT and ROC Embassy, which had emerged as alternative centers 
of power within Chinese society. The party’s growing influence in the Philippines, despite events 
in China, derived from its leading role in combating the Chinese left and the thickening of ROC-
Philippine relations after the Treaty of Amity in 1947. It was reflected in the increased presence 
of KMT members such as Sy En and Yao Shiong Shio 姚迺崑 and other dedicated anticommunists 
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such as Yu Khe Thai among its leadership.22 Sy would succeed Sycip as President of the Chamber 
in 1950. The party and the Chamber were not and would never become a single organization; nor 
would the former ever supplant the latter as the community’s governing body. But four years later, 
the Chamber would be overtaken at the head of Chinese society by the KMT-dominated Federation 
of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, an institution that infused the traditional 
mandate of the older General Chamber with Nationalist ideology. Its formation and the concurrent 
withdrawal of an older generation of leaders (such as Sycip) from public life signaled the definitive 
collapse of traditionalism as a political position and a major victory for the party in its efforts to 
institutionalize itself overseas. 
The KMT was also expanding as an organization within the Philippines. In its report to the 
Seventh National Party Congress in Taiwan in October 1952, the zongzhibu described the period 
from 1948 onwards, following its “bloody struggle” with the left from 1945 to 1947, as one of first 
“bitterly holding on” (kucheng 苦撐) and then “flourishing” (pengbo 蓬勃). At 7,369 in late 1952, 
the party’s membership was within several hundred of its prewar peak. 13 zhibu had been formed 
throughout the archipelago, with a further 128 fenbu underneath them. Party activities ranged from 
fundraising campaigns in support of Nationalist troops to instructional classes for party cadres to 
the organizing of “observation and study” (kaocha 考察) visits to Taiwan from June 1950 onwards. 
In the opposite direction, from Nanjing or Taipei to Manila, flowed guidance on how to coordinate 
ideological activism between the periphery and the center: detailed instructions, for example, on 
using the term gongfei and suffix “fei” in party newspapers when referring the CCP and its leaders 
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From 1948 onwards, two of the Philippines’ four Chinese dailies, the Kong Li Po (Gongli bao 公
理報) and Great China Press (Dazhonghua ribao 大中華日報), with a readership of about 10,000, 
served as the party’s main propaganda organs.23 Among Chinese schools, the party estimated that 
it had very close ties to 84 out of 136 boards of directors. These schools, together with provincial 
chambers of commerce, constituted the twin pillars of KMT strength in the Philippines.24 
Also growing in strength at the time was the Nationalist Embassy, an institution that traced 
its origins to the establishment of a Chinese Consulate in the Philippines in 1898.25 Following the 
Treaty of Amity, ROC-Philippine relations received a further boost in July 1949 when Chiang Kai-
shek, having just resigned as President of the ROC in January, visited the Philippines as Chairman 
of the KMT and at the invitation of President Elpidio Quirino to discuss preliminary plans for an 
anticommunist “Pacific Pact,” similar to NATO.26 Though nothing came of these plans, the optics 
of this visit and Chiang’s continuing identification with the ROC as a quasi-head of state enhanced 
the ROC’s reputation in the Philippines and stimulated anticommunist initiatives among Chinese 
leaders. Buoyed by the strong diplomatic ties and in keeping with the ROC’s emphasis on overseas 
Chinese affairs as a central aspect of its foreign policy, the Embassy took it upon itself to speak up 
on issues relating to Chinese society, from opposing legal restrictions on “alien” economic activity 
to showing its support for the Philippine government’s efforts to root out communists and other 
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“undesirables.”27 Compared to the Embassy, the Chamber came across as quiescent and ineffectual. 
The expanding influence of the KMT and Embassy, on top of fears of Chinese communism locally 
and abroad, brought about a more explicit ideological stance on the part of the Chinese community. 
 
The Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement 
Founded in January 1951, the awkwardly-titled Philippine-Chinese United Organization in 
Support of Anti-Communist Movement (Feilübin huaqiao fangong kang’e houyuanhui 菲律賓華
僑反共抗俄後援會, or ACM) was one of the most visible efforts by Chinese leaders in the 1950s 
to bolster their credentials as good anticommunists and loyal Philippine residents. The ACM was 
formed at the height of an anti-Red conjuncture of events in East Asia, including the White Terror 
in Taiwan and formation of CUFA, that the Chinese Civil War, the outbreak of the Korean War, 
and China’s entry into the latter helped create. In the Philippines, government-led anticommunist 
initiatives such as CUFA were reinforced by different forms of civic associationism, including the 
Philippine Anti-Communist League (PACL), a organization founded and led by retired US Army 
Major Frank Tenny and dominated by Americans and Filipinos. Following the visit of a Philippine-
Chinese delegation to Taiwan in August 1950 – the first of its kind by a huaqiao community – the 
ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping urged those who had gone on the trip to form an anticommunist 
organization, which would “display the facts of their anticommunism” (biaoxian huaqiao fangong 
zhi shishi 表現華僑反共之事實) to the Philippine state.28 The objective of the ACM, he explained 
in an official news release, was to “redouble and coordinate the efforts of the Chinese nationals in 
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the Philippines in aiding their legitimate government, now temporarily seated in Taiwan, to which 
they have all along manifested their loyalty, in its determined struggle against this evil force of 
Communist aggression.” As the first organization of its kind among overseas Chinese, it was meant 
to inspire Chinese in other countries to “[unite] together in the same manner so as to achieve greater 
strength to bring about the early defeat of Communism.” The ACM welcomed Filipinos. It had 
secured the support of President Quirino and its 25 Standing Committee members were approved 
by Chiang Kai-Shek himself;29 these 25 then nominated the Executive Committee and chaired its 
four subcommittees.30 
 Backed by the ROC Embassy, the ACM united under the banner of “anticommunism and 
resisting Russia” (fangong kang’e 反共抗俄) members of the two largest Chinese organizations 
in the country. Alfonso Sycip, who had just stepped down as President of the General Chamber in 
1950 after a record eight consecutive terms in office and ten in total (1934-1935; 1937-1941; 1946-
1949),31 was elected the Movement’s Chairman. Although not a KMT member, he was very much 
the ideal person to lead an organization that sought to gain favor with both the Philippine and ROC 
governments. Born in the Philippines in 1883 and fluent in both English and Chinese, Sycip was 
a naturalized Philippine citizen, and one of the richest men in the country, having made his fortune 
from the import and export business. During the occupation, he was detained by the Japanese for 
a year and then released on account of his old age. Unlike his counterparts who were forced to join 
the Chinese Association, Sycip fled to remote Fuga Island, where he remained until the end of the 
                                                 
29 “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 25, IMH Archives. 
 
30 Charter of the Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement, RG 84, Series: 
Classified General Records, 1946-1961, Box 32, Folder: 350.21 Communism in the Philippines, January 1950-June 
1951, NARA.  
 





war.32 He was also on personal terms with Filipino and ROC politicians, including Chiang, whom 
he was known to have met with in Taipei to plead for the release of innocent Chinese charged with 
being communists.33 
 Until the 1950s, however, Sycip had never been very nationalistic, certainly not compared 
to party ideologues. At the height of the Second Sino-Japanese War, he only reluctantly supported 
the campaign to boycott Japanese goods that more ideological, KMT-aligned Chinese leaders had 
pressured the Chamber to launch. In 1939, with the boycott taking its toll on Chinese commerce, 
Sycip told a gathering of Chinese businessmen that they should “regain their primary mission [as 
businessmen]” and “must not be excessively indulged in military and political affairs.”34 After the 
war, Sycip resumed his leadership of the General Chamber and remained disengaged from China 
politics until 1951, his friendship with Chiang notwithstanding. Only after becoming Chairman of 
the ACM did he start taking firm ideological positions in public, and thus it is in the context of the 
political climate of the times that his shift in public behavior must be understood.  
 Among the ACM’s four Vice-Chairmen were the incumbent President of the Chamber, Sy 
En, and Gonzalo Gawhok 吳金聘, who had led the August 1950 delegation to Taiwan. Sycip, Sy, 
Vice-Chairmen Yu Khe Thai and Yao Shiong Shio, and Standing Committee member Peter Lim 
林為白 were official advisers to the ROC Embassy on matters concerning the Chinese community 
such as communist infiltration, criminal activity, and the guilt or innocence of Chinese charged by 
the state with being communists or criminals. The remaining Standing Committee members were 
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mostly businessmen and General Chamber members, except for those who represented the media 
and education, two other important sectors of Chinese society. These included Go Puan Seng 吳
重生, Publisher of the Fookien Times (Xinmin ribao 新閩日報), which Sycip had helped found in 
1925, and Ong Chuan Seng. Shih I-Sheng, the zongzhibu’s Secretary-General at the time, was also 
on the Standing Committee.35 He and 11 others, including Sy, Yao, Gawhok, and Ong, were also 
members of the KMT, whose principal figures in the Philippines were all part of the ACM. 
Following its founding, the ACM focused on fundraising in support of the ROC, building 
its membership beyond Manila, and propagandizing in support of anticommunism in both the ROC 
and the Philippines. According to its charter, branches would be asked to make monthly and special 
“national salvation” contributions to its general headquarters in Manila. Chen Chih-ping, the ROC 
Ambassador, estimated that five million pesos could be raised this way. Some of this money would 
be channeled secretly to Taiwan, bypassing the foreign exchange controls that the Philippines had 
put in place.36 Chinese leaders had also earmarked a significant portion of these contributions for 
President Quirino’s National Peace Fund, which had been established in September 1950 to solicit 
private donations in support of operations against the Huks.37 Contributions to such projects were 
a straightforward means by which wealthy Chinese proved their value to their host government, 
performed good citizenship, and assuaged Filipino doubts about their political inclinations.  
The highlight of the ACM’s early years was its tour of the southern Philippines from March 
27 to April 5, 1951 led by Sycip, Sy, Yao, and ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping. The tour aimed 
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to establish branches of the organization in provinces like Iloilo, Cebu, Davao, and Cotabato (much 
in the same way that the KMT had done with its own branches), induct new members, and raise 
funds for the ROC through schemes such as the selling of “patriotic bonds” (aiguo gongzhai 愛國
公債). Chen did not specify in his report how much had been raised, but said instead that the results 
of the tour were not quantifiable and that the tour had made an enduring impact on anticommunist 
cooperation between the two governments.38 Statistics compiled by the ROC’s Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Commission indicate that the Philippine Chinese made 251,096.14 US dollars in “patriotic 
voluntary contributions” (aiguo zidong juanxian 愛國自動捐獻) to the ROC in 1951 – the highest 
amount by far among all Chinese communities overseas that year.39 
 The ACM also propagandized in local newspapers to raise its profile among Chinese and 
Filipinos. Go Puan Seng’s Fookien Times Yearbook was a favorite platform because it was a dual-
language publication and ideal for reaching out to a wide audience. As the designated spokesperson 
for the ACM, Sycip took frequently to the pages of the Yearbook to inveigh against communism, 
drawing upon a common pool of talking points that the ROC used to reach out to overseas Chinese 
communities. In its 1952 edition, for example, he wrote about “The Role of the Overseas Chinese 
in the Worldwide Struggle against Communism.” Besides urging huaqiao in the Philippines and 
elsewhere to strengthen their anticommunist beliefs, help the authorities root out communism, and 
assist Taiwan in every possible way, he also criticized other Southeast Asian governments for not 
recognizing and reacting to the Red threat “in as clear and as energetic a manner as the Philippines.” 
The same piece also allowed Sycip to update readers on ACM’s achievements. Since its formation, 
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it had formed 50 provincial chapters and begun an “extensive educational campaign,” comprising 
sponsoring newspaper articles, distributing literature, and hosting speakers in Chinese schools.40 
A year later, he wrote another hortatory piece called “An Appeal to the People of Free Nations,” 
which contained practical suggestions on how ordinary people could help their governments fight 
communism. One was helping people who had been “forced to become Communists return to the 
fold of democracy.” The other was reporting communists to the authorities. But, Sycip cautioned, 
with one eye on the Philippine situation, it was important to avoid false accusations.41 
 For Philippine Chinese like Sycip and other members of the ACM’s Standing Committee, 
anticommunism as an ideology and socio-political movement (the elimination of communists from 
the Philippines; the retaking of China from the CCP) was inseparable from the fashioning of one’s 
public identity as a “respectable,” ideologically correct “alien.” The complex relationship between 
these commitments was evident at a Committee meeting in December 1951 that Ambassador Chen 
attended and reported on. Materials that shed light on the internal workings of such organizations 
are hard to come by; Chen’s report thus deserves close scrutiny for what it says about the sensitivity 
of Chinese actors to the ideological climate and how important being perceived in the right way to 
the right authorities was to the ACM. 
 The occasion for the meeting seems to have been Britain’s continued recognition of the 
PRC despite Winston Churchill’s becoming Prime Minister for the second time in October 1951. 
The main topic for discussion at the meeting was not, however, Churchill’s “betrayal” (chumai 出
賣) of the ROC, but Sy En’s proposal that the ACM change its English name to that of a charitable 
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organization in case the PRC entered the United Nations and Manila recognized Beijing. Were this 
scenario to unfold, the Movement, under a different registered name, would still be able to collect 
donations from Chinese to support anticommunism in the Philippines and Taiwan. Sy’s pragmatic 
suggestion met with impassioned reactions from the other Standing Committee members. Dy Huan 
Chay 李煥彩, the only other person who supported it, believed that it would help protect Chinese 
society and was in accordance with popular views. Most, however, resolutely opposed this change. 
Chen denounced Sy as “myopic” (yanguang duanshi 眼光短視) and his proposal as a “cowardly 
compromise” (pasi tuoxie 怕死妥協), as he was obliged to do as a representative of the ROC. Yao 
Shiong Shio said that since the ACM’s aimed to oppose communism, a change in its name would 
render it meaningless; in any case, Chiang had appointed the Committee and thus had the final say 
on the proposal. Say Kok Chuan asserted that acting in response to what he called “Anglo-French 
imperialist schemes to sell out Taiwan” would signal to others that the Philippine Chinese had flip-
flopped. Chen echoed this concern when he said that since Quirino had approved the organization, 
changing its name would suggest to both the ROC and Philippines that the ACM’s core ideology 
had changed. In the end, the ACM did not change its name at that time. The last word belonged to 
Sycip, who acknowledged Sy and Say’s concerns but sided with the status quo. “Whatever happens 
to Taiwan in the future,” he said, “we Chinese in the Philippines should adhere to the Philippine 
environment. As it is an anticommunist country, the name of the organization does not need to be 
changed.”42  
Despite the accusations of cowardice that Chen and Yao leveled against Sy and Dy, the 
dispute was not between pragmatists and ideologues. It should be read instead as an affirmation of 
                                                 





how anticommunist credentials mattered to Philippine-Chinese elites in the early 1950s. Both sides 
at the meeting were ideologues and pragmatically concerned about the optical significance of their 
organization’s English name to the Filipino public. Their heated discussion was based on a mutual 
acknowledgement of anticommunism’s importance at the time. Where they differed was over the 
expediency of this name change and the relationship between local and international developments. 
Sy and his opponents disagreed over whether or not a change in name, given the ROC’s uncertain 
international status, served common anticommunist aims or indicated weakness and cowardice. 
Sycip’s summary remarks reminded everyone present that official attitudes toward communism in 
the Philippines should take precedence over the ROC’s status. Retaining “anticommunism” was 
pragmatic in view of the ideological position of the Philippine government and the perception of 
ideological commitment that the organization wished to create.   
 
Criminal anticommunists: Shih I-Sheng, Edward Lim, and the KMT 
 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, challenges to the social order and reputation of Chinese 
elites in the Philippines came from within and beyond the elite class, manifesting themselves in a 
variety of forms ranging from smuggling and profiteering to blackmail and gossip-mongering. The 
efforts of elites to burnish their reputations as law-abiding residents of the country and to inoculate 
themselves against charges of criminal or communist activities were a perpetual uphill struggle. 
The next two sections examine the dynamics of this struggle by focusing on those who practiced 
anticommunism in their own, oftentimes illegal ways, coming into conflict with established elites 
in the process.  
 Two such men, Shih I-Sheng and Edward Lim, emerged from within the KMT. Chapter 1 




Volunteers in the Philippines (CVP), his role in helping rebuild the Philippine KMT after the war, 
and involvement in the September 5, 1946 raids on alleged Chinese communist organizations. He 
served as the party’s Secretary-General from 1948 to October 1951, when his criminal activities 
and duplicity finally caught up with him and he resigned from his position before going on a “world 
tour” of the United States, Central and Latin America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Shih returned 
to the Philippines in April 1952 and remained on the party’s Executive Committee well into the 
1950s.43  
Edward Lim, Shih’s contemporary, hailed from a very different background. Lim claimed 
to have been born in Shanghai, but ROC and American sources suggest that he was instead born 
in Pyongyang and grew up in China. Having studied pharmacy in the United States, Lim served in 
the US army in World War I and then returned to China to practice medicine. Prior to arriving in 
the Philippines around the same time as Shih did, he served as a doctor with the rank of Lieutenant-
General under pro-Chiang warlord Yang Sen, through which he acquired a Chinese passport and 
became involved in KMT intelligence activities. He spent World War II in the company of anti-
Japanese guerrillas on Panay island, and engaged in anti-Japanese broadcasting. Because of his 
fluency in Chinese and English, the KMT employed him after the war as an intermediary between 
the party and the Philippine government. Until June 27, 1950, he was, in his own words, the party’s 
“General Secretary of Foreign Relations” (Waiwu zongganshi 外務總幹事), but was then demoted 
to a “liaison officer” after claiming to speak on behalf of the entire party to the government. Our 
trail on him runs cold around the same time that Shih left for the United States, at which point Lim, 
once described as “thoroughly pro-American” by US intelligence, was now under investigation by 
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the Philippine authorities on suspicions of being a communist. The outcome of this investigation 
is unknown, but Lim does not appear to have been arrested and deported to Taiwan. He likely 
remained in the Philippines and faded into obscurity, beyond the grasp of its justice system as so 
many were.44  
 Shih and Lim were not typical KMT members like Sy En or Yao Shiong Shio whose social 
status owed chiefly to their commercial wealth.45 Each was a relative latecomer to the Philippines. 
Shih was less of an outsider than Lim was because he and over 80 percent of Philippine Chinese 
at the time were from southern Fujian.46 With a common surname (施) that he shared with the likes 
of Sy En, Shih may have had relatives and have benefited from the services of his clan association 
in the country.47 But neither he nor Lim were members of the General Chamber of Commerce and 
possessed the wealth that was needed to forge durable social ties: regardless of what commercial 
dealings they had, both were basically political operatives rather than merchants. Descriptions of 
Shih make it clear that he was never accepted as an insider, even by his own party. US intelligence 
denigrated him as a “thorough-going opportunist whose proprietary attitude toward the party has 
been a matter of concern to the Chinese Embassy,” possessing an “arrogant personality,” and being 
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disliked by the Chamber.48 His own Embassy described him as a “swindler and bluffer” (zhaoyao 
zhuangpian 招搖撞騙) fond of “speculation” (maikong maikong 買空賣空), claiming that he only 
became a KMT Standing Committee member and then Secretary-General because others were too 
busy running their own businesses and organizations to devote their full attention to party affairs. 
Moreover, they hoped that Shih’s “foolhardy and extravagant” (yuyong haochu fengtou 愚勇好出
風頭) behavior might be useful to them. Consequently, left to run the party, Shih frequently got 
away with issuing orders contrary to party regulations, without the prior knowledge or consent of 
his fellow Standing Committee members.49  
 What Shih and Lim did have going for them were affiliation with the KMT and skills that 
were valuable to the state at a time of heightened ideological tensions in the Philippines. By virtue 
of his guerrilla activities during the occupation, Shih had built up connections with US and Filipino 
military and intelligence officials that he would continue to exploit in the years to come. His party’s 
reputation was high among the police and intelligence agencies because of its role in helping them 
combat the Chinese left after the war.  
 Shih’s background as both an anticommunist and intelligence operative helped him carve 
out a special but temporary role for himself within Philippine society. Although he did not hold a 
leadership position in the ACM, he represented the Chinese community in Frank Tenny’s PACL, 
which he was a Vice-Chairman of. Through the PACL, Shih cultivated ties with leading Filipino 
anticommunists such as Colonel Agustin Gabriel of NICA and CUFA Chairman Tito V. Tizon,50 
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becoming the go-to person within the Philippine intelligence community on Chinese communism. 
To burnish his reputation even further, Shih was also the Publisher of Free China Magazine, which 
was staffed by KMT members and written in English so as to keep his contacts in the government 
abreast of the party’s propaganda work and cooperation with the authorities. Its “Double Tenth” 
issue in 1951 featured photographs of Shih donating radio sets to the Philippine Army and gifts of 
food, wine, and cigarettes to Philippine soldiers returning from Korea. Shih was also described as 
participating, alongside Tenny, in a PACL rally in Tacloban, Leyte.51 Much like Sycip’s articles 
in the Fookien Times Yearbook, print publications such as Free China Magazine were less about 
their content than maintaining the visibility of particular individuals and institutions. But whereas 
Sycip and the ACM targeted a general public, Shih’s audience was more specific. Lacking Sycip’s 
wealth and connections to Chinese and Filipino society, Shih sought to impress a different social 
circle from Sycip’s.   
 From the late 1940s, by which time the Chinese communists in the Philippines had left the 
country or gone underground, the intelligence Shih that provided to his Filipino contacts was poor 
at best and often maliciously false. Invited by Tizon to testify before CUFA on June 18, 1950, Shih 
avoided any analysis of Chinese communism and lapsed into fearmongering. Corruption within 
the Philippine government was similar to that in China three years earlier, he declared. The security 
situation in the islands was so bad that in three years time, “the Philippines will be overcome by 
the communists.” The Philippine government, he said, “cannot deal with the Huks. If we Chinese 
were allowed to do so, we would be able to get rid of them in a very short time.” This was a self-
aggrandizing boast aimed at fueling the anticommunist climate that Shih’s social status and career 
                                                 
 





depended on. Substantiating his claims with good evidence proved problematic. On one occasion, 
Shih claimed that the CCP had secreted a staggering 200 million US dollars into the Philippines.52 
On another, he wrote to the US Embassy warning that a hundred or more Chinese communists, 
mostly Wha Chi guerrillas, were posing as security guards at Clark Air Base and were stealing and 
selling arms to the Huks. Shih provided no evidence to back up this claim and did not respond to 
a request for details on these alleged Reds. Four days later, the Embassy received a verbatim copy 
of the same letter, on the same KMT letterhead, signed by Edward Lim, who likewise said nothing 
more about it.53  
When Shih did furnish the authorities with lists of Chinese communists, the names on them 
were of individuals whom he was unable to extort money from or against whom he had a grudge.54 
Shih’s criminal activities were intertwined with more respectable anticommunist practices such as 
civic associationism, self-fashioning through the media, and information-mongering because the 
social and political gains resulting from these practices put him in a position of power vis-à-vis 
other Chinese. As KMT Secretary-General, his words carried weight among those in the Philippine 
state with the coercive, legal, and illegal means to affect Chinese society. Lim Tian Seng’s letter 
to Magsaysay shows that Chinese at the time knew well that Shih was well-connected to Philippine 
intelligence and military officials. Lacking these connections, his targets often found it simpler to 
pay him off rather than risk being harassed, arrested, and deported by the authorities: an instance 
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of how, in the early 1950s Philippines, losing personal wealth to a blackmailer was preferable to 
risking one’s reputation as a law-abiding, non-communist Chinese resident of the country.  
 The importance of reputation to Chinese individuals and organizations in the Philippines 
was underscored once again by Shih’s downfall, which was brought about by a combination of his 
own missteps, internal feuding within the KMT, and cooperation between the Philippine and ROC 
authorities. Sometime in the middle of 1951, Pua Chin Tao 潘行素, leader of the Philippine chapter 
of the Chinese Youth Anticommunist and Resist Russia League, accused Shih of breaking the law. 
Shih, who was by then already under investigation by the government, retorted in typical fashion 
by forging a communist memorandum featuring the signatures of well-known Philippine-Chinese 
Reds who had fled to China, and placing it in Pua’s possession. The letter “revealed” that Chinese 
communists had infiltrated military intelligence and had established an assassination squad whose 
targets included four Philippine politicians and Shih himself. It also spoke of a submarine base on 
Hainan Island that the CCP planned to use to conduct covert operations in Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and other parts of Southeast Asia. When the Philippine authorities obtained this letter, 
they suspected that Shih was behind it and sought the Embassy’s cooperation in dealing with him. 
Unlike cases of suspected communists or other “undesirables,” Shih’s case involved the highest-
ranking KMT official in the Philippines. By sanctioning his deportation to Taiwan, as the DND 
hoped to do, the Embassy would have compromised the reputation of the KMT in the country even 
further at a difficult time for the party, Taiwan, and Chinese society. Citing an ancient proverb on 
the need for “brothers quarrelling at home” to “join forces against external attacks” (xiongdi xi 
qiang, wai yu qi wu兄弟鬩墻, 外御其侮), it decided not to support Shih’s deportation. Instead, it 




the Philippine government to allow him to leave the country.55 Separately, a committee of KMT 
elders from Taiwan, including Chiang Ching-kuo, intervened in the quarrel between Pua and Shih 
and persuaded each to withdraw his accusation against the other.56  
 The case of Edward Lim offers useful parallels with Shih’s and, in particular, sheds further 
light on the roles of the media and publicity in the self-fashioning of one’s identity as a Chinese 
“leader,” or qiaoling 僑領, in the Philippines. Many Chinese, wrote KMT educator Chen Lieh-fu 
陳烈甫 on his first visit to the country in 1948, described themselves or were described as qiaoling, 
owing to the proliferation of Chinese social organizations there.57 Lim was one such self-described 
qiaoling. In January 1947, at the urging of then-KMT Secretary-General Koa Chun-te, he founded 
the Philippines-China Cultural Association (Zhong Fei wenhua xiehui 中菲文化協會, or PCCA) 
to “promote trust and understanding” between Chinese and Filipinos through the study of Tagalog, 
Chinese, and the history, customs, and culture of both countries, and by helping Filipino students 
in pursuing their higher education in China. On paper, the PCCA boasted impressive credentials. 
Secretary of the Interior and hardline anticommunist Jose Zulueta served as its President and Lim 
its Secretary. Also on its Board of Directors were the likes of Yu Khe Thai, Chua Lamco, Mayor 
of Manila Valeriano E. Fugoso, Justice Alexander Reyes, Albino Sycip, Senator Quintin Paredes, 
and Manila’s Chief of Police Lamberto T. Javalera. Its regular members included KMT bigwigs 
such as Shih, military police commanders, provincial governors, educators, and journalists. It had 
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branches in the provinces and was supported by the KMT and Embassy, although not the Chamber 
of Commerce.58 
 The PCCA also published a monthly magazine, the Philippines-China Cultural Journal, 
which featured poems, fiction (including a serialized version of Lim’s novel, “Two Beauties of the 
South”), inspirational quotations, and articles on assorted topics such as Philippine-China relations, 
opera in the Philippines, and “Manchuria, China’s Mindanao.” Lim’s contributions to the journal 
included “Oriental Democracy,” which argued that democratic freedoms had taken root in ancient 
China, and “Why Americans are Reluctant to Help China.” The latter, written in late 1947 reflected 
the darkening, conspiratorial mood among ROC partisans at the time. It warned that if China fell 
to the CCP, the rest of Asia would soon follow, and spoke of the American government and society 
being “honey-combed with Moscow-paid agents” seeking their destruction. The journal was not 
explicitly political in the way that Free China Magazine was. Anticommunism was, rather, both 
the subject of occasional pieces such as the above and encoded into several others, from “Oriental 
Democracy’ to Chinese proverbs emphasizing filial piety to an essay on the role of women in the 
ROC’s war effort to an article by Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s on the New Life Movement.59  
 Beyond publishing this journal and establishing provincial branches, the PCCA did little. 
In the provinces, PCCA activities seem to have been occasions for Lim to eat, drink, and socialize 
with Filipino and Chinese officials. In practice, promoting “trust and understanding” between the 
two ethnic groups was limited to the forging of personal ties between the PCCA’s founder and a 
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few of its supporters like Zulueta whose patronage kept the association afloat and who might also 
pen the occasional article for its journal. The vast majority of its members, including the likes of 
Albino Sycip and Chua Lamco, appear to have contributed nothing to it except their names. By 
the time Lim was demoted from his position within the KMT in June 1950, it was apparent that 
the PCCA was one front among several for Lim’s illegal activities. The erstwhile KMT “General 
Secretary of Foreign Relations” also headed two other professional-sounding organizations, the 
“Southeast Asia Association” and the “Edward Lim Hospital” in Davao, where Lim owned only a 
small drugstore). Through them, Lim extorted around 50,000 pesos from Chinese residents in the 
southern Philippines. His modus operandi was virtually identical to Shih’s. The Embassy obtained 
a letter that he wrote to one of his victims, which went simply as follows: 
Recently, someone has reported to the Defense Department that you have close connections 
to underground communist agents. I heard that the Department has ordered your arrest. I 
am shocked at this news and hope to reach a compromise with the authorities before this 
happens. What are your views on this? Please reply to my letter as soon as possible.60   
 
More so than Shih, Lim participated actively in the culture of intelligence-trafficking and 
rumor-mongering within Chinese society at the time. One of his many targets, it appears, was Shih 
himself – although sadly, no further details are available on this conflict. Ambassador Chen Chih-
ping was also on the receiving end of Lim’s accusations during the period when Lim was under 
investigation by the Philippine and ROC authorities. In October 1950, Lim reported to NICA that 
a communist agent was working in the Embassy to facilitate the escape of Chinese communists 
from the Philippines, and had secured his employment on the recommendation of Chen’s Jinan 
University classmate Young Ching-tong, a former Chinese communist leader in the Philippines. 
Two months later, Lim retracted this claim and instead accused the Embassy, the KMT, and the 
                                                 





Chamber of shielding a man named Gordon Lee, whom the Philippine authorities had found guilty 
of smuggling arms to China and would soon deport to Taiwan.61 By April 1951, Lim’s accusatory 
counteroffensive against his persecutors had fizzled out. A last-ditch appeal by his son Daniel to, 
of all people, Soong Meiling, was met with a firm response from Chen to Soong detailing Lim’s 
crimes. In a doubly ironic twist, Lim, by all accounts a committed Nationalist, was now tarred with 
the same brush that he had used against others despite a conspicuous lack of evidence proving that 
he was a communist.62 
 
The threat from “society”: Antonio Chua Cruz and his Chinese operatives 
 Shih and Lim’s personal rivalry, as exemplified by the identical letters that each sent to the 
US Embassy in quick succession, sheds light on the competitive, mimetic nature of anticommunist 
accumulation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Anticommunism was not a limited resource, the 
scramble for which yielded only overt social conflict with clear winners and losers. Organizations 
such as the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement and the PCCA could coexist with each other and 
overlap in membership and social function, without mutual antagonism. Yet certain practices of 
accumulation such as finger-pointing and rumor-mongering did result in social gains for some at 
the expense of others and could likewise backfire on their exponents, as the downfall of Shih and 
Lim shows. Providing intelligence to the authorities on Chinese communism was inherently risky 
and competitive because no one person or group enjoyed a monopoly on access to these authorities 
and inaccurate intelligence could result in a swift reversal of one’s social status. The state’s limited 
capacity to surveil the Chinese community created opportunities for all manner of Chinese social 
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actors to prove their utility their country of residence and further their own social and political 
ambitions in the process.  
 One such group of actors was, until November 1951, employed by the Military Intelligence 
Service and led by Antonio Chua Cruz. Born in Jinjiang as Cai Wobai 蔡我柏, Cruz was banished 
from his home village at the age of 16 for an unspecified crime and subsequently joined a gang in 
Shishi that menaced villages in Fujian and engaged in smuggling along the southern coast of China. 
After the leader of this gang was arrested in 1932, Cruz escaped to the Philippines, where his father 
lived, and registered himself as Cai Jie 蔡捷. Multiple such aliases and the absence of standardized 
Romanized forms of their Chinese names made it difficult for the state to keep tabs on persons like 
him. Cruz later faked his Philippine citizenship and obtained a fake passport. During World War 
II, he headed the overseas department of the puppet Chinese Association and profited from helping 
Japanese naval intelligence against the Chinese resistance. Immediately following the war, he was 
shot by several Chinese snipers for collaboration, but survived to further his career in crime.63 
 Cruz’s postwar criminal network started from the very top of the military establishment in 
Major-General Calixto Duque, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces. Besides Duque, 
Cruz also counted among his friends Secretary of Justice Jose Bengzon, Senators Mariano Cuenco 
and Macario Peralta, and Speaker of the House Eugenio Perez. How he forged these friendships is 
unclear. The intelligence gathered on him by the ROC Embassy describes his “beautiful” Filipina 
second wife as being close to Bengzon and implies that she played no small role in her husband’s 
social prominence. Through his personal ties to Duque, Cruz secured the appointment of George 
Co 許劍峰, Ching Boc 莊興提, and Celestino Cua 柯翠山 as MIS agents at a time when it badly 
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needed Chinese speakers. Claiming that they had in their possession a list of 3,000 communists 
that their new employer had furnished them with, and working closely with a Filipino MIS agent 
named De la Pena, Cruz’s associates engaged in the blackmail and extortion of money from local 
Chinese, proceeds from which went to Cruz’s own organization and into the pockets of Duque and 
his crony, Chief of Intelligence Ismael Lapus. By late 1951, Cruz’s gang had obtained 1.5 million 
pesos in this manner. Besides these activities, Cruz’s gang also reported on the ROC and KMT’s 
activities in the Philippines to MIS, in effect helping the military play off one group of informants 
against another and avoid overdependence on any particular source.64  
 Cruz’s other anticommunist practices after 1945 also resembled those of Lim and Shih, 
except that there is no evidence to suggest that he had any ounce of belief in the Nationalist cause. 
A self-founded, appropriately-titled social organization, the Free Asia Publishing House, served 
as the pretext for Cruz to strong-arm individuals into paying him money – in this case advertising 
fees for its journal, the Free Asia Magazine – or be denounced as a communist to the state.65 At a 
time when visits to Taiwan were becoming increasingly popular in the Philippines, Cruz planned 
one for Filipino journalists in the name of promoting “Sino-Philippine relations” and promised to 
pay a part of their traveling costs. When the ROC Embassy refused to grant him clearance for the 
trip, Cruz not only pocketed the money that the unsuspecting journalists had given him, but also 
retaliated against Chen Chih-ping, an easy target for criminals like him and Edward Lim.66 In June 
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1951, he leaked rumors to The Bullseye tabloid that the ACM was harboring communists and that 
Chen had promised the five million pesos that he had received from the Chinese community during 
the early years of the Korean War to the Movement. Chen, it turned out, had friends on the paper’s 
board of directors, who withdrew the article immediately.67 
 Several months after his failed attack on Chen, Cruz met his political demise. In late 1951, 
Cruz’s associates were arrested and Cruz himself, not for the first time, targeted for assassination 
– this time via a bomb. After surviving yet again an attempt on his life, he reported to the authorities 
that cigarette tycoon and ACM member Peter Lim was responsible for it. Lim had apparently paid 
a communist called Tang Huancheng 唐煥成 to kill Cruz, but this would-be assassin was one of 
Cruz’s lackeys at the Free China Publishing House whom Cruz was quite willing to betray to save 
his own skin. When the authorities arrested Tang at his home, they found 18 telegrams about secret 
arbitrage agreements with communist banks in Hong Kong. Tang, defending himself, said that the 
Cruz had forged these telegrams to extort money from Chinese businessmen. He also declared that 
he had refused Cruz’s attempts to bribe him into confessing that the documents were authentic and 
that Lim had ordered the bombing. In desperation, Cruz first accused a CVP member – whom he 
said was a communist, despite his membership in a KMT organization – and then special agents 
of the Embassy of trying to assassinate him. Who actually did so and who ordered it will remain a 
mystery. But by this point, the government had figured him out and, after an investigation, charged 
him for forging his identification documents and on multiple counts of bribery and blackmail. In 
January 1952, Cruz was arrested and sent before the Deportation Board, which ordered him to be 
deported to Taiwan.68  
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It was symptomatic of the political environment in the Philippines at the time that criminals 
who made a living from accusing others of being communists frequently ended up labeled as Reds 
themselves. Cruz himself merely “lacked a patriotic and national mentality” (haowu guojia minzu 
guannian 毫無國家民族觀念), according to the ROC authorities, but his associates were accused 
of being communists and formerly of the Wha Chi. In its recommendation to the President that he 
deport them, the Deportation Board said that they had propagandized and solicited contributions 
for Chinese communists in the Philippines, attended their meetings, and maintained relations with 
Chinese Reds previously based there. Ching Boc and Celestino Cua were charged with employing 
blackmail and forgery to extort money from an Ong Wei Hong, who, after refusing to pay the men, 
was arrested by the police for having in his possession a (forged) communist pamphlet. Ching and 
Cua were also reported to have delivered to one Lim Po the equivalent of one million renminbi for 
remittance to China, and then demanded from Lim 10,000 pesos to “fix” his violation of exchange 
control regulations; the amount would be used to bribe not only MIS chiefs but also Magsaysay. 
George Co and six other unnamed men had also posed as MIS agents and threatened to arrest the 
wife of a Chinese businessman unless she paid them – which she did. Police raids on their houses 
had yielded large quantities of guns and ammunition, which they did not have licenses for.69   
 
Conclusion 
 Coming from very different class backgrounds, Alfonso Sycip, Shih I-Sheng, Edward Lim, 
and Antonio Chua Cruz participated in the creation of a highly localized Cold War social order in 
the early postcolonial Philippines. Of them, perhaps Shih and Lim were true Cold Warriors, given 
                                                 
 





their involvement in the KMT. But how far they were committed to eradicating communism and 
to the ROC’s counterattack against mainland China is besides the point. I argue here that Chinese 
anticommunism as a social phenomenon was more than about opposing real Chinese communists. 
It was also a strategy by which huaqiao adapted to being minority residents of a country that was 
hostile to communism and often also to its Chinese population. At a time when Filipino suspicions 
of Chinese as “un-Filipino” communists ran high, Sycip, Shih, Lim, and Cruz engaged in practices 
of ideological accommodation to forge reputations as anticommunists in the eyes of their host state 
and to exploit the political environment for personal and social gain. While they might never have 
been able to overcome their racial and cultural distinctiveness, they could perform their conformity 
to Filipino norms and prove themselves useful to anticommunism as a nation-building project.  
 This chapter has examined multiple practices of ideological accommodation that cut across 
the social classes and factions that the four principal actors represented. Through civic associations 
such as the Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement and 
Lim’s Philippines-China Cultural Association, local Chinese secured the patronage of Filipino and 
ROC politicians and officials and raised their profiles as qiaoling in Philippine-Chinese society. 
English-language propaganda served a similarly legitimizing purpose. Through the Fookien Times 
Yearbook, Free China Magazine, and the Philippines-China Cultural Journal, Sycip, Shih, and 
Lim ensured their visibility in the public sphere and fashioned proof of their ideological credentials 
to a wide audience.  
 Ideological accommodation had a darker side and was a source of social conflict, as Shih, 
Lim, and Cruz’s criminal and ethically dubious activities thoroughly illustrate. Organizations such 
as the PCCA and Cruz’s Free Asia Publishing House masked various forms of criminal activity in 




Shih, Lim, and Cruz insinuated themselves into positions of power over their fellow Chinese that 
their non-elite social backgrounds would not normally have allowed them to hold. By leveraging 
the institutions that they were affiliated to (such as the KMT) and their connections with the state, 
they blackmailed other Chinese, threatening to accuse their targeted victims of being communists 
and planting forged evidence if they did not pay up. As the preceding sections have shown, even 
the likes of ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping and ACM Standing Committee member Peter Lim 
were vulnerable to being smeared as communists or communist sympathizers. Elites like them and 
Sycip were well aware of the harm that false accusations could pose to their reputation in society, 
and acted to ensure that their ideological credentials were beyond reproach. The respectable and 
criminal dimensions of anticommunism were, in this sense, inseparable. 
 Criminal anticommunists were of course not the only ones to accuse local Chinese of being 
communists. Chief among these accusers was the Philippine state itself, with whom the likes of 
such as Shih, Lim, and Cruz collaborated in different ways. The end of their careers and formation 
of the ACM as a bulwark against threats to the reputation of elites did not put an end to the disorder 
caused by false accusations. The culture of disinformation that they helped create persisted because 
state security organs remained dependent on intermediaries such as them to surveil Chinese society 
and continued to be vulnerable to inaccurate intelligence. No sooner had these men been dealt with 
than Chinese society was rocked by the mass arrest of around 300 Chinese on December 27, 1952. 







Mass Arrests, Disinformation, and the Politics of Anticommunism in the Philippines and 
Taiwan, 1952-1961 
 
 On December 27, 1952, Philippine military forces fanned out across the archipelago and, 
over the course of that day, arrested some 300 Chinese on charges of being communists. Well over 
half of these men – 185, according to ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping – were detained in Manila, 
with the remaining arrests taking place in Bicol, Cebu, Iloilo, and Central Luzon.1 Raids of Chinese 
homes and workplaces by the authorities were frequent occurrences in the Philippines at the time. 
In the populist imagination, the Chinese were inclined towards crime and therefore wealthy. Their 
supposed racial traits and objectively precarious legal status as non-nationals made the harassment 
of them by law enforcement officials endemic and profitable. Less frequent, though still common 
enough, were the detention and deportation of Chinese for everything from black marketeering to 
running illegal gambling and prostitution dens to illegal entry to engaging in communist activities. 
What distinguished December 27 from previous arrests was partly its scale, itself a function of the 
country’s intensified anticommunist drive under Defense Secretary Magsaysay. Never before had 
the authorities seized so many alleged Reds – Chinese or otherwise – all at once; in one journalist’s 
assessment, this was, “without doubt, the greatest single operation yet attempted” by the Military 
Intelligence Service.2 Yet because of how what Chinese society called the jinqiao an (literally, the 
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“case of the detention of huaqiao”) unfolded over the next nine years, never again would such an 
operation, on such a scale and involving only the Philippine military and not the ROC, take place. 
The jinqiao an was also distinctive because MIS claimed to have arrested the leaders of a secretive 
organization known as the Chinese Bureau.3  
 As things turned out, none of the 300 or so jinqiao were guilty of the charges against them; 
many were members of the KMT and Chinese Anti-Communist Movement. Approximately half 
were released in mid-1953, just before Deportation Board hearings against the remaining detainees 
began. More would be found innocent over time, but only in late December 1961 did the final few 
jinqiao secure their freedom thanks to the lobbying efforts of the ROC Embassy and local Chinese 
leaders over the past nine years. The only communist to be implicated in this case was Koa Chian 
柯千, a courier for the Chinese Bureau, who in fact had been arrested in April 1952. His testimony 
to MIS, when he was under duress, authenticated the evidence it needed to conduct the December 
27 arrests, and he was deported on July 26, 1957. On the ROC air force plane with Koa to Taiwan 
that day were three men, Lao Han Keng 劉漢卿, Sy Bun Chiong施文章, and Go Chi Kok吳志
國, and a 20-year old woman, Sy Yan Wan 施燕婉.4 They had been high school students in Cebu 
in the early 1950s and members of a leftist reading club, which, in response to the jinqiao an, they 
renamed the Philippine-Chinese Communist Party (Feilübin huaqiao gongchandang 菲律賓華僑
共產黨, or PCCP). In July 1954, they were arrested, their cases becoming intertwined with that of 
the jinqiao. Nine other members of this organization, which was unrelated to the Chinese Bureau, 
were arrested in early 1962. 
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 Chapter 3 is the first to examine a key procedural feature of the anticommunist relationship 
between the ROC and the Philippines. This involved the arrests of suspected Chinese communists 
(gongxian 共嫌), their trial by the Deportation Board, and their deportation to Taiwan, where they 
were sentenced as “Chinese nationals.” We have seen in the previous chapter how the likes of Shih 
I-Sheng, Edward Lim, and Antonio Chua Cruz exploited the Philippine authorities’ state’s reliance 
on local Chinese informants for information on “communists” in their midst. I use the jinqiao an 
and Cebu reading club episode to expand on this insight and explain how the multi-stage process 
of producing intelligence on gongxian and rendering them legible to both states was susceptible to 
disinformation and manipulation. In identifying, arresting, and seeking to deport the jinqiao, MIS 
relied not only on the inadequate and flawed evidence gathered by its main Chinese operative, but 
also the intentionally misleading testimony of the person whom she helped apprehend, Koa Chian. 
In the Cebu reading club case, the ROC struggled to reconcile the inconsistent and self-exculpatory 
testimonies of Lao Han Keng, Sy Bun Chiong, Go Chi Kok, and Sy Yan Wan, who downplayed 
their participation in the PCCP and attempted to shift the blame to others in the hopes of mitigating 
their sentences. I contextualize their tactics in relation to a repertoire of practices that the Chinese 
employed to confound state authority in the Philippines and the United States. 
 The deportation process was equally vulnerable to political maneuvering by the ROC and 
Chinese elites. The chapter’s secondary focus is on how Nationalist diplomats and huaqiao leaders 
responded to the arrests, the jinqiao an in particular, from 1953 to 1961. Both parties were caught 
completely unaware by the December 1952 arrests, which had been planned and executed entirely 
by the Philippine military for the purpose of legitimizing itself. This “anticommunism,” instead of 




of those invested in protecting them, necessitating bargaining with the Philippine President in order 
to secure the release of the innocent.  
 To contextualize the process by which the Philippines identified and prosecuted gongxian, 
this chapter first explains how Chinese society’s relative opacity to the state and Chinese practices 
of evading state authority presented an informational challenge for Manila and Taipei at the height 
of the Cold War. Focusing on the figure of Koa Chian, I then describe what became of the Chinese 
communist movement in the Philippines after the departure of most of its leaders from the country 
in the late 1940s. Next, the chapter narrates how MIS carried out its operation against the jinqiao 
in the months leading up to December 27, 1952, and how the Cebu reading club was founded and 
its members apprehended by the military in July 1954. Finally, I explain how ROC diplomats and 
Chinese leaders negotiated the release of the innocent jinqiao after December 27, 1952.  
 
Knowing and prosecuting Chinese communists 
Chinese society in the postcolonial Philippines did not lend itself well to probing by forces 
external to it, to being “seen” by the state, as James Scott might put it.5 Well before then, as Richard 
Chu has shown, the boundaries between “Chinese” and “Filipino” identities, once more permeable, 
had hardened.6 Social relations between these now distinct ethnic groups were complicated by the 
concentration of political power in the hands of the latter, and the perceived economic dominance 
of the former. The Jesuit anthropologist Jacques Amyot, who conducted fieldwork on the Chinese 
in Manila in the late 1950s, described in his pioneering book on the subject how 
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Few peoples are more sensitive about their privacy than the Chinese. The walls of their 
compounds and the heavily padlocked doors of their institutions are not only intended as 
protection against bandits. They also ensure the privacy of a sanctum against outsiders. To 
a Chinese, any non-Chinese is a barbarian to a certain extent. 
 
Amyot partially attributed the unintelligibility of Chinese society to outsiders to very real fears of 
exploitation by Filipinos – fears that the jinqiao an would have reinforced by the time he started 
his research. “To a Chinese,” Amyot argued, “all Filipinos are out to take advantage of him.” Any 
“nonauthorized foreigner who becomes curious about him is suspected of being a spy of some sort 
for Filipino officialdom which is considered to be ever seeking new ways of exploiting [him].” As 
a consequence, “exact statistics on Chinese personnel, institutions, enterprise, income, and the like 
are extremely unreliable.”7 To the extent that Chinese-Filipino interactions took place, whether in 
schools or through commercial dealings, they were largely dictated by the advantages to be gained: 
the goodwill and protection of, for instance, the mayor, congressman, or chief of police.8 
 Language and institutions were significant barriers for outsiders, whether Filipino, Western, 
and even Chinese – who sought to acquire information on Philippine-Chinese society. Most local 
Chinese traced their ancestry to three counties in Quanzhou province and spoke a creolized version 
of Hokkien in combination with some Tagalog and Cantonese.9 ROC officials such as Chen Chih-
ping, who was born in Hainan to a scholar-gentry family, did not speak this lingua franca and thus 
stood apart from the community by virtue of their profession and language. In the 1950s, fluency 
in Tagalog and English among lower-class Chinese was not widespread, limiting communication 
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between them and Filipinos and renderingd the likes of Koa Chian difficult subjects to interrogate. 
For outsiders, whether states and scholars, gathering and validating knowledge on Chinese society 
was difficult without intermediaries to serve as interpreters and arrange for meetings with insiders. 
Even the print media could prove opaque, despite in principle being accessible to anyone familiar 
with the Chinese script. Sociologist George Weightman, who like Amyot conducted fieldwork in 
the Philippines in the 1950s and read Chinese, commented that transliterations of English-language 
terms in Chinese newspapers were frequently non-standard and based on Hokkien. To save printed 
space and also conceal information from outsiders, many articles were also presented in an oblique 
and truncated fashion with their contexts omitted; important articles were often buried in obscure 
sections of the paper. For Weightman, intermediaries were necessary not simply as translators, but 
also to explain, for example, the long-running intracommunal feuds that underlay what appeared 
in print.10 
 Legal disputes within Chinese society, as opposed to between Chinese and Filipinos, were 
typically resolved within that society, Amyot argued, without relying on the legal mechanisms of 
the Philippine state. In part this was a question of citizenship. Court trials were also expensive and 
time-consuming and the judicial process was shot through with corruption and bureaucratic inertia. 
Disputes were thus customarily settled via arbitration, before the leaders of one’s clan association, 
with the prospect of ostracism usually sufficient to secure the litigants’ acceptance of their elders’ 
verdicts. If serious enough, or depending on the persons involved, disputes were referred upwards 
to the chamber of commerce or ROC Embassy. Only after these attempts at mediation failed were 
disputes referred to Philippine courts of law.11 Needless to say, except for the Embassy, which had 
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obligations to a formal state bureaucracy, none of the other mediating institutions have kept records 
of these disputes that are open to non-members such as researchers and the general public. Indeed, 
it may be that such records do not exist at all, and that arbitration was essentially a form of verbal 
communication, limited to within the “walls of their compounds and the heavily padlocked doors 
of their institutions.” 
 More than a matter of language, culture, or institutions, Chinese attitudes toward the state 
were shaped by the circumstances in which many Chinese entered the Philippines in the first place. 
For many, the very act of becoming part of Chinese society required circumventing state authority. 
During the Chinese Civil War, for example, the quota for Chinese immigrants seeking permanent 
residence in the country and who did not have kinship ties to Philippine citizens or past Philippine 
citizenship was only 500 annually; in June 1950, this number was reduced to 50. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, some 2,700 Chinese fleeing the Civil War bypassed these quotas by entering the country 
on visitor or student visas, finding refuge with their relatives, and then refusing to leave after their 
visas had expired.12 Migrants employed these and other practices to overcome Chinese Exclusion. 
Some simply smuggled themselves into the country. Others were coached by immigration brokers 
on how to answer questions from immigration officers that “proved” they had lived in the country 
during Spanish rule and were thus legally eligible to enter it. One could purchase forged certificates 
of residence from unscrupulous customs officials. The most sophisticated mechanism for evading 
Exclusion, writes Madeline Hsu, was what she and other scholars of Chinese immigration call the 
“paper sons” strategy, which involved entering US territory as the son (or grandson) of a resident.13 
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This involved a Chinese resident of the Philippines registering the names of his sons with the state. 
However, some of these names were fictitious and could be purchased and used by anyone wishing 
to send a son, under the age of 21, to the country. Those who entered illegally thus possessed actual 
and registered names, the latter of which were indicated in their landing and registration certificates 
and constituted their “official,” state-sanctioned identity.14 Naming practices thus represented yet 
another means by which Chinese accommodated themselves to legal scrutiny. As we will see, such 
practices could also be used to avoid the state entirely.  
 For the Philippines and Nationalist China and to a lesser extent the United States, Chinese 
society’s defensive opacity to outsiders was a problem to be solved in the age of anticommunism. 
National security interests necessitated devising methods of knowing this society, authenticating 
information on it, and then intervening in it. Episodes involving accusations of communism, as the 
activities of Shih I-Sheng, Edward Lim, and Antonio Chua Cruz suggest, were too important to be 
left to Chinese society to resolve. Such intermediaries played a vital role in helping the Philippine 
state come to terms with the “Chinese communist problem.” Sometimes in the employ of this state, 
they also operated apart from it and volunteered their skills to it (and the United States), conscious 
of the material and symbolic benefits that these ties would yield. They were indispensable despite 
the complications that arose from the authorities’ reliance on them.  
 Among these three states, the United States was the least well-informed and interventionist 
when it came to Chinese communism in the Philippines. Fears among US high officials of Chinese 
communism in Southeast Asia in general were widespread even before the CCP’s 1949 victory in 
the Civil War, and originated in British racial attitudes toward the overseas Chinese before World 
                                                 
 





War II.15 In the 1950s, at the height of the American Cold War in Asia, the US Information Service 
(USIS) and the Asia Foundation flooded the region with propaganda targeted at Chinese, seeking 
to counter similar efforts by the PRC.16 In the Philippines, US intelligence agents certainly did not 
lack for information on Chinese communists and possessed detailed reports on the organization, 
members, and activities of groups such as the Kang Fan, Lo Lian Hui, and Democratic Alliance.17 
But relative to the Huk insurgency, Chinese communism was a minor irritant: not more than two 
to three percent of a Chinese population of 200,000, estimated the Central Intelligence Agency in 
August 1950, had communist affiliations and most established Chinese businessmen were strongly 
pro-American.18  
 The US was largely content, therefore, to entrust its Philippine and ROC allies – two of its 
closest in Asia – with generating and sharing intelligence on Philippine-Chinese communism and 
acting against this dormant threat. But, as we will see, the Philippines did not always divulge what 
it knew to either the US or ROC. Although the US employed its own intermediaries, none of them 
furnished it with useful intelligence. One such informant was Julio Tan, a journalist and translator 
for the KMT-controlled Great China Press from 1947 to 1961. Tan, who speaks English, Tagalog, 
and Minnanhua fluently, was approached in a restaurant in Manila sometime in the 1950s – he has 
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forgotten exactly when – by a US Air Force Colonel named George Fong and asked if he wanted 
to work for US intelligence. Every day for the next one or two years, Tan would drive his jeep to 
the US Embassy on Roxas Boulevard to discuss developments in Chinese society. But never once 
was Tan able to provide his other employee with evidence of a communist threat from within that 
society. He perceived no such threat and regarded the United States as not serious about surveilling 
the local Chinese population, since everyone knew that he was moonlighting for the Americans.19 
Because of its relative lack of interest in the Chinese communist problem, the jinqiao an came as 
a great shock to the United States, a CIA agent privately told Chen Chih-ping after December 27. 
America had nothing to do with it, he said.20 
 The ROC, by contrast, was keenly interested in Philippine-Chinese society and the Chinese 
communist problem. Overseas Chinese affairs, or qiaowu, remained essential to Nationalist China 
in its campaign to “oppose communism and resist Russia” after 1949. From the names of Chinese 
communist leaders to their organizations, the basic intelligence that Embassy agents gathered was 
generally accurate. Like the Philippines and United States, the ROC knew that most of the Chinese 
communist movement’s leaders had fled the country in 1948, existing organizations had disbanded, 
and the remaining members had gone underground. It differed from these other countries in being 
more concerned about the communist threat to Chinese society than to the national security of the 
Philippines in general. Subversion, for Nationalist China in the Philippines, was about communists 
cultivating ties with Chinese leaders; fueling the flames of intracommunal disputes; hindering the 
ROC’s fundraising efforts while soliciting money of their own through community organizations; 
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delaying the passing of anticommunist measures by these organizations; and deceiving youth into 
leaving the Philippines for China.21 
 Yet even its understanding of the problem was limited. As we will see in the next section, 
in late 1951, well after US and Philippine intelligence had come to know about the Chinese Bureau, 
the ROC was in the dark about it. While US-Philippine intelligence cooperation against the Huks 
was systematized and well-funded, the sharing of information between the ROC and the other two 
states on Chinese communism in the Philippines took place on an ad hoc basis until several years 
after the jinqiao an. Chen Chih-ping was not only unaware of the Bureau, but only came to know 
about the arrests on the afternoon December 27 through a phone call from Magsaysay, who, it later 
transpired, had also been kept in the dark about them until the last minute.22 Distrust between the 
Embassy and Philippine security agencies exacerbated the poor coordination between them against 
their common enemy. The Embassy had to harmonize its mission to protect ROC nationals in the 
Philippines with its ideological commitment to anticommunism. Fearing that MIS, an agency with 
a track record of employing criminals, would use or even fabricate information on communism to 
harass Chinese society, the ROC was frequently reluctant to provide such information.23  
 The Embassy also lacked the resources and manpower to infiltrate the Chinese communist 
movement. It obtained its intelligence from three sources, none of which were completely adequate. 
The first consisted of individuals who had been expelled from communist organizations in the late 
1940s, after the structural changes that these groups had undertaken, and who now worked for the 
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ROC. But their knowledge of the movement ended in 1947 or thereabouts. The Embassy also made 
use of “general reports” (yiban baogao 一般報告) and “general surveys of the Chinese situation” 
(yiban qiaoqing guancha 一般僑情觀察), both of which were routed through Chinese society and 
its institutions such as the KMT and Anti-Communist Movement.24 This created the same problem 
of dependency on frequently unreliable intermediaries with their own agendas. Tensions between 
the Embassy, KMT, and Chinese leaders further complicated the Embassy’s ability to understand 
local Chinese communism.  
State security agencies in Taiwan, in turn, depended on the Embassy for intelligence which 
they could use to prosecute communist suspects that the Philippines deported there. According to 
the Philippines’ Immigration Act of 1940, “aliens” found to be “undesirable” were to be deported. 
Where to was a different question. Section 38 of the Act stated that a criminal alien “shall, at the 
option of the Commissioner of Immigration, be removed to the country whence he came, or to the 
foreign port at which he embarked for the Philippines, or to the country of his nativity or of which 
he is a citizen or subject, or to the country in which he resided prior to coming to the Philippines.”25 
In principle, a Chinese could be deported to a place of his choosing, but customarily, he was sent 
back to his country of citizenship and / or birth – China – via Xiamen, where the Philippines had 
a consulate. Much depended on political will rather than formal legal procedure.  
The ROC’s flight to Taiwan in late 1949 complicated the deportation process considerably. 
Deportation to mainland China under PRC rule was no longer possible, since the process depended 
on the existence of relations between the Philippines and the receiving state, as well as the consent 
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of the latter. On paper, the ROC was agreeable to accepting what both sides described in 1950 as 
“Chinese nationals who are truly obnoxious characters, the notorious examples of the undesirable 
elements and whose conduct is detrimental to the interests of [both states]… upon the certification 
of the Chinese Embassy.”26 But in practice, the ROC was reluctant to accept deportees who were 
not high-value communist suspects because, as Chen Chih-ping put it rather vaguely in 1953, the 
“situation [on Taiwan] is extremely difficult” (chujing shi shifen kunnan 處境是十分苦難).27 The 
problem of the “overstaying temporary visitors,” which would become the longest-running legal 
dispute between the two countries, was not resolved for over two decades. This was partly because 
successive Philippine administrations failed to devise a solution to the problem and partly because 
the ROC, asserting its sovereignty as a state, refused to accept deportees who had only overstayed 
their visitor visas. Among the reasons it cited were overcrowding and the war footing that Taiwan 
was on.28  
The ROC Embassy was thus empowered to serve as a bureaucratic screen when it came to 
the deportation of Chinese to Taiwan. As the official conduit for the transmission of information 
between the ROC and the Philippine states, it was tasked with compiling evidence on the suspects 
from multiple sources, attending to the logistics of the deportation, and obtaining its government’s 
authorization to have them deported to Taiwan.29 As the ROC state depended on it for information 
on potential deportees and the Philippine state depended on it to complete the deportation process, 
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the Embassy was thus in a position to delay or expedite deportation depending on how it perceived 
the persons in question. After being deported to Taiwan, the suspects were formally tried in a court 
of law as deportation hearings were, technically, not a criminal justice procedure and deportation 
thus not a criminal punishment.30 Taiwanese courts, usually military ones, were thus the final stage 
in the lengthy process by which gongxian in the Philippines were identified, arrested, interrogated, 
tried, deported, identified again, and prosecuted.  
 
Koa Chian and the Chinese Bureau: Chinese communism in the Philippines after 1948 
 One person to have undergone this process was Koa Chian, whose testimonies to MIS after 
his capture in April 1952 and his interrogation by ROC officials after his deportation offer valuable 
insights into the fate of Chinese communism in the Philippines after the late 1940s. Koa was from 
Fujian and arrived in the Philippines in 1937. Where and when he was born is unclear. During one 
of his first interrogation sessions, he claimed to be 29 and have been born in Xiamen, which would 
have made his year of birth 1922 or 1923.31 But in 1957, when in custody on Taiwan, he said that 
he was originally from Quanzhou and 26 when he left China.32 Arriving as a legal immigrant, Koa 
studied at various night schools and worked at the general store of his older male patrilineal cousin 
during the day. In 1941, he joined the Chinese Commercial News as a typesetter. At Nanyang High 
School before the occupation, he took part in a organization called the Chinese Youth Association, 
otherwise known as the Chinese Students’ Anti-Japanese Association (Feilübin huaqiao xuesheng 
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kangri fanjian da tongmeng菲律賓華僑學生抗日反奸大同盟), becoming one of its leaders, but 
claimed not to know that it was communist at the time. After the war, Koa represented his school 
in reorganizing the Chinese Youth Association, becoming aware in the second half of 1945 that it 
was in fact the Education Department of the Chinese Communist Party’s Overseas Chinese Bureau 
in the Philippines (Zhongguo gongchandang Feilübin huaqiao ju中國共產黨菲律賓華僑局).33 
 At this point, Koa was not a fully-fledged Chinese Bureau member, as full membership, in 
true Leninist fashion, required that one first be observed and then approved by existing party cadres. 
In 1947, with his general goods business faring poorly, Koa became a primary school teacher for 
a year. He eventually entered the ranks of the Bureau, most likely in 1948, having apparently been 
coerced into doing so by another member, who had discussed with him the favorable situation for 
the CCP in China and threatened to harm him if he did not join the group. Between 1948 and 1950, 
Koa worked again for the Chinese Commercial News and studied English at the Araneta Institute 
of Agriculture in Malabon. In June 1951, Koa was promoted to head of propaganda.34 
 The Philippine authorities and, through them, US intelligence had known about the Chinese 
Bureau since documents seized by the military in raids on Huk centers in Manila in October 1950 
revealed the existence of a “Chinese Branch” or “Chinese Board” of the PKP.35 Consisting of high-
level communications among PKP leaders, these materials helped MIS initiate its subsequent two-
year operation against the Bureau culminating in the December 27, 1952 arrests, but do not seem 
to have been shared with ROC officials. The Bureau represented what became of the Chinese left 
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in the Philippines after the exodus of prominent Red leaders such as Co Keng Sing, Young Ching-
tong, and Wong Kiat to Hong Kong and China in the late 1940s. It did not, as the military declared 
shortly after the arrests, date back to the Wha Chi,36 but was rather nominally separate from this 
and other more well-known and more active Chinese communist organizations in the country such 
as the Democratic League, Kang Fan, and Lo Lian Hui. In 1948, the Bureau assumed the leadership 
of the Chinese communist movement, supported members of these other organizations financially, 
and absorbed some them into its ranks.37 In March 1950, PKP leaders estimated that membership 
of the Bureau was around 200, but in August 1952, Koa put this number at 400.38 
Based on the October 1950 documents, US intelligence conjectured that while the Bureau 
was affiliated to the PKP, it probably enjoyed a closer relationship with the CCP in China. Tensions 
between the PKP and Bureau were many and communication between them lacking. Strategically, 
the Bureau and the Huks were at odds. “Many CBs want to go back home,” the PKP’s Secretariat 
reported in March 1950, and many did so without permission from the Secretariat; others, despite 
not leaving for China, remained unhappy and became “discontented and talkative.” As the Bureau 
focused on “mobilizing comrades and followers back to China to join the officer training class,” it 
lacked a “complete, over-all plan and concrete organizational measures” and “did not mobilize our 
whole Party to discuss this problem fully.” Luis Taruc himself commented that the PKP’s Chinese 
“comrade-advisors” had an “over-zealous desire for continuous attacks on the enemy,” motivated 
by “national opportunism.”39 In late 1951, following the seizure of an additional collection of PKP 
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materials in September, US agents asserted that a split had emerged between the PKP and Chinese 
Bureau going back to the early post-liberation period. Chauvinistic and believing themselves more 
well-versed in Marxist theory than their Filipino comrades, Bureau members consistently refused 
to disclose provide financial and organizational reports to the PKP’s leadership.40 Koa confirmed 
this split, if not its specific details, when he stated that while Bureau members had to agree to be 
placed under the PKP and paid monthly dues to the party in “theory,” they “did not like to follow 
the theory concerned.”41 He explained that the Bureau aimed primarily to unite Philippine Chinese 
in support of the CCP and only secondarily to help the PKP liberate the Philippines from American 
neocolonialism and establish a new government of national capitalists, intellectuals, laborers, and 
peasants. The role of the Bureau in the PKP’s armed insurgency was thus “purely spiritual, moral, 
and financial,” and should the PKP achieve its aim, the Bureau would call upon Chinese to follow 
the country’s new laws.42 Koa and PKP leaders’ remarks about the Bureau thus support Caroline 
Hau’s argument that Chinese communists in the Philippines were fundamentally oriented towards 
China, despite what she calls their “revolutionary cosmopolitanism.”  
As with earlier Chinese communist groups in the Philippines such as the Lo Lian Hui, the 
Bureau had no institutional ties to the CCP. Its connections with the mainland were limited to, first, 
the smuggling of money by local Chinese banks and other legal businesses to China, typically via 
Hong Kong. Second, through the mail, the Bureau obtained communist propaganda for distribution. 
Third, it received news on China through CCP radio broadcasts. Finally, it helped Chinese leave 
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the Philippines for the PRC. These links were fragile and easily disrupted, as a survey of Philippine 
intelligence reports on efforts to curb Chinese smuggling in the late 1940s and early 1950s suggests. 
Koa said that following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Bureau stopped receiving propaganda 
from China via the mail.43  
Within the Philippines, the Bureau scraped by on what little money it could raise from its 
members and supporters, aided by the extreme secrecy with which it operated. Party members paid 
dues, but according to Koa could pay any amount they wished to give. Bureau sympathizers were 
also to be found throughout the country and belonged to a group called the Merchants’ Association, 
which the Bureau’s Organization Department controlled. The Bureau also conducted fundraising 
campaigns in support of the CCP in China and to help its members in need of financial assistance 
because of unemployment or illness. Koa named three such campaigns: first, to help the People’s 
Liberation Army buy food and second, to fund the Bureau’s own expenses; he does not elaborate 
on the third. Money was also supposed to be sent to the PKP, but raids on the Central Post Office 
apparently prevented this.44 
Koa was aware of others in the Bureau – or at least he was in August 1952. In April, during 
one of his first interrogations, he claimed to know little about its inner workings. The Bureau had 
five main departments – Secretariat, Education, Organization, Finance, and Communications – but 
Koa said then that he did not know their heads.45 By August, however, Koa’s tune had changed, 
in reaction to being tortured. Koa confessed to being head of Education, and other names began to 
come forth: the Bureau’s Secretary was Chi Sen, and its Communications head was Bong Ah. Two 
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other men, Eng Sek and Kia Sen, were youth committee members, while “Lee,” one of Koa’s first 
contacts in the Bureau, was Ng Le Chiao, head of the Organization Department. While the Bureau 
as a whole never held group meetings, Koa occasionally met Chi Sen, Eng Sek, Bong Ah, and Kia 
Sen at rendezvous points throughout Manila that he drew on a map for his interrogator. He also 
identified photos that were shown to him of several other Bureau members, including Eng Sek and 
Bong Ah.46 These were the names of individuals that MIS later believed that it had apprehended, 
but in fact had not.  
   
Philippine military intelligence and the production of the Chinese communist suspect 
 By narrating how MIS caught Koa Chian and planned the December 27 arrests, this chapter 
now explains how the Philippine state produced Chinese communist suspects from the fragments 
of material and oral evidence that it gathered. It shows, also, how civilian-military tensions shaped 
the intelligence gathering process; how Chinese communists communicated to avoid the state; and 
how the Chinese language and Chinese social practices complicated the efforts of the state to know 
communists.  
In 1948, Koa became a regular member of the Chinese Bureau, and was taught the tenets 
of its underground work by one Tan It. He began using the alias of “Yu,” or 楊仁倫, in his daily 
life and “Benito” in his underground activities.47 In 1950, before leaving Manila for Visayas, Tan 
introduced Koa to his new contact, whom Koa knew only as “Lee” and suspected of being one of 
the Bureau’s leaders.48 Lee (or Ng Le Chiao, as Koa later revealed to MIS) gave him the task of 
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liaising with the Huks through Koa’s former English teacher, Purificacion Bolatao y Feleo, whom 
he had known since 1946. Feleo may have been related to or the wife of late Huk leader Juan Feleo, 
and it was through her that Koa met Tessie, one of Taruc’s couriers in July 1951. Together, Koa 
and Tessie traveled to meet with the Huk leader in the Sierra Madre mountains of Central Luzon.49 
Koa stayed there for an unknown period of time, and remained in contact with Taruc as the Bureau 
and the PKP sought to mend their relations. In September, Koa informed Taruc that “We are now 
operating our work smoothly,” including in his letter 800 pesos for the Huks.50  
 In March 1952, Feleo informed Koa that Taruc again wished to meet with him and would 
send a courier to guide him to Taruc’s hideout. On March 29, Koa met with this courier, a teenager 
nicknamed “Baby Zenaida,” at Feleo’s house. Tessie, it transpired, was wanted by MIS and would 
not be coming to Manila anymore. After discussing “Uncle” Taruc’s whereabouts and the situation 
in the mountains, Zenaida agreed that she would take him to Taruc. Two weeks later, on April 13, 
Zenaida and Koa met at the junction of Paseo de Azcárraga (renamed Recto Avenue in 1961) and 
Ylaya Street on the outskirts of Chinatown. Koa was then having his shoes shined near a magazine 
stand and when he saw Zenaida, motioned her inside a nearby bus station. Koa told her to wait for 
him while he went to fetch his belongings, but on his way home was arrested by three MIS agents.51 
 Baby Zenaida, it turned out, was also a MIS agent. Her original name seems to have been 
Profiteza Que, but she also went by Portetezar Que, Bobing Que, Paping, and Esa Zenaid, and her 
Chinese name was either Guo Zhubao 郭珠寶 or Guo Xiuzhi 郭秀治, according an ROC Embassy 
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operative. Born in Laoang City in Samar province to a Chinese father from Zhangzhou and Filipina 
mother, she attended Laoang Chinese School for three years and had been to Zhangzhou as a child. 
In 1948, she relocated to Manila with her father, a businessman.52 Thereafter, she started working 
for MIS and joined a counterintelligence team under Captain Cristobal Irlanda that began planning 
an operation against the Chinese Bureau in late 1950, following the seizure of Huk documents in 
Manila.53 “Benito” was among the names mentioned in these materials. A captured member of the 
Hukbalahap informed MIS that Benito was Chinese, giving MIS a lead to pursue.54 
 Irlanda selected Zenaida to infiltrate the Bureau, but she almost certainly only managed to 
snare Koa Chian. Testifying before the Deportation Board during its trials of the jinqiao that began 
in July 1953, Zenaida said that she made contact with Feleo on March 25, four days before meeting 
Koa, and used a forged letter to Koa, supposedly from Luis Taruc, to deceive Feleo into believing 
that she was Taruc’s courier. This first part of her account is consistent with what Koa testified to 
MIS. But the next part of her testimony is barely believable. After Koa was arrested, Zenaida said 
that she continued to enjoy Feleo’s trust and even took part in a meeting of the Bureau’s top leaders 
in Feleo’s home.55 Posing as Taruc’s representative, she apparently gained the trust of these leaders 
during her very first encounter with the Bureau. Starting at the very top, she worked her way down 
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its organizational structure and quickly familiarized herself with its rank and file. At the trials, she 
claimed to identify most of the jinqiao based on her knowledge of them before their arrests. When 
pressed, however, she admitted to meeting 90 of them only once and for about five minutes each, 
21 of them twice, and only 13 four or more times. The physical evidence that MIS presented was 
similarly inadequate. Despite claiming to have seized “cartloads of documents” on December 27, 
all that MIS had to show the Board were Horlicks bottles, comic magazines, altered dresses, typed 
letters, and a few peso bills.56 These were meant to prove that Zenaida had infiltrated the Bureau.  
Remarkably, this was the only material evidence that Irlanda’s team had gathered in its six-
month investigation of the Bureau and preparations for December 27. Another investigator claimed 
to have had contact with various jinqiao, but upon questioning, admitted that he had neither spoken 
to them or observed them engaging in communist activities. Bizarrely, he said that he did not know 
that MIS was planning to arrest them.57 All in all, as the respondents’ lawyers put it in December 
1953 in a motion to dismiss the case against their clients: 
Capt. Irlanda and his team bored us for six months with stories of how they conducted their 
surveillance and investigation. They bored us through not [sic] less than 20 witnesses who 
saw people talk to people but did not hear what they said. They saw no respondents in 
subversive activity. They saw no respondent in more compromising places than their own 
homes and places of employment. After those six months, one would think it was a crime 
to talk to one’s countrymen in their homes and store.  
They bored us with how they did it. They did not tell us what they found – for they 
found none [emphasis theirs].58 
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Given the manifest inadequacies of MIS’s case that the Deportation Board trials revealed, how did 
Irlanda and his team generate the names of the 300 or so huaqiao whom they arrested? And what 
motivated them to pursue what was, in retrospect, an ill-conceived operation? 
In the 1950s Philippines, anticommunism was the pretext of choice for self-aggrandizing 
(often unscrupulous) actors looking to augment their political reputations. As it was with Chinese 
actors, so too was it with MIS. A portion of the list comprised Chinese that MIS suspected of non-
ideological crimes such as arson and insurance fraud, smuggling, prostitution, and illegal entry or 
overstaying their entry visas. MIS wanted them deported to Taiwan and to not have the state bear 
the long-term costs of incarcerating them. However, it often lacked the evidence to prove that they 
had committed such crimes. Furthermore, as it was Nationalist China’s policy after 1949 to accept 
only those deportees that were communist suspects and not all “undesirable aliens,” MIS had the 
incentive of tarring these regular criminals with the same ideological brush.59  
 MIS also perceived its own reputation and autonomy as an intelligence organization to be 
at stake in this case, according to Chen Chih-ping. In the early 1950s, prior to the jinqiao an, MIS 
had no record of identifying and eliminating foreign communist threats to the Philippines, despite 
the existence of these threats to be common “knowledge” within the intelligence community. The 
organization’s operating costs were high and its political enemies many. During the 1951 Senate, 
gubernatorial, and mayoral elections, the military, then under Magsaysay, refused to take political 
sides and in doing so angered members of the incumbent Liberal Party, which Magsaysay was still 
a member of. In 1952, citing costs, a faction of Liberals congressmen sought to veto MIS’s budget 
for the fiscal year and cripple an agency that Chen called Magsaysay’s “political capital” (zhengzhi 
                                                 





ziben 政治資本). Rather than the Defense Secretary, it was Armed Forces Chief of Staff Calixto 
Duque and MIS head Colonel Ismael Lapus who took the lead in responding to this political threat. 
Duque, Antonio Chua Cruz’s military patron, had filled MIS with his loyalists such as Lapus. He, 
Lapus, and Naval Captain Rafael Pargas secretly began planning a large-scale counterintelligence 
operation against undesirable Chinese that they codenamed “Operation Chopsuy.” They presented 
their plan to President Elpidio Quirino, but he was too busy with affairs of state to bother with it.60 
 Unnoticed by Quirino, Irlanda’s team went about compiling the list of names it needed to 
launch Chopsuy and prove MIS’s usefulness to the state. Some of these names the agency already 
had from its investigation into non-ideological crimes. The capture of Koa Chian allowed MIS to 
pad its list with “real” communists. Through Koa, MIS came to know about the Bureau’s leaders, 
including Chi Sen, Ng Le Chiao, Bong Ah, Eng Sek, Kia Sen, as well as other “communists” who 
may or may not have been affiliated to the Bureau. We do not know how many names in total Koa 
provided, but he put his name to at least three written confessions during the eight months leading 
up to the mass arrests. Copies of the forged letter to Koa from Taruc were delivered to the addresses 
that he mentioned, and agents dispatched to secretly take photos of the people living there. Names 
were also extracted from other sources, including a CCP agent from Hong Kong who had entered 
the Philippines from North Borneo and, after traversing the entire length of the country, was caught 
trying to leave Batanes for Taiwan, where he had planned to link up with underground communists. 
Chen named names before retracting his confession entirely, but MIS used what he had originally 
confessed.61 Ambassador Chen also attributed part of the blame for the December 27 arrests to an 
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ethnic Chinese MIS interpreter and interrogator, Felix Bonaobra, who had provided many names 
to MIS and later tortured the arrested Chinese into confessing crimes that they had not committed.62   
 Consolidating a list of suspects’ names was one thing; apprehending the individuals named 
was another entirely. The suspects did not resist arrest, but many were not whom MIS thought they 
were. Koa, it turned out, did not expose the Bureau and its leadership. Rather, under pressure, he 
supplied his captors with the names of communists who had left the country, died, or already been 
outed. Many of the names that he provided were incomplete; sometimes he gave only last names, 
but not first names, and at other times first but not last names.63 Koa’s English was poor, but as far 
as we know he was interrogated only in English and not in Hokkien. He lied to protect himself and 
the Bureau, but could not have known then that the intelligence he provided to MIS would result 
in the mass arrests of innocent Chinese. When he did find out, he felt remorseful – at least this is 
what he told ROC officials several years later.64 
 Koa certainly deceived MIS, but more fundamentally, the agency lacked an understanding 
of Minnanhua, the Chinese written script, and in particular how Chinese identified themselves to 
the Philippine authorities. Consider the names of the Bureau’s leaders. In Koa’s statements to MIS, 
he identified the Secretary of the Bureau as “Chi Sen,” which was how his interrogator, a Captain 
Laconico, phonetically transcribed Koa’s verbal response. After the arrests, however, this person 
became known, in the Philippines Free Press and legal records, as “Chin Sang.”65 The actual man 
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arrested was a carpenter who went by the Chinese characters 黃積池 and whose name in his alien 
registration certificate was indeed “Chin Sang.” But the actual communist that Koa was referring 
to was 黃自新, also a carpenter. This person’s registered English name was not “Chi Sen,” despite 
its close phonetic correspondence with his Chinese name, but “Lee At,” and he had left the country 
in June 1951. MIS detained “Chin Sang” because of what it perceived were phonetic similarities 
between “Chin Sang” (黃積池) and “Chi Sen” (黃自新 / “Lee At”).66 If MIS did have agents such 
as Bonaobra who knew Chinese, it did not consult with them on matters of language and translation, 
as it made similar mistakes when arresting the other leaders of the Bureau. Nor was it familiar with 
how Chinese in the Philippines often kept multiple aliases in both English and Chinese and relied 
on either forged registration certificates or those of dead people in order to “legally” remain in the 
Philippines under its restrictive immigration laws, both during and after American rule.  
As ROC intelligence showed, MIS similarly misidentified the heads of the Organization, 
Communications, and Finance Departments. The men MIS arrested were林景安, 李文允, and 王
詩桐, who were registered as “Ng Le Chiao,” “Dy Bon Un,” and “Yu Dy” respectively. The first, 
whom Koa had known originally as “Lee,” had four Chinese aliases – 李煥來, 蔡煥來, 李文法, 
and 李清玉 – and was registered as “Toh Chu.” He had left the Philippines in January 1951. It is 
likely that MIS had brought up “Ng Le Chiao” when interrogating Koa about “Lee,” and that Koa 
had simply affirmed that the two were the same person. The man Koa named as Communications 
head was “Bong Ah,” who lived at 543 Elcano Street. This was the former address of communist 
guerrilla 張羅綱, whose name sounded like “Bong Ah” in Minnanhua; so too, unfortunately, did 
                                                 





“Dy Bon Un” / 李文允, whom MIS insisted was “Bong Ah.” Finally, Koa named the head of the 
Finance Department as “Yu Lan,” and said that he was a fluent English speaker. ROC intelligence 
conjectured that Koa was referring to a 陳有任; MIS ended up arresting a “Yu Dy” / 王詩桐, who 
spoke no English and was a common laborer with only a third-grade education. A summary of the 
Bureau leaders named by Koa and the persons mistaken for them and arrested by MIS is found in 
Table 1.67 
Rank in Bureau Persons mistakenly arrested Actual communists 
Chinese name(s) Registered name Chinese name(s) Registered name 
Secretary 黃積池 Chin Sang 黃自新 Lee At 
Organization 
head  





李文允 Dy Bon Un 張羅綱 [Unknown] 
Finance head 王詩桐 Yu Dy 陳有任 Yu Lan 
 
Table 1: Partial list of Chinese Bureau leaders named by Koa Chian from April-August 1952 and 
the persons mistaken for them and arrested by MIS on December 27. 
 
 Collectively, Koa Chian’s insights into the Chinese Bureau, his interrogation by MIS, and 
the agency’s missteps in arresting Chin Sang and others highlight the politicized, methodologically 
flawed process by which the Philippine stated, through unreliable agents such as Zenaida, gathered 
intelligence on suspected Chinese communists; how communists such as Koa communicated with 
each other and the Huks and evaded being captured or known by the state; and third, how Chinese 
naming conventions and the Chinese language in its written and spoken forms hindered outsiders 
seeking to understand Chinese society for political ends.  
                                                 





As in Chapter 2, which explained how anticommunism entailed the public performance of 
one’s ideological credentials, the preceding discussion on names, writing, and language highlights 
the interplay between what Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker have called self-identification 
and external identification.68 Self-identification involved attachment to China, the Philippines, the 
KMT, one’s kinsmen, and the chamber of commerce. But private expressions of such attachments 
do not concern us. What does is how self-identification necessarily existed in a dialectical relation 
to external persons or institutions; how, therefore, external identification depended partly on how 
individuals identified themselves. In their everyday interactions with fellow members of the same 
ethnic group, Chinese identified themselves in Hokkien by certain names or fragments of names – 
“Yu” and “Lee,” for example – which may have been aliases. In representing themselves in writing 
to other Chinese, they were known as “楊仁倫,” “黃積池,” and so on. In conversing with Filipinos, 
they may have used invented English names such as “Benito” or “Antonio Cruz,” or the names in 
their registration certificates such as “Lee At,” “Toh Chu,” and “Yu Lan.” To the Philippine state, 
bureaucratic procedures imposed singular, English-language identities upon Chinese migrants that 
were at odds with their own naming practices. But the production of registered names was not a 
one-way process. The state did not invent these names. By forging their registration certificates or 
appropriating those of the deceased and then providing them to the state as “proof” of their status 
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From narratives into legal subjects: the Cebu reading club case  
 December 27, 1952 had multiple aftermaths for Chinese society in the Philippines, one of 
which was the decision by a group of Chinese high school students in Cebu to commit themselves 
fully to communism. Among them were Lao Han Keng, Sy Bun Chiong, Go Chi Kok, and Sy Yan 
Wan, whose interrogation records and testimonies to MIS and the Taiwanese authorities allow us 
to know the activities and history of their group. But even more so than Koa’s statements to MIS, 
their narratives, given at different times to different authorities, are riddled with gaps, ambiguities, 
and contradictions. Like Koa’s, their accounts both aided and subverted the intelligence gathering 
process. What follows is a reconstruction of their experiences, after which I examine how the ROC 
state engaged in this same reconstructive process in order to produce legal subjects from firsthand 
narratives of Chinese communism.   
By late 1952, all four persons had joined a reading club in Cebu City whose members went 
on weekly outings to discuss left-wing literature and engage in self-criticism and mutual criticism 
of each other.69 The de facto leader of this club at the time seems to have been Chiu Siok Tuan 周
淑端, who proposed changing its name to the Philippine-Chinese Communist Party in response to 
the state’s anti-Chinese policies. The PCCP’s founding took place in June 1953 as an entirely sui 
generis organization with no ties to either the CCP or the PKP, unlike the Chinese Bureau.70 Lao 
recalled that he and other members rented a house in Cebu in which they hung up pictures of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, participated in a founding ceremony, and mimeographed their own 
membership cards.71 Each member was also given a number – Lao was No. 503, Sy Yan Wan No. 
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20, and Sy Bun Chiong No. 22.72 Thereafter, until the mid-1954, they and others met at the “party 
headquarters” to attend and deliver lectures and discuss communist pamphlets and magazines that 
they obtained from Hong Kong by mail.73  
 In the middle of 1954, their “training” complete, Lao and three female party members, Lim 
Yan Yan 林燕燕, Ang Giok Lun 洪玉润, and Uy Bee Siong 黄美嫦 embarked on their very first 
mission as young, self-radicalized communists. Their target was Sun Yat-sen High School in Iloilo 
City, which they posed as students of and looked to infiltrate. Partly because of their inexperience 
and suspicious behavior, they were quickly found out by the Iloilo branch of the KMT on July 9. 
Through their relatives in Iloilo, the party contacted their parents, who flew to Iloilo the following 
day to pick up their wayward children and escort them back to Cebu. A search by the KMT of their 
quarters in Iloilo yielded training manuals, a copy of the PCCP’s constitution, propaganda, and 
letters from Lao to the others. Yet with Deportation Board hearings against the jinqiao still ongoing, 
the KMT chose not to report them to the Philippine authorities for fear of upsetting Chinese society 
even further. Handing them over would also deprive it of the chance to interrogate them and learn 
more about their activities and organizational structure; information, for the time being, remained 
within Chinese circles. Instead, it had them write confessions in English and Chinese and promise 
not to repeat their actions, or be turned over to the state along with this evidence. Lao was shown 
a letter that he had written to Lim, Ang, and Uy exhorting them to remain steadfast in the face of 
difficulty, after which he confessed to being a communist. The KMT then counselled him “not to 
live this kind of life” and released him with a guarantee of good behavior from his father, a ranking 
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KMT member in Cebu. The three female students were also taken in by their parents and watched 
over by the Embassy.74  
 Professional revolutionaries these students were not: for one, the paper trail they left behind 
suggests that, unlike members of the Chinese Bureau, they had little idea of how to operate covertly 
in an ideological environment that was hostile to them. However much they may have trained and 
identified as communists, their backgrounds suggest reasons for participating in the reading club 
and PCCP beyond a deep-seated belief in revolution and socialism. Lao (or so he claimed) had no 
prior involvement in in communist activities before entering the Philippines in 1949 as a legal 
quota immigrant.75 His relationship with his father was strained. In April 1953, Lao found himself 
out of work and left home because he was too ashamed to stay with his father. Through the reading 
club, Lao and Sy Yan Wan fell in love, and when she was beaten by her father in July that year, 
she left home temporarily to live with Lao, who was nine years older than her.76 Sy’s father, David 
Sy Gaisano施維雄, also occupied a prominent social position as a son of the matriarch of one of 
Cebu’s wealthiest families.77 After being arrested, Sy Yan Wan was asked by MIS why she had 
joined the party. She responded simply: “I want adventure, sir.”78  
Lao and Sy’s relationship, far from being incidental to this narrative, helps explain why the 
two, along with Sy Bun Chiong, were arrested later that July. At that time, Sy Yan Wan was living 
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with her relatives in Manila. Although she may have trained as a PCCP member, she had not been 
given any assignments. Once free of the KMT’s clutches thanks to the intervention of his father, 
Lao went immediately to Manila to find her, knowing that Lim Yan Yan had revealed her existence 
and that of other party members to the KMT.79 Following this breaking of his promise to the KMT 
and his father, the party decided to turn over information on him to the Philippine authorities and 
let them arrest him. In Manila, Lao reunited not only with Sy Yan Wan, but also Sy Bun Chiong, 
who had been sent there on a separate mission to infiltrate Philippine Chinese High School; later, 
an agent of the PCCP contacted him and gave him orders to mail letters to Chinese residents across 
the country denouncing Magsaysay’s anti-Chinese economic policies. He ended up moving in with 
Lao and Sy. Fearing an impending crackdown on the PCCP, the three decided to destroy Sy Bun 
Chiong’s letters and flee Manila for Mount Banahaw, a Huk stronghold in Quezon Province then 
under siege by the Philippine military. But in their hurry to leave, they were not able to dispose of 
all the letters, which were later seized by MIS. They made it as far as Lucban, a city at the foot of 
Mount Banahaw that was crawling with troops. There, on the night of July 27, the military found 
them roaming around suspiciously and arrested them.80   
 Other (although not all) PCCP members were arrested over the next year and a half. 14 of 
them, including Lim Yan Yan, Ang Giok Lun, and Uy Bee Siong, were detained in various cities 
throughout the islands on November 26, 1955. A ROC official attributed the timing of the latter to 
the government’s desire to make a strong political statement following the 1955 midterm elections 
and to compensate for setbacks in the jinqiao an.81 Go Chi Kok was arrested on July 29 in Manila. 
                                                 
79 “Qijie zhongweihui gongzuo huiyi di 96 ci huiyi jilu,” KMT Records, HILA.  
 
80 “Qijie zhongweihui gongzuo huiyi di 96 ci huiyi jilu,” KMT Records, HILA; “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 
158-166, IMH Archives. 
  




His narrative of his participation in the organization does not square with the others’. Go claimed 
to MIS, testified before the Deportation Board, and told the Taiwanese authorities that he had left 
the reading club in January 1953 because he had come to realize the true nature of the organization. 
To MIS, he said that he had been reading USIS propaganda, resulting in this realization. Go also 
singled out Lao as the organization’s founder and leader, as well as a rival for the affections of Sy 
Yan Wan. Lao, according to Go, was a bona fide communist agent from China, became harshly 
critical of Go’s failure to rid himself of his “petty bourgeois tail” (xiao zichan jieji weiba 小資產
階級尾巴), and forbade any talk of romantic love between Go and Sy, saying that love was selfish 
and would hurt the morale of the organization. This, he said, was Lao’s ploy to separate him from 
Sy. When Go wished to quit the club, Lao threatened to kill him.82 No such details are forthcoming 
in Lao’s account, which in fact describes Go as a PCCP leader.83 Go’s relative lack of credibility, 
especially with regards to the length and extent of his involvement in the group, is evident not so 
much from Lao’s account, but Sy Bun Chiong’s. Sy had no vendetta against Lao or Go, but like 
Lao, identifies Go as a leader of the reading club and PCCP – an instructor of his and Lao’s.84 
 Discrepancies, ambiguities, and gaps in the narratives of Lao, Sy, Sy, and Go went beyond 
Go’s role in the organization. Who, for example, were the party’s leaders – and what did leadership 
entail? Chiu Siok Tuan, as both Lao and Sy Bun Chiong noted, passed away from illness in April 
1954. According to Sy, Go Chi Kok and Go Ka Sing 吳家聲 (who was arrested on November 26, 
1955) succeeded her. But the individual who gave him orders to infiltrate Philippine Chinese High 
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School in Manila and mail the letters was a mysterious person called Go Chui Lim, or “Lao Tok,” 
who was never arrested (and whose name in Chinese characters we do not know).85 Lao Han Keng 
stated to MIS that Go Chui Lim as the highest ranking member of the organization, but in another 
interview a few weeks later, he claimed that Lim Yan Yan had succeeded Chiu as leader.86 Neither 
he nor Sy mentioned Go Chui Lim in relation to the training that they received.  
After July 1957, when Lao, Sy, Sy, and Go were deported to Taiwan, sifting and evaluating 
their accounts became the ROC’s problem. Unlike the Philippines, for which deportation applied 
equally to all undesirable behavior by aliens, the ROC sought to dispense proportional justice and 
thus needed to weigh the relative gravity of their communist activities. Their narratives had to be 
transmuted into a usable hierarchy of guilt and responsibility: communist “leaders,” for example, 
had to be dealt with more severely than mere followers. Thus the ROC determined that Lao was 
the leader of the organization because of the letters that he had written to Lim Yan Yan in Iloilo 
instructing her on the principles of their struggle that the Iloilo KMT had confiscated in early July 
1954. From these letters, which Lao confirmed that he had written, Taiwan’s Garrison-General 
Headquarters concluded that Lao became the leader of the PCCP after Chiu Siok Tuan’s death and 
was responsible for printing the anti-Magsaysay propaganda that Sy Bun Chiong was supposed to 
distribute.87 In sentencing Lao, Taiwan leaned heavily on Go Chi Kok’s accusations against Lao, 
treating Go’s testimony as trustworthy and using it as the standard with which to evaluate Lao’s. 
The Garrison-General believed that Go had left the club before it became the PCCP and his claim 
that Lao had told him about his communist activities in China before 1949, because none of Lao, 
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Sy, or Sy had mentioned Go as a PCCP member in their statements to the Taiwanese authorities.88 
But in the documentation that the Philippine government had generated on these suspects, which 
the ROC explicitly stated that it possessed, Lao and Sy Bun Chiong mentioned Go multiple times 
as a leader or instructor of the party. If the ROC was aware of these documents, it chose to ignore 
them. Lao (together with Koa Chian) was given a death sentence on September 15, 1959 that was 
later commuted to life imprisonment; Sy Bun Chiong’s life sentence was reduced to a decade; and 
Sy Yan Wan’s seven years in jail to six – the reasons for which we will examine in the next section. 
Go Chi Kok, meanwhile, was sentenced to an unknown period of reformatory education, or ganhua 
感化, for apparently having quit the reading club early on.89 
 In the absence of a fuller documentary record, including the testimonies of the later group 
of detainees and the materials confiscated from their premises (such the letters Lao wrote to Lim 
and the propaganda Sy was supposed to mail), ascertaining what actually happened is impossible; 
this might conceivably be so even if we did have them. But what concerns us here is not the “truth”; 
it is, rather, how heterogeneous narratives and the fallibility and agency of individuals complicated 
the ROC’s efforts to dispense justice. Whether intentionally or otherwise, the narratives that Lao, 
Go, and Sy Bun Chiong (less so Sy Yan Wan) provided to MIS, the Deportation Board, and the 
Taiwanese authorities contained gaps and inconsistencies. Part of the explanation may simply have 
been the time that elapsed between the statements that they provided to each investigative agency: 
three years passed between their arrest in July 1954 and deportation to Taiwan in July 1957, and 
it was not until March 1960 that Taiwan rendered its revised and final verdicts on their case. How 
were questions to them framed and what pressures or blandishments were they subjected to? These 
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cannot be answered based on the existing written record. Self-interest and the desire to minimize 
one’s punishment by downplaying one’s agency, shifting the blame, and giving one’s interrogators 
what they were looking for also figured into how they represented themselves to the authorities.  
Go’s strategy from the outset, which he maintained with remarkable consistency across time and 
to different questioners, was to accuse Lao of being not only the organization’s mastermind, but 
also a bad person. By describing Lao as a communist agent from China, Go played on the ROC’s 
preexisting beliefs about the PRC’s subversive activities in Southeast Asia, and also the corrupting 
influence of communism on one’s character. The other detainees were not without their own tactics. 
Lao, for example, claimed to MIS after his arrest on July 27 that he had given up his “communistic 
activities” under advice from the KMT and was hoping for a chance to redeem himself.90 Sy Yan 
Wan made a similar (and perhaps heartfelt) plea for leniency when she spoke of her love for Lao 
and desire for adventure and said that “I no longer want to be a communist” after her arrest.91  
 The PCCP and Chinese Bureau – one a group of self-radicalized Chinese students and the 
other a secretive underground organization – were all that remained of Chinese communism in the 
Philippines after the likes of Co Keng Sing, Gong Taoyi, and other leaders had fled the country in 
the late 1940s. However much Philippine and ROC officials may have feared that a transnational 
network of Chinese communist agents had implanted itself in the archipelago, links between these 
two groups and mainland China ranged from minimal to nonexistent. As with the CCP, so too with 
the PKP, for which institutional ties to the likes of the Kang Fan and Wha Chi were very much a 
thing of the past by the time Koa Chian traveled to meet with Luis Taruc for the first time in July 
1951. At least in the Philippines, if not elsewhere in Southeast Asia as well, Chinese communism’s 
                                                 
90 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 172, IMH Archives. 
 





influence lay chiefly in its ideals, accessible remotely via print and radio, and capacity to motivate 
others, rather than any organizational strength. 
  
Rectifying anticommunism: resolving the jinqiao an and Cebu reading club case 
 This final section of this chapter turns to how ROC officials and Philippine-Chinese leaders 
responded to the jinqiao an and Cebu students’ arrests from 1953 all the way up to the final days 
of Carlos Garcia’s presidency in December 1961, when the 99 jinqiao still out on bail were finally 
cleared of any wrongdoing. Examining how these initially separate episodes were brought together 
and jointly resolved shows how the ROC and its overseas Chinese partners reconciled their shared 
goal of opposing communism with that of safeguarding the interests of Chinese society. It provides 
unusually detailed insight into how the ROC negotiated its place in the postwar world through the 
overseas Chinese communities it claimed to protect and by navigating the murky waters of another 
country’s domestic politics. 
 After being informed about the December 27 arrests on the afternoon that they took place, 
the ROC Embassy issued a statement to Chinese residents calling for calm, contacted the relatives 
of the arrested, and sent officials to Camp Murphy to reassure the detainees of the ROC’s support 
and ask that they abide by camp protocol. With Quirino having suspended habeas corpus by decree 
on October 20, 1950,92 the suspects could be detained without trial indefinitely. Within three days, 
however, 18 suspects were released, and the military’s operation began to unravel.93 The Embassy 
initiated its own investigation of the suspects, and by early February had recommended that 118 









of them be released. Among these men were individuals with unimpeachable anticommunist civic 
credentials. Qua Chi Peng 柯子冰, for example, was the President of the Legaspi Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce and the Legaspi chapter of the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement, and a Standing 
Committee member of the KMT in Bicol; in October 1952, he had traveled to Taipei to attend the 
inaugural Overseas Chinese Conference there; Lao Kiat 劉賢吉 was the President of the Tabaco 
Chamber and also a ranking member of the Bicol KMT and his local Anti-Communist Movement 
chapter. Chen wrote to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that it is “beyond any doubt that they have 
ever been Communist sympathizers,” and hoped for their swift release. The long delay in releasing 
them had “occasioned great privations” for them and their families, most of which were of limited 
means.94 
 In May 1953, with the military having completed its interrogation of the suspects, formal 
charges were filed against 152 of them, including Qua and Lao, before the Deportation Board.95 
Right after the arrests, the Embassy had joined with Chinese community leaders from various civic 
organizations, including the KMT, General Chamber of Commerce, Anti-Communist Movement, 
and Chinese Welfare Association in forming a “united working group to support of the innocent 
jinqiao” (Ge huaqiao tuanti yuanzhu wugu jinqiao lianhe xiaozu 各華僑團體援助無辜禁僑聯合
小組). Led by Welfare Association President Yu Khe Thai, the working group hired the law firm 
of Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing, and Salazar to represent the respondents.96 The Sycip family 
member here was Alexander, son of Albino and nephew of Alfonso, who, as President of the Anti-
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Communist Movement, was a member of the xiaozu. Sycip served as legal adviser to the Embassy 
and his firm was often contracted by the Chinese community in cases involving Chinese and the 
Philippine state.  
 What followed was the longest and most complex case in the Deportation Board’s history. 
The hearings alone lasted for one and a half years from July 1953 to January 1955.97 During this 
period, 34 jinqiao were freed on January 23, 1954, and 105, including Qua, released on bail shortly 
afterwards; members of the xiaozu raised funds and even contributed their own money to help the 
respondents post bail.98 Of these 105, five would have charges dropped against them in the coming 
years, while one would pass away. The respondents’ attorneys, as explained earlier in the chapter, 
based their defense on the questionable veracity of Baby Zenaida and MIS’s investigation prior to 
December 27. Following the conclusion of these hearings in January 1955, the Board turned to the 
13 individuals who remained in detention at Camp Murphy and had not been allowed to post bail. 
These were the accused leaders of the Chinese Bureau, including Koa Chian, Lao Kiat, Chin Sang, 
Ng Le Chiao, Dy Bon Un, and Yu Dy.99 
 A decision, whether on these 13 persons or the 99 out on bail, was not forthcoming for the 
next one and a half years, much to the dismay of the jinqiao themselves, ROC officials and Chinese 
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leaders, and the military officials such as Ismael Lapus who had hatched Operation Chopsuy in an 
effort to prove their utility to their political masters – a group that now included Magsaysay, who 
had become President on December 30, 1953. Part of the reason for the delay was the changing 
composition of the three-man Deportation Board and the sheer volume of paperwork that had been 
generated over the course of the hearings. In July 1956, new ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-mai陳
之邁 estimated that records of the hearings amounted to 11,626 pages, a quantity of information 
that Board members could not possibly be familiar with in great detail in their efforts to grasp the 
Chinese problem.100 
 As time passed, ROC officials in the Philippines and Taiwan became increasingly anxious 
about the harmful effects of the jinqiao an on their struggle against communism and the reputation 
that the ROC was trying to uphold as a protector of overseas Chinese communities and its nationals. 
From early on, Chen Chih-ping believed that the arrests had dealt a blow to the ROC’s ideological 
struggle and exposed the weaknesses of the KMT and Anti-Communist League.101 The tribulations 
of the jinqiao did not escape notice on Taiwan either, and not only among state and party agencies 
such as the Foreign Ministry and Third Section of the KMT Central Committee that specialized in 
overseas Chinese affairs. At the second meeting of the ROC’s First National Assembly in February 
1954, delegate Huang He-de 黃和德, who had spent an extended period of time in the Philippines, 
delivered a detailed report on the Chinese in the islands, a section of which focused on the jinqiao 
an. His report crystallized a general sense of impatience among ROC legislators over the seeming 
lack of progress of the case. Claiming that Chinese communists must have infiltrated MIS for the 
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arrests to have taken place, he proceeded to denounce the Embassy for not taking the case seriously 
and supporting the detainees sufficiently, and thus for damaging the morale of the ROC’s 200,000 
or so huaqiao compatriots in the Philippines.102 Antipathy in Taiwan towards the Embassy was so 
widespread even before then that in December 1953, Alexander Sycip’s law firm took the unusual 
step of writing to Foreign Minister George Yeh to defend how the Embassy had conducted itself.103  
 Efforts by Chinese leaders and the ROC over the course of 1955 and 1956 to have the 99 
jinqiao out on bail released entirely and 12 out of the 13 persons still in detention – excluding Koa 
Chian – released on bail proved unsuccessful. Magsaysay, Vice-President and Foreign Secretary 
Garcia, and Secretary of Justice Pedro Tuazon were amenable to this, but bureaucratic inertia and 
the military’s insistence that Chinese communism continued to pose a grave security threat to the 
country prevented any progress from being made; the July 1954 and November 1955 Cebu reading 
club arrests only seemed to confirm this. Precisely because of these fears, more successful during 
this period were attempts to institutionalize intelligence cooperation between the two states, a 
move that both sides welcomed. According to an agreement that they signed sometime in July, 
Embassy personnel with special training in intelligence would serve as consultants to MIS on the 
acquisition and evaluation of information on Chinese communists in the Philippines, after which 
the military reserved the right to act as it saw fit.104 For the ROC, this meant being able to interpose 
its own agents in the Philippine state’s information space. As a political gesture, it would hopefully 
come in useful in future bargaining over the jinqiao. 
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 In the fall of 1956, the Deportation Board finally delivered its verdict on the 13 jinqiao, 
recommending to Magsaysay that 11 of them be deported and two – Yu Dy and Li De-di 李德低 
– released entirely. Following the President’s deportation order on December 26, attorneys for the 
remaining jinqiao appealed to Magsaysay and presented fresh evidence to the Board, asking it to 
re-try the case.105 When the Board rejected this request in May 1957, the ROC gave up trying to 
resolve the case through legal means and attempted instead a political bargain. In that same month, 
President Garcia – Magsaysay had died in a plane crash on March 17 – issued a deportation order 
for Lao Han Keng, Sy Yan Wan, Sy Bun Chiong, and Go Chi Kok,106 whose ideological guilt was 
not in question. In consultation with the xiaozu, the Embassy proposed that the four Cebu students 
together with Koa Chian be deported to Taiwan, in return for which Garcia would release the ten 
innocent jinqiao into the custody of the Embassy under the personal guarantee of the Ambassador, 
and on the condition that any or all of them would be produced within 48 hours if so required by 
the Philippine government.107 Garcia was agreeable to this, and on July 26, Koa, Lao, Sy, Sy, and 
Go were deported to Taiwan. But this was not before the five of them threatened to commit suicide, 
using poison, knives, and metal rods that they had somehow obtained. Philippine police eventually 
used tear gas to subdue them and force them onto the ROC military aircraft that had been sent to 
return them to their “motherland.”108 
 The ten still in detention would have to wait another year before being released. Domestic 
politics and bureaucratic obstacles again proved complicating factors. Presidential elections were 
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set for the end of 1957. The release order that Garcia issued on September 6, a Friday, reached the 
Immigration Bureau after its working hours, allowing military officials to meet with him over the 
weekend and persuade him to delay the order. The opposition Liberal Party, it said, would try to 
use their release against him; other members of Garcia’s Nacionalista Party, including its chairman, 
Senator Eulogio Rodriguez, shared the same concerns. Garcia promised that he would free them 
after the election, regardless of its outcome, and as a sign of his good faith instructed that Dy Bon 
Un be allowed to seek hospital treatment for having fallen seriously ill during his confinement.109 
Following Garcia’s reelection, the number of imprisoned jinqiao dwindled further as Chin Sang 
and Pan Sigu 潘四姑, through their lawyers, petitioned successfully to self-deport to Hong Kong. 
The President finally fulfilled his end of the bargain by ordering the last seven jinqiao released on 
bail on September 3, 1958.110 Despite legally not being fully free, they do not appear to have ever 
again gone before the Deportation Board. 
Three years later, and only a few days before he stepped down as President, Garcia ordered 
the 99 respondents in Deportation Cases Nos. 488 and 489 freed on December 15 and 19, 1961 
respectively, citing the inadequate evidence against them that Baby Zenaida and Felix Bonaobra 
had provided to the Board.111 The remaining 14 Cebu reading club / PCCP members who had been 
arrested in late November 1955 also met their fates then. While their objective involvement in a 
communist organization could not be denied, their youth, naivete, and vulnerability to propaganda 
rendered them sympathetic figures in the eyes of both the military and Chinese community leaders. 
                                                 
109 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 205-206, IMH Archives. 
 
110 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 4, 21, IMH Archives; Tang, Wo zai Shang Zong sanshinian, 82-83. 
  
111 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 4, 145-148, IMH Archives; a more detailed and firsthand account of how they 





Both parties tried to persuade the students to confess and apologize for their crimes, and forswear 
communism. An English ex-communist, Douglas Hyde, even addressed them on the evils of the 
ideology.112 In 1960, the two states reached an agreement over how best to manage their situation: 
the Philippines would deport them, but in principle, allow them back into the country if Taiwan 
subjected them to ganhua.113 In December 1961, Garcia proceeded to order 12 of the 14 deported, 
excluding Uy Bee Siong and Go Siok King 吳淑瓊, only to modify his order further and free three 
additional persons, Ong Suy Tin 王瑞珍, Ong Suy Eng 王瑞英, and Ang Siok San王玉山. In 
releasing Go, Garcia said that she appeared to have joined the club out of a desire to be close to its 
leader, Lao Han Keng, whom she deeply loved, and not because of its ideology. She was therefore 
the “victim of an uncontrollable affection for a man.”114 
 Koa Chian, Lao Han Keng, Sy Yan Wan, Sy Bun Chiong, and Go Chi Kok were sentenced  
differently in Taiwan. As mentioned, Go received ganhua, although how long he was subjected to 
it remains unclear, while Koa, Lao, Sy, and Sy had their preliminary sentences reduced within the 
space of six months, from September 1959 to March 1960. Some credit for this must go to their 
family and attorneys, who persisted in seeking compassionate treatment of them, this time by the 
ROC. Go’s mother, for example, wrote a heartfelt plea directly to Chiang Kai-shek himself, while 
Sy Bun Chiong father made a similar appeal through the ROC Embassy.115 Social status, personal 
connections, and ideological credentials could help amplify these appeals. Sy Yan Wan’s father,  
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arranged for his good friend, the lawyer and senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, together with kinsman 
and ex-Chinese Chamber of Commerce President Sy En, to meet with Chen Chih-mai four days 
after his daughter’s deportation.116 Lao Han Keng’s father hoped that his involvement in the KMT 
and Chinese Anti-Communist League would help mitigate Lao’s sentence. As for Koa, who had 
no relatives to speak up for him, Alexander Sycip argued that he had not only been tortured into 
providing names to MIS, but had later openly confessed to falsifying his testimony. In fact, Chinese 
leaders believed that it was only with his help that the innocent jinqiao were freed.117 In its appeal 
to the Defense Ministry, upon whose judgement the case rested, the Embassy expressed its view 
that the death penalty for Lao and Koa would damage the ROC’s reputation among Chinese in the 
Philippines. A more lenient sentence might help the relatives of the accused and Chinese society 
feel “gratitude and respect” (gandai 感戴) towards the state and strengthen their “affection towards 
their motherland” (xiangwang zuguo zhi qing 嚮往祖國之情).118  
 
Conclusion 
 By focusing on the jinqiao an and Cebu reading club episodes that spanned the period from 
1952 to 1961, this chapter has explained how the arrest, trial, and deportation of suspected Chinese 
communists in the Philippines was vulnerable to manipulation by and disinformation from nearly 
all those involved. MIS and its principal Chinese agent, Profiteza Que (aka Baby Zenaida), sought 
to incriminate the jinqiao by presenting the Deportation Board with inadequate and false evidence 
in the hopes of legitimizing themselves to Filipino politicians. Chinese Bureau member Koa Chian, 
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the solitary communist that MIS apprehended, proceeded to mislead his captors by providing them 
with incomplete names, or those of persons who had left the Philippines, already been exposed, or 
passed away; MIS was confounded, too, by Chinese naming practices and how Chinese identified 
themselves to the Philippine state. Lao Han Keng, Sy Bun Chiong, Go Chi Kok, and Sy Yan Wan, 
the four Cebu high school students who formed a communist reading club in the aftermath of the 
December 27, 1952 arrests, attempted to shift the blame to each other after they were detained in 
the hopes of reducing their sentences in Taiwan. Finally, ROC officials and local Chinese leaders 
worked behind the scenes by lobbying successive Philippine presidents to secure the release of the 







Anticommunism and the Restructuring of Philippine-Chinese Society in the 1950s 
 
 On January 21, 1972, exactly a month before US President Richard Nixon visited the PRC, 
the sixth volume of Youth World (Shijie qingnian 世界青年) was published in the Philippines by 
the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In it was an assortment 
of essays, poems, short fiction, photographs, and illustrations, many explicitly ideological in nature, 
others implicitly so. Articles on international affairs updated readers on geopolitical developments. 
These included the translation of a speech that Anthony Kubek, an extreme right-wing US political 
scientist with ties to the pro-Chiang “China Lobby” and a former visiting professor in Taiwan, had 
delivered during his recent visit to the Philippines.1 In it, the author of such McCarthyite polemics 
as How the Far East was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949 
(1963) and Communism at Pearl Harbor: How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor 
and Open Up Asia to Communization (1959) warned that Red subversion posed a greater threat to 
the United States in 1972 than ever before because of, not despite, the PRC’s entry into the United 
Nations half a year earlier. 
 Complementing these analyses were pieces that transposed what the ROC and its advocates 
considered a global struggle against communism into personalized, localized, and sentimentalized  
registers. For example, an unnamed 60-year-old Jinjiang native who had managed to visit his ailing 
mother in China described the poverty, backwardness, and despair that had greeted him upon his 
bittersweet return to his hometown. It is unclear how far his narrative was genuine or embellished 
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from generic tropes about mainland China in KMT propaganda. Still more concrete than this was 
an essay towards the end of the volume entitled “I Love the Republic of China” (Wo ai Zhonghua 
minguo 我愛中華民國). Its author, Cai Liyi 蔡麗意, was a student at one of the country’s premier 
Chinese schools, Chiang Kai-shek College (Zhongzheng xueyuan 中正學院, or CKSC; Chiang 
Kai-shek High School until 1965). The essay waxed lyrical about her love for Chinese history and 
bemoaned the communists’ role in dividing the Chinese nation into two. Despite being born in the 
Philippines, she declared that her “person, blood, bones, skin, and heart in particular” (wo de ren, 
wo de xue, wo de gutou, pifu, tebie shi wo de xin 我的人, 我的血, 我的骨頭、皮膚, 特別是我的
心) forever belonged to the ROC, her ancestral land, or zuguo 祖國. In concluding, she confidently 
declared, repeating a standard KMT talking point, that the communists would soon be vanquished 
and that the ROC would imminently unite Chinese all around the world to reconquer the mainland.2 
 It is easy, in hindsight, to read these three pieces as embodying the ROC and its supporters’ 
futile, reactionary defiance of the international situation in the early 1970s. However, in the context 
of Philippine-Chinese society (perhaps even more so than Taiwanese society), the views that they 
expressed reflected the ideological mainstream as defined by the makers of Chinese civic opinion 
and would not be out of place in a school classroom, speech, or newspaper at virtually any moment 
from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. By comparison, Filipino society during this same period, despite 
the conservatism of its elites and the state, was a space for considerable ideological contention and 
much more receptive to leftist – even pro-PRC – perspectives. Collectively, these articles are also 
noteworthy for highlighting the connections between international and localized manifestations of 
anticommunism; they suggest that readers of Shijie qingnian were supposed to imagine themselves 
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as part of a transnational ideological community and as participating in a struggle simultaneously 
personal, China-centric, and global. This and other editions of the magazine and publications like 
it reveal that while not every aspect of Chinese social and cultural life in the Philippines may have 
revolved around the reproduction and transmission of anticommunist ideas, the threads of ideology 
were woven into the fabric of civic affairs and cannot be disentangled from it. 
 How do we understand such outward ideological uniformity and how was it sustained over 
time and across different social fields? Earlier chapters have shown how the shutting down of left-
wing publications such as the Chinese Guide in the immediate postwar years deprived the Chinese 
public of genuine ideological diversity. In a deeply anticommunist country that was grappling with 
its own communist threat, fears of both communist subversion and being identified as a communist 
or communist sympathizer, which in turn could result in harassment by the police and, worse still, 
arrest and deportation helped confine heterodox opinions to private spaces and verbal interactions. 
The jinqiao an and Cebu students’ affair made clear the consequences of even being suspected of 
ideological heterodoxy, and were exceptional cases that proved the rule. Anticommunism was thus 
a strategy of ideological accommodation, a means by which politically vulnerable ethnic minorities 
performed Philippine national values and cultivated useful relations with Filipinos. Most Chinese 
were, likely, anticommunist, but what mattered more than what they believed in was being seen as 
ideologically correct by persons and institutions of authority. 
 Building on earlier chapters, Chapter 4 argues for a structural and networked understanding 
of ideological uniformity within the Philippine-Chinese community from the mid-1950s onwards. 
The social foundations of anticommunism were already strong. Starting in 1954 with the formation 
of the Shang Zong, or Federation, commercial and cultural elites consolidated them in response to 




education and commerce. Community governance was henceforth concentrated in five institutions 
and in the hands of a small group of leaders that defined the community’s priorities. High among 
these priorities was the propagation of anticommunism, a potent centripetal force and worldview 
that Filipinos, local Chinese, and the ROC could identify with. Collectively, the Shang Zong; KMT; 
General Association of Chinese Schools (Feilübin huaqiao xuexiao lianhe zonghui 菲律賓華僑
學校聯合總會, or Xiao Zong); Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League (Feilübin huaqiao 
fangong kang’e zonghui 菲律賓華僑反共抗俄總會, or PCACL); and Grand Family Association 
(Feilübin ge zongqin hui lianhehui菲律賓各宗親會聯合會, or Zong Lian) – the “Big Five,” as 
they were known – overlapped in leadership, facilitated negotiations with the Philippine state and 
public relations with Filipino society, and enabled the rapid diffusion of anticommunist ideology 
and practices across social domains. 
This chapter also shows that Philippine-Chinese anticommunists belonged to a network of 
institutions and actors that connected them to like-minded ideologues among Filipinos and in the 
ROC and other countries. If, as anthropologist Susan Bayly has suggested, Indian and Vietnamese 
intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s were members of a “worldwide socialist ecumene” that was 
characterized by “a set of broadly inclusive moral, emotional, and even aesthetic dispositions,”3 
then Chinese activists in the Philippines and the individuals and organizations that they were linked 
to participated in what we might describe as a transnational “anticommunist ecumene.” This space 
of interaction was highly institutionalized and networked and not limited to intellectuals. Rather, 
it united intellectuals, businessmen, students, military officials, and politicians under the banner of 
a global ideology and straddled the boundaries between state and society. Like Chinese nationalists 
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in the first half of the 20th century, who deployed what Prasenjit Duara has called “wider narratives 
of historical community, based on common race, language, or culture” to encourage an “affective 
identification” with the Chinese nation, pro-ROC ideologues in the Philippines after 1949 sought 
to encourage the “right” dispositions among local Chinese and mobilize them in support of “China” 
by situating the national struggle against communism within a wider ideological landscape.4 
 In what follows, I first explain how developments within and beyond the Philippines such 
as the jinqiao an, Filipinization, and anticommunist regionalism contributed to the establishment 
of the Federation, Xiao Zong, and PCACL from 1954 to 1957 and strengthened Chinese society’s 
commitment to and capacity to propagate anticommunism. Partly by focusing on CKSHS, this first 
half of the chapter also explores how Chinese education served as a social and cultural foundation 
for the anticommunist movement and linked Chinese in the Philippines to Taiwan. The second half 
of the chapter then turns to the expansion and activities of the PCACL in the mid-late 1950s as a 
way of showing how anticommunist networks functioned to infuse Chinese civic life with ideology.  
 
Restructuring community governance: the Shang Zong 
 The events of December 27, 1952 and their long, drawn-out aftermath can be seen as part 
of a series of uncoordinated efforts by the postwar Philippine state to exercise greater sovereignty 
over its Chinese population and align it more closely with Filipino national interests. In the 1950s, 
interventions into trade and commerce, education, and individual security helped effect a top-down 
restructuring of Chinese society, beginning in 1954 with the displacement of the General Chamber 
of Commerce from its position of leadership. Anticommunism was integral to social reorganization. 
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Whereas linguistic and physiognomic differences, separate school systems, de jure differences in 
nationality, and internalized prejudices on both sides made ethno-cultural divisions between them 
difficult to bridge, ideology served as a common ground for Chinese and Filipinos, elites and non-
elites. Anticommunism united individual nationalities, but unlike communism did not presume to 
render nationality irrelevant. To an extent, it also helped mitigate factional tensions within Chinese 
society that social restructuring reproduced and exacerbated. For such reasons, anticommunism, a 
ubiquitous component of Chinese public life in the Philippines since the end of World War II, was 
amplified and institutionalized to a much greater degree than before from the mid-1950s onwards. 
 The impact of Filipinization was most acutely felt in trade and commerce, which Filipino 
nationalists long believed the Chinese dominated. As Chapter 1 has shown, attempts to pass anti-
Chinese economic and social legislation were made at the first postwar special session of Congress 
in mid-1945. The failure of H. B. No. 355 in October 1945 at the hands of President Osmeña only 
emboldened the nationalization lobby, whose efforts intensified in the years that followed. Similar 
bills – seven individual bills and one that consolidated four of them – were introduced during the 
first sessions of the First (1946-1949) and Second Congresses (1950-1953).5 None were passed, 
but following Ramon Magsaysay’s election and the Nacionalista Party’s overwhelming victory in 
the presidential and legislative elections of 1953, the political climate shifted decisively in favor 
of nationalization. Unlike his lawyerly predecessors, two of whom had vetoed nationalization bills 
out of concern for their international ramifications and constitutionality, Magsaysay was inclined 
towards populism and far less concerned about legal subtleties. In the first half of 1954, during the 
first session of the Third Congress (1954-1957), congressmen and senators capitalized on the new 
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president’s receptiveness towards nationalization and introduced a total of 47 bills targeting “alien” 
control of economic and social sectors and covering everything from the retail trade to universities 
to duck rearing. With Magsaysay’s support, and despite concerted opposition from Chinese leaders 
and the ROC, one such bill was eventually signed into law on June 19, 1954 as Republic Act (R.A.) 
No. 1180.6 The Retail Trade Nationalization Act, as it became known as, effectively provided that 
existing alien retailers would be permitted to continue business until their deaths, but corporations 
involved in retailing that were not 100 percent owned by Filipinos were to close down in a decade. 
Legal efforts by the newly-formed Federation to have the Act overturned failed when the Supreme 
Court upheld it in its May 31, 1957 verdict on the case of Lao H. Ichong, et al. vs. Jaime Hernandez, 
et. al.7 Further restrictions on foreign economic activity followed under the “Filipino First” policy 
of Magsaysay’s successor, Carlos Garcia, much to the dismay of the Chinese community.  
 The Shang Zong, founded on March 29, 1954, was born of and into an atmosphere of crisis 
in Chinese society that the jinqiao an and the unrelenting stream of nationalization bills since 1945 
had created. The Federation’s official history and memoirs of Tang Tack 鄧英達, the Zamboanga 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce President and a founding member and first Secretary of the Shang 
Zong, rationalize the movement towards federation from the late 1940s onwards as an attempt to 
establish an integrated leadership structure for Chinese society that would safeguard the interests 
of trade and commercial associations across the country more effectively than the Manila-centered 
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General Chamber did. The absence of such a body to promote the unity of all Chinese in the islands, 
in Tang’s view, had reduced Chinese society in the aftermath of the 1952 mass arrests to what he 
called, using Sun Yat-sen’s well-worn expression, a “sheet of loose sand” (yi pan sansha 一盤散
沙). At meetings of Chinese chamber of commerce representatives from across the Philippines in 
October 1947, January 1951, and November 1952 in Manila, proposals to establish such an entity 
failed to gain traction because of opposition from the General Chamber’s leaders.8 The Chamber’s 
own account, published after the establishment of the Shang Zong, explained that while proposals 
to form a pan-Philippine governing organization for all Chinese had merits, some businessmen 
opposed them because, first, the Chinese population was too dispersed to be governed by a single, 
top-down body and was better represented by local institutions; second, civic organizations ought 
not to be structured like government agencies; and third, having members of this organization meet 
regularly in Manila would inconvenience them.9 
 In early-mid-1953, following the jinqiao an and before the Third Congress, dissenters from 
within the Chamber renewed their push for a unified, inclusive governing body, beginning with a 
speech by the President of the Manila Chinese General Store Association Wang Guolai 王國來 on 
March 19 to its newly-elected board members. In the months that followed, a secretive campaign 
comprising figures from various Chinese trade and commercial organizations in Manila gathered 
strength, with the youthful and charismatic President of the Sugar and Rice Association (and future 
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Shang Zong President) Antonio Roxas Chua 蔡文華 emerging as an early leader of this movement. 
Roxas Chua and others decided that they needed the support of respected and influential Chamber 
members to, as Tang Tack put it, “begin the uprising” (jie gan er qi 揭竿而起).10 The three senior 
leaders they turned to were Yu Khe Thai, Peter Lim, and Yao Shiong Shio: Yu was Chairman of 
the Chinese Welfare Association and an adviser to the Chamber; Lim was on its board of directors; 
and Yao was its Vice-President.11 
Roxas Chua, Yu, Lim, and Yao proceeded to hold discussions with both General Chamber 
President Sy En and ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping about expanding the Chamber to include 
all Chinese trade and commercial organizations in the Philippines, rather than only chambers of 
commerce. Neither Sy nor Chen proved receptive to their proposal: Chen in fact counter-proposed 
the establishment of a sole governing body that included not only chambers of commerce, but also 
the Chinese Welfare Association, Cantonese Association, KMT, and Anti-Communist Movement. 
To circumvent these obstacles, the pro-federation group leaked information on its meetings with 
Sy and Chen to the Great China Press and Kong Li Po, the two KMT newspapers. Public opinion 
and growing calls from Chinese businessmen in support of the movement had their desired effect 
of forcing Chen to shift his stance and Sy to agree, at least verbally, to back the new organization. 
Subsequent discussions between the pro-federation movement and the Chamber, however, suggest 
that the Chamber hoped to govern the new grouping rather than be reduced to one among the many 
hundreds of Chinese associations that the federation hoped to represent. The split between the two 
factions was eventually resolved by popular referendum at a three-day meeting of representatives 
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from Chinese trade and commercial organizations across the country from March 26-29 in Manila. 
A last-ditch attempt by the Chamber to have its 16 directors automatically installed on the board 
of the Federation was thwarted. Elections for the board showed the Chamber’s loss of reputation, 
with Yu, Lim, Yao, and Roxas Chua garnering the most votes, in that order, and Sy coming in only 
fifth – enough to secure a place on the board alongside a few other Chamber loyalists.12 Yet despite 
this conciliatory gesture, the Chamber refused to join the Shang Zong until 1968, by which point 
Sy had passed away. In 1991, the Chamber quit the Shang Zong.13 It remains separate from and in 
the shadow of the Federation today.  
 Official and semi-official narratives of the Federation depict its formation as a principled, 
forward-looking, and popular response to the elitism, insularity, and inadequacies of the General 
Chamber. Other accounts, including those of contemporary scholars of the Shang Zong, are more 
attentive to power dynamics. In Chen Chih-ping’s analysis, for example, Yu Khe Thai, Peter Lim, 
Yao Shiong Shio, and Antonio Roxas Chua belonged to what he called the “party – that is to say, 
KMT – faction in opposition to Sy En, Alfonso Sycip, Dy Huan Chay, and Chamber loyalists. For 
Chen, the formation of the Federation represented the culmination of a long-running feud between 
the Chamber and KMT for control over the Chinese community. In other words, as Sy exclaimed 
angrily after coming in only fifth in the board elections, the Shang Zong was a KMT organ.14 Two 
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historians of the Federation make this very argument, although neither appears to have read Chen’s 
report.15 
With both the ROC Foreign Ministry archives and the KMT Archives themselves featuring 
little of the KMT point of view, the degree to which the party exerted influence over proceedings 
may never be known. What is clear is that the party supported the formation of the Federation, and 
that this signaled a renewed commitment on the part of Chinese business elites to anticommunism 
and Nationalist China. On March 28 and 29, the Great China Press, run by former KMT Secretary-
General Koa Chun-te, ran articles praising President Magsaysay’s speech at the opening ceremony 
of the Shang Zong. Addressing an audience of businessmen and traders, Magsaysay said very little 
about economic affairs and focused on exhorting the community to do more to oppose communism. 
“You cannot combat this menace by wishing that it will disappear, by merely standing with folded 
arms and hoping it will never disturb you. You can defeat it only by constant vigilance and action,” 
he declared; “your duty is to unite in the struggle against Communism regardless of the differences 
that may divide you in other matters…In a community as large as yours, there are bound to be a 
few who spoil the reputation of the many. Clean your own house of these undesirable elements 
and you will achieve stronger unity with your Filipino neighbors.”16 In fewer than 800 words, the 
President made it clear to Chinese leaders and ROC officials in attendance what his administration 
expected of them, in view of the ongoing trials of the jinqiao – presumably the “few who spoil the 
reputation of the many.” In describing anticommunism as a unifying force within the community 
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and between Chinese and Filipinos, Magsaysay even provided Chinese leaders with a ready-made 
justification for intensifying their ideological activism. His speech came as no surprise to the Shang 
Zong’s leaders, as ROC Embassy Counsellor Chow Shu-kai 周書楷 had met them and US officials 
beforehand to prepare several talking points for the President. Magsaysay elected to use only the 
first, on anticommunism.17  
 The Great China Press concurred with Magsaysay’s thinly-veiled criticism of the Chinese 
community. So-called Philippine-Chinese leaders, it said on March 28, enjoyed boasting that they 
were the foremost anticommunists in Southeast Asia, but this claim deceived both themselves and 
others. Its editorial on March 29 went further. The speech was a warning, it said; failure to heed it 
would result in dire consequences for the community. Responsibility for the lack of an active and 
united Chinese anticommunist movement in the Philippines lay primarily with the ROC Embassy, 
which had provided ineffectual leadership by not heeding calls to reform the existing Philippine-
Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement.18 That these reforms took 
place within the next two years under the leadership of the Federation suggests not only that KMT 
influenced the Federation, but that the two organizations shared ideological goals. 
While the KMT certainly supported the Shang Zong in the hopes of revitalizing the Chinese 
Anti-Communist Movement, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the party was the prime 
mover behind the Federation or that the Federation was a party organ. The very distinction between 
“party” and “Chamber” factions that Chen Chih-ping makes is problematic. Sy, for example, was 
a Standing Committee member of the KMT zongzhibu in 1953, together with Yao, Chua Lamco, 
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Gonzalo Gawhok, and Dee Haw Gim 李孝錦, but neither Gawhok nor Dee was on the Federation’s 
first board of directors.19 Moreover, as their biographies in the 1953 Philippine-Chinese Business 
Guide & Pictorial Directory show, Yu and Lim were not members of the KMT.20 Scholars have 
explained that Sy did not belong to the “party” faction because he was indifferent to its affairs and 
involvement in the Chamber; conversely, Yu, despite not being a party member, was supported by 
the party because he was a strong and respected leader.21 Be that as it may, the official narrative 
of the founding of the Shang Zong begins not with the so-called “party faction” (which is never 
referred to as such) but with frustration among less prominent Chinese businessmen such as Wang 
Guolai over the inadequacies of the Chamber; Yu, Lim, Yao, and Roxas Chua only come on board 
the movement after it had begun. Finally, to the extent that the secretive KMT headquarters made 
itself visible to the public and to Taipei, there is no evidence of animosity towards the Chamber – 
only, as the Great China Press articles suggest, the Embassy. In its report to the Seventh National 
Party Congress in Taiwan in October 1952, the zongzhibu even described KMT members in the 
Chamber as “our party’s most outstanding and ready-made citizen diplomats” (bendang zui youxiu 
er xiancheng zhi guomin waijiao rencai 本黨最優秀而現成之國民外交人才).22 The Federation, 
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in short, was not a KMT organization, as Pao Shih-tien 鮑事天, a party member and the longtime 
Principal of CKSC put it in 1993; the party only backed it.23 
 
Chinese education, anticommunism, and Filipinization  
 Filipinization, like manifestations of anti-Chinese nationalism elsewhere in Southeast Asia 
in the 1950s and 1960s, made itself felt just as much in education as in commercial affairs. Unlike 
the drawn-out and ultimately successful campaign to curb Chinese involvement in the retail trade, 
however, state intervention in the Chinese cultural sphere took place rapidly, but with little success. 
Underpinned by longstanding Filipino concerns over the foreignness and supposed unassimilable 
nature of the Chinese population, it was triggered by fears of communism that the jinqiao an and 
arrests of Sy Yan Wan, Sy Bun Chiong, and Lao Han Keng in July 1954 had stoked. In early 1955, 
responding to a report by the Committee on Un-Filipino Activities alleging communist infiltration 
of Chinese schools, the Board of National Education created a committee, chaired by Director of 
Private Schools Jesus Perpiñan, to investigate the Chinese school system and recommend a course 
of action.24  
                                                 
23 Chang Tsun-wu 張存武, Chu Hong-yuan 朱浤源, Dory Poa 潘露莉, and Lin Shu-hui 林淑慧 (ed.), The 
Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines 菲律賓華僑華人訪問記錄 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, 
Academia Sinica, 1996), 200. My analysis of the Shang Zong’s relationship to the KMT most resembles Chang and 
Ong, Feihua shanglian zonghui zhi xingshuai yu yanbian, 47-49. But while the authors suggest that the clash 
between the Roxas Chua, Yu, Yao, and Lim faction and the Sy faction was solely a power struggle for control over 
the community and had little to do with the KMT and ideological bent of the General Chamber, I argue that the 
party supported the Shang Zong, while the subsequent intensification of anticommunism in Chinese society implied 
dissatisfaction with the ideological status quo. 
 
24 Jesus E. Perpiñan, “New Controversy Over Chinese Schools,” in Shubert S. C. Liao, Chinese Participation in 
Philippine Culture and Economy (Manila, 1964), 334; Jiang Xingshan 姜兴山, Zhanhou Feilübin huawen jiaoyu 
yanjiu 战后菲律宾华文教育研究 (1945-1976) (Guangzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe, 2013), 145; Pao Shih-tien, 





 On August 16, Perpiñan’s committee issued its report, which affirmed the need for greater 
government control of the Philippines’ estimated 160 or so Chinese private schools, only a handful 
of which had registered with the Department of Education. These schools were unique in Southeast 
Asia for being dual-language institutions whose students usually sat for classes in Chinese in the 
morning and in English in the afternoon, with the Chinese curriculum set by Nationalist China and 
the English curriculum by the Bureau of Private Schools.25 The “Perpiñan Report” described the 
former, not inaccurately, as a “separate and complete system of education aimed at the training of 
the students for good Chinese citizenship” and whose every aspect – from programs of instruction 
to course materials to teacher qualifications – was supervised by the ROC. With recent intelligence 
reports “tending to show the danger of subversive influences infiltrating these courses,” Philippine 
supervision of them was a necessity. The committee was adamant, furthermore, that the Chinese 
curriculum came under the jurisdiction of the Philippine state, for while the 1947 Treaty of Amity 
had guaranteed Chinese nationals the right to establish schools for their children, it also subjected 
the exercise of this right to Philippine law.26 Specifically, the committee cited Article XIV, Section 
5 of the Philippine constitution, which placed all educational institutions under the supervision of 
the state, and Commonwealth Act No. 180 (1936), which made it punishable by law to operate a 
private school or college without prior approval from the authorities.27 For the committee, in other 
words, it was not a question of whether the state had sovereignty over Chinese-language education, 
but how to persuade Chinese schools to recognize this sovereignty, and then to exercise it. Beyond 
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the Department of Education, there were even some government officials, such as the Immigration 
Commissioner, who called for all Chinese schools in the country to be shut down.28  
 Led by Pao Shih-tien, Chinese educators and the ROC reacted swiftly to the report and to 
the possibility that Chinese schools in the Philippines would soon be closed down. Time and again, 
in both English and Chinese, Pao maintained that Chinese schools were no obstacle to assimilation.  
To the contrary, he believed that by admitting Filipinos “without any discrimination or hesitation,” 
promoting interactions between Chinese and Filipino students and teachers, and teaching Filipino 
and Chinese history and culture, these schools facilitated interracial understanding and hastened 
assimilation.29 As for the belief that they fostered divided loyalties among their Chinese students, 
Pao noted that these students were citizens of the ROC and permanent residents of the Philippines 
by law, and that naturalization was a difficult and expensive procedure. Therefore, schools should 
not be blamed for “simply doing what they should do” and preparing students to be “good citizens 
of China” – on top, of course, of teaching subjects that had been prescribed by the Department of 
Education such as Philippine History and Government and Philippine Social Life. Referring to the 
Treaty of Amity and earlier legislation, Pao argued that there was no basis in law to abolish Chinese 
schools and that doing so would amount to confiscating private property without just compensation 
and thus a violation of the constitution.30 A final argument that he and others advanced to justify 
the continuation of Chinese schools was that they were bastions of anticommunism and that their 
(Chinese) students were utterly loyal to Nationalist China. There was “absolutely no possibility of 
                                                 
28 Jiang, Zhanhou Feilübin huawen jiaoyu yanjiu (1945-1976), 146. 
 
29 Pao, “Chinese Schools in the Philippines,” The Fookien Times Yearbook 1961 (Manila, September 1961), 185. 
 






red infiltration into these schools,” which were “the vanguards of the anti-Communist movement,” 
he would say on multiple occasions, dismissing the Cebu reading club arrests and other evidence 
to the contrary as isolated incidents.31 
  Following Perpiñan’s report, discussions commenced between the two states and Chinese 
educators on how to address the concerns over sovereignty and security that it raised. In December, 
a memorandum of understanding between Vice-President Garcia and the new ROC Ambassador 
laid out the terms of cooperation between both sides going forward. All Chinese schools operating 
in the Philippines that had not been registered, as well as any schools that were to be established, 
had to be registered with the Bureau of Private Schools. Furthermore, while they had the freedom 
to teach any subjects that were required by the ROC, in accordance with the Treaty of Amity, they 
also had to meet minimum curricular standards required of Philippine public and private schools. 
To ensure this, a joint technical committee was formed to draw up a new curriculum for all Chinese 
schools. This went into effect in the 1956-57 school year and did away with separate Chinese and 
English departments, integrating Chinese and English subjects into a single program of study.32  
 As state interventions in Chinese education in Southeast Asia went, this was far from being 
radical and disruptive. While Pao and ROC officials believed that the revised curriculum allocated 
too many hours per week to classes in English, relative to those in Chinese,33 they emerged from 
discussions with the Department of Education relieved and feeling that, in Pao’s words, “the rain 
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had passed and the sky was clear” (yuguo tianqing 雨過天晴).34 Still, fears remained that the state, 
having succeeded at nationalizing the retail trade, would encroach further on Chinese education in 
the future. Developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia portended more extreme measures. Thailand, 
for example, had closed all Chinese secondary schools after 1948 and limited Chinese education 
to the primary level only. South Vietnam, another ally of the ROC, followed up on its August 1956 
requirement that all Chinese in Vietnam obtain Vietnamese citizenship by mandating that Chinese 
schools adopt Vietnamese as the sole language of instruction, employ Vietnamese principals, and 
place Vietnamese teachers in positions of responsibility. While these measures proved unworkable 
in the long-term, their immediate impact was Vietnamese-Chinese leaders’ decision to shut down 
all Chinese schools for six months.35 These events could not escape the attention of ROC officials 
and Chinese in the Philippines; CKSHS students even started a campaign to raise awareness of the 
plight of the Vietnamese Chinese and collect donations to help them relocate to Taiwan.36  
 Similar to what Chinese businessmen had done in 1954, Chinese educators worked swiftly 
to federate themselves in response to Filipinization and present a common front to the Philippine 
authorities. On April 15, 1957, 131 Chinese principals or school representatives from ten regions 
and 54 provinces or cities gathered at the Nationalist Chinese Embassy for a four-day conference,37 
which Pao chaired. Its outcome was the formation of the General Association of Chinese Schools, 
or Xiao Zong, which joined the KMT, Federation, and PCACL as the fourth Chinese organization 
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to span the Philippines, and whose constitution was drafted by the Embassy.38 The joint declaration 
issued by the attendees signaled the organization’s priorities. The Chinese nation – the declaration 
used minzu 民族 here to reflect a deterritorialized conception of this community – was under attack 
by “Red imperialism” (chise diguo zhuyi 赤色帝國主義). It thus fell upon educators to unite and 
train the next generation of youths to fight for the recovery and restoration of their homeland. Only 
after this ritualized gesture towards the ideological status quo did the declaration turn towards the 
history of Chinese education in the Philippines. In a revealingly chauvinistic expression, it stated 
that had Chinese schools not existed, huaqiao youth in the country would have long since become 
“barbarians” (yi 夷).39 
 
Chinese education and the foundations and propagation of anticommunism 
 As this declaration implies, Philippine Department of Education officials were quite correct 
in believing that Chinese schools were largely a force for malintegration. In his 1973 study of the 
Chinese community, American social scientist Gerald McBeath concluded that the school system 
represented “the last stand of Chinese communalism,” a view shared by supporters of integration 
such as the Chinese-Filipino activist Teresita Ang See and Jesuit priest Charles J. McCarthy, both 
of whom were active in the movement for jus soli citizenship in the early 1970s. Ang See, whose 
siblings all attended either the Anglo-Chinese School or CKSC, has described these institutions as 
“bastions of ultraconservatism and ethnocentrism.”40 Within the community in the 1950s, the most 
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outspoken criticism of the school system was from the Chinese Commercial News, which had long 
supported Chinese integration into Filipino society. From August 31 to October 19, 1958, the CCN 
published an eight-part series of articles on “The Bankruptcy of Chauvinistic Education” (Pochan 
de shawen zhuyi de jiaoyu 破產的沙文主義的教育), which attacked Chinese schools’ inattention 
to English instruction and dogmatic adherence to an outmoded form of nationalist education, and 
called for a complete overhaul of the system to meet the needs of a rapidly-changing society.41 (As 
we will see in Chapter 6, publishing such articles would lead to adverse consequences for the CCN.) 
It is easy to find in Chinese-language texts not meant for Filipino consumption ample evidence of 
the chauvinism that these advocates of ethno-cultural integration were alluding to. For example, 
in a 1958 book on Chinese education in the Philippines, the Principal of Cebu Eastern High School, 
Chen Lieh-fu, described overseas Chinese and Southeast Asians as completely different from each 
other owing to differences in climate. Efforts by Southeast Asian states to assimilate their Chinese 
populations would not succeed because China possessed a “more advanced and mature” (jiao gao 
jiao chengshu 較高較成熟) civilization that had successfully Sinicized the Manchus despite their 
superior military strength.42 
 Why, then, did the Filipinization of Chinese schools in 1956 leave their Chinese-language 
curriculum essentially untouched? One reason was that, as Perpiñan admitted, the Department of 
Education lacked the funds to hire Chinese-speaking employees and thus had no actual means of 
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supervising the Chinese-language curriculum, let alone design a new one.43 This limitation typified 
the Philippines’ partial and contested sovereignty over Chinese society. Another reason was that, 
as political scientist Robert Tilman has argued, Philippine politicians by and large did not believe 
that assimilating local Chinese was possible and emphasized anticommunism over assimilation. In 
their view, “the one way to make certain that the Chinese schools are anti-communist is to permit 
the Nationalist government to oversee them,” even if this entailed perpetuating cultural differences 
between Chinese and Filipinos.44 
 Tilman implies here that Philippine officialdom regarded Chinese schools as ethnically and 
culturally malintegrative for the same reason that it saw them as a bulwark against leftist influence: 
ROC control over them. This is broadly accurate. While only a minority of schools such as Chiang 
Kai-shek and Cebu Eastern were led by principals who were strongly supported by or members of 
the KMT, the zongzhibu (and after 1956, the PCACL and Xiao Zong) played an instrumental role 
in vetting the large majority of Chinese-language teachers for approval by the ROC Embassy; the 
party was even responsible for hiring at sectarian schools run by Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhist 
missions. In the absence of a sufficient number of qualified Chinese teachers in the country, some 
schools even employed teachers from Taiwan. Such practices ensured that teachers were politically 
innocuous at worst or KMT hardliners at best.45 
 Moreover, in the Philippines and most of Southeast Asia at the time, Chinese schools made 
use of textbooks that originated from Taiwan and were issued by government-operated publishers 
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such as the Cheng Chung Book Company (Zhengzhong shuju 正中書局) for primary school texts 
and the World Book Company (Shijie shuju 世界書局) for secondary school texts.46 Taiwan also 
supplied teachers with instructional materials through book series such as “Textbooks for Nanyang 
Chinese Schools” (Nanyang huaqiao xuexiao jiaokeshu 南洋華僑教科書) and “Overseas Series” 
(Haiwai wenku 海外文庫), the latter of which included Chen Lieh-fu’s 1957 book Philippines and 
China (Feilübin yu Zhongguo 菲律賓與中國).47 Such works were ideological, but not in the same 
way that Cai Liyi’s essay “I Love the Republic of China” and anticommunist polemics by the likes 
of Anthony Kubek were. Tilman’s analysis of student textbooks found that they tended to present 
factual material in a straightforward and didactic manner and contained little overt political content. 
Instead, they indirectly supported the Nationalist cause. Textbooks for Civics (Gongmin 公民), for 
example, reminded students to greet their parents in the morning and evening, bow to show respect 
to their elders, be punctual, and cover their mouths when yawning. Letter-writing exercises, which 
consumed a large proportion of students’ curricular time, reinforced these injunctions by exposing 
students to model letters between children and their parents and teachers featuring exhortations to 
embrace thrift, industriousness, filial piety, and other traditional “Chinese” virtues.48 
 Moral traditionalism and proper personal conduct had been staple features of KMT-issued 
textbooks since the Nanjing Decade and especially since the New Life Movement that Chiang Kai-
shek launched in February 1934, eight months before the end of the KMT’s campaign against the  
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Jiangxi Soviet.49 KMT ideologues recognized then, as they did after 1949, that the struggle against 
communism was also a struggle over how Chinese society should be organized and thus over what 
it meant to be Chinese. For the KMT, which had evolved into a counterrevolutionary party by the 
1930s, this entailed weaponizing “tradition” to regenerate the national essence and distinguish its 
vision of China from the CCP’s. If communism targeted feudalism, the bourgeoisie, landlords, and 
other aspects of the old society for elimination, the KMT would seek to impart moral and ethical 
values appropriate to the preservation of social order. It believed (not unlike its Qing predecessors) 
that hierarchical interpersonal relations and respect for parents, elders, and teachers would translate 
into an acceptance of established political authority: the “rightful” government of China, but also, 
depending on circumstance, the governments of countries where Chinese people happened to live. 
Civics lessons and letter-writing exercises, in this spirit, were supposed to inoculate Chinese youth 
against the germs of radical leftism.  
 Chinese schools in the Philippines were thus at the very least non-communist institutions 
by virtue of the teachers and textbooks that they employed, the close ties to the KMT and the ROC 
that these personnel and teaching materials embodied, and the political environment in which they 
operated. KMT-run schools went even further than this by mobilizing students and teachers against 
communism and strengthening their ties with Nationalist China.  
 For a glimpse into how schools propagated anticommunism and were linked to Taiwan, let 
us first turn to CKSHS in October 1957, just after the establishment of the Xiao Zong; later sections 
of the chapter will examine the PCACL’s role in this. Chiang Kai-shek’s latest book, Soviet Russia 
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in China had been published earlier in the year.50 It argued that a Nationalist counterattack against 
the Chinese mainland was the key to stopping the Soviet drive for world domination. All that was 
required from the West was moral and some material support, but not any military support. Instead, 
Nationalist troops and anticommunist Asian peoples would spearhead the offensive, joining forces 
with the Chinese masses once a beachhead had been established on the mainland. In the Philippines, 
the Xiao Zong purchased copies for all Chinese schools,51 and at CKSHS, one of only two schools 
outside Taiwan to be named after Chiang (the other being Chung Cheng High School in Singapore), 
the book became something of a canonical text for students and teachers. Multiple volumes were 
put on display in the school library for borrowing; every teacher received a copy and was asked to 
read it and encourage students to do so. History and Civics teachers were told to incorporate it as 
supplementary material into their lessons, while Chinese Literature teachers were to assign it as an 
extracurricular reading for the semester and have students write book reports on it. Lastly, students 
would be divided into groups and participate in a competition to test one’s knowledge of the text. 
Should they wish, they could also take part in a community-wide essay contest on the book, jointly 
organized by the PCACL, KMT, and Xiao Zong.52  
 The October 1957 edition of the CKSHS Student Journal (Zhongzheng xuesheng 中正學
生), which reported on these efforts to promote Chiang’s book, provides considerable evidence of 
the school’s special, multifaceted relationship with Taiwan. One news item noted that the Overseas 
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Chinese Affairs Commission had approved changes to the board of directors’ constitution. Another 
reported that students and teachers were responding enthusiastically to fundraising campaigns and 
donation drives such as the Generalissimo’s appeal for a “cultural counterattack” (wenhua fangong 
文化反攻) against China and the KMT zongzhibu’s call for donations of books, which would be 
airdropped onto the mainland. The magazine also listed the names of 36 recent graduates who were 
going on to pursue university degrees in Taiwan. One of these graduates, Zheng Tingting 鄭婷婷, 
would even be attending National Taiwan Normal University to study History and Literature with 
financial support from her alma mater. Zheng had topped an examination to select the recipient of 
this scholarship, which stipulated that she would return to teach at CKSHS after graduating from 
university. The school planned to continue with this scheme to improve the quality of its teachers 
and incorporate alumni into its staff.53    
 The Journal also published student essays to reward with a place in the spotlight what the 
school considered well-written and ideologically correct prose. One of the essays that stood out in 
this issue was “My recollections of studying at a school in the mainland bandit province” (Wo zai 
dalu feiqu xuexiao dushu de huiyi 我在大陸匪區學校讀書的回憶), by a first-year junior middle 
school student, Wu Shengmin 吳聖敏. As becomes quickly apparent from reading this essay, Wu 
almost certainly did not ever attend school in China, as we are not told where the school was, its 
name, or when, how long, and at what level he studied there. Nor do we ever learn how he managed 
at such a young age to leave the PRC for the Philippines. Such details mattered little. Although we 
do not know the circumstances in which this essay was written, it was likely an in-class assignment, 
the point of which was to have students reproduce propagandistic stereotypes about the horrors of 
                                                 





student life under communist rule. CKSHS students were bombarded with such stereotypes in the 
classroom and beyond on a constant basis, and may have absorbed them by reading tracts such as  
A True Account of How the Communist Bandits have Brought Disaster upon the Overseas Chinese 
(Gongfei huoqiao shilu共匪禍僑實錄) and How the Chinese Communists Treat Overseas Chinese 
Students (Zhonggong zenyang duidai qiaosheng 中共怎樣對待僑生), published in 1955 and 1956 
respectively and likely available in the school library.54 For example, his essay made sure to refer 
to the “Zhu-Mao bandit gang” (Zhu-Mao feibang 朱毛匪幫) that ruled China. He described being 
forced to learn Russian, read works on agricultural production, and participate in a Young Pioneers’ 
team that had its members praise the CCP at every opportunity; after falling sick for two months, 
he said that he returned to school only to be criticized by his peers for being lazy. This drove him 
to flee the mainland for the “path of freedom” (ziyou de daolu 自由的道路), which he was able to 
do because of the sacrifices of his paternal aunt. In short, while this essay, like Cai Liyi’s, may not 
have signaled any intrinsic commitment to anticommunism, it exemplified how the language and 
assumptions of this ideology circulated through Chinese schools and entered into daily usage.55  
 
Transnational anticommunism and the founding of the PCACL 
 Neither the Shang Zong nor Chinese schools existed only to promote anticommunism. The 
commercial and intellectual constituencies that they represented, however, acknowledged the need 
for Chinese society to do so as a way of legitimizing itself to an increasingly interventionist state; 
connecting Chinese and Filipinos through a shared, participatory ideology; and generating a new, 
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contextually relevant form of communal solidarity. This was evident in the creation of the PCACL 
in September 1956. By the end of decade, following the formation of the Grand Family Association 
in March 1958, anticommunism had taken its place alongside commerce (the Federation), culture 
and the nation (the KMT), education (the Xiao Zong), and clanship ties (the Zong Lian) as a central 
concern of the community.  
 The origins of the PCACL, more so than that of the Federation and Xiao Zong, lie both in 
and beyond the Philippines. The United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement, 
had done little except pad the resumes of its members, and after the jinqiao an came under attack 
from the ROC Ambassador for being an organization that existed “in name only” (youming wushi 
有名無實).56 Calls to revitalize the Chinese anticommunist movement were made at the very first 
meeting of the 1954 Shang Zong conference, partly in response to Magsaysay’s speech earlier that 
day. It was not until two years later, however, that discussions began in earnest between Chinese 
leaders and the ROC to form the PCACL. 
 The occasion that sparked these discussions was the second meeting of the Asian Peoples’ 
Anti-Communist League (APACL) in Manila in March 1956. Formed in June 1954 by Taiwan and 
South Korea (but without US input), the APACL was a transnational organization of activists from 
across Asia that met annually to denounce the evils of communism and neutralism and exhort its 
members and the world to redouble their efforts against the Soviet Union and its puppets in China, 
North Korea, and North Vietnam. Individual chapters of the APACL, based at the time in Taiwan, 
South Korea, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Hong Kong, Macao, and the Ryukyus, coordinated 
propaganda activities among like-minded government and civic groups in their countries or cities. 
                                                 





The APACL chapter in the Philippines, for example, was connected to the state security apparatus 
through Undersecretary of Defense Jose M. Crisol, among other military and defense officials, and 
headed by Catholic intellectual Jose Ma. Hernandez, an admirer of Taiwan and staunch defender 
of Chinese education in the Philippines. Through civic organizations such as the Philippine Anti-
Communist League and links with the ROC state, Chinese anticommunists in the country became 
part of this network of ideologues that transcended ethnic and national divisions, the local and the 
transnational, and the boundaries between state and society. Three “local” Chinese were members 
of the Philippine delegation at the Manila meeting of the League, including the General Chamber’s 
Sy En, who was then a Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement, and four were 
part of the ROC delegation, including Tang Tack and Cua Siok Po 柯叔寶, a writer, newspaperman, 
former guerrilla, and Secretary-General of the Philippine KMT. Meanwhile, among the “experts” 
on communism who attended the meeting was one “Colonel” Shih I-Sheng.57 His antics in the late 
1940s and early 1950s seemingly forgotten, Shih had reentered public life after his “world tour” 
and was even elected to the Shang Zong’s first board of directors.58 
The rising tide of Asian anticommunism in the mid-1950s and special relationship between 
Taiwan and the Philippine Chinese impelled reform of the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement. 
Following a speech by APACL Chairman and ex-ROC Interior Minister Ku Cheng-kang谷正綱 
calling on the Movement to intensify its activities, ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-mai and Ku met 
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with Chinese leaders to plan the establishment of the PCACL.59 Transnational in outlook, Chinese 
anticommunism in the Philippines was also entangled in the politics of the local. If the formation 
of the Shang Zong two years earlier had exacerbated Chinese society’s divisions, then the PCACL 
could help mitigate them by offering General Chamber members such as Sy En a seat at its table. 
Under the banner of ideology, trade, commercial, and clan disputes and the animosity between the 
KMT and the Chamber might be temporarily set aside; no Chinese, after all, would dare to claim 
public opposition to anticommunism. Sy and Dy Huan Chay were thus both involved in organizing 
the PCACL, with Sy maintaining his reputation as one of the leaders of Chinese anticommunism 
in the Philippines by participating in the preparatory committee of the PCACL. He even secured a 
place on its five-man Standing Committee (which also included Yu Khe Thai, Chua Lamco, Yao 
Shiong Shio, and Peter Lim), despite finishing in 19th place out of 60 in the PCACL’s elections in 
September.60 In that same year, the Federation even invited the Chamber to become part of it, but 
Sy rejected this offer.61 
 Another, less obvious social division that the PCACL transcended was between Chinese 
society’s commercial members, as represented by the Shang Zong, and its intelligentsia, consisting 
of journalists and educators such as the Publisher of the Fookien Times Go Puan Seng and Principal 
of Chinese Patriotic School (Huaqiao aiguo xuexiao 華僑愛國學校) in Manila Liu Chi-tien 劉芝
田, author of a monumental 900-page history of China-Philippine relations published in Taiwan 
                                                 
59 “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui 菲華反共抗俄總會,” Vol. 1, 182, 062.2/0004, December 1950-December 1959, 
IMH Archives. 
 
60 “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 132, IMH Archives; Shang Zong yuebao 商總月報, Vol. 1, No. 9 
(September 1956), 75, KHC.  
 





by Cheng Chung Book Company in 1964.62 Another such person to join the PCACL was Pao Shih-
tien, who had completed his Ph.D. in Education from the University of Santo Tomas in 1955. Born 
in Hubei, Pao neither spoke Hokkien nor owned any businesses, and was thus twice removed from 
the commercial mainstream of Philippine-Chinese society. His ideological credentials, on the other 
hand, were immaculate. Having taught at the KMT’s political reeducation school in Nanchang in 
1935, Pao helped establish CKSHS in 1939 alongside Ong Chuan Seng, one of the founders of the 
KMT in the Philippines. During the Japanese occupation, he drafted the constitution of the Chinese 
Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia. After the war, when the KMT recalled Ong to China to serve 
on the Legislative Yuan, Pao became the school’s acting Principal and then its Principal after Yu 
Khe Thai stepped down in 1959.63 In the years that followed, Pao championed Chinese education, 
led the struggle against educational Filipinization, strengthened educational ties between Chinese 
society and Nationalist China, and fortified CKSHS as an anticommunist stronghold; his greatest 
achievement, after years of negotiations with the Philippine government, was the transformation  
of the school into a college in 1965. By integrating the likes of Pao, Go, Liu, and Cua into its ranks, 
the PCACL drew upon their expertise in cultural propaganda to ensure that vital spheres of Chinese 
public life were filled with the right kind of information. 
Yet, even as it attempted to reconcile with the General Chamber on the grounds of ideology 
and to integrate itself into the cultural sphere, the PCACL also reflected the power shifts that had 
taken place between individuals and institutions in Chinese society, as well as its efforts to reach 
out to the Filipino establishment. Alfonso Sycip, for example, for many years the President of the 
General Chamber, resigned as Chairman of the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement in April 1956, 
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citing work and old age (he was 73).64 Yu Khe Thai, who served as President of the Federation for 
a record four two-year terms (1954-1962), became Chairman of the PCACL while continuing to 
head the Chinese Welfare Association; following Ong’s death in 1956, he was Principal of CKSHS 
for three years while also serving as Chairman of its Board of Directors. He and other Federation 
leaders, together with intellectuals like Pao and Cua Siok Po – who served as one of the PCACL’s 
three Deputy Secretaries and later its Secretary – came to dominate the upper echelons of political, 
economic, and cultural power in Chinese society across a network of interlocking civic institutions 
that was the densest in Southeast Asia at the time: according to OCAC in 1956, the ratio of Chinese 
civic organizations to the size of the Chinese population in the Philippines was 1 to 20 (5 percent), 
compared to a mere 1 to 143 (0.7 percent) in second-placed Burma and 1 to 250 (0.4 percent) in 
Malaya.65  
 Like the APACL meeting in March, the three-day inaugural convention of the PCACL in 
September 1956 was a transnational moment that straddled the boundaries between the state and 
society. As a social occasion hosted by the ROC Embassy, it was an opportunity for Chinese elites 
to cultivate officials in the Magsaysay administration and represent their ideological bona fides to 
their host country. In this way, the ceremonial dimensions of anticommunism were not incidental 
to or separate from its substance. As Jacques Amyot’s fieldwork in Manila in the 1950s suggests, 
Chinese gatherings to which Filipinos were invited were fundamentally transactional in nature and 
dictated by the advantages to be gained from associating with the right people.66 Jose Crisol, Jose 
Hernandez, and Ku Cheng-kang were present, as was a US Embassy representative, all of whom 
                                                 
64 “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 123, IMH Archives. 
 
65 Liang Ziheng梁子衡, Huaqiao shehui yanjiu 華僑社會研究 (Hong Kong: Haichao chubanshe, 1958), 74, 80.  
 





spoke to the 310 delegates from 182 organizations across the country that had gathered in Manila. 
In what typified the global dimensions of high-profile ideological occasions such as this, messages 
of congratulation and well-wishes poured in from Chiang, Magsaysay, Garcia, and dozens of other 
politicians, military officials, and right-wing civil society groups in the Philippines, Taiwan, the 
United States – including members of the pro-Taiwan “China Lobby” that Anthony Kubek was a 
part of – and other participants in the global anticommunist ecumene.67 Coming just a few months 
after, as Chapter 3 has shown, the ROC Embassy had agreed to second intelligence agents to serve 
as consultants to MIS, the convention symbolically affirmed the closer anticommunist ties between 
Manila, Taipei, and Chinese society that Magsaysay had called for in his speech to the Shang Zong 
in 1954. In the context of the jinqiao an, an important step towards finding a political solution to 
the case was winning over the likes of Crisol and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Jesus Vargas, 
who spoke at the convention.  
Preparatory meetings held in the six months leading up to the first PCACL convention, as 
well as meetings during the convention itself, make it clear how Chinese leaders understood the 
problem of communism and wished their reformed organization would develop in the context of 
developments in the Philippines and elsewhere. In keeping with the trend towards expanding the 
membership of leadership organizations, the preparatory committee agreed from the outset that the 
KMT, Shang Zong, General Chamber, schools, kinship associations, Cantonese Association, and 
Women’s Association were to be represented within the League.68 In September, the convention’s 
agenda stressed the importance of cultural propaganda and the media in the PCACL’s future work. 
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For instance, the assembled delegates agreed in principle to increase the volume of anticommunist 
periodicals then in circulation – Shijie qingnian becoming one of them – and to establish a radio 
station specifically for anticommunist broadcasting. Other proposals that passed muster involved 
the use of praise and censure as tactics to shape civic and political attitudes. The delegates agreed, 
for example, to commend Singapore’s Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock for his crackdown on leftist 
trade unions, teachers, and students, in the hope of encouraging a similarly vigilant stance against 
the dormant but ever-present threat of communist subversion in the Philippines.69 
By the end of the 1950s, therefore, the Big Five, through institutions such as CKSHS, had 
come to define Chinese civic identity in the Philippines. They were led by a small group of elites 
and overlapped in structure and function, allowing for the rapid propagation of ideology across the 
social spheres they stood for. Redundancy, rather than specialization, was essential to ideological 
uniformity. Both the PCACL and KMT – the “KMT Cultural Association” (Guomindang wenhua 
xiehui 國民黨文化協會),70 as it was renamed in the early 1960s – treated culture as an important, 
if vaguely-defined domain of influence, with schools, clan associations, and the media becoming 
spaces to be saturated with “traditional Chinese culture” and explicitly anticommunist messaging. 
With the Chinese community heavily institutionalized and hierarchically structured, its elites were 
able to mobilize its members more effectively in support of ideological objectives. Funds, in the 
form of Federation membership fees for example, were easily channeled into propaganda events, 
publicity for which could be disseminated rapidly through the Shang Zong, the KMT, newspapers, 
and schools. With the likes of Pao and Cua at the forefront of the PCACL, the institutions that they 
helmed, CKSHS and the KMT zongzhibu, provided convenient, symbolically meaningful venues 
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and captive audiences of party members or students for large-scale League events. Beyond Manila, 
Chinese schools, chambers of commerce, and party branches that often occupied the same building 
and were indistinguishable from each other became the structural foundation for PCACL branches. 
A provincial chamber of commerce or school event might double up as a PCACL rally, for instance. 
In these ways, networks, institutions, and elites them helped integrate anticommunism into Chinese 
civic life. 
 
Culture, ceremony, and the expansion of the PCACL beyond Manila 
 This chapter now turns to how the PCACL entrenched itself across the Philippines and the 
activities that it sponsored to promote anticommunism and ideological coherence among ordinary 
huaqiao. Chiefly (although not only) through the League’s activities in its first year, I emphasize 
two interrelated features of its civic anticommunism. First, it was a connective phenomenon that 
linked Chinese in the islands to each other and to Filipinos, thereby helping to foster goodwill and 
ideological solidarity within Chinese society and between ethnic groups, as well as to the global 
and Nationalist Chinese anticommunist struggles, which Chinese in the Philippines were expected 
to identify with and contribute to. Second, the PCACL molded Philippine-Chinese subjects, youth 
and students especially, through a shared vocabulary and the techniques of public spectacle, active 
participation in rituals and performances, and rewards: discursive practices that fused the language 
of anticommunism with its material and social forms.71 
 High on the list of priorities of the PCACL was ensuring that Chinese beyond Manila were 
institutionally incorporated into the new organization, much as provincial chambers of commerce 
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and trade associations had been into the Shang Zong. From the jinqiao an to the Cebu reading club 
arrests, recent events made clear to rightist Chinese that communism was a pan-Philippine problem, 
and that anticommunism had to be similarly broad in geographical scope. Outside the capital, state 
capacity, border security, and the influence of Shang Zong elites in Manila were weaker. Well into 
the 1960s, provincial Chinese continued to be involved in trans-border smuggling networks, which 
could be depicted as an ideological problem because of how they connected the Philippines to the 
Chinese mainland via Hong Kong, the south China coast, and even North Borneo, thus serving as 
channels for the inflow of propaganda, arms, and other subversive elements – including communist 
agents – into the islands. A delegate from Bacolod City, for example, urged the PCACL convention 
to stop Chinese brokers in the provinces from trafficking in communist goods, although the report 
on his proposal did not specify what sorts of products he was referring to.72 And, as Chapter 3 has 
shown, part of the blame for the jinqiao an lay with a CCP agent from Hong Kong, Chen Jiading, 
whose false testimony the military harvested for names of individuals to arrest. 
 To stimulate excitement in the PCACL and pave the way for the formation of chapters in 
the provinces, the League created a traveling performing arts troupe to tour Northern Luzon during 
the summer school holidays in 1957 and raise awareness of anticommunism. Enthusiasm for this 
troupe appears to have come from the bottom-up, with the Chinese Students’ General Association 
proposing such an event to the PCACL shortly after the League convention in 1956.73 Cua Siok 
Po and six other culturally-inclined PCACL members, with logistical support from its Secretariat, 
were in charge of organizing this troupe. More important than what it performed and how it was 
received was how it mobilized different sectors of the Chinese community in pursuit of a common 
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ideological goal. Active participation in producing, and not just consuming, propaganda mattered 
because it was measurable, socially visible, and could help inculcate and reinforce the correct civic 
ideological dispositions in those involved. As with Chinese cultural events in general, businessmen 
funded the troupe, eager as ever to show off their patronage of the arts and ideological credentials; 
the Rice and Sugar Association even supplied uniforms for its members. Five of its members were 
from the PCACL Secretariat (Cua and others on the organizing committee did not travel with the 
troupe), with Fernando Chua serving as troupe leader. The remaining 20 were Chinese performers 
drawn from the Philippine-Chinese Youth Military Service Fraternity, KMT Artistic Propaganda 
Troupe, Manila Amateur Dramatic Guild, and Philippine-Chinese Youth Educational Center. With 
the help of local dramatists and directors, the troupe decided to stage two main items: a skit, “Hell 
on Earth” (Renjian diyu 人間地獄), and a traditional Chinese opera entitled Da bu gang 大補缸. 
Other items that the troupe prepared included magic acts, harmonica solos, comic dialogues, and 
the screening of documentary films.74 
Artistic performances were a staple of PCACL events going forward. Besides encouraging 
participation in the production of anticommunist discourse and bolstering the attendance, they also 
allegorized the evils of communism and complemented the speeches and lectures that also featured 
at these events. Although its exact contents are unknown, “Hell on Earth,” was a frequent trope in 
Nationalist propaganda and a clear reference to communist rule in China. Its writer, Chu I-Hsiung
朱一雄, was a professor at Far Eastern University and a reliable producer of cultural propaganda 
for the PCACL. The interlude to a February 22, 1958 Anti-Communist and Salvation Rally by the 
League in Manila, for instance, was centered on another of his plays, “The Spring Breeze Comes 
                                                 






Once Again on the South Bank of the River,” which students and teachers from CKSHS performed 
in front of Sy En, Fernando Chua, and their Vice-Principal, Pao Shih-tien, the three speakers at the 
rally. As described in a report on the event, this play “tells of the miserable life of Chinese teachers 
and students who live on the South Bank of the Yangtze River under…Communist tyrannical rule. 
These intelligentsia gradually find themselves unable to endure the suffocating life which is totally 
different from the life they knew before. Finally, they are able to get away from the Communist 
occupied area and breathe again the free air in the free land.”75 
On May 8, 1957, the troupe set off on its 16-day tour of Northern Luzon. A day earlier, its 
members were given a ritualistic sendoff at an anticommunist propaganda meeting at the KMT’s 
headquarters in Manila. There, in a gesture that symbolized the conferral of authority by the ROC 
state on its national subjects, Ambassador Chen Chih-mai presented Chua with the troupe’s official 
flag in an ceremony presided over by the Deputy Chairman of the KMT Central Committee’s Third 
Section, Chen Yuan 陳元, who was visiting the Philippines at the time. To drive home the wider 
significance of the tour, Chen Yuan also gave a lecture entitled “An Appeal to the Human Race to 
Save Itself” (Renlei zijiu de huyu 人類自救的呼籲), in which he denounced Chinese communists 
for being Soviet puppets and using violence and deception to enslave the Chinese people. Warming 
to a familiar theme in Nationalist propaganda, Chen identified three groups of enemies: dictators 
behind the Iron Curtain; “hired thugs” (yingquan 鷹犬) from communist states who had infiltrated 
free societies to do the bidding of these dictators; and indigenous communists. 
Civic ceremonies overseen by ROC officials and the vocabulary of enslavement, thuggery, 
raoluan, “hell on earth,” “hired thugs,” and infiltration on a worldwide scale became increasingly 
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widespread from the late 1950s onwards as anticommunism became a category of Chinese social 
life. Through these rituals and tropes, the ROC state, personified by the likes of Chen and Chen as 
well as the ubiquitous visages of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen, sought to bind its overseas 
subjects more closely to the Chinese nation and normalize anticommunism as a mode of thinking 
and feeling. What the performers genuinely thought about Chen’s speech, the tour, and politics is 
unknowable. As Chen probably lectured in Mandarin, it may be that native Hokkien speakers did 
not fully understand him. Some may have been encouraged to join the troupe by parents, relatives, 
classmates, teachers, or clan leaders, or done so out of an interest in the arts, drama, and Chinese 
culture. Those involved in the Military Service Fraternity and KMT Propaganda Troupe may have 
been committed to the tour’s ideological premises. But above all, they knew what roles they were 
supposed to perform: those of overseas Chinese participants in a global anticommunist movement 
spearheaded by the ROC.  
The official report on the tour (unsurprisingly) depicts it as a great success. Stopping in 15 
cities or towns in Northern Luzon with significant Chinese populations,76 the troupe performed to 
crowds of, allegedly, over a thousand people each time, including Filipino politicians and military 
officials. If the performances in themselves were meant partly as entertainment and were no doubt 
consumed as such by many among the audience, the presence of the troupe and Shang Zong leaders 
such as Fernando Chua in the provinces as semi-official emissaries of the ROC state was ultimately 
about institution-building and ideological mobilization. Accordingly, the troupe made sure to meet 
with local Chinese leaders to encourage the formation of provincial chapters of the PCACL, with 
exchanges of anticommunist memorabilia signifying the commitment of all involved – producers, 
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performers, and audience members – to the cause. To encourage such behavior, OCAC presented 
troupe members upon their return to Manila with copies of Chiang Kai-shek’s illustrated biography 
and letters of commendation, tokens of the ROC government’s concern for them.77 Through such 
symbolically meaningful rewards, the PCACL and similar social institutions incentivized the right 
ideological behavior among Chinese youth and accorded participation in anticommunist, pro-ROC 
events prestige and recognition. 
In the years following the founding of the PCACL and the troupe’s tour of Northern Luzon, 
anticommunist Chinese periodicals reported on growing public enthusiasm for the League beyond 
Manila. The October 1957 edition of the English-language Pacific Review, for example, described 
the founding of PCACL chapters in three cities in Northern and Central Luzon: San Fernando in 
the province of Pampanga (in July 1957), which the troupe had visited, Siain in Quezon (in August 
1957), and Olongapo in Zambales (in September 1957), with the last becoming the 26th branch of 
the League to be (re)formed in the past year. The founding ceremonies for these chapters resembled 
each other. Chen Chih-mai attended all of them as the official representative of the ROC at these 
events. Accompanying him on most of his visits, to impress upon participants the civic-diplomatic 
nature of these occasions were PCACL and Federation leaders: Yu Khe Thai, Shih I-Sheng, and 
Tang Tack at San Fernando, Yao Shiong Shio and Tang at Siain. To emphasize the League’s role 
as a bridge between ethnic groups, Chinese leaders and students and Filipino provincial governors 
and military commanders welcomed and interacted with the visitors from Manila. Congratulatory 
and hortatory messages from President Garcia and ROC and Filipino officials reminded all present 
                                                 






of how their work performed a vital service to not only the Philippine nation, but also in defense 
of what Garcia’s message to the Zambales PCACL called “the democratic way of life.” 
Ceremony, spectacle, and public performances also characterized the formation of PCACL 
chapters and its activities going forward. In Pampanga, Siain, and Olongapo, Chen presided over 
mass induction ceremonies for new members of these chapters in conference halls festooned with 
ROC and Philippine flags and portraits of Chiang, Garcia, Sun Yat-sen, and José Rizal in order to 
reinforce the solemnity of the occasion. To reaffirm ties between Chinese elites in Manila and the 
provinces, PCACL leaders presented their provincial counterparts with tokens such as the chapters’ 
official seals. Newspapers, journals, and the newsletters and special commemorative volumes of 
civic associations publicized the founding of these chapters, their activities, and their participants, 
registering the presence of the League and its associated individuals in the public imagination.78 
 
Beyond the Iron Curtain: the world in the Chinese anticommunist imagination 
This next section of the chapter focuses on the campaign the PCACL sponsored in 1957 in 
support of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain and in response to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 
which, along with events elsewhere, the ROC and Philippine-Chinese anticommunists interpreted 
as prefiguring communism’s downfall. Through this campaign, I explain how global, Taiwanese, 
Filipino, and Philippine-Chinese anticommunisms articulated with each other in the Philippines, 
and how the League brought home to the Chinese community the realities of communist rule.  
 Communism, as framed by the PCACL, its ROC patrons, and right-wing anticommunists 
in general was a transnational problem: a function of the Soviet Union’s imperial designs on “free 
                                                 
78 “PCACL, Pampanga Chapter, Inaugurated in San Fernando”; “Ambassador Chen Attends Inauguration of 
PCACL, Quezon Chapter”; “PCACL Chapter in Zambales Inaugurated,” The Pacific Review, October 1957, 19-23, 





societies,” its accomplices in China and elsewhere, porous borders, and the lack of vigilance and 
awareness of communism’s depredations within these societies. Ideologues inflected this problem 
differently. Anthony Kubek, for example, believed that the Soviet Union was responsible for Pearl 
Harbor.79 For the ROC and its supporters in the Philippines, communism was primarily about the 
fates of territorial China under Mao’s “bandit gang” and the Chinese nation as a deterritorialized 
ethno-cultural community. As with the activities they sponsored, the speeches of PCACL leaders 
made clear the relationship between anticommunism as both a global and a Chinese movement. 
At the February 1958 Anti-Communist and Salvation Rally in Manila, for example, Pao Shih-tien 
expounded on the platform of the newly-formed Overseas Chinese United Salvation Association 
in Taiwan. Anticommunism, he declared, began with “self-salvation” and ended with “saving the 
whole world.” Asia, he said, was a vital cornerstone for the security of the world and the recovery 
of China the “only path towards checking Communist expansion in Asia and rescuing its peoples 
from enslavement.” It was thus incumbent upon all Asian peoples to put aside their differences in 
nationality, religion, and party affiliation, reject neutralism, and give their full support to the ROC 
in its campaign to recover mainland China. At the same time, he called for greater solidarity within 
overseas Chinese societies and higher standards for Chinese education, a means of promoting “our 
age-old tradition of character development,” as well as newspapers.80 
 The language of “salvation” here is notable for its historical overtones. “National Salvation” 
(Jiuguo 救國) was how the ROC state branded the anti-Japanese movement that erupted in China 
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after 1937, to which overseas Chinese contributed significantly.81 By casting the struggle against 
communism after 1949 in comparable terms, the ROC and its huaqiao loyalists looked to situate 
anticommunism within a longer genealogy of patriotic movements in defense of the Chinese nation 
and its legitimate government, with imperialistic communism replacing imperial Japan as China’s 
enemy. Yet by dropping “national” from “salvation,” while retaining its Chinese dimensions, pro-
ROC ideologues transformed anticommunism into a less exclusive discursive space, allowing it to 
take onboard Chinese and non-Chinese. More than that, by depicting anticommunism as a global 
movement with Asian and Chinese characteristics, men like Pao hoped to promote affinity among 
Philippine-Chinese youth and students with the ROC through ideological causes that transcended 
national boundaries, and, vice-versa, with global anticommunism through the ROC. 
 Anticommunist movements, the ROC’s in particular, consistently emphasized the coming 
collapse of communism in the hopes of mobilizing peoples against it. In Taiwanese rhetoric, for 
example, the “bandit regime of Mao” (Maofei zhengquan 毛匪政權) was forever in crisis, and the 
ROC military’s “counterattack” (fangong 反攻) against the regime perpetually imminent. As Mao 
was depicted as puppet of the Soviets, at least until the Sino-Soviet split became too obvious for 
ROC propagandists to ignore, cracks anywhere in the Soviet imperial edifice could be interpreted 
as prefiguring the fall of the entire structure. In 1957, the PCACL seized upon the failed Hungarian 
Revolution against Soviet rule in late 1956 to mobilize Chinese society in opposition to both global 
communism and the PRC. Through the visit of six Hungarian “freedom fighters” to the Philippines, 
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the League hoped to provide Chinese with firsthand accounts of the struggle against communism 
and channel the resulting social energies toward the fight against Mao. 
 Demonstrations in support of the uprising and in opposition to the Soviet Union took place 
through to September 1957, when the Hungarian visit took place. In December 1956, for example, 
2,600 Chiang Kai-shek High School students took part in a mass rally on school grounds to express 
solidarity with the Hungarian people, during which Pao described the revolution as the death-knell 
for communism and urged all those present to “live up to the spirit of President Chiang and lend 
determined support to all anti-Communist movements.”82 Hungary quickly became something of 
a rallying point for anticommunists globally, especially after the pro-Chiang Time magazine named 
the Hungarian freedom fighter its 1956 “Man of the Year,”83 while newspapers in Taiwan provided 
detailed coverage of events in Hungary. In March 1956, the League sponsored a week-long series 
of activities in support of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, the Hungarians especially. During 
that week, the PCACL flooded the Chinese media and civic sphere with special commemorative 
volumes, cartoons, newspaper articles, slideshows, posters, and pro-Hungary, anti-Soviet speeches; 
Pao and Fernando Chua held a press conference to publicize these activities. The week culminated 
in simultaneous mass gatherings across the country; in Manila, some 3,000 people were reported 
to have shown up to witness, among other items, a thousand-student mass chorus and “Hungary’s 
Mother” (Xiongyali de muqin 匈牙利的母親). Written specially for the occasion by local Chinese 
dramatist Chen Bing Sun 陳明勳 and performed by the KMT Propaganda Troupe, this play told 
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the “true story of a mother who sacrificed her youngest and only remaining son for the interest and 
honor of her country” during the Hungarian Revolution.84 
 By September, Chinese youth in the Philippines had been primed to receive the Hungarians 
and regard the global, Filipino, and Nationalist Chinese anticommunist movements as intertwined. 
In June, for instance, the PCACL swiftly proclaimed its support for Garcia’s Anti-Subversion Act 
(R.A. No. 1700), which outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations 
on the grounds that they constituted an “organized conspiracy” to overthrow the Philippine state.85 
The League not only backed R.A. No. 1700, but also declared its intention to help the authorities 
implement it.86 A month later, it organized another mobilization week, this time in support of what 
it called the “mainland anti-tyrannical movement” that had emerged in response to Mao’s Hundred 
Flowers Campaign and that portended the fall of the CCP. As ever, in their speeches to large and 
enthusiastic crowds, PCACL propagandists were keen to highlight the interconnectedness of one 
anticommunist struggle to the other. Cua Siok Po, for instance, spoke of an “anti-Communist tide” 
that had risen in the preceding five months and “extended from the Danube to the Yellow River,” 
while Jose Hernandez, an honorary member of the League, cited Soviet Russia in China, in calling 
for Taiwan, South Vietnam, and South Korea to unite against their respective communist foes.87 
 Little is known about the visiting Hungarians except their names and occupations, and that 
they did so from Taiwan, moving from one “free” Asian state to another within the anticommunist 
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ecumene. In the Philippines, like foreign heads of state or politicians, they were granted audiences 
with the President and Foreign Secretary and accompanied wherever they went by Chen Chih-mai 
and local Chinese leaders. Chinese anticommunist practices in the Philippines were anything if not 
repetitive. As we might expect, they visited CKSC, a hub and symbol of ideological fervor within 
Chinese society. The rally held on the third and final night of their visit featured a second staging 
of “Hungary’s Mother” and, as was customary, a speech by a Filipino politician, this time Senator 
Francisco Rodrigo, a member of Catholic Action, the right-wing religious organization that Jose 
Hernandez was President of.88 It also reinforced the same themes of global ideological identity and 
the unity of the Chinese and Hungarian anticommunist struggles that earlier campaigns in the year 
had promoted. At it, for example, Chua Lamco invoked human rights as an underlying principle 
of anticommunism and said that the ROC and Hungarian people were on board the “same storm-
tossed ship” (fengyu tongzhou 風雨同舟). Chen even asserted that the Hungarian Revolution had 
“inspired and brought about demonstrations, riots, and uprisings all over the mainland of China.” 
 Finally, it was the turn of three Hungarians to speak. As reported in PCACL propaganda, 
they did not only describe their firsthand experiences of the Revolution and denounce communism, 
and had much to say about Taiwan and the Chinese experience. Nurse Csilla Biro spoke about the 
high standard of living and the “wonderful progress” that Taiwan had made in economic, industrial, 
and agricultural development during her three-week stay there. In recounting the Revolution, she 
made it a special point to mention how mainland Chinese students studying in Budapest had joined 
with Hungarians in their demonstrations. Graduate student Csaba Mezei charged communism for 
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bringing the “evils of materialism” to Hungary and the was also full of praise for Taiwan, which 
he previously thought was “just a military base.” After his visit there, however, he “realized how 
wrong the conception was” and declared that the “people in Taiwan are now happy in their life of 
freedom and prosperity.” Finally, the author and musician Jeno Platthy held forth on the evils of 
communism, claiming among other things that the Hungarian “puppet government” had signed a 
contract to deliver 85,000 Hungarian youths to the Soviet Union and PRC as forced laborers.89 As 
a public spectacle, the Hungarians’ visit tripled up as a condemnation of global communism, a call 
for unity by different national peoples against it, and an advertisement for the ROC. Like much of 
the PCACL’s campaigns, it embedded Taiwan’s and the overseas Chinese anticommunist struggle 
iwithin a wider ideological movement and exploited the gravity of the global situation to drum up 
huaqiao support for Nationalist China. 
 Over the 1960s, the PCACL flourished, diversifying its activities and expanding into every 
realm of Chinese cultural life. By 1970, the number of provincial chapters and civic organizations, 
including the other four Big Five, that were part of the PCACL was close to 200. From 1958 to 
1967, fundraising campaigns yielded a total of over three million pesos in support of the League’s 
activities and in response to Taiwan’s calls for voluntary contributions by overseas Chinese to the 
ongoing cause of national salvation. Summer ideological activities were routinized in the form of 
seminars and workshops on Chinese culture that structured the free time of students and teachers. 
Such activities organized the calendar of Chinese civic life partly around celebrating the ROC and 
its leaders, national culture, and ideology, on both regular occasions such as National Day (October 
10), Overseas Chinese Day (October 21), and Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday (October 31), or special 
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occasions such as Chiang’s reelection as ROC President in May 1966 and the 100th anniversary of 
Sun Yat-sen’s birthday on November 12 that same year. By ensuring that such events were well-
publicized, print and radio propaganda helped sustain anticommunism. The PCACL continued to 
connect like-minded individuals and institutions in the Philippines and Taiwan to each other, and 
to global networks of anticommunism. Under its auspices, organized group visits to Taiwan, which 
the next chapter examines, took place regularly, typically in conjunction with regular or one-off 
events on what had become a shared civic calendar between the ROC and the Philippine Chinese. 
Exemplary anticommunist visitors to the Philippines, such as PRC fighter pilots who had defected 
by flying to Taiwan, remained convenient mouthpieces for the anticommunist cause. In 1961, the 
PCACL again welcomed the APACL to Manila for its annual meeting; its members continued to 
be active in regional and global anticommunist organizations such as the APACL’s 1967 successor, 
the World Anti-Communist League.90 
 
Conclusion 
 By the late 1950s, Chinese society in the Philippines had been restructured in response to 
Filipino anti-Chinese economic and cultural nationalism and the mass arrests earlier in the decade. 
Leadership of this society now lay with a small group of elites and five organizations that spanned 
the country, represented the community, and defined its interests. Anticommunism was one such 
interest. It transcended national, ethnic, and cultural differences, helped Chinese prove themselves 
as upstanding residents of their host country, and connected them to Nationalist China, expanding 
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its sovereignty over them. With Chinese schools such as CKSHS serving as its foundation and the 
newly-formed PCACL as its propagator-in-chief, anticommunism came to dominate civic life. By 
examining its expansion across the Philippines and its campaigns to support anticommunist causes 
both locally and globally, I show how the PCACL engaged with Chinese society and youth through 
public spectacle, ritual, and a common ideological vocabulary, and by encouraging and rewarding 
participation in anticommunist cultural activities.  
 Networks and connections are at the heart of this chapter. In restructuring Chinese society, 
businessmen such as Yu Khe Thai and educators such as Pao Shih-tien positioned themselves at 
the forefront of multiple, overlapping civic institutions with a stake in promoting anticommunism.  
PCACL events in Manila and the provinces united Chinese and Filipinos against a common enemy. 
Chapter 4 has also shown how CKSHS and the PCACL were connected not only to Taiwan, but 
to global anticommunist institutions and actors such as the APACL and the Hungarian “freedom 
fighters” – participants in what I call an “anticommunist ecumene.” Global anticommunism helped 
catalyze the formation of the PCACL and supplied wider narratives of ideological solidarity which 
League events drew on to justify and mobilize support for the struggle against communism in the  






Experiencing the Nation-State: 
Philippine-Chinese Visits to Taiwan and the Politics of Transnationalism, 1958-1971 
 
We have returned, bearing 我們回來了, 帶著 
On our shoulders the dust of a drifting life,  一肩漂泊的風塵, 
A warm longing in our bosom, and   一腔熱望, 和 
A heart that wants to return home but cannot. 一顆有家歸不得的心。 
 
Home, sucked into a black iron curtain, blocking sun and sky;  家, 被捲入暗無天日的鐵幕;  
Bodies, drifting in the Philippines, haunted by turbid waves; 身, 浮沉在濁浪排空的菲律賓; 
Five hundred thousand pairs of teary eyes place their hopes, 是五十萬雙淚眼交託的期待, 
Their hopes on you —— free ancestral land, our mother!   期待你 —— 自由祖國母親啊! 
You must stand up for freedom and justice! 妳要, 為自由與正義挺身! 
 
Retake freedom from the grasp of the devils;   把自由, 從惡魔的掌中爭回; 
With justice, comfort the people who wander in foreign lands;  把正義, 撫慰浪跡異邦的子民; 
Let tomorrow’s timely rain, 把一個甘霖的明天呀,  
Fall upon the drought of five hundred million hearts…… 降給五萬萬頃苦旱的心田…… 
 
We have returned, to breathe in your 我們是回來了, 呼吸妳 
Fresh smell, to kiss your 清新的氣息, 親吻你 
Fragrant soil, we  芬香的泥土, 我們 
Shake the dust from our bodies, and with 抖落一身風塵, 用 
A rigging of iron, here 鐵的纜繩, 在這裏 
Anchor our —— 拋錨了我們 —— 
  
One hope, and 唯一的希望, 和 
One loyalty! 唯一的忠誠! 
 
— Cua Siok Po, “We Have Returned — Arriving in Taiwan” [我們回來了— 抵臺] (1950)1 
 
 In August 1950, Cua Siok Po and 45 other Philippine Chinese became part of the very first 
overseas Chinese delegation to visit Taiwan since the supposed end of the Civil War. There, they 
met with the Chiang family and other ROC leaders, donated money, radios, and towels to the ROC 
military, and traveled to Quemoy, the island cluster at the frontline of the KMT’s ongoing struggle 
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to reclaim the Chinese mainland.2 A man inclined towards literary expression, Cua was so moved 
that he wrote a series of poems about what he experienced in Taiwan and Quemoy and published 
them in the March 1953 edition of Wenyi chuangzuo 文藝創作, a literary magazine that had been 
established in 1951 by the KMT’s Committee on Chinese Literature and Art Awards (Zhonghua 
wenyi jiangjin weiyuan hui 中華文藝獎金委員會) to promote cultural anticommunism.3 The first 
of these eight poems is reproduced and translated above. In it, the 30-year-old Cua depicts his visit 
to Taiwan as that by an overseas Chinese sojourner who has been “drifting in the Philippines” and 
has returned to smell and touch the “fragrant soil” of his “free ancestral land, our mother.” With 
his “home” having fallen to the communist “devils” and behind a “black iron curtain,” he sees the 
ROC as the sole hope for the half a billion Chinese in “foreign lands” seeking “freedom and justice.” 
 The poem is overflowing with seemingly straightforward ideological sentiments, but also 
betrays a fundamental tension over what Taiwan and China meant to the author, at the time a rising 
young party member in the Philippines. Intentionally or otherwise, he grapples with a fundamental 
challenge that KMT propagandists like him faced in signifying the ROC to the Chinese diaspora 
after 1949. Cua situates his “home” in China and laments that he wants to return there, but cannot. 
Like many Southeast Asian huaqiao, he did not trace his ancestry to Taiwan or its offshore islands, 
but to Fujian province on the mainland, now under the control of the CCP. Yet, he also uses what 
would become a ubiquitous term in Chinese anticommunist rhetoric, ziyou zuguo (“free ancestral 
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land,” “free motherland,” or “free homeland”) to describe Taiwan. Cua has never previously been 
to Taiwan, but nonetheless says that he is “returning” to it and cherishes the sensory and emotional 
experience of doing so. He thus invests in the act of visiting what was not his jia with an affective 
intensity that we typically find in a sojourner’s description of returning to his hometown or native 
place. His verse makes jia and zuguo overlap in meaning, but cannot make them one and the same 
thing. If the ROC could not be the former, it could at least represent itself as the latter to Chinese 
people everywhere.  
 Philippine-Chinese visits to the ROC were intended to further this goal. Except in several 
years when the majority ethnic (and questionably “overseas”) Chinese societies of Hong Kong and 
Macao came in first, huaqiao groups in the Philippines organized the most “homecoming” (huiguo 
回國) visits to the ROC annually from 1950 to 1970,4 whether to “bring greetings and gifts to the 
troops” (laojun 勞軍), “pay their respects” (zhijing 致敬) to ROC leaders, or “observe and study” 
(kaocha 考察) the development of their ziyou zuguo. Featuring planned itineraries, sponsored by 
overseas Chinese civic organizations, and supported by the KMT and state organs such as OCAC 
and the Foreign Ministry, these visits were part of a repertoire of diasporic nation-building policies 
that the ROC employed to compete with the PRC for legitimacy. From the Big Five to schools to 
native-place, commercial, and veterans’ associations, nearly every Philippine-Chinese institution 
organized them. An average Chinese person growing up in the Philippines from the 1950s onwards 
would very likely have gone on these tours or taken part in summer activities in Taiwan at least 
once, especially if from Manila. For the businessmen who funded them and the elites, both cultural 
and commercial, who led them, they were a recurring item on their civic calendars and virtually a 
                                                 





social, cultural, and political obligation. Like the textbooks that Chinese schools in the Philippines 
relied on and the Philippine-Chinese high school graduates who went on to study in Taiwan, these 
visits helped constitute the dense web of linkages between the ROC and its most ardent huaqiao 
supporters in Southeast Asia.  
 I argue in this chapter that these visits were a means by which the ROC projected itself to 
the world as a sovereign polity – a de facto nation-state – and recreated aspects of being a zuguo 
to the overseas Chinese. For state propagandists, the visits were a form of what I call experiential 
nationalism, whereby huaqiao immersed themselves in the culture and traditions of this substitute 
“homeland,” beheld firsthand the progress towards modernity and democracy that it was making, 
matched textual and visual descriptions of Taiwan with a carefully curated reality, and internalized 
certain ways of knowing and feeling about the Chinese nation. Similar to the anticommunist rallies, 
rituals, and public performances that huaqiao in the Philippines participated in, these visits were a 
type of discursive practice that integrated the language of ideology with its material forms to shape 
perceptions of Taiwan, China, and being Chinese.  
Those who organized and went on visits to Taiwan, I argue, understood them in different 
ways that manifested diverse understandings of patriotism and what the ROC stood for. As highly 
publicized community events in the Philippines and Taiwan, these visits were visible displays of 
Chinese elites’ and non-elites anticommunist and patriotic credentials. Yet as Cua’s poem suggests, 
many who visited Taiwan truly believed in the historical mission of the Nationalist regime, despite 
and because of the Civil War. Some traced their loyalties back to World War II and imagined the 
anticommunist struggle as an extension of the KMT’s historical mission to unify China against its 
foreign enemies. For others, with mainland China in the grip of a Soviet puppet regime (or so they 




“home.” The ROC’s promotion of Chinese culture as an ideological bulwark against communism 
also aligned with concurrent efforts by Chinese in the Philippines to defend the autonomy of their 
schools and improve Chinese education in response to Filipinization. For these educators, Taiwan 
was attractive to them not as a bastion of anticommunism, but as a source of professional expertise. 
The visits in question are nothing if not well-documented in the yearbooks and newsletters 
of civic organizations and, in particular, “special commemorative volumes” (jinian tekan 紀念特
刊) and reports that visiting groups published as souvenirs for their participants, and to document 
their experiences. Featuring itineraries, photographs, delegation lists, rules of conduct, sponsors’ 
advertisements, day-by-day travel narratives, and well-wishes from community leaders and ROC 
officials, these materials yield valuable insights into the who, when, what, why, and how of these 
tours. As texts that were produced by and circulated within two anticommunist societies, they also 
(un)intentionally reproduce the tropes and rhetoric of ROC nationalism. For this reason, they are 
powerful examples of non-state propaganda and the cultural dominance of anticommunism in each 
society. Reading them closely and contextually allows us to see beyond their propagandistic aims 
and reconstruct the interests and motivations of those who organized and went on the tours. 
Combining analysis and narrative, this chapter seeks to capture the richness of these source 
materials, the contexts in which they were published, the perspectives of those who went on them 
or who had a stake in the trips, and the itineraries of the trips themselves. I begin by situating them 
within the context of the PRC and ROC’s global contest for overseas Chinese capital, remittances, 
and bodies – a struggle to control Chinese transnationalism and press it into the service of the state. 
I then show how overseas Chinese visits to Taiwan and the policies and texts associated with them 
were meant to represent the ROC to the world as a sovereign, nation-state-like polity and pseudo-




huaqiao to illuminate the rhetorical and practical strategies surrounding these visits that helped the 
ROC create the image of itself as the authentic “China.”  
The next three sections of the chapter focus on the visits themselves. In the first of these 
sections, I examine a visit by leading members of the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League, 
including Cua Siok Po, in October and November 1958, focusing on their trip to Quemoy and how 
native-place sentiment and affective ties shaped their affinities for the ROC. Second, I turn to a 
delegation of primary schools teachers which took part in an intensive teacher training program in 
Taiwan in the summer of 1967: I use this visit to discuss how the ROC state sought to discipline 
visiting overseas Chinese, and how practical and professional concerns underpinned pro-Taiwan 
sentiments. Third and finally, I describe a series of trips by one particular organization, the Chinese 
Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia’s Veterans’ Association (VA), to Taiwan. For its members, I 
show that anticommunism was constitutive of a deep-seated, historically-informed patriotism, but 
not the only element of their relationship to the ROC.  
 
Capital, persons, and propaganda: the PRC-ROC struggle over Chinese transnationalism 
 From the late Qing onwards, monarchists, reformers, and revolutionaries alike sought not 
only to stimulate transnational inflows of Chinese people and capital into China for state-building 
purpose, but also to imbue such flows with political meaning in their propaganda. The post-1949 
CCP and KMT, in this regard, were no different, except that each wished to channel the movement 
of huaqiao and their money towards separate territorial-ideological polities. During the Cold War, 
the “China” a person of Chinese ancestry traveled to and invested in signaled his political loyalties. 
By promoting certain forms of Chinese mobility, the PRC and ROC used Chinese transnationalism 




 In terms of investment, neither the PRC nor ROC could claim much success until the 1960s. 
Most overseas Chinese capital after 1949, if it did leave Southeast Asia, flowed into Hong Kong, 
whose free port status, low taxes and secure colonial legal system gave it an unassailable edge over 
China and Taiwan until decades later. Moreover, despite restrictions on Chinese economic activity 
in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, business opportunities for ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, 
the country with the largest Chinese population in the region, expanded. China’s efforts to attract 
huaqiao capital were also limited by mistrust between its officials and potential investors, and the 
aggressive tactics that the former employed to pressure the latter.5 These reflected and contributed 
to growing suspicions of returned overseas Chinese, persons whose foreign and class background 
rendered them incompatible with demands for continuous revolution. For these reasons, according 
to one estimate, overseas Chinese investment companies in China may have raised a total of only 
$100 million from the early 1950s until they were disbanded during the Cultural Revolution.6   
 Large-scale capital aside, the CCP was also keen to tap into overseas Chinese remittances, 
which would help overcome the American-led embargo on trade with China by providing the state 
with an alternative source of foreign exchange. Its efforts to nationalize a large and well-organized 
private remittance sector, however, were never completely successful, with illicit remittance firms 
continuing to operate out of Hong Kong well into the late 1950s. Furthermore, many huaqiao were 
reluctant to remit money to China, fearing that communist cadres would confiscate it. These fears 
persisted despite efforts by the state in 1955 to guarantee the right of families to receive and dispose 
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of overseas remittances as they wished.7 Perhaps unsurprisingly, as Chun-hsi Wu has shown, only 
about 30 percent of such remittances that were transferred through Hong Kong after 1949 actually 
made it back to mainland China; most simply remained in Hong Kong.8   
Taiwan’s economy, meanwhile, was driven by some $100 million in US non-military aid 
per year from 1951 to 1964 and had no actual need for foreign capital until the 1960s.9 Policies to 
attract huaqiao investment in the 1950s were thus limited and their effects inhibited by Taiwan’s 
strategy of import-substitution industrialization. Only in the late 1950s, at the urging of the United 
States, did ROC planners embrace export promotion and foreign capital in anticipation of the end 
of US aid in 1965. Comprehensive changes to a set of older regulations for huaqiao investment in 
March 1960 and the enactment of a Statute for the Encouragement of Investment that September 
increased the inflow of overseas Chinese investment from $1.13 million in 1960 to $8.3 million in 
1961.10 By the end of 1963, the cumulative value of all 212 huaqiao investment projects, according 
to official statistics, was $60.3 million. 21 of these projects, totaling $13.2 million, were from the 
Philippines; the average value of each Philippine-Chinese project was over three times that of each 
Hong Kong Chinese project.11  
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Investment and other monetary figures such as the above were frequently incorporated into 
publications intended for consumption beyond China and Taiwan, and given an ideological twist. 
The English-language, bi-monthly Free China Review featured a regular section on huaqiao affairs 
that paid increasing attention after 1960 to investment and its political significance. Its November 
1, 1961 issue, for example, not only stated that overseas Chinese investment since 1951 amounted 
to an “impressive” $66,840,000, but also compared this act of “participating enthusiastically in the 
economic buildup of their mother country” with how huaqiao “helped finance Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s 
revolutionary movement to overthrow the Manchus.”12 In this way, state propagandists imagined 
continuities between the ROC in 1961 and its founding 50 years earlier and invested self-interested 
economic behavior with patriotic, historical meaning.  
The movement of Chinese persons was also significant to both Chinas. The PRC’s OCAC, 
for example, arranged tours and set up special hotels for visiting overseas Chinese.13 In the 1950s, 
most of these tours originated from Hong Kong and Macao and featured visits to ancestral villages 
and meetings with officials in Beijing to discuss prospects for trade and investment.14 On a longer-
term or even permanent basis, 500,000 to 600,000 overseas Chinese returned to China from 1950 
to 1961, whether because of family ties, patriotism, or – particularly in the case of Indonesia – in 
response to the anti-Chinese policies of Southeast Asian governments. Tan Kah Kee 陳嘉庚, the 
rubber tycoon and de facto leader of the Singaporean Chinese community, was perhaps the most 
famous of these guiqiao. After returning in 1950, he enjoyed a relatively comfortable career in the 
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government and was given a state funeral in 1961 in recognition of his contributions to economic 
and educational reconstruction in Fujian.15 Despite the disillusionment and discrimination that less 
prominent guiqiao than Tan later experienced, leading to the departure of around a sixth of them 
via Hong Kong for Southeast Asia before 1964, their return journeys were spun as an ideological 
victory for the New China.16  
Eager to compete for Chinese bodies, the ROC persisted – albeit selectively – in admitting 
Chinese into Taiwan despite the threefold increase in its population since 1900 and the influx of 
900,000 to 1.15 million people from the mainland during the latter part of the Civil War.17 These 
included refugees from Hong Kong, around 150,000 of whom were resettled in Taiwan with aid 
from the United States from 1949 to early 1954; students, welcomed under a program to promote 
educational opportunities in Taiwan for Southeast Asian Chinese; and, most famously, over 14,000 
Chinese prisoners of war from Korea who were repatriated to Taiwan. This was nearly double the 
number of those who went back to China.18 The “return” of these POWs was a propaganda coup 
for the ROC, which quickly designated January 23, 1954, the day that the they arrived in Taiwan, 
“Freedom Day.” This was later rebranded “World Freedom Day” by the World Anti-Communist 
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League; it is still celebrated today by the WACL’s successor, the World League for Freedom and 
Democracy.  
 
Strategies of sovereignty: “Free China” as territory, text and, experience 
Philippine-Chinese visits to Taiwan were thus one front in the ROC’s struggle to politicize 
the movement of Chinese people to its advantage. These visits and the propaganda associated with 
them worked on multiple levels to produce the ROC as a territorially sovereign polity and a nation-
like zuguo for members of a global Chinese nation. To begin with, the very act of regulating the 
mobility of persons whom the ROC claimed as its nationals constituted proof of its capacities as a 
state, despite the chaos that had engulfed it during the Civil War. As Meredith Oyen has shown in 
her recent study of US-Chinese migration diplomacy, even after relocating to Taiwan, the KMT 
continued its postwar policy of investigating and approving all potential emigrants before granting 
them a passport, whether or not they resided in Taiwan. This allowed it to maintain the illusion of 
control over the transnational communities that linked their government to that of the United States 
and to improve US opinions of China and the Chinese by ensuring that only the most desirable 
people were allowed to emigrate.19 Similar procedures and logic applied to Chinese seeking entry 
into Taiwan. Fearing overpopulation and communist infiltration, the ROC admitted only a small 
number of refugees from Hong Kong despite lobbying on their behalf and a 1954 survey showing 
that 70.4 percent of the 988,545 refugees who were willing to emigrate from Hong Kong hoped to 
                                                 





be resettled in the ROC.20 It persistently refused to accept the deportation to Taiwan of the 2,700 
“overstaying temporary visitors” for the same reason.21  
In the late 1950s, with the situation in Taiwan stabilized, the ROC was willing to simplify 
the bureaucratic procedures that overseas Chinese needed to undergo to visit Taiwan. In 1957, the 
Executive Yuan promulgated a revised series of “Regulations Governing Entering and Exiting the 
Taiwan Region During the Period of Communist Rebellion” (Kanluan shiqi Taiwan diqu rujing 
chujing banfa 戡亂時期臺灣地區入境出境辦法). Under these regulations, prospective huaqiao 
visitors from countries such as the Philippines that had diplomatic relations with the ROC filled in 
a basic application form and, through their local ROC consulate or embassy, submitted it to OCAC 
together with any supporting documents. OCAC then obtained the approval of various government 
agencies before requesting that the Foreign Ministry authorize the embassy or consulate to affix a 
“homecoming endorsement” (huiguo jiaqian 回國加簽) to applicants’ passports. Ethnic Chinese 
living in countries that did not recognize the ROC filled in the same application, but submitted it 
to OCAC through legal, pro-ROC Chinese organizations rather than via a consulate and received 
an entry permit instead of a huiguo jiaqian. Visits fell into seven categories, related to both purpose 
and the visitors’ places of residence: 1) investment; 2) higher education; 3) “individual” visits (by 
Chinese leaders, schools, and other organizations for business, sightseeing, and kaocha, as well as 
by transit passengers); 4) kaocha missions from Hong Kong or countries without diplomatic ties 
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to the ROC; 5) investment and business trips from Hong Kong; 6) emigration; 7) visiting relatives 
and family. Visits by Philippine Chinese belonged to the third category and were relatively simple 
to organize, as they required only four photographs of each applicant on top of the basic application 
form.22    
Well before the 1950s, such practices of border control and categorization that once worked 
to exclude Chinese and other Asian peoples from white settler nations such as the United States, 
Canada, and Australia had been universalized as what Adam McKeown has called the “foundation 
of sovereignty…for all states within the international system.”23 In this regard, the ROC differed 
only in degree, not in kind, from the white settler nations whose exclusion laws it once vehemently 
opposed, and postcolonial states such as the Philippines that placed similar restrictions on Chinese 
mobility. Ironically, as Oyen has pointed out, common security concerns meant that it was just as 
difficult for Chinese abroad to gain entry to Taiwan as the United States in the early-mid-1950s.24 
This was doubly ironic given that the ROC legally identified these people as its nationals, but did 
not allow them to enter their supposed zuguo freely. For the Nationalist government, the regulation 
of overseas Chinese mobility helped secure Taiwan’s borders against communist infiltration and 
avoid overpopulation, thereby projecting the sort of competency that earlier, corrupt incarnations 
of the ROC lacked. They also demonstrated its sovereignty over an ethno-cultural community and 
highlighted desirable patriotic activities such as investment, attending university, kaocha missions, 
and even visiting one’s relatives. 
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To better understand how these visits were supposed to function, let us turn now from their 
role in shoring up Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty to the textual strategies surrounding them that 
the ROC and its supporters employed in order to represent Taiwan to the world. These strategies 
are evident in a “Guidebook for Overseas Compatriots Returning to the Homeland for Sightseeing” 
(Qiaobao huiguo guanguang zhinan 僑胞回國觀光指南), which OCAC published in 1958 as part 
of its propaganda war with the PRC for overseas Chinese loyalties.25 Much of what OCAC, the 
state-controlled media in Taiwan, and pro-ROC Philippine-Chinese organizations published aimed 
at denigrating the PRC while proclaiming the ROC’s achievements in industry, self-government, 
agriculture, education, and military and cultural affairs. This text is slightly different, as it contains 
both practical information and propagandistic elements, with the distinction between the two not 
always clear-cut. Overseas Chinese looking to visit Taiwan found within this pocket-sized volume 
everything from copies of the basic application form to the rules on permitted and prohibited items 
in one’s hand carry luggage to the recently-issued regulations on entering and exiting the ROC for 
its overseas nationals. The last of eight appendices lists the 16 foreign consular services in Taipei 
and contact details, starting with the most important of them, the US Embassy.26 
 To reinforce this aura of facticity, the Guidebook also features multiple chapters on various 
aspects of the ROC within a global context. Its first chapter surveys Taiwan’s physical and human 
geographical features. We are informed of the exact physical dimensions and contours of the island, 
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its climate, industries, special local products, population, administrative divisions, main cities, and 
transportation infrastructure. Interpolated into these facts were remarks on Taiwan’s “fertile soil” 
(turang feiwo 土壤肥沃), “enchanting” (yinren rusheng 引人入勝) natural landscape, “honest and 
hardworking citizens” (renmin qinpu 人民勤樸), and “favorable foundations” (lianghao jichu 良
好基礎) for further industrial development. The chapter describes Taiwan’s local produce as being 
valued by global markets and the island as connected via sea and air to cities in Asia and the rest 
of the world. It concludes with a standard geopolitical account of Taiwan as a “model province of 
the Three Principles of the People” (Sanminzhuyi de mofan sheng 三民主義的模範省), the “base 
of the anticommunist revolution to recover and build the nation” (fangong geming fuguo jianguo 
de jidi 反共革命復國建國的基地), and the “Free World’s protective barrier against communism 
and invasion” (Ziyou shijie fangong, fanqinlüe de pingzhang 自由世界反共、反侵略的屏障).27 
Those wishing to know more could read chapters five to nine, which provided detailed information 
on governance, industry, transportation, education, media, and natural scenery. 
Like much ROC propaganda, including the jinian tekan and reports that later sections will 
examine, the Guidebook depicts Taiwan as a place of modernity, democracy, culture, and natural 
beauty. Its chapter on governance and politics, for example, makes no mention of martial law and 
instead emphasized local county and municipal elections that the KMT had begun implementing 
in Taiwan from January 1951 onwards,28 calling them “ample evidence of democratic politics and 
the spirit of the rule of law” (minzhu zhengzhi he fazhi jingshen de chongfen biaoxian 民主政治
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和法治精神的充份表現).29 Citizens enjoyed freedom of expression and the press (or so it claims), 
while overseas Chinese students attending universities in Taiwan were “nurtured in the culture of 
their motherland and trained intellectually” (zuguo wenhua de xuntao he zhineng de xunlian 祖國
文化的熏陶和智能的訓練).30 Finally, chapter nine, the last and longest, describes Taiwan’s eight 
natural wonders, such as the cloud sea of Alishan, Sun-Moon Lake, and the fishermen’s lights of 
Penghu, as well as other tourist destinations in cities such as Taipei and Taichung.31 Besides being 
of practical use to prospective huaqiao visitors, therefore, the Guidebook also establishes Taiwan’s 
ontological presence in the world by bombarding readers with lists of places, products, and modes 
of transportation; data on economic production, huaqiao university students, and newspapers; and 
the measurements of mountains, highways, and forests.  
But what was Taiwan supposed to be as a political entity? The text, like other such works 
of ROC propaganda, shifts between multiple registers of representation. Expressions such as “A 
Short Introduction to Taiwan Province” (Taiwan sheng jianjie 臺灣省簡介), “model province of 
the Three Principles of the People,” and “Regulations Governing Entering and Exiting the Taiwan 
Region” refer to Taiwan as a “province” (sheng 省) or “region” (diqu 地區) of the ROC. At all 
times, however, it embeds such legal nomenclature within a broader, ambiguous discourse on the 
nation. Terms such as Ziyou Zhongguo, zuguo, and even Zhongguo are frequently used instead of 
“Taiwan,” particularly in publications with a more aggressively propagandistic stance. Huaqiao 
visits there were literally a “return to the nation [motherland / homeland].” Yet “Taiwan province” 
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and “Free China” were never synonymous with each other. The former was part of a nation-state, 
while the latter is never explicitly described as such. Consumers of such propaganda were expected 
to deduce that the rest of China was not only “unfree,” but also not a nation-state. The “communist 
bandit regime” (gongfei zhengquan 共匪政權) of Mao and puppet of Soviet imperialism, in ROC 
rhetoric, was beholden to a foreign power and therefore not authentically Chinese; lacked popular 
sovereignty over the Chinese people, whom it simply tyrannized into submission; could not meet  
society’s basic needs; and was not recognized by the United Nations. By embodying qualities that 
the PRC lacked, the ROC called attention to how it resembled a nation-state, despite being, legally, 
a province.  
 Two factors explain the use of “Free China” and “motherland” on top of “Taiwan province” 
and “region.” The first is that nationalist, ideological, and culturalist conceptions of Taiwan were 
supposed to both be more appealing to overseas Chinese visitors, and instill in them a specific set 
of patriotic affinities. At the heart of the ROC’s qiaowu was the politically-charged label, huaqiao. 
Literally “Chinese sojourner,” the term first emerged in the late 19th century and was ratified with 
the promulgation of China’s first Nationality Law in 1909. As scholars such as Wang Gungwu and 
Prasenjit Duara have observed, the term redefined those who had left China as temporary absentees 
from home, thus giving Chinese migration and even settlement overseas legitimacy. As an emotive 
term, it reminded overseas Chinese that they owed their allegiance to China and the Qing state 
(and after 1911, the Republic of China) and entailed certain legal rights and responsibilities toward 
the Chinese state.32 Needless to say, although Nationalist claims upon the Chinese abroad rested 
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on idealized assumptions about how so-called “sojourners” understood their relationship to China, 
it was politically advantageous after 1949 to keep huaqiao and zuguo in circulation. Propagandists 
hoped that the unprecedented levels of overseas Chinese support for the ROC during the Second 
Sino-Japanese and Pacific Wars would carry over into the post-1949 period – that, in other words, 
“Free China” would serve as an acceptable substitute for the entire China.  
Geopolitics also helps us explain this discursive ambiguity. By 1958, the year in which the 
Guidebook was published, Chiang Kai-shek had long since given up hope of “counterattacking” 
(fangong 反攻) China in his lifetime. But, as his biographer Jay Taylor notes, he continued talking 
up this and the other fangong (反共, anticommunism) to maintain military and mainlander civilian 
morale and because they helped rationalize Nationalist rule over the island.33 The terminological 
confusion reflected a growing uncertainty among KMT stalwarts over whether or not retaking the 
mainland or fortifying “fortress” Taiwan against the PRC ought to be the goal of the state. “Taiwan 
province” implied that the island was a temporary seat of the ROC government, as Chongqing had 
been during the Second Sino-Japanese War, while “Free China,” with its connotations of “nation-
state-ness,” left open the possibility that Taiwan was a legitimate nation-like polity unto itself and 
not dependent on a larger territorial entity for validation. In effect, having multiple signifiers for 
Taiwan allowed the ROC to hedge its political bets during two decades of declining international 
recognition.  
Notably absent in this Guidebook and other similar works of propaganda are references to 
Taiwan as a jia for overseas Chinese – it could approximate a “homeland” for them in other words, 
but not be their “home.” In the Chinese sojourning tradition, which Cua’s poem draws from, the 
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idea of jia was intimately associated with one’s native place. Where one was born was a “critical 
component of personal identity in traditional China, and geographic origin was generally the first 
matter of inquiry among strangers, the first characteristic recorded about a person (after name and 
pseudonyms), and the first fact to be ascertained regarding individuals coming before the law,” as 
Bryna Goodman puts it. “Home” was a specific village or city which sojourners were supposed to 
return to for marriage, mourning, retirement, and burial, and to which they sent their remittances.34 
No amount of propaganda could alter the fact that the vast majority of overseas Chinese were not 
born in Taiwan and persuade them to conceive of it as their home; only traces of jia could be found 
there in the form of native-place connections. In fact, the very legitimacy of the post-1949 ROC 
was based on establishing that Taiwan was not a home, but a place from which one’s native places 
in China, “sucked into a black iron curtain,” could be reclaimed from the CCP.  
For ROC supporters and propagandists on both sides of the Luzon Strait, textual strategies 
were a necessary but insufficient means of producing Taiwan’s place in the world. Taiwan had to 
be experienced directly, not just vicariously, so as to establish virtuous circle between rhetoric and 
reality. As a KMT member Chen Lieh-fu, the principal of Cebu Eastern High School and a prolific 
author on overseas Chinese education said on the occasion of his school’s basketball team’s visit 
to the ROC in May 1968, it was not enough for Philippine Chinese youth to read about their zuguo 
in textbooks and magazines. Their visit allowed them to “set foot on the territory [literally, “rivers 
and mountains”] of their motherland for the first time, as well as appreciate its scenery and famous 
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historical sites” (初次踏上祖國之河山, 欣賞風光勝跡 chuci tashang zuguo zhi heshan, xinshang 
fengguang shengji).35 
Upon setting foot on Taiwan, overseas Chinese delegations adhered to itineraries designed 
to reinforce propagandistic depictions of “Free China.” While these itineraries varied according to 
the composition and purpose of individual tours, they shared many common items and were always 
well-regulated. Government and party officials accompanied the tours and answered questions that 
the participants had about the ROC. Most trips also required that their members abide by a written 
code of conduct. Besides having to dress appropriately and be on their best behavior, they also had 
to remain with the group at all times, except during designated and limited periods of free activity, 
or unless given special permission to leave the group by their leaders. Even during their free time, 
socializing with locals was forbidden. Other than designated spokesmen, no one else was allowed 
to issue public statements or speak to the media. 
Items on their itineraries fell into the very same categories that were used to organize the 
Guidebook. Tours of factories, schools, model villages, military bases, and infrastructural projects 
such as highways showcased the role of the state in modernizing the island. Some delegations were 
even given permission to visit Quemoy, which was under military rule because of its proximity to 
the mainland and tendency to get shelled by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Visits to cultural, 
and historical locations such as the National Palace Museum, Sun-Moon Lake, and Yangmingshan 
foregrounded the ROC’s role in preserving traditional Chinese culture and the Taiwanese natural 
landscape as an ahistorical, organic embodiment of the Chinese nation. Visiting Philippine Chinese 
also met with state and party officials, other visiting huaqiao groups, and even Chiang himself – 
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the flesh-and-blood incarnation of the Republic. Like factories and mountains, he gave overseas 
Chinese something tangible to identify with. Meetings with him were highly ritualized and often 
involved the presentation of gifts or monetary contributions as a gesture of respect and appreciation, 
followed by photo-taking. After experiencing the Chinese nation, they returned to their countries 
of residence to report favorably on their time in Taiwan, reinforcing the relationship between text 
and experience in the process. Tours were supposed to unfold in this way. The next three sections, 
in describing three tours, expand on the strategies outlined above and complicate propagandistic 
understandings of them in the Philippine-Chinese and Taiwanese print media. 
 
Quemoy on show: the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League’s tour of Taiwan in 1958 
Two years after its formation, the PCACL coordinated with other members of the Big Five 
to bring greetings and gifts to the troops and congratulate Chiang Kai-shek on his 72nd birthday on 
October 31. The tour lasted from October 10 to November 3. October was the most popular month 
for visits to Taiwan by overseas Chinese, as it encompassed not only Chiang’s birthday, but also 
the ROC’s National Day on October 10 (“Double Tenth”) and Overseas Chinese Day on October 
21. That the PRC’s own National Day fell on October 1 meant that the ROC could steal attention 
from its rival right afterwards. In 1958, the October celebrations took on a particular significance, 
as they came immediately after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis from late August to late September. 
The PRC’s four-week artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu contributed to a sharp increase 
in “patriotic voluntary contributions” by overseas Chinese to Taiwan from $130,500.52 in 1957 to 
$388,031.87 in 1958 and $957,483.52 in 1959 – an all-time record.36  
                                                 





As President of the Shang Zong, Yu Khe Thai was the natural choice to lead the 24-person 
(22 men and two women) PCACL delegation to Taiwan. Four out of the five Standing Committee 
members of the League went on the tour: Yu, Vice-Presidents Chua Lamco and Sy En, and Yao 
Shiong Shio. The remaining participants represented, in addition to the Shang Zong and General 
Chamber, branches of the KMT and PCACL in Manila and beyond, Cantonese Association, Xiao 
Zong, Women’s Association, Great China Press, and Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, the 
KMT-controlled anti-Japanese guerrilla force during World War II, now a veterans’ organization. 
Given the symbolic importance of October and the defense of Quemoy and Matsu to the ROC and 
its supporters, there was also widespread media coverage of the tour.37 
Our chief source of information on the trip, a “special volume” published after the occasion 
by the PCACL, centers the tour on the multiple contributions by the visiting Philippine Chinese to 
the ROC’s defense of its offshore islands. Monetary support amounted to nearly three million New 
Taiwan Dollars (NTD) in individual and organizational donations, which Yu and Chua presented 
to Chiang on the final day of the tour.38 Tour members, along with other visiting huaqiao, also met 
with and offered comfort and encouragement to wounded soldiers and refugees from Quemoy and 
Matsu who had been relocated to Taiwan itself; each soldier received 50 NTD from the delegates, 
while each refugee received 20 NTD and second-hand clothing.39 Interviews with and speeches to 
the media also figured frequently on the tour’s packed itinerary, as befitting an event whose main 
purpose was to showcase the ROC to the world and drum up support for the Nationalist regime. A 
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press conference in Taipei allowed Sy, Cua Siok Po, and Fernando Chua to explain the significance 
of their Quemoy trip and efforts to support ROC troops on the frontlines, while also giving Chen 
Nanying 陳南英 – one of the tour’s two female delegates – an opportunity to describe the activities 
of the Philippine-Chinese Women’s Association.40 The KMT-run China Broadcasting Corporation 
also invited Yu to deliver a radio address to overseas Chinese and people on the mainland, in which 
he praised the government for bringing about improvements in people’s lives, including those of 
local Taiwanese. He declared that a counterattack against the mainland was inevitable and hinged 
on the morale of their mainland compatriots. Yu concluded his broadcast on an empathetic note. 
Despite living overseas, Chinese like him felt the suffering of the Chinese people because of family 
members and friends who remained on the mainland and the CCP’s destruction of ancestral tombs. 
Separated from their homes and kin, they, like their tongbao, ardently wished for the recovery of 
China.41 
The highlight of the tour was a day trip to Quemoy on October 16 – ten days after the PRC 
had announced that it was suspending its bombardment – by six of the 24 delegates: Sy En, Chua 
Lamco, Fernando Chua, Cua Siok Po, Tang Tack, and Ren Jiaming 任家銘, a deputy chairman of 
the Cantonese Association. Located several miles off the coast of southern Fujian, and visible (on 
a clear day) from Xiamen, Quemoy, as Michael Szonyi writes in his study of Cold War geopolitics 
and everyday life there, symbolized the ROC’s commitment to anticommunism and its sovereignty 
over more than just the island of Taiwan.42 If Taiwan was supposed to be a “model province” of 
the ROC, then Quemoy was a “model county” of that province: a microcosm of Taiwan, but ruled 
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by the military rather than the KMT. Because of its proximity to southern Fujian, native residents 
of Quemoy also spoke Minnanhua, albeit a different sub-dialect of it. Cua’s three-page account of 
the visit in the “special volume,” made no mention of social and economic development, focusing 
rather on affective, native-place, and geo-material ties between the visitors and “Free China” at a 
time of crisis for their “homeland.” His travelogue opened by contrasting areas of the island that 
had been shelled by PLA artillery with those that had not. As his jeep wound its way across the 
island towards the frontlines, he described how an pastoral landscape of paved roads, green fields, 
and smiling children gave way to a hellish one of scorched trees, destroyed houses, bomb craters, 
and unexploded shells. Nonetheless, soldiers and locals’ morale had not been dampened:  
Under the strong sun, the wind and dust blew ever so fiercely and stained our white shirts 
yellow. Our brothers, topless, were busy digging trenches and constructing fortifications, 
preparing to welcome a greater battle and victory after this first victorious round.  
 
強烈的陽光下, 風沙還是那麼凌厲, 把白襯衫都染成黃色的了。弟兄赤身露臂, 忙着
在挖溝筑堡, 準備在第一回合勝利之後, 迎接更大的戰鬥, 更大的勝利。 
 
Accompanied by the chairman of OCAC, officials from the military and county, and the 
media, Cua and the others toured the frontlines and met with residents of the villages most affected 
by the shelling. In what was very likely a prearranged meeting, the delegates “encountered” an old 
woman in the village of Yangshan who said that she had a son in the Philippines. When Cua asked 
what she wished to tell her son, she said that she hoped he would send some money to help rebuild 
their home and maybe come to see it. In her smile, Cua said that he saw his own dear mother, who 
was living in a state of poverty just across the sea in Jinjiang – his ancestral home, now behind the 
Iron Curtain of CCP rule. The tour members also met with a young soldier and presented him with 
a gift from his father, who was a Standing Committee member of the Philippine KMT. The young 
man asked them to tell his father that the artillery fire had “tempered” (磨煉 molian) him and made 




during the Japanese occupation, described the act of this son of an overseas Chinese leader fighting 
on the frontlines as having a value greater than any monetary donation. He described shaking hands 
with him as the “highest honor” (wushang guangrong 無上光榮) for the delegates.43 
Affective, native-place, and geo-material connections continued to inform the delegation’s 
remaining activities on Quemoy. Cua gave a speech to the military radio station there calling on 
his compatriots in Fujian to rise up against Soviet imperialism and join ROC troops in retaking the 
mainland when the time came. The army likely broadcasted the speech across the narrow strip of 
water between Quemoy and Xiamen through large loudspeakers.44 To complement their monetary 
contributions, the tour also presented local officials with a book of well-wishes for the soldiers and 
a compilation of letters for residents of the islands; some may have come from the few Philippine 
Chinese who traced their ancestry there.45 Just before they left Quemoy, Cua described Fernando 
Chua as busy taking photographs and gathering flowers and soil samples as souvenirs; Tang Tack, 
ROC flag in hand, was deep in conversation with several soldiers in various Chinese dialects; and 
Ren Jiaming, during his chat with a ROC artilleryman from Guangdong province, gave a thumbs-
up gesture and repeatedly exclaimed “Guangdong spirit!” (Guangdong jingshen 廣東精神).46  
However much their tour of Quemoy was guided by the state, and despite media coverage 
of it, we should not dismiss these moments of melodrama or the sentiments expressed in Cua’s 
narrative (and poetry) as utterly contrived and merely for display’s sake. For Chinese communities 
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abroad that were historically accustomed to being connected to China, being separated from one’s 
family and native place by a regime that reportedly wrecked ancestral tombs was no trifling matter. 
When Cua spoke of his mother just across the sea in Jinjiang; or when the Fookien Times reporter 
who accompanied the tour wrote that tour members (figuratively) saw their hometowns from the 
top of Mashan, the northernmost point of Quemoy,47 each was expressing the sort of yearning for 
China that the ROC, native-place associations, and collective and individual memories sustained. 
China remained embedded within the imaginaries of people like them not despite their separation 
from China, but because of it. The young Chinese from the Philippines who volunteered as soldiers 
and nurses to defend Quemoy did so out of a complex affinity for the ROC and their hometowns, 
rather than the straightforward patriotism that official ROC propaganda ascribed to them. Decades 
after Chinese nationalism was supposed to have superseded all sub-national forms of identification, 
provincial and dialect-group affinities – “Guangdong spirit!” – continued to manifest themselves 
at unexpected times. As Goodman reminds us, love for one’s native place was virtuous because it 
helped constitute and strengthen the larger political polity of China.48 There was no incompatibility 
between love for one’s hometown and the nation, as the former was a building block of the latter.  
From the point of view of media coverage and aiguo zidong juankuan by overseas Chinese 
to the ROC, the PCACL’s tour of Taiwan and visit to Quemoy can be considered something of a 
success for the Nationalist regime. Propaganda and visibility, however, worked also for the benefit 
of Philippine-Chinese elites, who were eager to proclaim the record-breaking amount of juankuan 
that they helped collect that year. Regular visits to “Free China,” on top of efforts to institutionalize 
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Chinese anticommunism and socialize with politicians and officials in the Philippines, effectively 
inoculated them from charges of ideological deviance; it was precisely this institutionalization that 
enabled such an effective fundraising campaign. Yet, as their tour of Quemoy suggests, ideological 
accommodation and social self-interests must be married to deep-seated and complex affinities for 
“China” if we are to fully grasp the motivations of these elites and the intricacies of their support 
for the ROC. 
 
The nation, through instruction: Philippine-Chinese primary school teachers visit Taiwan 
 Visits by Chinese in the Philippines to Taiwan clustered around two periods in the calendar 
year. Elites visited in October to join in the festivities surrounding “Double Tenth” and Chiang’s 
birthday, while students, teachers, and principals went during the summer holidays to take part in 
military-style training camps and educational seminars and programs organized by agencies such 
as OCAC and the China Youth Corps. Moving down the social scale from elites to school officials, 
this section focuses on the month-long visit of 57 Philippine-Chinese teachers from May 21-June 
21, 1967, during which they visited schools, met with ROC officials, and took part in an intensive, 
three-week training program for Chinese teachers at an educational facility in Panchiao, outside 
Taipei. Following the end of this program on June 10, they remained in Taiwan to visit additional 
schools and government agencies. By engaging in a close reading of the report that they published 
after their visit, I explain how Chinese education served as a common discursive space for practical 
and ideological concerns, and those of both the ROC state and Chinese society in the Philippines. 
I also describe how this program disciplined their behavior and worked to incorporate individuals 
into an idealized national community while teasing out how the teachers themselves understood 




Sponsored by the ROC Embassy and General Association of Chinese Schools, this visit by 
the “Philippine-Chinese Primary School Teachers’ Homecoming, Inspection, and Advanced Study 
Group” (Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan 菲律賓華僑小學教師回國
考察進修團) took place in the context of efforts in both Taiwan and the Philippines to strengthen 
Chinese education. On November 12, 1966, the centenary of Sun Yat-sen’s birth, Chiang Kai-shek 
launched the Cultural Renaissance Movement (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong 中華文化復興
運動) in reaction to the Cultural Revolution in the PRC. In the words of anthropologist Allen Chun, 
the campaign sought to “lead people to believe that [a] spirit of cultural consciousness was the key 
to the fate of the nation in all other respects.” With the support of the state, an “all-encompassing 
culture industry” emerged in Taiwan to promote the Confucian classics; encourage a new literary 
and art movement based upon ethics, democracy, and science; preserve historical artifacts; finance 
tourism; construct cultural infrastructure such as art galleries and museums; and – like the KMT’s 
New Life Movement three decades earlier – inculcate in students and citizens conservative ethical 
values and “correct” social and individual behavior such as thrift, punctuality, and filial piety. In 
schools, courses on citizenship, morality, military education, and the Chinese classics became an 
integral part of the school curriculum and were reinforced by essay and speech competitions, study 
groups, and artistic performances beyond it.49 One US scholar at the time dismissed it a “clear-cut 
failure” and “either completely ignored by most intellectuals, except for those currying favor, or it 
is considered an embarrassing joke.”50 By contrast, Chinese elites in the Philippines welcomed the 
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Movement. Those involved in Chinese education, including businessmen who patronized schools 
and the arts, eagerly incorporated its principles into school curricula and reproduced the language 
of cultural renewal in their proclamations of support for the ROC and addresses to the community. 
Chinese educators like Pao Shih-tien, a vociferous promoter of the Renaissance Movement, 
had their own reasons for adopting a defensive cultural posture. While Chinese elites remained in 
control of Chinese-language education after the mid-1950s, the threat of more extreme measures 
was ever-present. In May 1964, for example, the Immigration Commissioner proposed closing all 
Chinese schools by August.51 Pao and other conservatives responded by fortifying their resistance 
to educational Filipinization through the newly-established Xiao Zong and schools such as Chiang 
Kai-shek College, by lobbying the Philippine government to preserve the status quo, and through 
closer ties with the ROC, which had long sought to distinguish itself as a provider of expertise on 
Chinese education and guardian of Chinese traditions. At their core, therefore, summer training 
programs for Chinese teachers in Taiwan were eminently practical in nature and meant to improve 
the quality of pedagogy and teaching materials in overseas Chinese schools. For these teachers, 
culture was less an abstract concept than a means by which they made their professional living.  
More so than tours of Taiwan and Quemoy by Shang Zong and PCACL elites, educational 
training programs allowed for closer state supervision of the visiting huaqiao, a more specialized 
itinerary, and more meaningful interactions between the visitors and Taiwanese officials. For three 
weeks, the 57 school teachers and principals enrolled in the Panchiao National Schools’ Teacher 
Training Program (Banqiao guomin xuexiao jiaoshi jiangxi hui 板橋國民學校教師講習會) were 
subjected to a kind of Foucauldian disciplinary regime, a panoptical, prison-like discursive space 
                                                 
 





but without the element of criminality. At Panchiao, they were not so much explicitly indoctrinated 
in anticommunism as conditioned to think, feel, act, and even speak like exemplary ROC citizens, 
thereby indirectly fortifying them against the ideology of the enemy.52  
Unusually, for such a large Chinese visit to Taiwan from the Philippines, the members of 
this particular group were not accompanied by any senior community leaders. This was most likely 
because the visit itself was planned in haste and had to compete for members with the many other 
huiguo groups that summer. They were, however, given the customary ceremonial send-off by the 
ROC Ambassador and representatives of their sponsoring organization (in this case the Xiao Zong) 
in Manila.53 The participants in the training program were instead led by Pan Zhaoying 潘肇英, 
the 51-year old head of moral education at Anglo-Chinese School (Zhongxi xuexiao 中西學校) in 
Manila, the oldest Chinese school in the country. Of the 57, only 14, including Pan, were men, and 
three were naturalized Philippine citizens. Most were in their twenties. Only one was a principal, 
and the rest either teachers or department heads like Pan. He was also one of the few to have more 
than a high school education. In total, they represented 39 schools from across the Philippines.54  
Established in May 1956, the Panchiao campus was unremarkable in its layout, consisting 
of a few buildings clustered around a common area and parade ground. The disciplinary effects of 
the program lay in its code of conduct for trainees and how their daily schedules, from sunrise to 
sunset, were organized both within and beyond this space. Codes of conduct for the members of 
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organized visits to Taiwan were commonplace no matter what their age, as mentioned earlier. This 
particular visit imposed upon participants an additional set of 22 requirements, in keeping with the 
broad aims of the Cultural Renaissance and with the regimentation and militarization of Taiwanese 
society that had taken place since the KMT’s declaration of martial law in 1947. Wearing pajamas 
and slippers outside the residential quarters, smoking, spitting, littering, and speaking loudly were 
forbidden. Above and beyond these basic expectations, trainees were also supposed to be “sincere 
and humble” (chengken xuxin 誠懇虛心), “conscientiously self-evaluate” (renzhen jiantao 認真
檢討) themselves, and “accept criticism” (jieshou piping 接受批評). While eating, they not only 
were not to waste food, but were to “maintain a cheerful mood” (baochi yukuai xinqing 保持愉快
心情) and a “good deportment” (lianghao yitai 良好儀態). Conversations had to be in Mandarin.55 
This was a notable requirement, as trainees may have been more used to speaking Minnanhua in 
their schools and among peers and lacked verbal proficiency in the “national language” (Guoyu 國
語).  
By the time their training began on May 23, a day after they arrived in Taiwan, participants 
in the program had been made fully aware of what was expected of them. On the morning of May 
21, the trainees gathered at Liberty Hall, the headquarters of the KMT zongzhibu in Manila. There, 
before they made their way to the airport, a Xiao Zong member instructed them to read an article 
in the Great China Press on the meaning of their trip. Upon arriving in Taipei, they were whisked 
off to Panchiao by OCAC and divided into groups of around six; each group was then assigned its 
own living quarters. In the afternoon, OCAC, the KMT’s Overseas Chinese section, and the China 
Youth Corps hosted the visitors to reception-cum-symposium on the Cultural Renaissance, during 
                                                 





which they swore an oath to the Movement and were officially inducted into it. The following day, 
the Panchiao program’s director, Gao Zi 高梓, introduced them to the program, its rules, and the 
campus facilities.56 
The training program began on May 23 and ended on June 10, running each day from early 
in the morning to the evening, except on Saturday afternoons and Sundays, which were designated 
periods of free activity. Six days a week, the trainees were woken up at 6 by a bell and the sound 
of martial music, had breakfast, and participated en masse in physical exercises (zaocao 早操) set 
to music and lasting for about 50 minutes. Usually, this was followed by a “reading and instruction” 
(duxun 讀訊) session, for which trainees read out loud from their assigned readings or delivered 
short speeches. However, on Saturdays, instead of duxun, their living quarters were inspected for 
cleanliness. At 8, an hour before classes started, the trainees took part in a flag-raising ceremony 
and sang the national anthem, after which they cleaned their quarters, classrooms, common room, 
and dining hall. Teachers, program staff, and director Gao joined in this collective effort to order 
their working and living environments. Educated at Mills College in California and the University 
of Wisconsin, Gao was a well-known educational reformer in China and Taiwan and advocate of 
physical education.57 A panoptical authority figure, she ate with and got to know the trainees, who 
described her relationship with them as of a mother to her children. But they also called her a stern 
lecturer, whom they revered. On one occasion, after some trainees informed her that others were 
not singing the national anthem loudly enough, Gao reminded the entire delegation at flag-raising 
                                                 
56 “Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan baogaoshu,” 89, KHC. 
 





the following day of the need to do so as an expression of their “patriotic zeal” (aiguo rechen 愛
國熱忱).58 
From 9 in the morning to the late afternoon, the trainees visited schools in the Taipei area 
that specialized in pedagogical methods such as teaching composition to first-graders or the use of 
music and singing in the classroom; attended small-group classes at Panchiao, taught by instructors 
from local universities, on teaching everything from mathematics to moral education; and went for 
lectures on topics such as the foundations of Chinese culture, psychological health, modern history 
and the spirit of national education, and trends in modern education. Some of these sessions were 
more explicitly ideological than others. On each of the two Mondays of the program, the trainees 
participated in a meeting of the entire school to hear guest lectures on “The Three Principles of the 
People and the Construction of Taiwan” (on May 29) and “An Analysis of the Communist Bandit 
Situation” (June 5). They also received visitors, whose presence helped to keep them on their best 
behavior: Pao Shih-tien, for example, stopped by on May 26 to show his support for the program, 
while Taiwanese journalists from the Credit News (Zhengxin xinwen bao 徵信新聞報) did so on 
June 1. On weekday evenings, the program organized cultural and recreational activities and taught 
them, for instance, Chinese dance.59 
How did participants in the training program remember their time in the ROC? The report 
that they published in January 1968, suggests that the teachers’ dominant understanding of Taiwan 
was as a source of pedagogical skills and ideas that they could adopt to become better teachers and 
educators. The report itself is evidence of their pragmatic approach to cultural work. As opposed 
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to shorter jinian tekan, this report is 100 pages long. Besides serving a commemorative purpose, 
it was meant to be useful. Most of it consists of detailed writeups on the classes they took, teaching 
methods they learned, and schools they inspected. Little is said about the foundations of Chinese 
culture, “The Three Principles of the People and the Construction of Taiwan,” or “An Analysis of 
the Communist Bandit Situation.” As their afterword to the volume makes clear, they hoped that, 
through the Xiao Zong and Embassy, the report would be distributed to Chinese schools across the 
Philippines so as to motivate teachers and help raise standards of Chinese education there.60 Quite 
remarkably, anticommunism and counterattacking the mainland are not explicitly mentioned at all 
throughout it – not even by ROC Ambassador to the Philippines Han Lih-wu 杭立武 or Gao Zi in 
their forewords to the report.  
At another level, the visit was about individual memories of everyday life that had little to 
do with classes or school visits, and that sometimes worked against the ideological messaging and 
disciplinary techniques of the Panchiao program. In her recollections of the visit that were printed 
in the report, 46-year old Bai Yueying 白月英 recalled the complete lack of coordination that she 
and others displayed during their dance-like zaocao regimens. While she dutifully recorded what 
she had learned about teaching, she also fondly remembered playing badminton with other trainees, 
talking with them in the evenings when their classes were over, the scenes of rural life that they 
observed around them, and listening at night to the wind blowing. Mishaps, tragedies, and comic 
episodes punctuated their weekly routine. A trainee’s father passed away. Another was bitten by a 
dog and had to go for a blood test. On a Sunday sightseeing trip to Wulai, a group of teachers was 
caught in a torrential downpour while making its way down a mountain and ended up thoroughly 
                                                 





soaked. Indeed, if there is a common thread that runs through how different trainees recalled their 
time in Taiwan, it is not anticommunism, but rain.61  
None of this is to suggest that patriotism, culture, and ideology did not figure into how the 
trainees understood their time in Taiwan. Indeed, Shi Wenrui 施文瑞, a 40-year old teacher at Sun 
Yat-sen High School in Iloilo, framed his experience of the trip in more orthodox ideological terms. 
In his recollection of the visit, he wrote that he had always wanted to “return to the embrace of his 
motherland” (hui dao zuguo de huaibao 回到祖國的懷抱) and see for himself Taiwan’s military, 
economic, and educational progress. The great strides that his zuguo had made in education were 
unimaginable to someone like him living in the Philippines, he said. Children in Taiwan were so 
fortunate to have their families, schools, and society united in support of them. His only regret was 
that, because of time constraints, he had not been able to observe Taiwan’s military development. 
A conventional understanding of Chinese culture and the roles of educators in promoting it is also 
evident in the foreword to the report. Here, the Cultural Renaissance Movement receives its only 
explicit mention throughout the volume. Like Shi’s recollections, the foreword draws extensively 
on stock descriptions of Taiwan and overseas Chinese visits to Taiwan: the “smell of its fragrant 
soil” (tudi de xinxiang qiwei 土地的馨香氣味); the sincerity and warmth of their compatriots on 
the motherland; Taiwan’s scenic beauty and great development; hearing, seeing, and feeling their 
zuguo. It is as if the teachers recognized the importance of couching their experiences in a common 
ideological language, irrespective of what Taiwan meant to them individually.  
 
 
                                                 





Serving the nation: the Hsuehkan Militia Veterans’ Association and the ROC 
 Among Chinese civic groups in the Philippines, few were as enthusiastic about visiting the 
ROC than the COWHM Veterans’ Association. This, at least, is how its members hoped to be seen 
by the public, and in particular by the Taiwanese government and media. On the occasion of the 
ROC’s 60th National Day celebrations in October 1971, the VA delegation’s deputy leader Wang 
Tiannian 王天年 proudly declared that this was the tenth visit by the COWHM to Taiwan since 
1954, making it the champion among all huaqiao organizations in the world.62 ROC officials and 
journalists who contributed to the VA’s huiguo tekan were full of praise for the organization. One 
radio journalist said that the Association enjoyed an “unmatched reputation” (wubi de shengyu 無
比的聲譽) among soldiers and civilians in Taiwan for its deeds during World War II, outstanding 
support for anticommunism, and achievements in “joint service” (lianhe fuwu 聯合服務) to the 
ROC. In 1970, a representative of the ROC’s Overseas Chinese News Service hailed the group for 
not only meeting with military and government officials and participating in guanguang, zhijing, 
and laojun activities, as most visiting huaqiao did, but for going out into the Taiwanese countryside 
to (jointly) “serve the people” (wei renmin fuwu 為人民服務) and contributing their money and 
labor to building the Chinese nation.63 
 To understand the COWHM’s relationship with the ROC and the significance of its visits 
to Taiwan requires that we go back to its transition from a militia to civic organization after World 
War II. Following the Japanese occupation, the COWHM and other Philippine-Chinese guerrilla 
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groups on the left and the right demobilized. The Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services Corps, 
or Tebie zongdui, was a branch of the Three Principles’ Youth Corps in China, and having fulfilled 
its wartime mission, was disbanded entirely, while the Chinese Volunteers, the paramilitary branch 
of the KMT zongzhibu in the Philippines, merged with the party. The Hsuehkan Militia, the most 
decorated of these three rightist groups,64 transformed itself into a veterans’ group with branches 
across the country, joined the Filipino Veterans’ Association, and promoted cultural activities and 
education. To help Chinese youth who had joined the resistance and whose education had been cut 
short by the war as a result, as well as to prevent communist subversion, the VA founded Loyalty 
Night School (Danxin yexiao 丹心夜校), an auxiliary educational institution for high schoolers. 
Through it, a self-governing “student brigade” (xuesheng dadui 學生大隊) was formed to sponsor 
patriotic and cultural events in schools, ranging from music and drama performances to badminton 
tournaments to anticommunist rallies. Comprising both individuals who had fought against Japan 
and students who joined the VA after the war, the brigade also organized regular, though not annual, 
visits to Taiwan, starting in 1954.65 
 The COWHM VA, a member of the PCACL,66 was as anticommunist and pro-ROC as any 
Chinese civic institution in the Philippines at the time. But if it stood within and was emblematic 
of the ideological mainstream, it was structurally removed from the leading institutions of Chinese 
society. Unlike most such Chinese civic groups, its visits to Taiwan were not conducted under the 
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auspices of or sponsored by the League, KMT, Shang Zong, or similar community organizations. 
Notably absent from the tekan that it published in the late 1960s and early 1970s to commemorate 
its visits to Taiwan are the well-wishes and exhortations from local Chinese leaders and the ROC 
Ambassador that are typically found in this textual genre. No major community figure features on 
the lists of advisers of the dadui and editorial board members for these tekan. Individual brigade 
members appear to have financed the printing of these volumes and the trips themselves from their 
own pockets, bypassing the patronage of local Chinese elites.67 The only messages of support in 
them are from party and state officials and journalists in Taiwan, including Cua Siok Po, who by 
1968 had left the Philippines to become Deputy Chairman of the KMT Central Committee’s Third 
Section. Like the lack of explicit references to anticommunism and counterattack in the Panchiao 
training program report, the absence of the usual community elites from these volumes, and from 
the leadership of the VA, suggests that COWHM veterans understood and performed their affinity 
to the ROC in their own ways. 
The language of the tekan highlights how VA members, in particular those who had fought 
against the Japanese during the war, saw themselves as participants in a continuous struggle against 
enemies of the Chinese nation and foreign obstacles standing in the way of a unified, territorially-
whole China under the KMT’s leadership: first the “Japanese invaders” (Rikou 日寇), and then the 
“communist bandits” and “Soviet puppet regime” of Mao. To sustain overseas Chinese support for 
Nationalist China during the Civil War and afterwards, ROC propaganda promoted this long-term 
historical perspective of huaqiao as the “mother of the revolution” (huaqiao wei geming zhi mu 華
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僑為革命之母), a phrase that Sun Yat-sen supposedly said.68 But by the 1960s, if not earlier, we 
find few attempts at drawing such continuities in the civic language of Chinese patriotism in the 
Philippines. No such references to the War of Resistance are found in the tekan from the PCACL’s 
visit in 1958, for example. The struggle against Japan had receded in popular memory; Japan and 
the ROC had enjoyed diplomatic relations since 1952; and the Cold War was in full force. From 
the Taiwan Strait Crises to the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution, pro-ROC huaqiao 
did not lack for developments with which to manufacture patriotism and outrage against the CCP. 
Anticommunism increasingly came to define what it meant to love one’s homeland, not to mention 
what it meant to be an ideologically-correct alien in the Philippines.  
COWHM veterans embraced this ideology as a component of their patriotism, a disposition 
that sprung from their earlier service to the nation. Yet anti-Japanese sentiments remained integral 
to their worldview. In October 1971, Wang Tiannian wrote grimly that the international situation 
had worsened. He was not referring primarily to the ROC’s loss of its United Nations seat or 
Richard Nixon’s forthcoming visit to China, but to the agreement between the United States and 
Japan on June 17, in which the former relinquished all rights and interests under Article 3 of the 
San Francisco Treaty of 1952, transferring sovereignty of Okinawa, the Ryukyus, and the Senkaku 
or Diaoyu Islands to Japan while retaining its bases on Okinawa. As both the ROC and the PRC 
claimed the Diaoyu Islands as “Chinese” territory, the United States’ decision angered its partisans. 
In denouncing this unjust violation of the ROC’s sovereignty, Wang resurrected the language of 
World War II, claiming that the United States and Japan were “collaborating to annex” (goujie 
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qintun 勾結侵吞) the ROC’s “sacred territory” (shensheng lingtu 神聖領土).69 To underscore the 
emotional resonance of this decision with its members, the VA published two articles on World 
War II in the tekan for that visit. One was a firsthand account of the Japanese military’s massacre 
of around 600 Chinese in San Pablo, Laguna, in early 1945, while the other was a polemic, written 
under the pseudonym of “old man of the Diaoyu Islands” (Diao sou 釣叟), pledging to protect the 
Islands and warning that in the near future, a unified China would prioritize retaking them from 
Japan.70 
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the VA enacted its affinities to the ROC state differently 
from other visiting huaqiao. In August 1968, responding to the KMT’s call for “joint service,” 19 
members of the VA headed for Taiwan to “serve the people,” spending a month touring rural areas 
of the island. Appreciative ROC officials-cum-propagandists noted in their well-wishes to the VA 
that this was an unprecedented act, as most overseas Chinese visitors interacted with ROC officials 
and soldiers in urban, built, and militarized environments, rather than with ordinary people in the 
countryside. In total, VA members visited 130 villages and towns in the counties of Taipei, Yilan, 
Nantou, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, where they donated medicine and household items to farmers and 
villagers, provided scholarships to schoolchildren, and even helped build houses. To complement 
and emphasize the wider significance of these activities, delegation leader Cai Anluo 蔡安洛 gave 
speeches on communism, in both Mandarin or Minnanhua, to various county- and town-level civic 
associations on each day of the tour. For their contributions to the nation, the KMT Fifth Section, 
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which oversaw social movements and associations, presented them honorary certificates of merit 
and the delegation as a whole with a plaque from Chiang Kai-shek.71  
Not long after returning to the Philippines, Cai contacted the Fifth Section and proposed 
contributing towards a large-scale construction project in Taiwan with some 200,000 NTD that the 
VA had raised. Working with the Cai and the VA, the Fifth Section decided that these funds would 
go towards the rebuilding of Yuehe 樂合, an urban village (li 里) of 144 plains aborigines (pingdi 
shanbao 平地山胞) in the urban township (zhen 鎮) of Yuli 玉里 in Hualien county. A year later, 
in October 1969, with VA members in attendance, construction began on new houses for Yuehe’s 
21 indigenous families, whose existing homes were located at the foot of a mountain and were at 
risk of being destroyed by landslides and flooding. In November 1970, Cai revisited Yuehe to find 
it a picture of modernity and happiness, according to the Director-General of the Fifth Section who 
accompanied him. Houses were now made of brick and reinforced by steel, to minimize earthquake 
from damage; modern sanitary facilities and a freshwater reservoir had been built. On the doors of 
each home were inscribed the names of Cai and other huaqiao who had given back to their nation.72 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has used Philippine-Chinese visits to Taiwan to explain how the ROC sought 
to represent itself to the world and shape how visiting huaqiao understood Taiwan and its struggle 
against communism. Through these visits, I argue, the ROC fashioned for itself qualities associated 
with the nation-state as a political form and cultural community in an effort to represent itself to 
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the world as a substitute zuguo for overseas Chinese. The first half of this chapter shows that visits 
and the textual propaganda on them were constitutive of a larger struggle between the PRC and 
ROC to politicize Chinese transnationalism by directing Chinese people and capital towards either 
mainland or Taiwan. For Nationalist China, controlling and categorizing the inflow of its nationals 
were necessary for security purposes, and also a way of performing its sovereignty over Taiwan’s 
borders and asserting a universally-recognized attribute of state-ness. Publications associated with 
overseas Chinese visits such as the Guidebook that I examine factualized Taiwan’s presence in the 
world as a nation-like polity. While references to Taiwan as a sheng and diqu exposed the ROC’s 
territorial incompleteness and the uncertainty over its geopolitical future, propagandists retained 
the use of terms such as Zhongguo and zuguo to appeal to overseas Chinese visitors and legitimize 
the KMT-ROC party-state. Shifting my focus from rhetorical to practical strategies, I then describe 
the itinerary of a typical visit to explain how visits provided huaqiao with a firsthand glimpse of 
the development of “Free China.” Text and experience were meant to reinforce each other to help 
overseas Chinese internalize certain dispositions toward the nation when visiting the ROC. 
The second part of this chapter focuses on how three different groups of Philippine Chinese 
visitors experienced “Free China,” and on their diverse relationships to the ROC. In examining the 
visit of PCACL leaders to Taiwan and Quemoy in October and November 1958, shortly after the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, I show that native-place sentiment and nostalgia for their home on 
the mainland underpinned many Philippine-Chinese elites support for their zuguo. For the primary 
school teachers who spent a month in the summer of 1967 learning pedagogy and visiting schools, 
the ROC was a provider of educational expertise and professional training. In the twin contexts of 
the Cultural Renaissance Movement and efforts by the Philippine state to nationalize Chinese 




teacher training at Panchiao serving as a means by which the ROC disciplined visiting huaqiao. 
Finally, members of the COWHM VA understood anticommunism in relation to their services to 
the ROC during World War II, and as an aspect of their patriotism. This patriotism did not express 
itself in anticommunist practices alone, but also in the forms of anti-Japanese attitudes and “joint 






A Government Within a Government: 
Nationalist China, the Philippine Military, and the Yuyitungs, 1950-1970 
 
On the evening of May 4, 1970, agents of the Immigration Bureau detained Quintin 于長
城 and Rizal Yuyitung 于長庚, respectively the Publisher and Editor of the Chinese Commercial 
News, at the Manila Overseas Press Club (MOPC). The CCN was, at the time, probably the most 
widely-read Chinese newspaper in the Philippines.1 The Yuyitungs had been, since March 24, on 
trial by the Deportation Board for having purportedly published pro-communist articles in their 
newspaper, and were then out on bail. Eight years earlier, they and ten other CCN employees had 
been arrested and charged with comparable offences. On May 14, 1968, they published an apology 
and retraction, and the Board dropped its case against them, placing them on probation instead. In 
March 1970, however, President Marcos resurrected these charges, claiming that the brothers had 
reverted to their former ways. This time, they would not escape the two regimes that opposed them. 
With their hearings ongoing, and without being allowed to contact their lawyers or family members 
or even gather their belongings, they were bundled onboard a Philippine Airforce plane in the early 
hours of May 5 and deported to Taiwan as ROC nationals, by order of Marcos himself. On August 
14, after a hearing that lasted only three and a half hours and was covered by the world media, a 
military tribunal found them guilty; Quintin was sentenced to two years of reformatory education 
and Rizal to three.  
The case of the Yuyitungs bears superficial resemblance to that of the jinqiao in 1952 and 
Cebu students in 1954. Like the former, the brothers were not communists, and like the latter, they 
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were deported to Taiwan in what amounted to a perverse kind of “homecoming” for two persons 
who had been born in the Philippines and were only citizens of the ROC by virtue of their “Chinese” 
– in fact, Manchu – ancestry. Unlike previously, however, the Philippine military acted against the 
Yuyitungs with the full support of the ROC and local KMT ideologues, who had long sought their 
deportation. For liberal Filipino journalists, Quintin and Rizal’s persecution by the party and ROC 
signaled nothing less than de facto ROC encroachment upon Philippine sovereignty. On April 27, 
1970, for example, Ernesto Granada of the Manila Chronicle described the KMT as “practically a 
government within a government in this country.”2 The day after they were deported, Napoleon G. 
Rama of the Philippines Free Press denounced his country for having “degenerated into a puppet 
of a puppet.”3 Not to be outdone, the People’s Daily in the PRC excoriated the “reactionary” and 
“increasingly fascist” Philippine state for “openly collaborating” with the “Chiang Kai-shek bandit 
gang” to “persecute” the brothers.4 As we will see in Chapter 7, the second of two on the Yuyitung 
affair, these were sentiments shared by liberals and more radical types the world over.  
While the Cold War rhetoric of puppetry goes overboard by denying the Philippines agency 
in its relationship with Taiwan, Rama and others’ claims of ROC involvement in the deportation 
of the brothers are broadly true. No episode illustrates more vividly how Nationalist China and the 
Philippines shared sovereignty over the Philippine-Chinese community to construct the “Chinese 
communist” as a legal subject and attack this imaginary common foe. Complementing Chapter 4, 
the CCN affair is similarly a rich case study with which to analyze the ideological texture of this 
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community and the institutions that sustained it. The paper’s nonconformist approach to reporting 
news on China suggests that despite the ubiquity of anticommunism, print media provided a rare 
informational space for the ideological orthodoxy of Chinese society to be contested. At the same 
time, the case makes clear how representatives of the status quo thought and acted in response to 
perceived challenges to their rigid worldview.  
Scholarship analyzing the campaign against the CCN, however, is virtually non-existent.5 
Most of what we know about the affair comes only by way of journalists and political activists in 
the Philippines and beyond who defended the Yuyitungs in the name of press freedom, denounced 
the Marcos and Chiang regimes, and lobbied for the brothers be released from Taiwan. Years later, 
Rizal Yuyitung compiled a selection of articles into The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers: Philippine 
Press Freedom Under Siege. This volume, together with his own recollections, as told in a series 
of interviews to scholars from the Institute of Modern History (IMH) at Academia Sinica in 1993, 
are our two main published sources on the Yuyitung affair today.6 But they do not explain the anti-
CCN side of the story: how, for instance, the KMT, Embassy, and military worked together behind 
the scenes to persecute the brothers. It is here that the largely untapped records of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) archives in Taiwan come in invaluable – their own gaps and prejudices 
notwithstanding. 
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 This chapter, the first of two on the Yuyitung affair, explains how and why the KMT in the 
Philippines and Taiwan and ROC officials in both countries – which I refer to as a “Nationalist 
Chinese bloc” – colluded with the Philippine military and, in 1970, Marcos and a small number of 
his cronies, against the CCN. Drawing on the published sources mentioned above and also archival 
materials from Taiwan and the United States, I show that this bloc gathered, forged, and interpreted 
evidence to assist the military in making a case to the Deportation Board for deporting the brothers 
in 1962 and 1970. It supplied the linguistic and cultural resources needed for the Yuyitungs to be 
identified as pro-communist Chinese “aliens” and exerted political pressure on Philippine officials 
and politicians such as Marcos from behind the scenes. The Philippine military, on its part, fronted 
the campaign and supplied the coercive means and legal justification needed to bring the brothers 
into the fold of the state. In December 1952, the absence of such collaboration and the military’s 
dependence on unreliable sources of intelligence destabilized Chinese society and threatened the 
reputation of institutions that claimed to defend its interests. The anti-CCN campaign showed that 
by the 1960s, these institutions, the KMT and Embassy, had successfully arrogated to themselves 
the power to determine the ideological guilt of Chinese in the country; in this sense, they did indeed 
constitute a “government within a government.” 
I also explain why the Nationalist Chinese bloc and Philippine state acted against the CCN. 
As we will see, the CCN’s support for Chinese integration and criticisms of Chinese schools were 
at odds with the chauvinistic worldview of KMT intellectuals such as Cua Siok Po and his former 
colleague at the Great China Press, Hsin Kwan-chue 邢光祖. Personal vendettas and community 
politics likely impelled some, among them the President of the Shang Zong, to seek the destruction 
of the paper. And in the context of the political turmoil that engulfed the Philippines in early 1970, 




of martial law two years later. These are the motivations that Rizal Yuyitung and supporters of the 
CCN have cited to explain the campaign against it. Evidence from the MOFA archives, however, 
shows that those involved in the campaign against the CCN focused exclusively on exposing it as 
a pro-communist mouthpiece, or even a communist organ; nothing in these hundreds of pages of 
documentation suggests that factors such as the CCN’s views on integration mattered at all. I argue, 
therefore, that most anti-CCN actors not only employed anticommunism as a strategy for opposing 
the CCN, but also believed that the newspaper supported communism. Individuals associated with 
it had been deported to Taiwan as communist suspects. Most of all, its self-proclaimed independent, 
centralist editorial policy was perceived as pro-Beijing in the context of a largely illiberal society 
in which anticommunism was regnant and communism was supposedly ever looking for ways to 
infiltrate it. By reprinting articles on China from foreign wire agencies that indirectly cited official 
PRC news agencies and their ideologically-incorrect language, for example, the CCN was seen as 
reporting favorably on the PRC and thus suspect. A common, oftentimes a priori conviction in the 
paper’s communist sympathies sustained opposition to it across the years and across the multiple 
factions that comprised the anti-CCN coalition. Its members did not see themselves as framing the 
innocent, but as prosecuting the guilty through any means necessary, including the manipulation 
of intelligence to make a more persuasive legal case for deportation.  
 
The CCN and the KMT, 1937-1950  
The Chinese Commercial News was founded in October 1919 as the monthly journal of the 
Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and edited by Yu Yi-tung 于以同, a school teacher from 
China who had become the Chamber’s Secretary-General. In 1922, with the financial backing of 




paper. Except during the Japanese occupation, and despite the prosecution of Quintin and Rizal in 
the 1960s and 1970s, it remained in circulation for half a century until the onset of martial law in 
1972; in 1986, it resumed publication. Yu Yi-tung did not survive the occupation. For refusing to 
propagandize on behalf of the Japanese, he was executed and the newspaper closed in early 1942. 
In April 1945, shortly after Manila’s liberation, the paper was resurrected by Yu’s four children: 
Quintin, Rizal, Helen, and Tiong Nay. By the 1960s, it had become the largest of the four Chinese 
dailies in the country, and remains a staple of the Chinese community today.7  
In his 1965 study of Chinese newspapers in the Philippines, political scientist James Blaker 
described the CCN as a prototypically “Type II,” or “internal-political” paper that was established 
in response to developments not in China, but in the countries where huaqiao lived – in the CCN’s 
case, less the May Fourth Movement and more the 1919 Bookkeeping Law, which stipulated that 
business records were to be kept only in English, Spanish, or a Filipino dialect and thus threatened 
the economic livelihood of most Chinese merchants.8 By the 1960s, long after the pre-1949 heyday 
of Chinese print journalism in the country, the CCN was the only such paper of its type remaining. 
Unlike “Type I” or “external-political” papers such as the two KMT organs the Great China Press 
and Kong Li Po (not to mention the now-defunct Chinese Guide), the CCN adopted what its editors 
considered a centrist and non-partisan approach to reporting the news. 
 By the late 1930s, the CCN’s purported objectivity and non-partisanship had fallen out of 
step with a polarized political climate in China and among Chinese nationalist circles in Southeast 
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Asia. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Rizal recalled, while the Fookien Times only reported 
that Chinese troops were victorious, the CCN reported both Japan’s victories and defeats and relied 
on news dispatches from both the ROC’s Central News Agency (Zhongyang tongxunshe 中央通
訊社, or CNA) and the Associated Press. If the latter cited Japanese government sources, the CCN 
translated them without modifying their original language, however derogatory towards the ROC 
it might be; it maintained the same policy of indirectly quoting PRC news agencies. Consequently, 
despite supporting the War of Resistance against Japan, the CCN became a “traitorous” newspaper 
to KMT loyalists in the Philippines.9 Shortly after World War II, the CCN’s determination to avoid 
taking sides in the Civil War saw it caught in the middle of a vicious war of words between leftist 
and rightist Chinese newspapers. Pro-communist outlets such as the Chinese Guide regarded it as 
a “running dog of the rightists,” while to pro-Chiang papers such as the Kong Li Po, Chung Cheng 
Daily News, Great China Press, and Chungking Times, it was insufficiently pro-KMT.10 With the 
collapse of the radical Chinese left and its media organs by the late 1940s, Chinese public opinion 
in the Philippines shifted rightwards and the CCN assumed its position at the leftmost extreme of 
a very narrow ideological spectrum. Well before 1962, if the Yuyitungs are to be believed, their 
paper had fallen afoul of ideological extremists. “There is a Chinese group that has tried for years, 
even before the war, to undercut my family and our newspaper,” Quintin said in an interview with 
the Free Press in 1962, shortly after the arrests. “For upholding the policy of truthful reporting my 
paper has offended many in the Chinese community,” he claimed, in a thinly-veiled reference to 
the KMT.11 
                                                 
9 Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, ii. 
 
10 Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 313. 
 
11 The interview is reproduced in “Huaqiao shangbao an 華僑商報案,” Vol. 1, 35-36, 020-010708-0067, February 




 Over the course of the KMT’s long war with the Japanese and Communists from the 1930s 
onwards, therefore, the CCN acquired a reputation for ideological unreliability that informed how 
a generation of KMT partisans perceived it. The CCN’s “objective” journalism ran contrary to the 
policies of a censorious, state-controlled media regime, the fascistic cult of personality surrounding 
Chiang Kai-shek, and institutions such as the Jiangxi Political School in Nanchang and the Central 
Military Academy in Nanjing and Chengdu that trained and indoctrinated party cadres.12 Had the 
paper circulated in China during the 1930s, it would have been shut down by the Nationalist state 
for propagating ideas “discordant with the Three Principles of the People and People’s Revolution” 
and subjected to violent attacks by Blue Shirts and CC Clique members.13 Illiberal attitudes toward 
the press and the institutions that fostered such illiberalism were essentially transplanted to Taiwan 
after the War of Resistance. There, after 1949, they found fertile ground in a society under martial 
law that was being mobilized – and whose elites sought to mobilize huaqiao – to counterattack the 
mainland and defeat a communist enemy whose modus operandi involved propagating “subversive” 
ideologies such as neutralism and “peaceful coexistence.” Many of the most strident opponents of 
the CCN, as we will see, were products of this ideological nexus.  
 The CCN’s first postwar encounter with the authorities appears to have taken place in mid-
1950, when Quintin Yuyitung left Manila on a cruise ship for a two-week tour of Hong Kong and 
Tokyo. Upon returning to the Philippines on June 12, he was interrogated by MIS and his luggage 
searched. According to a US Air Force intelligence agent present at the interrogation, Quintin said 
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that he had traveled to Hong Kong to buy typecasting equipment for the newspaper. The search of 
his belongings yielded nothing of note. British intelligence had subjected him to similar procedures 
upon his arrival in Hong Kong, and had shadowed him. American agents who trailed him in Japan 
said that he was on a sightseeing tour organized by the Japan Travel Bureau and also found nothing 
suspicious about his behavior. Allan Charak, the Air Force agent who reported on him, called him 
the “suspected head of the Chinese Communist Party in Manila.” Charak’s source was Counsellor 
Chow Shu-kai of the ROC Embassy, who claimed that Quintin was planning to meet with high-
ranking communist leaders in Hong Kong and Tokyo to exchange documents with them. Chow’s 
informant, in turn, was a “highly reliable person in the Chinese Nationalist Party organization in 
Manila.”14 
Several months after Quintin returned from his cruise, and following Ramon Magsaysay’s 
appointment as Secretary of National Defense in August 1950, three men associated with the CCN 
were arrested by the military as part of a fresh wave of crackdowns on Chinese undesirables in the 
country. Lim Hua Sin 林華新 had worked for the CCN as a translator after the war and had been 
attached to the ROC Consulate and Embassy; Ma Piao Ping 馬飄萍was then the CCN’s circulation 
manager; and Pao Kee Tung 鮑居東 was Ma’s business partner and a writer for the paper.15 All 
three were accused of being communist propagandists. Rizal Yuyitung blamed the local KMT for 
plotting against the paper. Over 40 years after the arrest of his employees, he insisted that Lim’s 
only crime, according to a conversation that Rizal had with Immigration Commissioner Engracio 
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Fabre, was to translate an article for the newspaper reflecting on Eleanor Roosevelt’s plans to visit 
Moscow.16 The actual offending evidence consisted, first, of an article by Lim in the CCN in 1946 
ironically entitled “I became left-leaning,” in which he declared that he had no connections with 
any political parties and claimed, prophetically, that anyone at the time who identified as a centrist 
risked being called a communist. Lim’s diary, however, revealed that he was in financial difficulty 
and thus had sought to sell arms and ammunition to the Hukbalahap.17 The deportation case against 
Ma was based on a master list of communists that the Philippine military had obtained, most likely 
from the KMT, and on sworn statements that he was an active communist. Pao owned a bookstore 
at Ongpin Street that sold communist propaganda and testified that Ma was aware of all the books 
and magazines stocked there. The KMT and Embassy further believed that  Pao’s “habitual words 
and actions” (pingsu yanxing 平素言行) made him a suspect.18 Lim, Ma, Pao, and other Chinese 
were deported to Taiwan in early 1951 as the anti-Chinese Red scare in the Philippines escalated. 
In January 1952, Taiwan sentenced Lim to an undisclosed period of political reeducation; Ma was 
tried in July 1953 and found innocent, while Pao was sentenced to seven years in jail.19 In profiling 
Lim, Taiwan’s Public Security Bureau (Guojia anquan ju 國家安全局) branded the CCN a centrist 
paper that had been attacked by the Chinese Guide and the Great China Press. Lim had not joined 
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any illegal organizations, it concluded. Nonetheless, because he had considered selling materiel to 
the communists, “his thinking is clearly biased” (sixiang xian you pianpo 思想顯有偏頗).20 
The Taiwanese state, as distinct from the KMT and ROC officials in the Philippines, was 
evidently skeptical then of claims that the CCN was a communist publication, even if it was within 
its power to find persons who had worked or written for the paper ideologically suspect according 
to the standards of martial law. If Rizal Yuyitung is to be believed, all three men, and not just Ma, 
were released shortly after being deported and started families and businesses on Taiwan instead 
of returning to the Philippines.21 While ROC sources do not reveal if Lim and Pao were released, 
it is clear from them that a handful within the Taiwanese government were concerned that the ROC 
had erred in accepting their deportation. At this time, a critical mass of evidence needed to prove 
that the Yuyitungs and the paper in general were ideologically undesirable did not yet exist. 
 Over the 1950s, and particularly from 1960 to 1962, ROC partisans in the Philippines grew 
increasingly convinced that the CCN was pro-communist, expanding the basis of their belief from 
guilt by association with specific individuals to include what they considered the heterodox ideas 
and bad faith of the paper itself. For instance, the known fact that Koa Chian – an actual communist, 
unlike Lim, Ma, or Pao – had worked for the CCN before and after World War II did not appear 
to matter much. Anti-CCN sentiment, rather, took the form of objections to the content of the paper. 
In September 1956, at the first convention of the PCACL, among the many items on the delegates’ 
agenda was a proposal by a representative of the Co (Xu) clan association, Xu Junwu 許君武, to 
censure the paper for its “pro-communist opinions and attitudes and confusing what Chinese saw 
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and heard” (tangong yanlun taidu raoluan huaqiao shiting 袒共言論態度擾亂華僑視聽). After 
much discussion, the motion passed.22 Unfortunately, we do not know exactly what they discussed 
behind closed doors, or what Xu’s background was. Two years later, a ROC-KMT anticommunist 
working group in the Philippines, convened by the ROC Ambassador, adopted identical language 
in discussing how best to persuade the CCN to change its “communist-leaning opinions” (qing fei 
yanlun 傾匪言論).23 We can infer what their objections may have been from the two main factors 
that Rizal cited as causing antipathy towards the CCN.   
  
Undermining Chineseness? The CCN and Chinese integration in the Philippines 
In recalling his life to interviewers from IMH in the early 1990s, Rizal attributed the CCN’s 
non-conformist positions to his family’s unusual ethnic background. Born in Manila rather than in 
Fujian, the brothers were also not Han Chinese, but Manchus. “Our background and family history,” 
he told them, “would not allow us to take extreme positions. We were unenthusiastic about politics, 
especially Quintin. Once, when angry, he said to me that the CCN should simply not publish front 
page international news or supplements.”24 But political it certainly was – just not with respect to 
international affairs. As Chapter 4 has shown, the CCN advocated Chinese integration into Filipino 
society. It began doing so as early as June 1952 with the publication in its Sunday supplement, the 
Chinese Weekly (Huaqiao zhoukan 華僑周刊), of a two-part article, “The Road Ahead for Chinese 
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Society” (“Huaqiao shehui de luxiang” 華僑社會的路向). Written under a pseudonym by literary 
editor Go Eng Guan 吳永源, it criticized the China-oriented “provincialism” (xiangtu zhuyi 鄉土
主義) of most of his compatriots. Returning to China was not a realistic option. Instead, Go called 
on the Chinese to contribute their skills and talent to the Philippines and for the weaving of cultural 
Chineseness into the multi-ethnic fabric of the Philippine nation.25 A steady stream of such pieces 
followed. While critical of the state’s discriminatory economic policies, the CCN took the unusual 
position of encouraging a kind of self-Filipinization from the bottom-up. Starting in 1960, usually 
under a pseudonym, Rizal himself took to the pages of the Weekly to promote the “metamorphosis” 
(tuibian 蛻變) of Chinese into Filipinos, a process that would entail not simply the acquisition of 
formal citizenship by Chinese, but also the “hybridization” (hunhua 混化) of Chinese and Filipino 
cultures through, for instance, the widespread adoption of Filipino languages by Chinese and the 
relegation of Chinese to a secondary tongue.26  
The CCN’s calls for integration were ahead of the times and out of place in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. Philippine citizenship remained difficult and expensive to obtain, and there were no 
efforts to push for the simplification of the naturalization process among either Filipino politicians 
or Chinese elites. As Rizal explained, the belief that “if you were born Chinese, you would die and 
become a Chinese ghost” (sheng wei Zhongguo ren si wei Zhongguo hun 生為中國人死為中國
鬼) was too deeply embedded in how Chinese, Filipinos, and Americans in the country understood 
Chinese identity. Quintin was outgoing, persuasive, and well-connected, and was able to win over 
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many to the CCN’s side,27 but the brothers’ efforts met with resistance from Chinese intellectuals 
affiliated with the KMT, in particular Hsin Kwan-chue, editor-in-chief of the Great China Press. 
Born in Jiangsu, Hsin first arrived in the Philippines in 1946 as the CNA’s editorial director, having 
previously worked in China as a journalist and propagandist for the KMT. Throughout the course 
of a long career in China, the Philippines, and Taiwan, he published dozens of volumes of poems 
and literary criticism in praise of an essentialized Chinese culture.28 Hsin wrote frequently for the 
Press under the suitably conservative pen name of Sima Guang and condemned the Yuyitungs for 
“forgetting their roots” (shu dian wang zu 数典忘祖) in advocating integration.29  
It is not difficult to understand why Hsin and other KMT cultural warriors in the Philippines 
such as Cua Siok Po (a close associate of Hsin’s at the Great China Press and in the party) opposed 
Chinese integration and the CCN’s support for it. For intellectual conservatives like Hsin and Cua 
(a graduate of the Chongqing Central Training Group in 1939),30 cultural Filipinization meant the 
loss of Chineseness and threatened Chinese-language education, the foundation of KMT influence 
in the country. As identities underwent hunhua, so the logic of cultural chauvinism went, as so too 
did identification with the ROC – the self-appointed guardian of Chinese “tradition” at the time – 
diminish, depriving Taiwan of support from its overseas nationals.  
To compound the Yuyitungs’ relationship with the KMT, from the mid-1950s, supporting 
the integration of Southeast Asia’s Chinese became the official policy of the PRC as it sought to 
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win over non-aligned countries and allay their fears of local Chinese populations as potential fifth 
columnists. In December 1956, Zhou Enlai gave a speech in Burma making it clear that all Chinese 
abroad could unilaterally renounce their PRC citizenship. By the end of 1957, the PRC had shifted 
from merely giving them this choice to actively encouraging them to become local citizens, limit 
their pro-PRC activities, and adopt integrative practices such as intermarriage.31 We do not know 
if the Yuyitungs’ and other CCN contributors’ thinking on integration was influenced by the PRC 
– there is no mention of this in Rizal and Quintin’s public utterances – or if the KMT believed that 
such influence existed, but the party cannot have failed to notice the broad similarities between the 
CCN’s position and the PRC’s. Advocating integration could certainly have been perceived as a 
“communist-leaning opinion.”  
 Rizal, Quintin, and their lawyers were adamant that the CCN’s support for integration was 
a key reason for the Philippine KMT’s and ROC’s hostility towards the paper. Beyond their own 
statements, however, there is no evidence from ROC archives to show that the Nationalist Chinese 
bloc used integration to oppose the Yuyitungs during the Deportation Board trials in 1962 or 1970, 
or at the Taipei military court in 1970.32 The ROC government’s policy on integration, as opposed 
to that of individual KMT ideologues such as Hsin, was never explicitly articulated. While Taiwan 
neither abrogated its Nationality Law nor relinquished its claims over Chinese abroad, as the PRC 
did, it did not officially consider advocating hunhua or even tonghua 同化 (assimilation) as anti-
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ROC and pro-communist behavior. A legal argument against the CCN on such grounds would not 
have persuaded the ROC to accept the Yuyitungs, and neither would the Deportation Board have 
entertained such evidence; integration was a pro-Filipino position, after all.  
 
Undermining anticommunism? The CCN and the Chinese media in the Philippines 
While opposition to integration may have driven many among the KMT to oppose the CCN, 
it cannot explain the Philippine military’s and ROC Embassy’s involvement. Their campaign was 
centered on anticommunism. As an ideological lens through which they apprehended social reality 
and the justification and strategy for persecuting the Yuyitungs, it united these factions. The CCN’s 
reporting on mainland China evinced pro-communist tendencies in their eyes and would serve as 
a necessary (albeit insufficient) evidentiary basis for their case against the paper.  
In his IMH interviews, Rizal Yuyitung explained that the CCN was neither a leftist nor a 
rightist newspaper and was chiefly concerned with reporting on issues of interest to local Chinese 
businessmen. It encouraged integration, for instance, as the most realistic solution to anti-Chinese 
economic nationalism. Not being a KMT organ, unlike the Great China Press or Kong Li Po, the 
paper cherished its independence and felt no compulsion to toe the Nationalist line. Ideologically, 
the CCN also differed from the Fookien Times, which was independently-run, but whose founder 
and publisher Go Puan Seng was a committed anticommunist. International news tended to receive 
less attention than local news, but increased in proportion to the latter during the 1950s as the CCN 
sought to bolster its appeal.33 In reporting on China, it did so in the belief that, irrespective of the 
KMT-CCP split, readers had the right to know what was truly happening there because they had 
relatives on the mainland and many had been born there. At the time, however, neither English nor 
                                                 





Chinese newspapers in the Philippines had direct access to the PRC’s official news agency, Xinhua. 
Chinese papers, including the CCN, obtained most of their news on China from the ROC’s Central 
News Agency, while English-language papers also relied on international news agencies such as 
Reuters, Agence France-Presse (AFP), United Press International (UPI), and the Associated Press, 
all of which subscribed to Xinhua. Unlike the other three Chinese dailies, the CCN translated and 
published these agencies’ articles verbatim to offer a diversity of perspectives on China,34 much 
as it had done with respect to Japan before the war. On the few occasions that Filipinos publicly 
visited China, the CCN also provided coverage. For instance, Rizal recalled that when a group of 
Filipino journalists travelled to China (he did not say when), the CCN translated their report, which 
provided both favorable and critical views of the PRC.35  
The CCN’s reliance on multiple news sources in covering China resembled that of English 
papers in the Philippines and, in that context, was unremarkable. From the standpoint of the KMT 
in the Philippines and ROC officials there, however, indirectly reproducing official PRC sources 
was unacceptable. A news item such as “Red China navy rated strongest in the Far East” was “pro-
communist” simply because it reported positively on the PRC. Provenance mattered not. The frame 
of reference for pro-ROC ideologues was the tightly-censored media scene on martial-law Taiwan, 
where “balanced” reportage on China was non-existent and considered antithetical to the nation-
building project because it “confused what Chinese saw and heard,” to quote Xu Junwu (slightly 
out of context); neutralism, as PCACL propagandists reminded local Chinese, was a Trojan horse 
for communism. By the end of the 1940s and certainly by the mid-1950s, Nationalist organs such 
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as the KMT, PCACL, CKSC, and Embassy had mostly succeeded in recreating an informational 
environment within Chinese society in the Philippines that was similar to Taiwan’s, as Chapter 4 
has shown.  
A constant and prominent obstacle to the ideological monopoly of anticommunism was the 
country’s most widely-read Chinese newspaper. The CCN did not merely print news on China not 
from the CNA. It also violated the linguistic-ideological guidelines that the central KMT imposed 
on the media in Taiwan and required all organs of the state and party at home and abroad adopt. 
In July 1947, the KMT stipulated that all official correspondence, press releases, and newspapers 
refer to the CCP solely as gongfei, an announcement that the ROC authorities consolidated into a 
comprehensive set of guidelines for “rectifying the names” (zhengming 正名) to reflect the “true” 
nature of the CCP, PRC, Soviet Union, and Soviet and Chinese leaders and delegitimize Chinese 
communism. For instance, “fei” was to be attached as a suffix to the last names of Mao and other 
CCP leaders, while the PRC was always supposed to be the “communist bandit regime” (gongfei 
zhengquan), never Zhonghua renmin gongheguo.36 In the Philippines, the KMT, party newspapers, 
the Fookien Times, and Chinese civic organizations more generally adhered strictly to this naming 
policy, blanketing Chinese public discourse with KMT-approved ideological signifiers. The CCN 
did not observe these strictures. As a matter of principle, it kept the original language of any news 
dispatches that it reprinted, including that of the KMT and CNA. Thus in translating and publishing 
articles from AFP and other international wire agencies, it did not employ the rhetoric of banditry. 
Mao was Mao, and Beijing was Beijing (“Northern Capital”), which Taiwan persisted in naming 
“Beiping” (“Northern Peace”) in order to maintain the fiction that Nanjing (“Southern Capital”) 
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remained the true capital of China. The Philippine KMT did not accept this, Rizal said. “It believed 
that you had to use ‘Beiping.’ If you used ‘Beijing,’ you were recognizing the CCP; if you did not 
use ‘Mao-bandit,’ ‘Mao-traitor’ [zei 賊], and similar language, you were a leftist, a communist.”37 
To make matters worse for the CCN, in indirectly citing PRC news sources, it also often ended up 
publishing pejorative descriptions of Chiang Kai-shek, whom the PRC denounced as a “bandit” in 
exactly the same way that the ROC disparaged Mao.38 For instance, it republished a UPI article on 
May 17, 1962 that quoted a PRC news release attacking Chiang Kai-shek’s “bandit gang” (feibang) 
on Taiwan and Chiang as a “cruel bandit” (canfei 殘匪).39 
To maintain its editorial independence, the CCN also refused to allow the KMT to dictate 
how it should publish the party’s news items. Rizal explained that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the KMT zongzhibu and overseas Chinese section of the Central Committee regularly issued press 
releases to the CCN with instructions on which page to print them on, how much space they should 
take up, and the size of the headline. When the Yuyitungs persistently refused to comply with the 
KMT, the party stopped issuing the CCN with its news releases in the late 1950s and pressured the 
CNA into cancelling the CCN’s subscription to it in 1969.40 This forced the CCN to depend only 
on international wire agencies for its news on mainland China.41 
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In condemning the KMT, Rizal’s recollections reveal the gulf in attitudes between the CCN 
and KMT toward the role of the media in society and how “China” should be represented in print. 
A good liberal, Rizal was committed to fairness and balance in reporting the news and a free and 
independent press. He had only scorn for what he considered the servility of other Chinese papers 
toward the Nationalist government and their meddlesome pursuit of ideological uniformity: he and 
Quintin approached the news as a Filipino journalist might. Yet he acknowledged that his enemies’ 
belief in the CCN’s guilt was genuine, however much he knew that his paper was innocent. KMT 
ideologues were not only intolerant of deviations from official naming policy, but had been trained 
to ascribe such deviations to ill intent and communist scheming. Gongfei were, after all, ubiquitous, 
and constantly seeking to subvert overseas Chinese societies. In the Philippines, the jinqiao an and 
absence of an active Chinese communist movement since the late 1940s only heightened fears on 
the part of right-wing Chinese (and Filipinos) of a hidden Red menace – whose outward signs they 
were convinced they had identified in the early 1960s.  
 
The Philippine military, the Nationalist Chinese bloc, and the arrest of the Yuyitungs in 1962 
Quintin and Rizal Yuyitung were arrested for the first time in the early hours of March 8, 
1962, together with ten CCN staffers; two additional CCN employees on the military’s wanted list 
of 14 names were never caught. Quintin, Rizal recalled, was dragged out of bed at home and taken 
to the offices of the CCN, which the military ransacked. Finding nothing of note, they returned the 
next evening and found a letter to Quintin from Li Weihan 李維漢, head of the United Work Front 
Department (Tongyi zhanxian gongzuo bu 統一战线工作部) of the CCP (in his IMH interviews, 
Rizal mistakenly identified Li as the head of the Chinese communists in the Philippines). Rizal’s 




The problem was that he “didn’t understand a thing about communism. They confiscated several 
hundred of my books, because they believed that so long as someone’s last name ended with ‘ski,’ 
he was a communist. What a joke!” Most of the people arrested were released the following day, 
but Rizal was detained for two weeks and Quintin for six months. Even after both were freed, they 
had to remain within a ten-mile radius of Manila and report to a police station once a week.42 
MOFA records allow us to reconstruct how these arrests came about and the motivations 
of the Embassy, KMT, and Philippine military in opposing the CCN. As Quintin’s brush with the 
law in 1950 and the deportation of Ma, Lim, and Pao suggest, MIS had long suspected the paper 
of being communist. In the years leading up to March 8, 1962, the Embassy reported, MIS began 
gathering incriminating evidence and surveilling key figures associated with the CCN.43 In August 
through September 1961, it formed a special working group to accelerate its operations and invited 
four leading party members, Cua Siok Po, the KMT’s Deputy Secretary-General S. C. Lim 林樹
燦, the Kong Li Po’s General Manager Cheng Kim Tiao 莊金朝, and the Great China Press’s Koa 
Chun-te, to join it.44 Several months later, the Embassy came onboard the campaign at the asking 
of MIS and formed its own working group to discuss how best local Chinese and ROC officials 
ought to cooperate with MIS and how to represent the case to the media and Chinese public. Cua 
and Lim were also members of this second group.45 
All involved took it as a given that the CCN was pro-communist; if there were dissenting 
views, they are not to be found in the archives. MIS believed that the CCN directly subscribed to 
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Xinhua and was willfully publishing CCP propaganda, as its arrest warrant for the Yuyitungs and 
their employees shows.46 Agence France-Presse, it claimed, was simply a front that the CCN used 
to pretend that its Xinhua pieces were second-hand.47 ROC Ambassador Tuan Mao-lan admitted 
in a private conversation with Alfonso Sycip that while he did not read the paper closely every day, 
his general impression was that it leant towards the communists.48 On February 3, 1962, just over 
a month before the arrests, the Embassy’s working group stated emphatically that cooperating with 
the Philippine authorities to eliminate the CCN was the “most concrete and important work” (zui 
shiji er you zhongda de gongzuo 最實際而又重大的工作) against communists overseas. For the 
Nationalist Chinese bloc, the issue was not whether the CCN was guilty, but the optics and legality 
of the case and its ramifications for Chinese society. It was essential, the party and Embassy agreed, 
that they work closely with the military to avoid implicating innocent Chinese and any repeat of 
the jinqiao an.49 Equally vital was ensuring that the Philippines take the initiative and act legally; 
Nationalist Chinese assistance be rendered in secret so as to avoid accusations of meddling in the 
Philippines’ internal affairs; and the arrests be framed as an anticommunist operation and nothing 
more.50 
In the months before March 8, 1962, the Embassy’s working group provided four forms of 
assistance to MIS. First, it vetted the original list of 27 suspects that MIS drew up and advised it 
to cut the list down to 14 names, lest the arrests be seen as targeting Chinese society in general as 
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opposed to key figures in the CCN. Second, the Embassy secured the approval of the ROC to have 
the suspects deported to Taiwan. Third, in January 1962, the working group covered the Kong Li 
Po’s subscription to AFP so that the military could cross-reference its dispatches with CCN articles. 
Finally, to make up for MIS’s lack of manpower and translators, Embassy staffers helped translate 
three years’ worth of the CCN’s “pro-communist” articles, which later served as evidence for the 
prosecution.51  
Also working against the CCN behind the scenes was Hsin Kwan-chue, whom MIS invited 
to serve as its principal translator before the Embassy joined the campaign. Ideological differences 
aside, Hsin had an unusually personal relationship with the CCN. According to Rizal Yuyitung, 
Hsin bore a grudge against the paper for running stories about his opera singer wife and exposing 
him as a plagiarist.52 A propagandist and literary critic, he was also involved in intelligence work. 
In early-mid-1960, Hsin turned over to Narciso Ramos, the Philippines’ Ambassador to the ROC, 
a cache of documents purportedly detailing the activities and structure of the Chinese communist 
party in the Philippines from 1926 to 1956 or 1958. At Ramos’s request, he wrote a report on these 
documents that circulated widely and was highly regarded within the intelligence community. How 
Hsin obtained – if indeed, he simply “obtained” – these materials and what they actually contained 
are unknown, but, according to Ramos, he sought no material reward for handing them over. Nor 
was he financially compensated for translating thousands of CCN news items in the three months 
leading up to March 8 and sorting through and translating CCN staffers’ books and documents that 
were seized.53 
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Hsin not only believed that the CCN was a pro-communist organ, but also had the incentive 
and means to seek the paper’s destruction. His involvement helps us explain why the military acted 
against the paper when it did. Hsin’s plagiarism scandal broke in 1959.54 In 1960, he reported on 
Chinese communism in the Philippines to the Philippine authorities and very likely implicated the 
CCN by highlighting its reporting on China. In 1961, MIS, whose longstanding suspicions of the 
paper Hsin’s report confirmed, invited him and his fellow KMT members Cua, Lim, Cheng, and 
Koa to help them construct a legal case centered on the selection, translation, and interpretation of 
the CCN’s “pro-Beijing” articles. Given his close ties with these four men through the KMT, Great 
China Press, and PCACL, Hsin cannot have acted alone. If the Embassy and, through it, the ROC 
state were aware of the KMT’s plot, their records do not say.  
 
The 1962 trial of the Yuyitungs and its aftermath 
To make its case for deporting the Yuyitungs, the military submitted a total of 1,916 items 
of evidence to the Deportation Board, most of which consisted of articles that Hsin and Embassy 
staffers had translated. Also included as evidence were several “anti-Filipino” cartoons and poems, 
books and periodicals that MIS had confiscated, Kong Li Po editorials, a report by Narciso Ramos, 
statements by the Shang Zong and PCACL denouncing the CCN as communist, and a December 
15, 1961 letter from Li Weihan that MIS “found” in Quintin’s home study.55 The anti-CCN plotters 
evidently felt the need to produce as wide a range of evidence as possible in the hope that some, if 
not all, of it would prove persuasive. Li Weihan’s letter was key, because it was the only first-hand 
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“proof” of ties between the CCP and the CCN. In this letter, Li addressed Quintin as “Comrade 
Chang-Chen”  and praised him, Rizal, and 21 other individuals (who were mostly CCN employees) 
for working hard over the past year before criticizing them for not keeping pace with changing 
times. It was clear that “reactionary forces have been greatly expanding” with the Liberal Party’s 
victory in the November 1961 presidential elections and the growing strength of the “Chiang Kai-
shek clique” in the Philippines. That year, “no prominent Chinese and Filipinos have come to visit 
and to inspect the Fatherland.” The letter, written mostly in simplified Chinese, concluded with Li 
instructing Quintin and the others to “discuss humbly the reasons why you cannot keep pace with 
change of environs” and to submit a plan for 1962 to him for endorsement.56 Quintin denied having 
seen it before and knowing its origins.57  
 The letter was almost certainly a forgery, given how it was “discovered” a day after Quintin 
was arrested, when he had been removed from his home. Rizal was certain that it was the product 
of collaboration between the KMT and the military. That 23 names were squeezed onto a one-page 
letter suggests that it was fabricated and planted specifically to incriminate the entire CCN staff, 
he argued.58 Whoever forged it must have had knowledge of the CCP’s organizational structure 
and propaganda, as Li Weihan was indeed head of the United Work Front Department at the time. 
It resembled internal CCP missives and propaganda in style and content, and its use of simplified 
Chinese characters further “proved” that it originated in the PRC. Hsin was likely behind it. With 
his background as a propagandist and counter-intelligence agent, recent record of “obtaining” such 
documents, and enmity towards the CCN, he had both the motivation and means to forge the letter. 
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  Hsin himself was a witness for the prosecution, but appears not to have not commented on 
the Li Weihan letter. Instead, he was introduced as a specialist on the Chinese language and tasked 
with explaining to the Board why the CCN’s published output was pro-communist. According to 
Rizal, Hsin indicted the CCN for using simplified Chinese in its news items and publishing news 
items from Xinhua. But, Rizal said in response to Hsin, the CCN did not use simplified characters, 
because the type for its printers consisted only of traditional characters. The only character it used 
that could even be considered simplified was yi (traditional: 藝; simplified艺), which it printed in 
its cursive form (芸) because of how complex its traditional form was. Hsin insisted that this was 
a simplified character, despite clear differences between its simplified and cursive forms.59 Quintin 
and his lawyer, Alexander Sycip (ironically, the ROC Embassy’s legal adviser until he was forced 
to resign from the position during the trial because of a conflict of interest) deftly handled Hsin’s 
accusation that the CCN printed CCP propaganda, explaining that it was an independent paper that 
published news on mainland China because its readers were interested in developments there. It 
did so through foreign wire agencies rather than the CNA because it did not want to print anything 
that had previously been vetted by a government. Commenting on the news item “Red China navy 
rated strongest in the Far East,” Quintin told the Deportation Board that “a reporter is not on the 
side of A in a basketball game against B simply because he reported that A won the game.”60 
 Instead of Hsin, the prosecution called on a Hong Kong-based “authority” on communism 
named Chao Ching Win 周鯨文 to analyze Li Weihan’s letter and testify against the CCN. (Rizal 
did not mention Chao to his IMH interviewers, despite recalling the letter in detail.) The Embassy’s 
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working group had recommended Chao as an expert witness and also paid for Chao’s two visits to 
the Philippines and his living expenses there, amounting to around 800 US dollars. Chao had no 
formal affiliation with the KMT or the ROC state and had never been to the Philippines previously, 
which explains why the prosecution felt that he would a more credible witness. Born in Liaoning 
and educated in Tokyo, Michigan, and London, Chao helped found the China Democratic League, 
a coalition of political parties that sought a “third way” between the KMT and the CCP, in 1941. 
In December 1956, having attended the first two People’s Political Consultative Conferences in 
the PRC, he defected to Hong Kong. There, he wrote a bestselling critique of the CCP entitled Ten 
Stormy Years風暴十年, which was translated into English, Japanese, and Korean; re-founded in 
1958 a journal called Modern Critique, which he had originally set up in 1937; and established in 
1960 the Mainland Research Institute, which published an English-language intelligence digest on 
the PRC and employed refugee intellectuals like him.61 
 In his testimony, Chao informed the Deportation Board that, while part of the Democratic 
League, he had met Li Weihan previously, and that his research in Hong Kong proved that Li was 
indeed head of the United Work Front Department. Li had either penned the letter himself or gotten 
someone else to write it for him, Chao believed. Everything about it – its letterhead, seal, use of 
simplified characters, and style – was identical to CCP documents.62 He was adamant that the CCN 
was a Red organ, despite having no previous history with the paper. But he had different standards 
of legal proof from the Board, which remained skeptical of his interpretation of the evidence. Chao 
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quickly became frustrated with his limited influence over proceedings. During his second visit to 
the Philippines, during which he gave a series of lectures to the military on the CCP’s united front 
activities, he bemoaned the prosecution’s poor preparation, the Board’s limited understanding of 
the case, Filipinos’ lack of understanding of communism in general, and his minimal contact with 
Philippine KMT members and local Chinese. After testifying, an exasperated Chao told Koa Chun-
te that Koa had find someone from Taiwan knowledgeable about the CCP to continue Chao’s work. 
You have to win the case, he declared, as a loss would have a huge impact on Chinese overseas in 
the future. Ironically, he said that it was acceptable to “make up a little evidence” (zao dian zhengju 
造點證據) and “treat [the Yuyitungs] a little unfairly” (yuanqu tamen yidian 冤屈他們一點). In 
other countries, based on evidence such as Li Weihan’s letter, they would have been found guilty 
much earlier. He said much the same to a Philippine military official and warned him not to release 
them. Before returning to Hong Kong, Chao accused one of the three Deportation Board members 
(he did not say who) as well as the English-language media, which had reported sympathetically 
on the CCN, of having been bribed by communists.63 
 In late 1962, the Deportation Board concluded its hearings and found the Yuyitungs guilty 
of “printing communistic news items and offensive cartoons and articles” from 1949 to 1962.64 It 
rejected, however, other pieces of evidence and arguments, including Li Weihan’s letter. Rather 
than simply recommending to the President that he deport the Yuyitungs, the Board suggested that 
if the brothers apologized for their actions, they be allowed to remain in the Philippines on a five-
year probation period. With the fate of the Yuyitungs out of the hands of the Board, the Nationalist 
                                                 
63 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 3, 218-222, AH. 
 
64 “Mageshi tongzong weihe qianpei Yu shi xiongdi,” 2, undated mss., Chinben See Memorial Library, Kaisa 





Chinese bloc and Philippine military turned to Malacañang in the hopes of persuading Macapagal 
to ignore this proviso and deport them as quickly as possible. But his executive order never came, 
despite multiple lobbying attempts, including a long memorandum on April 2, 1963 attacking the 
Yuyitungs from Ramos to Macapagal. Wary of being seen as meddling in the Philippines’ internal 
affairs, the Nationalist Chinese bloc ensured that it communicated with the President through the 
proper channels and relied on intermediaries such as Ramos and Marcos Soliman, Macapagal’s 
high school classmate and the head of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, in the hopes 
of persuading him.65 Macapagal’s thinking on the case is largely unknown, except for an undated 
conversation he had with Tuan Mao-lan. After hearing Tuan’s case for deporting the Yuyitungs, 
the President asked if they would be sentenced to death in Taiwan. Tuan said that they would only 
receive reformatory education, to help them turn over a new leaf. Macapagal was unconvinced by 
Tuan’s assurances and commented that the Philippines had only sentenced Huk leader Luis Taruc 
to life imprisonment, while communist propagandists were only jailed. On his mind were concerns 
about how the fate of the Yuyitungs and his complicity in their fate would affect his own political 
fortunes. Tuan came away from this exchange determined to work harder to persuade the President 
and Deportation Board.66 
 In February 1965, almost three years on from the arrests, a report by the Embassy working 
group stated that Macapagal was willing to deport the Yuyitungs, but on the condition that Taiwan 
pay two million pesos (approximately USD 51,200) and send an airplane to pick up the brothers.67 
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This money may have been earmarked for Macapagal’s reelection campaign later that year, and it 
was not forthcoming. The President, either too distracted by the impending elections or afraid of 
how any decision on his part would play out with the electorate and the opposition Nacionalistas, 
was quite happy to stymie the anti-CCN bloc even further. After his defeat in November, the case 
passed into the hands of his successor.  
 Marcos, like Macapagal, did not prioritize the Yuyitung case, at least during his first term 
in office. His inaction, the ROC Embassy conjectured, was down to an unwillingness to offend the 
English-language media – among whom the Yuyitungs had many friends and supporters – and be 
seen as violating freedom of the press.68 When Marcos eventually acted in 1968, he went with the 
recommendation of the Deportation Board and insisted that the Yuyitungs apologize for and retract 
the offending articles, so that they might be put on probation. Although they were at first unwilling 
to apologize because they had done nothing wrong, their friends persuaded them to, so that they 
could get on with their lives.69 The CCN published their apology in English and Chinese on May 
14, 1968. The Nationalist Chinese bloc treated this as proof of the CCN’s guilt, and stepped up its 
surveillance of the paper in the hopes of finding fresh opportunities to act against it.70  
 
The First Quarter Storm and the Thunderbolt Plan 
In early 1970, leftist opposition to the once-popular Marcos administration surged. After 
lying dormant for many years since the end of the Huk Rebellion, Filipino communism had found 
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a new lease of life with the re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 
December 1968, along Maoist lines, and the creation of its armed wing, the New People’s Army, 
in March 1969. Marcos was reelected by a large margin in November 1969 thanks to what Alfred 
McCoy calls “an exceptional surge in violence and blatant vote buying.”71 In early 1970, Marcos’s 
popularity, especially among younger Filipinos, nosedived in response to a post-election financial 
crisis and austerity measures. In what became known as the “First Quarter Storm,” leftist student 
demonstrations erupted in Manila against Marcos and his American patrons, beginning with the 
visit of US Vice-President Spiro Agnew in late December the previous year and continuing well 
beyond then. On January 30, clashes between protesters and the police near Malacañang Palace 
led to six students being killed and hundreds more injured.72 For the first time in the Philippines’  
independent history, Filipino anti-Chinese sentiment manifested itself in the form of social protests 
against the ROC and Chinese, rather than as economic or cultural legislation enacted by the state. 
On February 27, around 200 protesters gathered in front the ROC Embassy on Dewey Boulevard 
waving huge portraits of Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, and demanding that Taiwan resolve the 
“irritants” in its relationship with the Philippines.73 Before the police arrived, the demonstrators 
banged the front doors of the Embassy building and threw stones at its windows, including those 
                                                 
71 Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the 
Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 390. 
 
72 Robert O. Tilman, “The Philippines in 1970: A Difficult Decade Begins,” Asian Survey 11.2 (1971): 140-141. 
 
73 According to the manifesto of Makabansa sa Pugad Lawin, one of the protesting groups, these irritants were 
Taiwan’s refusal to accept the deportation of 109 ethnic Chinese detainees that were being held on Engineering 
Island at the time; its tolerance of illegal fishing by Taiwanese fishermen in Philippine waters; and the longstanding 
problem of the “overstaying temporary visitors.” See “Feiguo xuesheng shiwei 菲國學生示威,” Vol. 1, 113, 020-
010709-0013, February 2, 1970-July 16, 1971. As for the 109 Chinese detained on Engineering Island, they were 





of Ambassador Patrick Sun 孫碧奇’s office. During this period, there were also minor occurrences 
of vandalism against businesses and cars in Chinatown.74  
Not surprisingly, everyone from Marcos to members of the Philippine political and military 
establishment to right-wing Chinese and Filipinos were convinced that a Maoist plot against the 
Philippine and other Asian governments was underway, especially after January 30. The journalist 
Jose F. Lacaba reported that a policeman had called the events of that day an “insurrection,” while 
the President had labelled them “a revolt by local Maoist Communists” and “act of rebellion and 
subversion.”75 Fanning the flames of hysteria, the Philippine Anti-Communist Movement declared 
that Congress, the University of the Philippines (UP), and “practically all government offices had 
been infiltrated by subversive elements.”76 For Nationalist China, which had long staked part of 
its international reputation on understanding and combatting communism, social instability, left-
wing anti-Chinese populism, and the resurgence of the CPP presented it with a golden opportunity 
to press its case against the Yuyitungs and ingratiate itself with Marcos and the military. As Chao 
Ching Win’s comments during the first CCN trial in 1962 indicate, Chinese anticommunists long 
believed that Filipinos did not grasp the magnitude of the threat facing them. This was evident in 
what Nationalist officials believed was the police’s sluggish and excessively tolerant response to 
the protests in front of the Embassy. Not only did the police arrive a whole 45 minutes after being 
contacted, but they made no attempt to disperse the demonstrators or have them stop waving Mao 
and Che’s portraits. In lodging its complaint with the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Embassy 
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said that it would never allow Chinese nationalists to wave portraits of Huk leaders in front of the 
Philippine Embassy in Taipei.77 Taiwan’s expertise was therefore needed to help the Philippines 
come to terms with this resurgent Maoist menace.  
The anti-CCN campaign had in fact restarted prior to the First Quarter Storm, which proved 
to be as unexpectedly beneficial to Marcos’s political ambitions as it was to the ROC’s long-term 
goal of ridding Chinese public discourse of ideological heterodoxy. As the case dragged on over 
the course of the 1960s, state and party officials in Taiwan and the Philippines came increasingly 
to view the paper as a threat that had to be dealt with in such a way that it had “no way of continuing 
to exist” (wufa jixu shengcun 無法繼續生存); failing to do so would harm their reputation.78 Just 
over half a year after the Yuyitungs apologized, the Nationalist Chinese bloc sprung into action 
again, prompted by what it saw as continuing textual evidence of the CCN’s communist tendencies 
and the paper’s violation of the conditions of its probation. Unlike in the early 1960s, when it is 
unclear precisely what or whose actions prompted the Philippine military to launch its operation 
against the CCN, the initiative this time can clearly be attributed to the KMT. In January 1969, the 
party launched what it called its “Thunderbolt Plan” (Leiting jihua 雷霆計劃) and, together with 
the Embassy and Great China Press, resumed compiling and translating articles from the CCN to 
prove that it persisted in publishing pro-communist propaganda.79 Left-wing anti-Marcos and anti-
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Chinese demonstrations during the First Quarter Storm reinforced long-held assumptions among 
Chinese rightists of a Chinese communist plot to destabilize the Philippines and allowed them to 
pin this social unrest onto the CCN.  
The Thunderbolt Plan unfolded on multiple fronts in early 1970 as part of a multi-faceted 
campaign by the Embassy and local Chinese leaders to protect Chinese property, clarify the ROC’s 
efforts to resolve problems in the diplomatic relationship, and strengthen ROC-Philippine relations 
on the basis of a shared commitment to anticommunism. At the official level, Sun was tasked with 
meeting Marcos and offering ROC and Philippine-Chinese aid in combating the Maoist problem. 
The first recorded meeting between Sun and Marcos on this issue took place on February 6, during 
which Sun briefly mentioned the CCN’s role in fanning the flames of anti-government unrest. In 
response, Marcos said only that he had “also heard about this.”80 By then, the Thunderbolt planners 
had likely nearly completed their translation of the CCN’s articles for the benefit of the military. 
Unlike in 1962, the KMT in Taiwan, and not only the party’s main branch in the Philippines, 
was actively involved in the overall Nationalist Chinese campaign against the Yuyitungs in 1970, 
chiefly through the Central Committee’s Third Section, which was responsible for huaqiao affairs. 
Thunderbolt was a transnational project that shows the reach of the KMT as an institution across 
state boundaries and the role of “cosmopolitan conservatives” in the making of overseas Chinese 
policy. The Third Section appears to have initiated Thunderbolt. It was chaired by Mah Soo-Lay, 
whom we last encountered in Chapter 1 as a founder of a Fuxingshe cell in the Philippines in 1936 
that included Koa Chun-te, whom Mah maintained his friendship with and kept informed about 
                                                 





the CCN case.81 (Mah was also friends with Marcos’s chief Chinese business crony, Ralph Nubla 
高祖儒 – who was not a KMT member – and in 1966 was invited to the President’s inauguration.82) 
Its Deputy Chairman was Cua Siok Po, who had assumed this appointment and gone to Taiwan in 
November 1967.83 In early 1970, Cua revisited the Philippines to rally the party there and “patriotic 
Chinese” behind the Plan. Joining him there from Taiwan was Hsin Kwan-chue, who had left his 
position at the Great China Press in 1968 to become a visiting professor of foreign languages and 
literature at the Political Warfare Cadres Academy in Taipei, whose mission was to train political 
commissars loyal to the regime who would be assigned to military units.84 Because of his intimate 
ties to MIS, Hsin was tasked with encouraging the Philippine military to renew its operation against 
the Yuyitungs and to assist it in doing so.85 
Rizal Yuyitung’s recollections identify four Philippine KMT members who comprised the 
anti-CCN group in 1970. Cheng Kim Tiao and S. C. Lim, who was now the Secretary-General of 
the party, were again involved. The other two were Chen Ruishi 陳瑞時, a journalist for the Great 
China Press, and Cai Jingfu 蔡景福, who had succeeded Hsin as editor-in-chief of the Press and 
Cua as PCACL Secretary in 1968.86 A journalist and author cut from the same ideological cloth as 
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Hsin, Cai bore a personal grudge against the CCN’s international affairs editor Tan Chin Hian 陳
振賢, said Rizal, for having attacked Cai in the paper over the latter’s personal life.87 Along with 
Cua, Cai had acted as a witness for the prosecution in 1962.88 In apportioning the blame for his 
and Quintin’s arrest in 1970, Rizal did not mention Hsin, Cua, and Mah at all, but he recalled that 
someone from Taipei flew into the Philippines to testify that the CCN was a CCP mouthpiece. He 
described Koa Chun-te as a peripheral figure who had sent a messenger to inform the brothers after 
they were arrested that “I have nothing to do with this incident, which is the doing of another small 
group.” Koa, Rizal claimed, “very clearly did not approve of fabricating evidence against the CCN. 
He had spent many years in the Philippines and was quite familiar with us.”89 This is a puzzling 
exoneration of someone who had participated in the operation against the CCN in 1962 and who, 
because of his seniority within the party and ownership of the Great China Press, had close ties to 
most if not all of the party members involved in both the Philippines and Taiwan. Koa was also 
close to Narciso Ramos,90 who pushed insistently for the Yuyitungs to be deported during and after 
the 1962 trial.  
Rizal also accused Antonio Roxas Chua, President of the Shang Zong from 1970 to 1974, 
of actively seeking the Yuyitungs’ deportation. As with his accusations against Cheng, Lim, Chen, 
and Cai, this claim is hard to corroborate. Cultural conservatives associated with the KMT, PCACL, 
Kong Li Po, and Great China Press were the driving force in both 1962 and 1970, with the business 
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community as represented by the Federation playing a supporting role. The Shang Zong’s quarrel 
with the CCN can be traced back to a war of words between them that erupted in 1960 following 
Rizal’s criticism of the chamber’s lackluster response to Filipinization. This conflict prompted the 
Shang Zong to censure the CCN at its annual meeting. Two years later, Secretary Tang Tack, who 
had issued the chamber’s response to the CCN, was among a small handful of Federation members 
to step forward as witnesses for the prosecution and accuse the CCN of being pro-communist to 
the Deportation Board.91 It is thus entirely plausible, despite his absence from MOFA records on 
the Yuyitungs, that Roxas Chua pressed for their deportation, and not only for ideological reasons. 
In 1968, when Ralph Nubla was running for his second term as Shang Zong President, a clique of 
KMT members within the Shang Zong tried to unseat him and have Roxas Chua elected instead. 
Marcos backed his good friend Nubla, who remained President for two more years, after which 
his unwritten two-term limit expired and Roxas Chua succeeded him on November 25, 1970.92 
Roxas Chua cannot therefore have used his leadership of the Federation to advocate deportation, 
but may have done so anyway in an effort to ingratiate himself with Marcos. And among KMT 
members in Taipei, it was common knowledge that Marcos made his decisions concerning the case 
based on intelligence from Chinese leaders.93 
Marcos ordered the arrest of the Yuyitungs on March 23. In his interviews with IMH, Rizal 
stated that the newly-appointed Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile wrote a report to 
the President, who then had Enrile take action against them.94 But in his memoirs, Enrile said that 
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an intelligence report from the military had prompted Marcos to have him “revive the deportation 
case against Quintin and Rizal.”95 Irrespective of whether or Marcos or Enrile initiated the arrest, 
it is clear that, by then, Thunderbolt’s planners had finished compiling evidence against the CCN 
and presented their findings to the military.  
The President’s rationale for arresting them is not hard to grasp. Excerpts from his diaries 
show that Marcos had given serious consideration to declaring martial law during the First Quarter 
Storm, especially after January 30; on February 17, he wrote that “I have that feeling of certainty 
that I will end up with dictatorial powers if the situation continues – and the situation will continue.” 
Seeing himself surrounded by enemies, Marcos was especially hostile to leftist journalists such as 
Joaquin “Chino” Roces of the Manila Times, Teodoro Locsin of the Free Press, and I. P. Soliongco 
and Ernesto Granada of the Manila Chronicle – newspapermen “busy placing the government in 
disrepute and holding it in contempt before the people” by blaming it for the unrest and criticizing 
its policies toward the protesters. In the privacy of Malacañang, he lashed out at them as communist 
sympathizers, if not outright communists. Locsin “had always written sympathetically of Mao Tse 
Tung”; Granada “happily refers to me as snake-like” and “probably knows that he is suspected as 
a communist by me. And so too does I. P. Soliongco.” Marcos did not seem to think that the CPP 
was receiving external military aid – that is to say, from China – but he was quite willing to believe 
that communists and their fellow travelers in the Philippine media were lending rhetorical aid and 
legitimacy to “rebellion and subversion.”96 His was not a very different ideological logic from the 
ROC and KMT’s, in this sense. When either Enrile or the military reported to Marcos on the CCN, 
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their allegations would have jibed with his conspiratorial state of mind. Moreover, acting against 
the CCN allowed him not only to rid the country of supposed subversives, but also test the waters 
before declaring martial law. Ceferino “Joker” Arroyo, one of the Yuyitungs’ lawyers, argued that 
Marcos’s prosecution of the brothers was one of the “principal conditioning methods” with which 
he prepared the people to accept Proclamation No. 1081 on September 23, 1972. While he did not 
believe that he could directly assault the Filipino media, he reckoned – incorrectly, as it turned out 
– that no one would care if he arrested and then deported two Chinese journalists whose paper was 
read only by a small fraction of the country’s population.97  
 
The 1970 Deportation Board trial of the Yuyitungs  
 While Deportation Board hearings for Chinese and other aliens were procedurally similar 
in some respects to court trials for Philippine citizens, the fate of those who underwent the former 
lay exclusively with the Executive.98 For example, Marcos could have easily rejected the Board’s 
earlier recommendation to grant conditional probation to the Yuyitungs and ordered them deported 
instead. Well aware of these discretionary powers and also his ability to determine the composition 
of the Board, the President would have been certain of the outcome of the CCN case in 1970 before 
it began. To ensure that the Board recommended deportation and that he would simply be seen as 
adhering to its verdict, Marcos instructed that only Immigration Commissioner Edmundo Reyes – 
his appointee – conduct the hearings beginning on March 24, as opposed to a conventional three-
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man panel. Despite protests by the Yuyitungs’ lawyers, the Court of First Instance ruled that it was 
well within the President’s rights to appoint one person to oversee the hearings.99 
 The evidence presented by the prosecution consisted of the military’s intelligence report 
and 68 CCN articles from November 9, 1968 to March 6, 1970 that Thunderbolt’s planners had 
collected and translated.100 47 of these were from foreign wire services, and the remaining 21 from 
the Philippine News Service.101 The report combined previous evidence against the CCN (such as 
the Li Weihan letter, which Rizal remembers was dredged up again) with an assortment of fresh 
charges, among them that Quintin, as a lecturer at the Asian Center of UP from December 1969 to 
April 1970, had used his lectures to spread Maoism; that they had secretly funded Maoist student 
leaders at UP; and that they had remitted money illegally to mainland China (presumably, because 
of latent sympathies with the communist regime). Quintin in fact had not lectured at UP, but had 
merely sat in on the lectures of Antonio Araneta, Jr., as a “resource person.” Araneta and several 
Asian Center students confirmed this as witnesses before the Board. Other UP students whom the 
brothers were said to have financed testified that they did not know them at all, had met them only 
once and not received money from them, or had never visited the MOPC, where they were reported 
to have met the Yuyitungs.102 The illegal remittances charge proved to be just as unfounded. As 
Rizal recalled:103 
A person whose last name was “Lee” said we had helped him send money to his children 
in China. In other words, we had violated the law. But this Mr. Lee, when questioned, did 
not dare to say his parents’ names and could not describe the surroundings of his residence 
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in Manila. I remember a Western newspaper jokingly referring to him as “the worst KMT 
special agent.” 
 
The first of two “expert” witnesses for the prosecution was one Captain Romualdo Dizon, 
a “specialist on China” who admitted during his cross-examination to not knowing Chinese.104 He 
also confessed to having nothing to do with the intelligence report on which he was supposed to 
testify. The report was signed by a Major Pedro Baldanero, who had simply collected a number of 
shorter reports from various agents and certified them as true copies of the originals. Although 
Dizon was adamant that these shorter reports were reliable, the prosecution refused to disclose the 
original agents’ identities, preventing the defense from being able to cross-examine them.105  
 Provenance and context mattered little to the prosecution. Its second key witness was Hsin 
Kwan-chue, who flew in from Taipei as an honored guest of the Philippine military to reprise his 
role as interpreter-in-chief of the CCN’s “pro-communist” articles. Hsin engaged in a close reading 
of the news items that Thunderbolt had gathered and indicted the CCN based on its use of “leftist” 
terms such as “fascism,” “imperialism,” “feudalism,” “protracted struggle,” “serve the people,” 
“Beijing” and “People’s Republic of China,” dismissing as irrelevant the origins of these terms in 
foreign news dispatches and factual reports on China’s domestic affairs.106 
 Neither Dizon nor Hsin proved a persuasive witness, to say the least. The reporters present 
during the hearings recorded a quite extraordinary exchange between Hsin and Juan Quijano, one 
of the Yuyitungs’ defense lawyers, ostensibly about press freedom in Taiwan, but which quickly 
devolved into a remarkable act of self-sabotage by Hsin:107 
                                                 
104 Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 336. 
 
105 Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, 29-30. 
 
106 Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, xxv. 
 




“You will agree with me,” [said] Attorney Quijano on cross-examination, “that in 
Taipeh [sic], in Taiwan, your newspapers do not enjoy the full freedom of the press.” 
“We enjoy fullest freedom of press,” replied Professor Hsin, “so much as you enjoy 
right here. The only thing you see, we do it not upon the censorship of the government but 
upon the agreement of the editors.” 
Quijano: “Can you publish in Taipeh an article severely or savagely criticizing 
General Chiang Kai-shek?” 
Hsin: “This is...this belongs to a different tradition. We Chinese...” 
Quijano: “No, no, just answer my question.” 
Hsin: “We never do that.” 
Quijano: “You never do that. That’s the answer there.” 
Hsin: “Simply because our tradition is different.” 
Quijano: “You never do that.” 
Hsin: “How would we do that? You see, I hate these people who do that.” 
Quijano: “Now, suppose there is an editor in Taipeh whose sentiment is different 
from yours, whose guts or courage is different from yours, will he be free to criticize 
General Chiang Kai-shek savagely, the way our newspapers criticize our President?” 
Hsin: “Mr. Attorney, your question is hypothetical, you see. I don’t want to...” 
Quijano: “No, my question is not hypothetical...” 
Hsin: “There is nothing wrong with President Chiang Kai-shek! Why should the 
people start attacking him? There’s no reason!” 
 
Commissioner Reyes may have been tasked with finding the Yuyitungs guilty and expediting their 
deportation, but even he had to acknowledge the poverty of Dizon and Hsin’s testimonies. Quijano 
and the other members of the Yuyitungs’ legal team, Juan T. David, Joker Arroyo, and Napoleon 
Rama, succeeded at having the witnesses’ testimonies discarded.108 
The evidentiary basis for prosecution thus narrowed to the MIS intelligence report and the 
68 CCN’s articles. On the question of press freedom, the prosecution argued that Quintin and Rizal, 
as ROC citizens, did not possess the same rights as Philippine journalists, but the defense countered 
that there was nothing in the constitution which limited such freedom to only Philippine citizens.109 
The urgent need to deliver a guilty verdict was compounded by the brothers’ declarations on April 
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25 and 26 that they were renouncing their “Chinese” citizenship in protest against the ROC and 
KMT’s persecution of them – a declaration that Taipei had to officially approve before they could 
become legally stateless.110 By then, as ROC sources clearly show, their guilt was fait accompli. 
Taiwan had already agreed to accept them, and the logistics of deportation were already being 
discussed. The Department of National Defense had originally hoped to deport them on April 21, 
but Rizal had fallen sick on April 18, and the trial had not ended as early as hoped because of the 
Yuyitungs’ legal team’s efforts before the Deportation Board.111 Marcos, fed up by the delays and 
confident of being able to legally defend his decision, ordered the Yuyitungs re-arrested on May 
4 and deported the morning after.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Yuyitungs and their supporters have long known that the KMT and ROC collaborated 
with Philippine military intelligence against the CCN in 1962 and 1970, as newspaper reports from 
the time and the reminiscences of Rizal Yuyitung in 1993 make clear. This chapter explains how 
and why so many different actors – from MIS to the KMT to Marcos – in both the Philippines and 
Taiwan persisted in opposing the CCN over such an extended period of time. Making use of ROC 
archives in addition to published sources on the affair, it describes how the KMT, ROC Embassy, 
and Philippine military twice manufactured a legal argument for deportation centered on the “pro-
communist” articles which the CCN published. Keen to avoid a repeat of the jinqiao an and ensure 
that the coercive powers of the Philippine state were exercised only upon the “guilty,” Nationalist 
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Chinese actors interpolated themselves into this state, working behind the scenes to construct and 
interpret the evidence needed to indict the Yuyitungs as undesirables. When they were deported, 
they believed that they had eliminated a threat to their transnational ideological project.  
 This chapter has also examined the motivations of the different factions that came together 
to persecute the Yuyitungs and persisted in doing so over the eight years between 1962 and 1970. 
The CCN’s support for Chinese integration into Philippine society, Rizal claimed, rankled right-
wing Chinese chauvinists such as Hsin Kwan-chue, a key figure in the anti-CCN campaign across 
the two Deportation Board hearings. Hsin and the likes of Antonio Roxas Chua and Marcos may 
have also sought to destroy the CCN for reasons that went beyond their perceptions of its political 
leanings such as personal grudges, political ambitions. Yet ideology was central to their campaign. 
Anticommunism anchored their strategy and served as a rhetorical cudgel with which to publicly 
denounce the Yuyitungs; it is the sole motivating factor that all involved in the conspiracy shared. 
Between longstanding fears of communist subversion – which the First Quarter Storm heightened 
– and the overwhelmingly pro-ROC nature of most Chinese civic discourse in the Philippines, they 
had ample reason to perceive the paper as ideologically heterodox. The CCN was guilty through 
its association with persons who had been deported to Taiwan previously as undesirable aliens and 
because reactionary ideologues such as Hsin, Cua Siok Po, Chao Ching Win, Mah Soo-Lay, and 
others saw it not as centrist and independent, but as pro-communist. Convinced of its fundamental 
guilt, the paper’s enemies were willing to go to great lengths to achieve their goal of deporting the 







A Humane Sovereignty: 
Nationalist China’s Public Relations Campaign in Response to the Yuyitung Affair, 1970-1972 
 
 The saga of the Yuyitungs entered a new phase with the brothers’ deportation to Taiwan 
on May 5, 1970. In the period leading up to and following Quintin and Rizal’s trial before a military 
tribunal on August 14,1 CCN supporters from the Philippines and the International Press Institute 
(IPI) in particular mounted a staunch defense of the paper and lobbied unsuccessfully for Taiwan 
to release them in the name of press freedom and human rights. Liberal anti-ROC sentiment in the 
Philippines and within IPI ranks placed “Free China” under intense international scrutiny at a time 
when its all-important United Nations seat was taken away from it. The ROC could not but seek 
to justify its actions (and the Philippines’) to the world as those of a sovereign, law-abiding, and 
democratic “nation-state.” Yet neither could it ignore global public opinion entirely. The relatively 
lenient sentence that the ROC handed down to the brothers and the manner with which it treated 
them during their time on Taiwan owed much to its desire to appear flexible and humane in the 
eyes of international society. This satisfied no one. Liberals remained incensed that the Yuyitungs 
had been sentenced at all, while KMT hardliners in the Philippines contended (not incorrectly) that 
the ROC had caved in to the IPI’s lobbying by only having them undergo reformatory education. 
Picking up from where the previous one left off, this chapter examines the ROC’s public 
relations campaign in response to the deportation of the Yuyitungs and to their trial in Taiwan. It 
begins by describing Nationalist China’s relations with the world in the early 1970s and with the 
IPI. I then examine Philippine and international responses to the deportation and verdict, before 
analyzing the campaign itself. In this section, I first focus on ROC-IPI relations and the lobbying 
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efforts of newspaperman and “citizen-diplomat” Wang Tih-wu 王惕吾, and then the relationship 
between the ROC and the Philippine KMT. The campaign concluded, ambiguously, in late 1972 
with the end of Quintin’s two-year period of reeducation. Taiwan’s handling of the Yuyitung affair 
from early 1970 to the end of 1972 resulted in its IPI committee being derecognized for four years 
and a near-fatal fracturing of its relationship with the KMT in the Philippines. More importantly, 
the campaign offers a different and virtually unstudied perspective on the ROC in the world from 
high diplomacy, US-Taiwan relations, and the East Asian regional economy.2 While its ties to the 
United States and its United Nations seat were of the greatest importance to the ROC, it also valued 
its ties to overseas Chinese communities and its membership of what might be called international 
civil society. This was a space of interaction comprising institutions in fields such as human rights, 
humanitarian relief, developmental assistance, environmental protection, and cultural exchange, 
which crossed borders and were established by private individuals and groups rather than the state.3 
The messy aftermath of the Yuyitung affair provides detailed insight into how the ROC negotiated 
both relationships simultaneously and exploited an international crisis to shore up its sovereignty 
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Nationalist China in the world in the early 1970s: beyond geopolitics and capitalism 
Only a few iconic dates seem to matter as far as studies of the ROC’s relations with the 
rest of the world in the 1970s are concerned. In July 1971, US National Security Adviser Henry 
Kissinger visited China on a secret trip aimed at normalizing ties between the United States and 
its longtime Cold War enemy, and on October 25, Mao’s China replaced Chiang’s China in the 
United Nations. The following year, from February 21 to 28, Richard Nixon traveled to the PRC. 
As a political scientist put it, this ended the post-Civil War “golden age” of Taiwan’s foreign policy 
and marked the start of a period of “diplomatic isolation,” which lasted until newly-democratic 
Taiwan began practicing “pragmatic diplomacy” from 1988 until the present.4 This narrative treats 
all of Taiwan’s efforts in the world up to 1971 as focused on maintaining its UN seat and relations 
with the United States. Only after 1971, as more and more countries switched Chinas and Taiwan 
lost its place among international bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 
did the ROC begin exploring unofficial, economic and cultural relations with its former diplomatic 
partners (including, after 1975, the Philippines).5   
A somewhat different, but also US-centered narrative of Taiwan in the world emphasizes 
its place in the regional capitalist economy. As Bruce Cumings argues, borrowing from Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s world-systems approach, Taiwan and South Korea emerged as a vital periphery of a 
non-territorial US capitalist imperium in East Asia after World War II. Japan, both states’ former 
colonial overlord, occupied a crucial semi-peripheral role in this international division of labor. As 
Japan’s economy developed rapidly thanks to US economic and military aid, it moved through a 
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classic product-cycle industrialization pattern, with Taiwan and South Korea following in its wake. 
In shifting from heavy to high-technology industry, Japan passed down its now-outdated heavy 
industrial equipment and expertise to its former colonies, boosting their industrialization drives. 
This, in Cumings’s view, offers a more systemic and less mono-national perspective on the East 
Asian “economic miracle” after 1960.6 
In the early 1970s, the ROC’s place in the world was simultaneously more and less certain 
than it was two decades earlier. After two cross-strait crises in the first decade of KMT rule on 
Taiwan, no overt PRC military threats against the ROC surfaced during the 1960s. The Sino-Soviet 
Split and Cultural Revolution had largely weakened the PRC’s reputation internationally, except 
among social movements worldwide that were attracted to radical Maoism. Taiwan’s increasingly 
globalized, export-oriented economy was booming: foreign investment in 1969 exceeded the total 
amount of grants made in any single year of US economic aid. In that same year, exports accounted 
for 25 percent of Taiwan’s GNP and amounted to one billion US dollars for the first time.7 At the 
United Nations, diplomatic efforts to have the ROC kicked out had stalled, thanks to continued US 
support. On November 11, 1969, in what had become an annual affair, the General Assembly voted 
56-48 (with 21 abstentions) against ejecting Taiwan and admitting the PRC. Among African states, 
more recognized Taipei than Beijing.8 
There were also signs that the diplomatic tides were turning against the ROC. Since 1950, 
the number of countries that recognized the PRC had steadily increased. In 1969, rumors were that 
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Canada and Italy, among others, would switch Chinas – which both did in late 1970.9 Well before 
then, argues Chiang’s biographer, the Generalissimo would have been aware that secret exchanges 
between Washington and Beijing had been taking place through intermediaries such as Pakistan.10 
Outwardly, the United States was showing signs of relaxing its hardline stance towards the PRC 
by issuing passports for travel there and allowing the import of a limited amount of PRC-made 
products.11 And in November 1969, it quietly ended its 19-year patrol of the Taiwan Strait, which 
had become a symbol of its commitment to Chiang.  
The mainstream US-Taiwan narrative is a necessary context for the narrative that I sketch 
here. So too is the ROC’s long history of engagement with the world, going all the way back to a 
period that Frank Dikötter controversially labels an “Age of Openness.” As Dikötter argues, China 
before 1949 was an active participant in the international community through organizations such 
as the League of Nations, and in “almost every major international conference in a whole range of 
fields, from penal reform to human genetics.”12 Though not necessarily inspired by Dikötter, other 
scholars have also begun exploring the ROC’s place in the post-1949 world from perspectives such 
as, for example, Taiwan’s role in promoting agricultural development in the Third World through 
initiatives such as Operation Vanguard, which offered Taiwanese technical expertise (supported 
by US funding), to African nations in exchange for diplomatic support.13 Overseas Chinese visits 
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to Taiwan, as explained in Chapter 5, together with tours of Free China for other groups of foreign 
visitors, served similarly propagandistic ends. But while huiguo visits were shows of strength, the 
ROC’s campaign in response to the Yuyitung affair highlighted its vulnerability.  
 
Taiwan, press freedom, and the IPI before 1970 
The IPI, the international nongovernmental organization at the heart of this chapter, was 
founded in 1951 in Zurich by a small group of editors from fifteen countries for the purposes of 
improving the flow of news between nations, obtaining better access to the news, and protecting 
freedom of the press.14 None of its national committees were drawn from Second World countries, 
making the IPI an attractive organization for the anticommunist ROC. In June 1969, the executive 
committee of the IPI, with approval from its general assembly, accredited a national committee for 
the ROC at the institute’s annual general meeting in Ottawa. This was not the first time the ROC 
had applied to join the IPI. In December 1960, the IPI rejected Taiwan’s application because it had 
shuttered the liberal and ironically titled Free China journal and jailed its editor-in-chief Lei Chen
雷震 for attempting to organize a new political party.15 Nine years later, the IPI relented thanks to 
the lobbying of Wang Tih-wu, founder and owner of the United Daily News (Lianhebao 聯合報, 
or UDN). The Zhejiang-born Wang was no mere private citizen, but a graduate of the Whampoa 
Military Academy who had served as director of security for Chiang Kai-shek’s official residence. 
As UDN owner, he was involved in high-level party and state affairs as a KMT Central Committee 
member. The UDN was one of the two major “privately-owned” papers in Taiwan at the time, but, 
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like all media outlets under martial law, practiced self-censorship and faithfully toed the official 
anticommunist line. The state restricted the ownership of private newspapers such as the UDN to 
“reliable” persons such as Wang, and it was common for the military and KMT to call publishers 
and editors to suggest how to treat certain stories.16 
Wang and his paper exemplified the blurring of lines between the state, party, and society 
that the KMT sought to achieve in China and Taiwan. Like Hsin Kwan-chue, Koa Chun-te, and 
Mah Soo-Lay, Wang was a journalist and party member with a background in military affairs, and 
saw little tension between reporting the news and serving the interests of his party, state, and nation. 
Good KMT and military man that he was, Wang strongly believed in uniting the interests of his 
newspaper and those of the nation, so that the paper could serve as a “social instrument” (shehui 
gongqi 社會公器).17 He envisioned the Lianhe bao not as “official” (guan 官) or “privately-owned” 
(minying 民營), leftist, rightist, or centrist, but as an “honest and decent” (zhengpai 正派) private 
paper.18 In his memoirs, he declared that he supported a free press and he had opposed the state’s 
proposed amendments to the Publishing Act in 1958 because they violated press freedom. But he 
also asserted that this freedom must be united with the national interest and “the most ideal balance 
found” (zuijia pingheng 最佳平衡) found between the two. His military training convinced him 
that national interests took priority over the interests of the individual and the newspaper, and of 
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the importance of the “solidarity of the whole and collective strength” (zhengti de tuanjie yu jiti 
liliang 整體的團結與集體力量).19 
Wang’s success in persuading the IPI to admit the ROC into its ranks in 1969 will come as 
a surprise to anyone familiar with the ROC’s human rights record under martial law. Article 11 of 
its constitution of 1947 guaranteed “freedom of speech, teaching, writing, and publication,” but all 
such freedoms were heavily circumscribed under martial law.20 In 1969, while human rights was 
not yet the global phenomenon that it would become by the late 1970s,21 Taiwan’s authoritarianism 
and restrictions on free speech were well-known within Western circles. Amnesty International’s 
1969-1970 annual report, for example, criticized the “draconian legislation enacted by the Chiang-
Kai-Shek Government, not only to curb left-wing opposition, but also to discourage all forms of 
independent Formosan opinion and expression.”22 The case of Chen Yu-hsi was ample evidence 
of this. In February 1968, Chen, a Taiwanese graduate student in Economics and East-West Center 
fellow at the University of Hawaii (UH), was arrested in Taiwan for writing “seditious” articles in 
a Japanese newspaper and reading PRC newspapers and protesting against the Vietnam War while 
in Hawaii.23 Chen’s arrest was met by protests at UH, and a fellow student even traveled all the 
way to Taiwan in a failed attempt to observe Chen’s trial.24 Responding in an underground student 
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publication to East-West Center officials’ claim that the United States had no business interfering 
in Taiwan’s internal affairs, another of Chen’s supporters asserted that “Taiwan is not a sovereign 
nation” because it belonged to China, could not exist without US military and financial aid, and in 
1947 had revolted against “mainland intruder Shanghai Jack.”25 These were precisely the kinds of 
perceptions that the ROC sought to dispel.  
The IPI was not unaware of the ROC’s transgressions against press freedom. In 1964, the 
sole member of the IPI in Taiwan at the time, Stanway Cheng, wrote in the IPI’s monthly bulletin 
that the greatest threat to press freedom on Taiwan was “self-censorship caused by fear of official 
sensitivity or repercussions for printing something objectionable.” But the Editor and Director of 
the English-language China News also claimed that there was no official press censorship on the 
island and that a “thriving private, independent press, which is often critical of government policies, 
is in operation.” Cheng concluded that given the state of martial law, the press enjoyed a “relative 
degree of freedom, although sometimes this limited freedom is challenged and threatened.”26 
Wang Tih-wu eventually persuaded the IPI to recognize a national committee for the ROC. 
In one of his memoirs, he says that he had begun lobbying the Institute in 1964 for this recognition, 
which he believed would enable ROC papers to occupy a more prominent position internationally 
and compete with their Western and Japanese counterparts. A weak nation, he philosophized, had 
neither foreign relations nor a newspaper industry. Two years later, Wang gave a well-publicized 
speech at the IPI’s annual general meeting in New Delhi in which he described the progress the 
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ROC had made in press freedom – but to no avail. In the buildup to Ottawa in 1969, Wang sensed 
that he stood a good chance of realizing his aim. The number of ROC journalists participating in 
the general meeting was increasing by the year. Wang’s reputation among IPI members had been 
boosted in 1968 with his role in the establishment of the Chinese Language Press Institute, an IPI-
backed organization.27 Before the Ottawa meeting, Wang met with the IPI executive committee in 
Zurich, and wrote to each of its members individually asking for their support. Despite opposition 
from the United States and several Western European countries, the committee voted to recognize 
the ROC, noting that while it was impressed with the “great improvements” that Taiwan had made, 
it was not fully satisfied with the state of press freedom on Taiwan and expected further progress.28 
Wang was voted chairman of his country’s national IPI committee and became the ROC’s de facto 
representative to the global media.29  
 
The Yuyitungs, public opinion, and popular protest in the Philippines in 1970 
Beyond the Chinese-language press, the Yuyitung case attracted considerable attention in 
the English-language media, which came down mostly on the side of the brothers. At the time, the 
Philippines was one of the few countries in Asia with a genuinely free press and without emergency 
political regulations limiting press freedom.30 Anti-Marcos sentiment and the historically high 
regard for press freedom in the Philippines meant that local newspapers found themselves in the 
unusual position of being able to defend “Chinese” persons and a core tenet of national identity at 
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the same time. Fluent in English and supportive of integration, the Yuyitungs were also on friendly 
terms with Filipino politicians and journalists, the more socially outgoing Quintin in particular. In 
1969, he served as President of the Manila Overseas Press Club, and in 1970 as its Treasurer.  
No news outlet was more vocal in its defense of the CCN than the Philippines Free Press 
(PFP) the country’s oldest news weekly and a supporter of the Yuyitungs going all the way back 
to March 1962. Napoleon Rama, the PFP’s chief political writer, conducted what appears to have 
been the first and only interview with Quintin on his arrest. The interview featured in the March 
24, 1962 edition of the PFP, and portions of it were translated and published in the CCN that same 
day.31 Eight years later, Rama was not only one of the most outspoken critics of how the ROC and 
Marcos handled of the case, but also a member of the Yuyitungs’ legal team before the Deportation 
Board. With its weekly format and close ties to the Yuyitungs, the PFP was able to provide detailed 
investigative coverage of the CCN case. Because of how different the circumstances surrounding 
the case were this time compared to in 1962, the PFP was also joined in its campaign by prominent 
journalists such as the MOPC President Maximo Soliven, National Press Club President Antonio 
Zumel, and Joaquin Roces, founder of the country’s leading broadsheet, the Manila Times.  
Liberals and radicals alike condemned Marcos’s actions, which they perceived (rightly) as 
a portent of much worse to come. Six days after the deportation, the PKP’s youth arm, Malayang 
Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino (Free Union of Filipino Youth, or MPKP), issued a manifesto, 
“The Moving Finger of Imperialist Diktat: The Yuyitung Case.” In it, MPKP denounced Marcos 
for enacting a “hitlerite [sic] policy of repression” that “shocked even more conservative sections 
of the press and bureaucracy.” The manifesto then pivoted from Marcos’s ties to the “KMT pirates” 
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in Taipei to a full-throated attack on US imperialism, the “the No. 1 enemy of the Filipino people” 
and prime mover of what had happened.32 On May 12, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines 
organized a protest at Agrifina Circle in Rizal Park in Manila to demand “Justice for the Yuyitung 
Brothers” in language virtually identical to the MPKP’s.33 
A notable exception to left-wing denunciations of Marcos, the KMT, and Taiwan was the 
Manila Bulletin, which was run by a Wang Tih-wu-like figure in Brigadier-General Hans Menzi, 
a Swiss-Filipino émigré and crony of Marcos’s. Menzi was also the chairman of his country’s IPI 
committee. In its editorial on May 19, the Bulletin made what was becoming a standard argument 
in defense of the deportation and trial. After May 4, the Philippine and ROC states treated the guilt 
of the Yuyitungs as beyond question in their public remarks on the case and sought to focus the 
world’s attention on the legality of their actions instead. In response to human rights arguments, 
the editorial asserted that the issue here was not freedom of the press, which was not absolute, but 
national security, which (of course) was. The Yuyitungs were deported to Taiwan and not a country 
of their choice because “our laws require that deportable aliens be sent back to their country of 
citizenship. While they were born here, they had not exerted any effort to become Filipino citizens.” 
Furthermore, although they had renounced their “Chinese” citizenship on April 25, the ROC was 
yet to approve this. Legally, they thus were still Nationalist Chinese. Menzi would later comment 
that “there was absolutely no infringement of the freedom of the press” and that President Marcos 
had done nothing wrong.34 
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Perhaps surprised by the outcry that his actions had provoked and ever eager to polish his 
public image, Marcos held a press conference on May 20 to defend himself. He said that although 
there may have been a “lack of humanity and compassion” in deporting the Yuyitungs, they had 
received “full due process of law.” As a concession to his critics, Marcos cleverly shifted some of 
the blame away from himself and onto Immigration Commissioner Edmundo Reyes, who was also 
present at the conference. Marcos said that he had reprimanded Reyes for not allowing them to see 
their families before they were deported, calling Reyes’s actions “unduly harsh.” Still, Marcos 
equivocated, Reyes had “not violated any of their individual rights under the law.” The brothers 
“knew from the start that they were faced with deportation, and their families knew this as well. 
Their departure was not as sudden as we would like to think.”35  
 
“A most successful international public relations service” 
International (as opposed to merely domestic) condemnation of the Philippines certainly 
existed, but with the Yuyitungs’ fate in the hands of the ROC after May 4, the global spotlight was 
very much on the latter rather than the former. For Taiwan, it was similarly if not more important 
to be perceived as respecting public opinion and acting in accordance with legal and democratic 
norms, given its questionable legitimacy of the ROC as a polity. Accordingly, the ROC took steps 
to limit “negative impressions” (buliang yinxiang 不良印象) of its actions among the international 
media.36 A small, meaningful rhetorical gesture that its official propaganda organs adopted right 
after the deportation, for example, was to avoid referring to the Yuyitungs as fei before their trial 
on Taiwan, lest the state be perceived as prejudicing the judicial process and predetermining their 
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guilt.37 The ROC was also determined not to cave into international pressure and compromise what 
it believed was its sovereign right to judge its nationals. Despite perceptions that a military tribunal 
would deliver a harsher sentence (worst of all, the death penalty) than a civilian court, for instance, 
the state stuck to its original decision to conduct a military trial. Whether or not the trial took place 
in a military or civilian court did not matter, since either would have to adhere to the articles of 
martial law. By not changing its mind, Taiwan would show that it was not influenced by external 
pressure and had adopted a firm position on the case. A change in venue also risked upsetting the 
Philippine government and anticommunist Philippine Chinese, the ROC’s staunchest supporters, 
who might misunderstand the switch as implying leniency.38  
As for the verdict, liberal fears that the Yuyitungs would be sentenced to death were, in 
hindsight, overblown. However much the ROC claimed the Yuyitungs as “Chinese nationals,” the 
case was never about legal formalities. The brothers were clearly not going to be found innocent 
and released – not when the ROC had invested so much effort into proving their guilt and had its 
relations with both Marcos and Philippine KMT hardliners to worry about. Yet the death penalty 
or even a lengthy jail sentence was equally as unrealistic an option. A death sentence, hypothesized 
the ROC Embassy in Manila, would attract condemnation from multiple quarters, undermine the 
ROC’s international position, and serve as propaganda fodder for the PRC.39 
International condemnation of the ROC came swiftly following the deportation. Amnesty 
International, at the time far from being a household name, mobilized liberals from North America, 
Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand into bombarding Chiang Kai-shek with postcards 
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and letters calling for the Yuyitungs’ release; in 1971, Amnesty chose the brothers as its prisoners 
of conscience for the year. Beyond the Philippines, Asian voices in support of the brothers figured 
less prominently, but were certainly present: Chiang received a telegram from the Penang branch 
of the Malayan People’s Party, for example, denouncing the deportation as an “unjust act and clear 
violation of the declaration of human rights.”40 The only organized and concerted international 
opposition to the ROC, however, came from the IPI, owing to the particular nature of the case, the 
ROC’s recent and conditional admission into the body, and close ties between the Yuyitungs, the 
Philippine supporters, and foreign journalists. By chance, not only was the IPI’s 19th annual general 
assembly in 1970 held in nearby Hong Kong in mid-May, but the post-assembly tour included a 
three-day visit to Taiwan arranged by Wang Tih-wu.41 Hans Menzi presented on the contents of 
the secret military intelligence report on the brothers during the assembly,42 but this only prompted 
censure from the gathered delegates.  
The ROC exploited the post-assembly tour as an opportunity to reassure the IPI that it was 
committed to freedom of the press and to show off Free China to some of the makers of global 
public opinion. Not unlike high-level overseas Chinese fact-finding or tribute missions from the 
Philippines and elsewhere, the delegates toured Quemoy, Taroko Gorge, and the Palace Museum, 
and met Premier Yen Chia-kan, Vice-Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, and Chiang Kai-shek himself. 
The elder Chiang personally reassured them that the ROC practiced and guaranteed press freedom. 
On May 22, the Garrison-General Headquarters even took the unprecedented step of allowing the 
four members of a special IPI tasked with investigating the Yuyitung affair to visit the brothers: 
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these were Hans Kluthe, the immediate past chairman of the IPI; Ernest Meyer, the IPI’s executive 
director; Barry Bingham, Sr., another former chairman and the publisher of the Louisville-based 
Courier-Journal and Times; and Maximo Soliven. The found that the brothers were being treated 
well. Over the course of the four-day junket, reported Wang’s UDN, ROC IPI members carefully 
explained Taiwan’s position to their counterparts and dispelled their suspicions surrounding the 
case. For example, some IPI members had apparently “maintained that the Yuyitung brothers were 
no longer alive,” or that they would be court-martialed. By the final day of their visit, however, a 
“harmonious atmosphere” had emerged between Taiwan and the IPI delegates, who had begun to 
“realize the basic attitude of the ROC Government in upholding rule by law and respecting human 
rights.” The article concluded, triumphantly, that: “For the first time in twenty-one years, the ROC 
performed a most successful service in international public relations.”43 
The IPI was placated for the time being, and the ROC’s public relations campaign off to a 
good start. Beyond this confident façade, though, Taiwanese officials were unhappy at the IPI’s 
interventionist behavior and the complications that it had resulted in. The ROC Embassy’s press 
officer in Manila even conjectured that the CIA was pulling the strings from behind the scenes. In 
a speculative memo on August 10, he accused Quintin of working with the CIA to disrupt US-
ROC ties, based on a confession that Quintin had apparently made during his detention about his 
friendly relations with CIA agents in Manila. It was the CIA that was instigating the US, French, 
and West German IPI committees’ hostility towards the ROC. The press officer even compared 
the brothers to Peng Ming-min, the Taiwanese independence leader who had escaped from Taiwan 
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in late January 1970.44 (Rizal in fact opposed Taiwanese independence, which he believed was a 
foreign-driven movement.45) By helping Peng escape and working covertly to have the Yuyitungs 
freed, the CIA was hoping to make them heroes in the eyes of the 20 million Chinese overseas.46 
There is no follow-up to this speculative memo. In 1993, Rizal claimed the exact opposite: that the 
CIA assisted Marcos in having him and his brother deported.47 
In the absence of evidence from either the US or ROC archives, we need not pursue these 
contradictory accusations further. Coming well before Kissinger’s first visit to China in June 1971, 
the press officer’s remarks are best understood as evidence of the ROC’s anxieties about its place 
in the world and fears that its most powerful ally for the past two decades was actively seeking to 
undermine it. His logic is hard to follow: why would the CIA want to burnish the reputation of the 
Yuyitungs among huaqiao, of all constituencies? The very mention of the overseas Chinese here 
is puzzling, but also indicative of the importance that Nationalist China placed on its ethno-cultural 
compatriots abroad. In this particular case, Western public opinion and the views of the diaspora 
were perpetually intertwined.  
 Though not as pressing a concern as it would become in mid-1972, the ROC also kept an 
eye on the Philippine KMT’s obvious unhappiness with the ROC’s accommodation of the IPI. The 
Yuyitungs were the main subject for discussion at the KMT’s annual meeting in Manila in mid-
July, during which party members expressed their hopes that the government would adhere strictly 
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to the letter of the law in prosecuting the brothers. In their report to Taipei, they rehashed many of 
the arguments that had been used previously against the CCN and cited recent anti-ROC articles 
in the Chinese Weekly as further proof of its pro-communist leanings. These included: “Taiwan is 
a second-rate colony of the United States and Japan” (“Taiwan shi Mei Ri de ci zhimindi台灣是
美日的次殖民地”); “The KMT is a party of plunder” (“Zhongguo guomindang shi ‘gua’ mindang 
中國國民黨是刮民黨); and “Taiwan is a small feudal dynasty” (“Taiwan dangdi shi fengjian xiao 
huangchao台灣當地是封建小皇朝”). As for public opinion, the party dismissed the speculation 
that Western newspapers had been engaging in with regards to the case and reassured Taipei that 
they had quietened down recently. It also criticized the ROC for indulging the world’s media and 
warned that any softening of the sentence would be tantamount to mocking the Philippine state 
and would damage the anticommunist spirit of loyal overseas Chinese.48  
 Sadly, the ROC archives do not yield insights into the deliberations that were taking place 
behind the scenes over how best to respond to both the IPI and Philippine KMT hardliners. Every 
outward indication in the buildup to and aftermath of the trial, however, suggests that the ROC 
took the latter’s support almost for granted and was more interested in placating the former than 
the latter. It would do so by passing a sentence that was as humane as legally permissible, but that 
simultaneously asserted its sovereign right to judge the guilt or innocence of its national subjects. 
If Rizal Yuyitung’s 1993 interviews with researchers from the Institute of Modern History are to 
be believed, the ROC quickly realized, upon taking the brothers in, that they were innocent. Taipei 
acted according to what the Philippine KMT reported, he said; the ROC Embassy would not speak 
up for them because it dared not offend party “scoundrels” (ditou she 地頭蛇). “But when our case 
                                                 





reached the highest levels of government, it required them to collect intelligence from different 
sources, and from this intelligence they came to realize that we were not communists,” he asserted. 
Someone – he does not say whom – had also told them that ROC intelligence agents in Hong Kong, 
Tokyo, and the PRC had gone through the materials that the Philippine military (with the assistance 
of the Thunderbolt planners had provided to the ROC, and found no evidence that the Yuyitungs 
were communists. All the charges were fabricated: “The Taiwan Garrison-General Headquarters 
also sent agents to Manila to infiltrate the newspaper, and found nothing. It decided we had been 
the victim of a malicious plot and were completely innocent.”49 
 Rizal’s claims here, like many others he made in his interviews, cannot be verified, as the 
archival record contains no dissenting views on the Yuyitungs. Whatever disagreements over the 
severity of their sentence may have arisen, their guilt was beyond question. It may be, of course, 
that state and party came overwhelmingly to believe that the brothers were innocent and proceeded 
to expunge all such incriminating evidence from its archives. A more likely scenario is that certain 
individuals and agencies within the party-state’s bureaucracy were skeptical of the arguments and 
evidence against the Yuyitungs, and that such doubts were incorporated into the decision-making 
process, but kept off the record. This view is supported by what a man whom Rizal identifies only 
as General Wu, the deputy chief of staff of the Garrison-General, told him over dinner just before 
he was about to be released on August 16, 1973. Wu – or rather Rizal, recalling his conversation 
with Wu 20 years earlier – did not explicitly state that he believed the brothers to be innocent, but 
said instead that 
You don’t know the real story behind this incident. Pressure came from multiple directions, 
and it could not be individually handled. It’s clear is that the different groups involved did 
not get what they wanted, but that was because they had no alternative. Those KMT people 
in the Philippines, from the outset, heavily pressurized the central KMT to have you two 
                                                 





executed. But the IPI and the world media strongly advocated for you to be freed, and urged 
that you be declared innocent and released immediately. We at the Garrison-General were 
stuck in between. This was the best compromise.50 
 
The August 14 trial  
 The trial of the Yuyitungs by a three-man military tribunal in Taipei on August 14, 1970, 
was notable for being open to the public, as well as lasting for only four hours. In attendance were 
IPI chairman Aw Sian (adopted daughter of the “Tiger Balm” tycoon and philanthropist Aw Boon 
Haw), Barry Bingham, Juan Quijano, the CCN’s new publisher and one of the Yuyitungs’ lawyers, 
Amnesty International observers,51 and around 60 ROC and international journalists. Several days 
earlier, ROC Embassy officials in Manila had informed the wives of Rizal and Quintin that they 
could apply for a visa to attend the trial, but neither did so.52  
 During the trial, Rizal and Quintin, fully aware that their guilt had already been decided, 
adopted an apologetic stance towards the tribunal to secure a more lenient verdict. Rizal said that 
because he had grown up in the Philippines, he was “not aware of the situation of his fatherland 
and might have committed mistakes.” Despite having read some of Mao’s works, he asserted that 
his thinking had not been affected by them and that his reasons for publishing news from CCP-
controlled areas were solely to maintain and increase his paper’s readership. Having spent three 
months in Taipei, he had a “better understanding of the situation of his mother country now” and 
hoped that the ROC would “forgive him for his past mistakes.” Quintin also contended that he had 
no intention of aiding the CCP and that the CCN published what it did for the sake of “professional 
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competition,” since English-language newspapers in the Philippines published articles by foreign 
wire services quoting PRC news sources. Their assigned lawyer, Wang Shan-hsiang, recapitulated 
several familiar arguments in his defense of the CCN, including the fact that the CCN had never 
subscribed to Xinhua and had only ever published direct, unaltered translations from foreign wire 
services. The Yuyitungs, he argued, could not be found guilty because their violation of the ROC’s 
sedition laws was unintentional. Wang further claimed that the Yuyitungs were patriots because 
they had repeatedly but unsuccessfully applied to enter the ROC and because they were born to a 
patriotic father who had been executed by the Japanese. 
 The ROC public prosecutor maintained that intentions were irrelevant and repeatedly cited 
a signed confession made by Quintin and Rizal during their interrogation in Taiwan, in which they 
admitted to knowing beforehand that all the materials that they published were “for the benefit of 
Chinese Communist propaganda.” No record of this confession is to be found. It was very likely 
something that the Yuyitungs consented to in return for a less severe sentence; and given that Rizal 
stated on several occasions how well-treated they were by the ROC authorities, such a confession 
was not obtained through coercive means. The prosecutor used it to counter the defense’s argument 
for unintentionality. He claimed that because the brothers knew full well that the CCP was a “rebel 
organization” and that the news articles they published would benefit CCP propaganda, they were 
therefore accomplices to an objectively seditious act, regardless of their purposes and innermost 
beliefs. Freedom of the press was no excuse for such a report; and in any case the brothers were 
citizens of the ROC, under whose laws they were being tried.53  
Following the prosecution’s summing up, the Yuyitungs chose not to argue their case any 
further, thus allowing the tribunal to deliver a swift verdict. It found that, in 1968, the brothers had 
                                                 





“redoubled their efforts in propaganda articles for the benefit of the Chinese Communist rebels in 
[the CCN and Chinese Weekly]. Prominent spaces were devoted to false and over exaggerated [sic] 
reports on Peiping’s military, political, economic, cultural, scientific and industrial activities.” The 
accused had admitted to investigators that their publications “have been 100 per cent pro-Peiping 
in the last few years.” Therefore, as ROC nationals by law, they were guilty of violating the Statute 
for the Punishment of Seditious Acts even though their offenses were committed abroad. However, 
as the brothers “lacked knowledge of Chinese Communist schemes and atrocities” and had “shown 
signs of sincere repentance since their arrest and deportation to Taiwan,” they were to be “given 
an opportunity to reform themselves.”54 
 
Citizen diplomacy: Wang Tih-wu and the IPI, August-November 1970  
 Having staked its international reputation on the optics and outcome of the trial, the ROC 
would have been disappointed by the largely negative responses to it. With the First Quarter Storm 
still fresh in its institutional memory, Philippine officialdom considered the verdict too lenient and 
an incitement to left-wing unrest. Jolly Bugarin, the chief of the National Bureau of Investigation, 
expressed the views of many within the military and intelligence community when he said that the 
sentence encouraged communist activity. He even alleged that Filipino communists were plotting 
to assassinate ROC Embassy officials, a sensational claim that protests after the deportation had 
done nothing to dispel. An unnamed member of the military’s working group on the CCN echoed 
Bugarin’s views, saying that the verdict “disheartened” them. Why, he asked, had the tribunal not 
adhered strictly to the letter of the law and sentenced the Yuyitungs to jail for at least seven years?55  
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 For the left, the openness with which Nationalist China had conducted itself, arguments for 
the primacy of national security interests, and the relative benevolence of the verdict mattered little. 
Press freedom had been violated; the trial was a farce; and only the immediate and unconditional 
release of the Yuyitungs would compensate for the injustice committed against them. Hoping to 
exploit the ROC’s susceptibility to public opinion, IPI executive director Ernest Meyer petitioned 
Chiang Kai-shek on August 25 to grant an official pardon the brothers on his birthday, October 31. 
A “humanitarian gesture of this nature would have a tremendous effect on world public opinion 
which would reflect greatly on your government and would be considered as a real sign of the 
respect of your government for freedom of the press of which the [IPI] is the careful watchdog all 
over the world,” he said. Juan Quijano and Joker Arroyo, another of the CCN’s lawyers, also wrote 
directly to Chiang, having heard Wang Shan-hsiang’s advice that an appeal might take too long 
and had little chance of succeeding. Their letter centered on freedom of speech and criticized the 
state for denying the brothers access to their lawyers for three months before speeding through the 
actual trial, all with scant regard for due process. In addition, they sought to “Filipinize” the case 
by denying that the ROC had any sovereignty over two persons who had renounced their “Chinese” 
citizenship and committed their supposed offence in the Philippines.56  
 The task of explaining the ROC’s actions to the world, and to the IPI in particular, fell to 
Wang Tih-wu, the most famous Free Chinese newspaperman in the world. Slightly over a month 
after the trial, Wang produced a detailed, footnoted statement on the Yuyitung affair for the benefit 
of the IPI, whose executive committee would be meeting in Zurich in October to discuss the case. 
His aim was to “present the facts about the case and offer explanations on some questions that 
arose from it,” but the report was far from being a full and honest account of what had transpired. 
                                                 





Wang misidentified the Philippine Defense Secretary as Armed Forces Chief of Staff Manuel Yan, 
not Juan Ponce Enrile. Although Wang summed up both sides’ arguments during the military trial 
in Taiwan, he said little about the contentious nature of the Deportation Board hearings in the 
Philippines from March to May, or that the brothers were deported before these hearings concluded. 
By emphasizing the formal legality of proceedings, Wang sought to deflect attention from more 
fundamental considerations of justice and the thorny problem of intent. His report concluded by 
noting that reformatory education was the “most lenient [sentence] possible” under ROC law; for 
sedition cases, the verdict showed “unprecedented leniency.” The IPI had done its utmost to ensure 
an open and fair trial and secure favorable treatment for the brothers, but ultimately, the ROC’s 
“life and death struggle with communists” had to override liberal ideals. Wang criticized the IPI’s 
absolute commitment to a free press. Seeing as the IPI did not accredit journalists from communist 
countries because of these countries’ suppression of individual freedoms, did it then also defend 
communist propaganda advocating a political system opposed to such freedoms?57  
 Meyer was dissatisfied with Wang’s report. In his response to Wang on September 24, he 
focused on the illegitimacy and inhumaneness of the ROC’s sovereign claims upon the Yuyitungs. 
Returning to a familiar talking point among the brothers’ supporters, he questioned Taiwan’s right 
to try them for having supposedly committed crimes against the Philippine state. He accused the 
ROC of violating international law, according to which extradition in “political cases” was not 
permissible. Taiwan and the Philippines collaborated to deport the brothers because their “crimes” 
were insufficient grounds for conviction in the latter, which had a long tradition of press freedom. 
Reformatory education bore a disturbing similarity to the “usual brainwashing in communist trials,” 
and the “confessions and expressions of satisfaction of the prisoners resemble too much the usual 
                                                 





confessions of totalitarian practices to be accepted by people really devoted to the principles of 
human rights.” He concluded prophetically: “No country and no regime in the world – not even 
the very powerful ones – can afford to ignore the great currents of world public opinion. I really 
wonder, therefore, if the distribution of [your report] on the Yuyitung case will not have an effect 
very contrary to what you want it to have.”58 
Seeking reassurances that it had acted legally, the ROC submitted Wang’s report and some 
primary evidence to Harold Riegelman of the New York law firm Nordlinger, Riegelman, Benatar, 
and Charney. Riegelman had been a counsel to the ROC Embassy in New York since 1938 and in 
1948 was awarded the ROC’s highest civilian honor for services rendered during World War II.59 
After 1949, he became part of the China Lobby and chaired an organization called the “Committee 
to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China.”60 On October 14, 1970, just before the IPI 
executive committee’s meeting in Zurich, he reassured I-cheng Loh, the director of the Chinese 
Information Service in New York, that “there is a sound basis in international law on which the 
Yuyitung brothers could be tried and convicted of sedition by a military tribunal for acts committed 
by them outside the Republic of China.” Unlike Ernest Meyer, Riegelman believed that it was a 
“clearly enunciated and universally accepted principal [sic] of international law that a nation has 
jurisdiction over its citizens where a treasonous act is committed against the nation, irrespective 
of where such act is committed.” After conducting an “unbiased review,” he concluded that their 
“newspaper was pro-Communist and their extra-newspaper activities were Communist-inspired, 
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if not Communist-financed.” But the 25 articles cited as evidence could only be seen as seditious 
in the context of these external activities. Riegelman advised the ROC to translate and refute these 
pieces for the benefit of the IPI, as well as show that the CCN published only negative news reports 
about the ROC (and positive ones about the PRC) by international wire services. He concluded by 
hailing the ROC as a “democratic nation” and criticizing the tendency of Western journalists to 
overreact when it came to perceived violations of press freedom.61   
Undeterred by Meyer’s criticisms, Wang Tih-wu persisted in trying to win over his good 
friend in the hopes that Meyer would be able to influence proceedings at Zurich. On October 6, he 
left Taiwan for Tokyo, where he lobbied members of the Japan IPI committee; the Japanese were 
not going to Switzerland because of a prior commitment, but agreed to issue a statement in support 
of Taiwan. On October 9, Wang arrived in Zurich and met with Meyer, who explained how the 12 
other national committees attending the meeting stood on the case. Britain, which had tried to 
prevent the IPI from accrediting the ROC in June 1969, was most opposed to the ROC and was 
seeking to derecognize. Canada, Finland, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the United States were 
also unhappy, although none had opposed the admission of the ROC into the IPI. Fearing the worse, 
Wang reiterated that the ROC’s magnanimous handling of the case was proof enough of its respect 
for the IPI’s efforts to protect freedom of the press. He also attacked the UK IPI for distorting the 
“facts” surrounding the case and interfering in Taiwan’s sovereign affairs in a most undemocratic 
manner. 
Meyer was not unsympathetic to his friend’s predicament and sought a solution to the case 
that would help effect the Yuyitungs’ release, while enabling the ROC to remain in the IPI. Meyer 
informed Wang that the majority of delegates appreciated Wang’s good faith attempt at mediating 
                                                 





between his government and the IPI, and that they were also unhappy with how the UK committee 
had been conducting itself. If Wang promised to do his utmost to have the ROC free the Yuyitungs, 
Meyer would dissuade others from expelling Taiwan. As the meeting drew near, Wang and Meyer 
stepped up their lobbying efforts. Wang traveled to West Germany to speak to Hans Kluthe and 
Aw Sian, and also phoned the US delegation, which he won over. Meyer met with other countries’ 
delegates, who slowly came around to the ROC’s point of view. In the two days before the meeting, 
Meyer arranged for Wang to dine with the executive committee and representatives from various 
national committees. He also advised Wang on how to act during the meeting: Wang ought not to 
bring up the affair, but allow Meyer to do it. If Britain motioned to expel the ROC, South Korea 
would propose that its IPI delegates, together with Britain, Japan, and South Africa’s, visit Taiwan 
to inspect the situation there first before deciding. Wang was also not to discuss the legality of the 
case, but to put forth a political solution that he and Meyer had agreed on.62  
This political solution was as follows: the IPI would first seek the Philippines’ agreement 
to support the release of the Yuyitungs. The IPI would also ask Singapore to accept the brothers, 
as the city-state had informed the IPI its willingness to do so before the August 14 trial.63 They 
would also promise not to criticize the ROC or Philippine governments in print any further. Only 
if both Singapore and the Philippines were agreeable would the IPI request the ROC to free them. 
Wang saw this as an acceptable compromise, as any action by Taipei was dependent first on how 
Manila and Singapore reacted. In his report to the ROC authorities, Wang expressed his hope that 
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the ROC would release the brothers if the Philippines and Singapore agreed to their sides of the 
deal. Ever the newsman-cum-propagandist, he suggested that this bargain would reflect well on 
the ROC and dispel any lingering doubts that IPI members had about the ROC’s commitment to 
press freedom and constitutional democracy.64 
During the meeting, after Meyer raised the Yuyitung case, Britain tried but failed to have 
the IPI derecognize the ROC. In Wang’s narrative of what happened, Canada, Sri Lanka, and India 
“went through the motions” (xu ying gushi 虛應故事) in supporting Britain; the United States and 
West Germany called for fairness; Pakistan and Israel did not really understand what was going 
on; and South Korea and Japan, in a welcome display of Asian anticommunist solidarity, defended 
the ROC and the ROC IPI’s handling of the case. Wang ascribed the ROC’s success to four factors: 
IPI delegates’ fundamental belief in the ROC’s commitment to press freedom, despite their verbal 
criticisms of its behavior; Wang’s report, which allowed delegates to better understand the case; 
the backing of Kluthe, Aw, and the IPI national committees of the United States, South Korea, and 
Japan; and the delegates’ visit to Taiwan in late May, which convinced its members of the ROC’s 
determination to build a democracy and constitutional government.”65 
 The deliberations surrounding this deal that took place at the highest levels of government 
in the ROC and the Philippines are largely unknown to us. Marcos appears to have asked Edmundo 
Reyes in late October 1970 to give the proposal careful attention so as not to harm ROC-Philippine 
relations, according to a memo from the Philippine KMT that was circulated among state and party 
agencies in Taiwan. His final decision is unknown, but according to Wang, Meyer planned to visit 
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Taiwan on November 9 to lobby for the Yuyitungs’ release, which suggests that Marcos may have 
been on board and content to let the brothers find asylum in Singapore. Taiwan at that time was 
still deliberating on how to react, Wang wrote. Legally, although there were provisions in the 1957 
law on “Procedures for Consigning Communists to Reformatory Education During the Period of 
Communist Rebellion” (Kanluan shiqi feidie jiaofu ganhua banfa 戡亂時期匪諜交付感化辦法), 
the minimum length for ganhua was one year, according to the 1963 “Law on Implementing Public 
Security Measures” (Baoan chufen zhixing fa 保安處分執行法). To complicate matters further, 
ganhua was not a “penalty for a criminal offence” (xingfa 刑罰), but rather, as the latter law stated, 
a “public security measure.” The unique legal status of ganhua would make it difficult for Chiang 
to issue a special pardon to the Yuyitungs, which, according to the “Law on Pardons” (Shemian fa 
赦免法) of 1954, was only meant for “those found guilty of crimes” (shou zuixing zhi xuangaozhe
受罪刑之宣告者).66  
 In mid-November, Meyer, Wang, Aw, Juan Quijano, and an interpreter met in Hong Kong 
to work out an agreement on the CCN’s editorial policy going forward. The ROC’s lack of a firm 
response at this time was almost certainly a calculated ploy to extract more concessions from the 
CCN, as subsequent events show. However deep-seated their belief in press freedom was, Meyer 
and Quijano prioritized the release of the Yuyitungs, even if it meant censoring the CCN. Quijano, 
the paper’s new publisher, stated that he had instructed his editorial board to adopt a “factual and 
objective attitude” on all matters concerning the ROC. He conceded that the CCN’s coverage of 
Taiwan in the past few months sometimes displayed “resentment,” but denied that this had to do 
with ideology and was because of “emotional dissatisfaction” with the detention of the Yuyitungs. 
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As a sign of his goodwill, he said that he had told the CCN to carry advertisements congratulating 
the ROC on its National Day. He also brought all copies of the paper from September and October 
to the Hong Kong meeting for Wang to scrutinize. Wang, skimming through the copies, observed 
that there were still some instances in which the CCN reported the news in a manner “antagonistic 
to the Chinese Government.” For example, he noted that a report on a visit that the brothers made 
to Taipei described them as being “marched” by their superintendent to “parade” them before the 
public. Quijano reassured Wang that he would repeat his instructions and supervise the paper more 
carefully than in past so that his editors “[respected] the understanding of strictly objective news 
coverage without any systematic hostility and malicious criticism.”67 
 
Illusions of victory: Taiwan, the CCN, and the IPI in 1971 
The gentlemen’s agreement that Wang, Quijano, Meyer, and Sun signed in Hong Kong on 
November 17, 1970 marked a victory for the ROC in its long-running conflict with the CCN, but 
offered only temporary respite from the scrutiny of global public opinion. With Quijano having 
promised to “moderate” the paper’s editorial policy towards Taiwan in the hopes of securing the 
Yuyitungs’ early release, the ROC was at long last in a position to censor the paper, after decades 
of trying. If, as Rizal claims, the majority of state and party agencies in Taiwan had indeed come 
to realize that the Yuyitungs was innocent of the charges against them, Mah Soo-Lay’s behavior 
after the Hong Kong meeting certainly did not reflect this belief; if anything, the increasingly (and 
understandably) hostile attitude of the CCN to Taiwan after the deportation of the Yuyitungs only 
reinforced the ROC authorities’ suspicions of the paper. In the months that followed, Mah assumed 
the role of censor-in-chief and would frequently send news clippings from the CCN that he found 
                                                 





objectionable to Wang, who then forwarded them with an explanation to Quijano and, occasionally, 
Meyer. It fell upon Quijano, a lawyer with no previous journalistic experience or knowledge of his 
paper’s working language, to convince his staff to adopt a more “objective” and less hostile attitude 
towards the government that had just jailed their former editor and publisher.  
As Wang’s objections to the article on the “parading” of the Yuyitungs shows, the selection 
of some of these articles reflected little more than KMT media policy and the hypersensitivity of 
propagandists like Mah towards any perceived slight against their party and state and the ROC’s 
position in the world. Some of these slights amounted to little more than clever and intentionally 
irreverent wordplay. An article in the Jan 17, 1971 Chinese Weekly, for example, substituted the 
character min 民 (people) in Sanminzhuyi with mian 眠 (sleep),68 which prompted a stern message 
from Wang to Quijano on respecting the Three Principles and on the author’s “malicious” (e’yi 惡
意) motivations. Other items were problematic, as the CCN’s items over the decades had been, for 
simply reporting unfavorable news on the ROC. On January 11, for example, it published a cartoon 
depicting the ROC’s ex-ambassadors to Italy, Chile, and Canada carrying their embassies’ signs 
on their backs and dejectedly making their way back to Taiwan.69 Staunch KMT supporter that he 
was, Wang told Quijano and Meyer that based on journalistic standards in Taiwan, the cartoon was 
a “malicious” attempt to ridicule the ROC’s international setbacks. Meyer, upon receiving Wang’s 
complaint, expressed his complete bewilderment that the cartoon and “rather factual article” that 
accompanied it could be considered an expression of “systematic hostility” towards Taiwan. Such 
items would be seen as “most normal” in Western countries. To make his point, Meyer attached a 
cartoon from The Guardian depicting the British Prime Minister Edward Heath at a meeting of the 
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Commonwealth Heads of Government in “a position which – I am afraid – in your country would 
have justified a trial for Communist propaganda. I am sure that [Heath] just smiled when he saw 
the cartoon.”  
Quijano, on his part, made a good faith attempt to placate Wang and his political masters 
by repeatedly informing him that he had instructed his editors to report on news about China in a 
more impartial manner. On the offending cartoon, for example, he acknowledged that it may have 
caused readers to think that the CCN was prejudiced against the ROC and said that it should not 
have been published. In that same reply to Wang, he even attached a letter that he had written to 
his staff asking that they moderate their views. In a meeting with the Yuyitungs in early January, 
he even asked them to make a similar request, but the brothers said that they had already done so 
and were reluctant to be seen as undermining Quijano’s authority as publisher. Ultimately, though, 
Quijano could do little: “as I do not know Chinese, I do not understand what the CCN is publishing 
on a daily basis.” The CCN’s new editor informed Quijano in a long memorandum that while the 
editorial board was willing to avoid printing “subjective” or “critical” headlines or captions about 
the ROC, it believed that nothing it did would ever satisfy KMT censors. Wang’s constant requests 
infringed upon freedom of the press. Balanced coverage of both Nationalist and Communist China 
was impossible given their vastly different sizes and how foreign wire services (which the CCN 
depended on) overwhelmingly focused on the latter. Furthermore, if other Philippine newspapers 
printed news that the ROC considered taboo, the CCN was obliged to follow suit for the sake of 
its readership. Finally, as the ROC’s Central News Agency had stopped issuing its releases to the 
CCN, the paper had access to very few sources of positive news about the ROC.  
Wang Tih-wu, like Quijano, was but an intermediary with little influence over how his side 




the bargain and have the Yuyitungs’ release brought forward. Even as he faithfully conveyed his 
government’s views to Quijano, he also tried to persuade his bosses that Quijano was sincere about 
changing the paper’s editorial policy towards Taiwan. He even suggested that a friendlier attitude 
on the part of Philippine-Chinese society towards the CCN might cause the paper to become more 
anticommunist, and that the CNA consider restoring its ties with the CCN. His entreaties fell on 
deaf ears. Mah was never convinced that Quijano was sincere about trying to change the paper’s 
“anti-ROC” position, as it persisted in publishing what he considered pro-communist propaganda, 
despite Wang’s intercessions. 
 As the months passed and the Yuyitungs remained in detention despite the best efforts of 
Quijano and Wang, discontent among anti-ROC members of the IPI resurfaced. Meyer, who had 
played such an important role in Zurich in October 1970 in swaying delegates to the ROC’s side, 
could no longer influence proceedings as he once did and appeared to be swinging back to the side 
of the IPI. In December, he cautioned Wang that the IPI would likely call an extraordinary meeting 
to propose a resolution to the effect that “continued recognition of a national IPI committee in the 
ROC was irreconcilable with the constitutional principles and ideals of the organization.” The 
longer a “positive decision” was delayed, the “tougher reactions would be.” In the first two months 
of 1971, the Yuyitung case came up at the general meetings of both the West German and French 
IPI committees. By late February, Meyer warned Wang that “strong ill-feeling” towards the ROC 
was growing. A letter from IPI vice-chairman Aatos Erkko of Finland warned that if the Yuyitungs 
were not released by the IPI’s annual general meeting in Helsinki in June, the IPI would have to 
seriously consider the ROC and Philippines’ membership. “From now on,” Meyer told his friend 




solution to this case were in vain.” Meyer’s appeals to Cheng Pao-nan, the ROC’s UN Ambassador 
to Geneva, were unsuccessful in persuading the ROC to change its stance.70 
 As things turned out, Wang was able to delay the expulsion of the ROC’s IPI committee 
until October. In the buildup to Helsinki, Wang embarked on yet another lobbying campaign in an 
attempt to secure support for the ROC’s actions, traveling to Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea 
and meeting with Meyer and Aw in preparation for the meeting. This time, the anti- and pro-ROC 
factions were clearly divided between Asia and the West, with the United States initially leading 
the charge against Taiwan, and Japan assuming the mantle of the ROC’s principle defender. After 
a succession of stormy meetings from June 6-9, during which Wang, Aw, and Japanese delegate 
Susumu Ejiri each threatened to resign from the IPI if the ROC committee was derecognized, the 
executive committee tabled a motion calling for the Philippines and ROC to expedite a deal that 
would see the Yuyitungs released and allowed back into the Philippines if they met certain criteria 
laid out by Manila. This was a variation on the political solution that Meyer and Wang had verbally 
agreed on before the Zurich meeting in 1970, but which had not been officially incorporated into 
the motions passed at that meeting. The main difference was that the Yuyitungs were now to be 
readmitted into the Philippines rather than exiled to Singapore. At Helsinki, Hans Menzi informed 
the IPI that Marcos was willing to accept them if they publicly apologized (again) to the Philippine 
government and people, completely overhaul the CCN’s ideological position, and promise to be 
“good citizens” going forward; Napoleon Rama interpreted Menzi’s announcement as Marcos’s 
attempt to pass the buck to Taipei and stave off criticism from the foreign media, whose favorable 
opinions he constantly sought.71 Wang was asked to convey Marcos’s criteria to his government 
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and continue trying to persuade the ROC to relent. The motion passed, despite European attempts 
to have the ROC IPI committee suspended for a year, or until the Yuyitungs were released.72  
 Wang had won yet another temporary reprieve for the ROC IPI, but at considerable cost to 
his personal wellbeing. Two days after the Helsinki meeting ended, an exhausted Wang flew to 
Hamburg, where he fell gravely ill and had to be admitted into hospital for a blocked blood vessel 
in his brain. Rather than receiving medical treatment there and then, he flew straight back to Taipei 
to hold a press conference explaining how he had safeguarded the ROC’s membership of the IPI, 
and only afterwards underwent treatment. No agreement between the ROC and the Philippines 
was forthcoming in the subsequent weeks and months, however, and on October 22, 1971 in Zurich 
– three days before the PRC was admitted into the United Nations – the IPI executive committee 
derecognized the ROC.73 After recovering from his near-fatal brush with death, Wang resumed his 
lobbying efforts and in June 1975 secured the re-recognition of the ROC’s IPI committee.74 
 
The center holds: the Philippine KMT’s reaction to Quintin Yuyitung’s release 
The internationalization of the Yuyitung affair and the conflict between the ROC and IPI 
offer a unique vantage point from which to consider the ROC’s position in the world just prior to 
its expulsion from the United Nations. Wang Tih-wu’s indefatigable attempts to depict the ROC’s 
treatment of the Yuyitungs as just and humane, and to maintain the ROC’s membership of the IPI, 
highlight Taiwan’s sensitivity to global public opinion and desire to be perceived by international 
civil society as a nation-state-like polity fully capable of exercising sovereign rights over its own 
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“citizens.” A full account of the ROC’s response to the affair must also address relations between 
Taiwan and both the Philippine government and the Philippine KMT. As we have seen, relations 
between the ROC and the Marcos regime eventually came to revolve around a political solution to 
the affair that would see Taiwan release the brothers if the Philippines accepted them back. No 
such deal came about because Quintin and Rizal were not willing to meet the criteria that Marcos 
had laid out. 
Relations between the ROC-KMT party-state in Taiwan and the Philippine KMT came to 
the forefront of the former’s international public relations campaign as Quintin Yuyitung’s two-
year period of reformatory education drew to a close. As August 16, 1972 neared, state and party 
officials began debating whether or not to allow him to leave Taiwan. As previously, deliberations 
over this issue revolved around more than just formal legal procedures. Legally, and in the absence 
of precedent, Garrison-General Headquarters believed that Quintin should remain on the island. 
An August 8 KMT Central Committee meeting, which Mah Soo-Lay attended, agreed on this point, 
but also that the government need not inform Quintin explicitly about this, since they figured that 
he probably did not expect to leave anyway. Mah was tasked with helping Quintin to find work in 
Taiwan and arranging for his wife to visit him. The same meeting also sketched a plan to manage 
the media. There was no need for the ROC to comment on the matter of Quintin’s leaving Taiwan; 
if pressed, it ought simply to say that he had not applied to do so. If foreign journalists sought to 
interview him, the state would have a UDN journalist sit in on that interview, and have it published 
first in the two English-language newspapers in Taiwan, but not in the Chinese-language media.75 
On August 16, Quintin was released from the reformatory education facility at Panchiao. 
As there was no possibility of his returning to the Philippines, the US IPI national committee, one 
                                                 





of the staunchest supporters of the Yuyitungs, invited him to the United States and began working 
with the State Department to obtain a visa for him. This was reported in the August 15 edition of 
the Manila Times, which also mentioned that, according to “official sources,” the ROC had reached 
a “preliminary decision” not to let Quintin leave Taiwan.76 A Chinese Information Service press 
release that same day, in keeping with the state’s media plan, mentioned nothing about this.77 Yet, 
it soon became apparent that Taiwan could not simply adhere to its original plan and disregard the 
US IPI’s invitation to Quintin and the State Department’s involvement. On August 18, the UDN 
reported that Quintin was considering visiting the United States.78 Several days later, Frederick 
Chien, head of the Government Information Office, informally told a US official in Taipei that he 
was aware of Quintin’s “job offer” in the United States and “there would be no difficulty with his 
leaving to accept it,” except that he first needed a ROC passport. The same memo that mentioned 
Chien’s remarks noted that while the ROC did not customarily allow former political prisoners to 
leave Taiwan, it was “stung” by the bad publicity that it had received and was willing to let Quintin 
do so to avoid further criticism and improve its relations with the IPI.79 
Already unhappy at what it perceived was the ROC’s excessively lenient treatment of the 
brothers and weakness in the face of pressure from the IPI, the Philippine KMT reacted to news 
of Quintin’s being allowed to leave Taiwan by threatening to resign from the Central Committee. 
In its view, the ROC had shown disregard for its own laws and the rule of law in its handling of 
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the case. Based on how the CCN continued to depict the ROC in its articles, party hardliners also 
believed that the paper’s pro-communist behavior had only intensified and that it was incapable of 
reforming itself. Were Quintin to return to the Philippines after being released, he would no doubt 
resume propagandizing on behalf of the CCP. All in all, party members in the Philippines felt that 
Taipei’s management of the Yuyitung affair was having a dispiriting effect on their anticommunist 
efforts.  
The Central Committee responded to this unprecedented crisis in intra-party relations by 
dispatching Cua Siok Po, still Deputy Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, to 
the Philippines from September 5-10 to justify Taipei’s behavior to his former Manila comrades. 
Cua’s lengthy report to his superiors is the clearest available evidence of how international public 
opinion, as manifested through the IPI, decisively shaped the ROC’s handling of the Yuyitung 
affair after May 1970, and specifically, its decision to let Quintin leave Taiwan. Together with the 
ROC Ambassador Liu Chieh 劉鍇 and elders such as James Lee 李治民, Pao Shih-tien, and Koa 
Chun-te, Cua spent his first three days there meeting with disgruntled party members individually. 
On September 8, he addressed a meeting of about 40 KMT leaders in Manila. After praising the 
Philippine KMT for its “resolute fighting spirit” (douzhi jianqiang 鬥志堅強) and “firm stance” 
(lichang jianjue 立場堅決), Cua explained that Taipei had decided to allow Quintin to leave the 
country in response to the “current international environment” (dangqian guoji huanjing 當前國
際環境), and to snuff out the plot against the ROC by leftist IPI members. Quintin would not be 
allowed to return to the Philippines, he assured them. 
Cua’s appeal for understanding and assurances about Quintin were sufficient to persuade 
the Philippine KMT to withdraw its resignation. In its written response to Cua, the party called for 




this uncertain time for the ROC, particularly in areas such as propaganda, the media, and outreach 
to Filipinos. Juan Quijano, who had to shoulder part of the blame for the CCN’s continuing pro-
communist views, was to be denied entry into Taiwan. Finally, party members expressed doubts 
that two years of reformatory education had changed Quintin’s political beliefs and said that they 
deeply regretted how international public opinion had played such a decisive role in his release. 
Going forward, they urged Taipei to ignore public pressure when handling Rizal. They hoped that 
if Rizal remained obstinate in his political views in a year’s time, he would continue undergoing 
ganhua, and that Taipei would consult closely with them. Not doing so, it claimed hyperbolically, 




Following his release from detention, Quintin remained in Taiwan for several months to 
secure a ROC passport and a visitor’s visa to the United States through the US Embassy in Taipei. 
On November 11, Chiang Ching-kuo himself authorized Quintin’s departure,81 and on December 
8, Quintin left Taipei for San Francisco, where he was joined by Quijano.82 A year later, Rizal was 
released from detention with little fanfare and joined his brother in the United States. Unlike a year 
earlier, there were no protests from the Philippine KMT this time around. Rizal eventually settled 
down in Toronto. He and Quintin would eventually return to the Philippines in 1986, after Marcos 
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was overthrown, to help restart the newspaper, which remains in print today. Quintin passed away 
in San Francisco in 1990, and Rizal in Toronto in 2007. 
 This chapter has examined the two-year public relations campaign that the ROC waged in 
response to the deportation of the Yuyitungs to Taiwan and their trial and detention there. With its 
focus on the ROC’s responses to the IPI and sensitivity to international public opinion, Wang Tih-
wu’s “citizen diplomacy,” and efforts by the KMT to prevent the secession of its Philippine branch, 
the preceding narrative offers an alternative framework for thinking about the ROC in the world 
during a critical moment in its history. That well-known history, centered on US-ROC relations, 
Taiwan’s struggle to maintain its seat at the United Nations, and the ROC as an emerging capitalist 
economy, has overshadowed its equally determined attempts to uphold its reputation as sovereign, 
just, and “free” in the eyes of international civil society. These were the qualities that it sought to 
project onto the global stage through by managing the Yuyitung affair. The “world” that the ROC 
interacted with to validate itself consisted not only of nation-states, but also of overseas Chinese 
communities, overseas party branches, and organizations such as the IPI; and the “ROC” that did 
so comprised not only state bureaucrats and party officials, but also “private” actors such as Wang 
who were just as committed to the Nationalist state as the likes of Mah Soo-Lay and Cua Siok Po 
were. In its calculations, this regime realized that it could not simply release the Yuyitungs, despite 
the IPI’s pressures upon it, for it had staked its legitimacy as a sovereign polity on anticommunism 
and legal claims upon its “nationals” overseas. But, with the international environment shifting in 
opposition to it, the ROC adopt a relatively lenient attitude towards the Yuyitungs’ alleged crimes. 
It sought to exercise its sovereignty in a manner that it regarded as humane and that demonstrated 




parties with a stake in the fate of the brothers – the IPI, the Philippine KMT, and the Philippines – 





 The deportation of the Yuyitungs to Taiwan exemplified the collaborative anticommunist 
relationship and sharing of sovereignty between the ROC, Philippines, and Philippine Chinese and 
represented their greatest “triumph” in the struggle against a largely imaginary Chinese communist 
enemy. Yet by the time Rizal was released from Panchiao in the fall of 1973, if not earlier, it was 
clear to all except the most blinkered ROC supporters that the political tides had turned irrevocably 
against the ROC, both internationally and in the Philippines. From 1973-1975, Nationalist Chinese 
influence in what was previously one of its staunchest allies in Asia declined precipitously in the 
face of Sino-US rapprochement and the PRC’s admission into the United Nations, executive power 
in the Philippines, and long-term generational changes in Philippine-Chinese society. Within these 
five years, Chinese schools were Filipinized, Manila switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing, 
and the naturalization process for resident aliens was vastly simplified.  
 The first pillar of ROC influence in the Philippines to crumble was its control over Chinese 
education. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the state’s previous efforts in the mid-1950s to supervise 
Chinese schools had left their Chinese-language curriculum and thus the ROC’s all-important role 
in shaping it essentially untouched. Educational Filipinization, however, remained on the political 
agenda, and would be brought up again during the Constitutional Convention from 1971-1972 that 
Marcos had convened in order to extend his stay in office beyond the two-term limit stipulated in 
the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution.1 Over the course of the Convention, 38 distinct resolutions 
recommended provisions to Filipinize or suppress Chinese schools. After much debate, both within 
the Committee on Education and on the Convention floor, the proposed constitution was amended 
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to reflect widespread support for educational Filipinization among the political establishment.2 In 
April 1973, seven months into martial law, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 176 instructing 
the Education Department to implement Article XV, Section 8 of the new constitution. Henceforth, 
all educational institutions were not only placed under the supervision of the state, but also had to 
be owned solely by Philippine citizens or corporations that were controlled by a 60 percent Filipino 
majority. No schools were to be established exclusively for aliens, or any school offer a curriculum 
exclusively for aliens.3 The Chinese curriculum, patterned after Taiwan’s, was cancelled, and the 
teaching of Chinese made optional and only as a foreign language. All Chinese schools were given 
until the end of the 1976-1977 school year to meet these requirements.4 With the stroke of a pen, 
Marcos had unilaterally abrogated the ROC’s “liberty to establish schools for the education of their 
children,” as spelled out in the 1947 Treaty of Amity.  
 The severing of diplomatic ties between Taiwan and the Philippines and the establishment 
of Philippine-China relations soon followed in 1975; the groundwork for this had been laid during 
the preceding decade. After entering office, Marcos almost immediately lifted a ban on Philippine 
citizens traveling to socialist countries in the hope of diversifying his country’s trade relations. By 
March 1974, the Philippines had normalized relations with Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hungary and Mongolia. Trade between the Philippines and these states, along with the 
Soviet Union and the PRC, had reached some $80 million, with China accounting for nearly half 
the total volume. China, which had recently discovered large deposits of oil in Heilongjiang, was 
                                                 
2 Charles J. McCarthy, “The Chinese Schools 1899-1972,” in Philippine-Chinese Profile: Essays & Studies, ed. 
Charles J. McCarthy (Manila: Pagkakaisa Sa Pag-unlad, 1974), 176. 
 
3 Presidential Decree No. 176 can be found at http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pd1973/pd_176_1973.html. 
 
4 Antonio S. Tan, “The Philippine Chinese, 1946-1984,” in Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since 





a potential source of discounted oil imports at a time of volatility in global energy markets; Marcos 
also feared that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries would curb oil exports to the 
Philippines in retaliation for the military’s armed operations against the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front in Mindanao. Apart from economic concerns, Marcos also believed that opening up relations 
with China would bring to an end its provision of weapons to and rhetorical support for the Maoist 
Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People’s Army.5 
 Marcos adopted a consultative approach towards normalization and sought the opinions of 
former Foreign Secretary Salvador Lopez, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Romeo Espino, and former 
Ambassador to the ROC Narciso Ramos. All three men cautioned against it and believed that doing 
so would allow the PRC to expand its influence among the local Chinese population. The President, 
not totally convinced by their arguments, sought a further opinion from Benito Lim, a lecturer in 
contemporary China at the University of the Philippines. Marcos asked Lim for his views on mass 
naturalization, which the President believed had to be part of any plan to establish ties with China 
so as to limit the PRC’s influence over Chinese in the country. Lim, who had previously failed in 
his application for citizenship because he could not afford to pay the bribe that the presiding judge 
had demanded, advocated this policy. With Marcos’s backing, Lim conducted a survey under the 
auspices of the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies at UP to investigate local Chinese attitudes 
toward citizenship, the PRC, and Chinese schools. The results dispelled any fears that the Chinese 
could be vulnerable to PRC influence. 85 percent of those surveyed expressed fears of communism 
and 90 percent preferred to become Philippine rather than PRC citizens. Acting upon these results, 
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Marcos issued a Letter of Instruction on April 11, 1975 that simplified the previously cumbersome 
naturalization process for aliens by vesting the power to approve all applications for naturalization 
in a special committee chaired by the Solicitor-General.6 Five years later, in 1980, it had received 
43,180 applications; by comparison, only 579 petitions for citizenship were filed through the courts 
from 1969-1974.7 On June 7, 1975, Marcos went on a five-day official visit to China, and on June 
9, the PRC and the Philippines recognized each other. During his visit, posters of Mao and Chinese 
flags were prominently displayed in some establishments in Chinatown.8 Even five years earlier, 
this would have been unthinkable.  
 In part, as the above narrative suggests, the decline of Nationalist Chinese influence in the 
Philippines was brought about by geopolitical shifts and presidential decision-making. Martial law 
made it possible for policies to be enacted into law without recourse to the legislature. More than 
this, the concentration of power in Marcos’s hands and his willingness to use it against his enemies 
effectively silenced any potential opposition among Chinese leaders to his policies and encouraged 
instead a deepening of patron-client ties. Within days of declaring martial law, Marcos ordered the 
military to detain Federation President Antonio Roxas Chua, prompting an emergency meeting of 
Shang Zong leaders and ROC officials. Through his close friend and former Shang Zong President 
Ralph Nubla, Marcos conveyed his wish for the Federation to openly declare its support for martial 
law, help bring down prices, and comply with regulations and decrees – in return for Roxas Chua’s 
release. A formal resolution addressing all three demands swiftly followed. Over time, the Shang 
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Zong came to identify Marcos’s continued stay in power with the protection of Philippine-Chinese 
business interests. Crime and extortion against Chinese decreased, at least in the first few years of 
martial law. With Congress dissolved, anti-Chinese economic nationalization bills could no longer 
be passed. Politics was simplified: all that mattered for the Federation’s leadership was cultivating 
its relationship to one man.9 As they had closely aligned themselves with the anticommunist goals 
of the state in the 1950s and 1960s, so too did they accommodate themselves to the realities of the 
martial law years.   
 The shift away from Nationalist China in the early-mid 1970s was underpinned by longer-
term social changes. Benito Lim’s survey suggested that most Philippine Chinese were either non- 
or anticommunist: decades of exposure to KMT propaganda and living in a highly anticommunist 
country had contributed to this. Where the ROC and its loyalists ultimately failed was in hindering 
acculturation into Filipino society and in maintaining identification between younger Chinese and 
the Nationalist state. The rearguard action of Pao Shih-tien and other conservative educators from 
the mid-1950s onwards; educational visits to the “homeland”; textbooks; PCACL rallies; Chinese 
elites’ embrace of the Cultural Renaissance – none was able to sustain the ethnocentrism that ROC 
influence depended on. The US political scientist Robert Tilman found in 1970 that many Chinese 
high school students had difficulty reading and writing Chinese characters and few read Chinese 
newspapers or periodicals except those prescribed in school.10 Even among those fluent in Chinese, 
attitudes were changing. In that same year, young ethnic Chinese university graduates – including 
a few who had studied at Chiang Kai-shek College – formed the civic organization Pagkakaisa sa 
Pag-unlad (Unity for Progress) to advocate for jus soli citizenship and the Filipinization of Chinese 
                                                 
9 Carino, Chinese Big Business in the Philippines, 48-49. 
 





schools at the Constitutional Convention.11 If the Chinese Commercial News’s calls for integration 
seemed out of place in the 1950s, they were now gaining increasingly widespread acceptance.  
 A further challenge to the established ideological order emerged from among the relatively 
few and hitherto marginalized members of the Federation who favored closer relations with China, 
whether because of ideological or cultural affinities. In 1970, as the political winds were beginning 
to shift, several of these businessmen – including former CCN literary editor Go Eng Guan – came 
together to establish the Filipino-Chinese Amity Club (Feihua lianyi hui 菲華聯誼會), which soon 
formed branches across the country. After 1975, the Amity Club was able to operate more openly 
and cultivated as one of its patrons First Lady Imelda Marcos, thereby undermining the previously 
exclusive access to Malacañang Palace that the Shang Zong had enjoyed.12 
 The conservatives did not go quietly, however. Although Pagkakaisa’s calls for citizenship 
based on jus soli were backed by some Shang Zong members, its support for the Filipinization of 
Chinese schools proved highly unpopular. Pagkakaisa founding member Teresita Ang See recalls 
that when her late husband, Chinben See, gave a lecture on educational Filipinization at CKSC, he 
was “almost literally thrown out” of the establishment.13 Marcos’s decision to establish diplomatic 
relations with Beijing proved just as controversial. Officially, the Federation supported this move. 
But when the newly-emboldened but still small pro-PRC faction, including Amity Club members, 
insisted on replacing the ROC flag inside Federation headquarters with a PRC one, the dominant 
pro-Taiwan leadership held a special meeting and decided that only the Philippine flag was to be 
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displayed. The Federation’s President Yao Shiong Shio and the four Vice-Presidents threatened to 
resign if this gesture of defiance did not carry the day. With the dispute roiling Chinatown, Marcos 
himself intervened, urging the warring groups to resolve their differences amicably. He indicated 
that while he would respect the decision to display the Philippine and PRC flags inside the building, 
only the former ought to be flown outside it. One of the most outspoken members of the pro-PRC 
faction was eventually suspended from the Shang Zong after launching a campaign in the Chinese 
press against it. (In another time and age, he might have been reported to the military and deported 
to Taiwan.) The Amity Club, although patronized by the First Lady, was not supported by the new 
PRC Embassy, which – unlike its predecessor – was careful not to become involved in community 
politics. Consequently, pro-Beijing views needed time to gain acceptance. The Federation held out 
against recognizing the PRC until 1994, when 55 of its members officially visited China as part of 
a larger trade mission to various Northeast Asian countries. Immediately after leaving China, they 
proceeded to Taipei, where they assured ROC officials that the close ties between them, built up 
over the previous four decades, would persist. Ever attentive to the importance of symbolism, they 
spent an equal amount of time – ten days – in both Taiwan and China.14 
 Where it had previously flourished largely unopposed, the Philippine KMT was now forced 
to accept a more circumscribed role in the Chinese community. Just as the ROC Embassy became 
the Pacific Economic and Cultural Center in 1975 and, in 1989, the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Office, the KMT renamed itself the Filipino-Chinese Cultural and Economic Association (Feihua 
wenhua jingji zonghui 菲華文化經濟總會, or Wen Zong).15 Its two newspapers, the Great China 
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Press and Kong Li Po, were forced to merge into the United Daily News (Lianhe ribao 聯合日報; 
no relation to the Wang Tih-wu’s paper) in 1973 and scale back on supporting Taiwan, for example. 
Its grip on Chinese education was loosened. Yet, the fundamental goals of the party remained the 
same, which were to “win the hearts of our overseas compatriots” (zhengqu qiaobao xiangxin 爭
取僑胞向心) by promoting Chinese culture, and to champion democracy, according to the KMT 
zongzhibu’s longtime Secretary-General (and conspirator against the Yuyitungs), S. C. Lim. Party 
stalwarts such as him held fast to the belief that most Philippine Chinese were lovers of freedom 
and democracy and thus steadfast supporters of Taiwan. On their part, Lim and others proved more 
conservative than Taiwan’s leaders in their attitudes toward the PRC. The zongzhibu disapproved 
of high-level visits by Taiwanese officials to the mainland, for example, and for a time, local KMT 
members holding committee appointments who wished to do so had to first inform the party. While 
the vocabulary of “communist banditry” and “counterattacking the mainland” was soon abandoned, 
anticommunism remained the organization’s raison d’être. We must maintain our anticommunist 
stance, Lim told a group of interviewers from Academia Sinica in 1993, and oppose the application 
of the communist system to China; this was something that “we could not give up” (buneng fangqi 
不能放棄), regardless of what other Chinese in the Philippines believed in.16  
 Today, Chinese society in the Philippines is largely unrecognizable from half a century ago. 
The Federation is thoroughly pro-China and the majority of Chinese-Filipinos, born and raised in 
the country, are citizens of the Philippines and integrated into Filipino society. Schools no longer 
rally students around the cause of fangong kang’e, or spend half a day teaching a Chinese-language 
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syllabus imported from Taiwan. Although nativist sentiments have certainly not gone away, anti-
Chinese attitudes manifest themselves these days largely in opposition to the PRC’s expansion into 
what Manila officially refers to as the “West Philippine Sea,” rather than against Chinese-Filipinos. 
Many such “Tsinoys” travel to and do business in China – the PRC – but none are deported there. 
Yet as S. C. Lim’s remarks above imply, the legacy of Nationalist China’s anticommunist qiaowu 
in the Philippines is everywhere to be found. It is institutionalized, for example, in the Wen Zong, 
which remains at Liberty Hall at 820 Benavidez Street in Manila’s Chinatown, where the party has 
been since being re-opened in March 1947. Just down the street is the United Daily News, and ten 
minutes away by foot is another quintessentially pro-Taiwan institution, Chiang Kai-shek College. 
The Chinese Commercial News has been in business since the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship 
in 1986, when Quintin and Rizal returned to the Philippines to help resurrect the paper. It continues 
to be run by the Yuyitung family today; the events of 1962 and 1970 remain etched in the memory 
of former CCN staff members. Older Chinese-Filipinos like them recall an earlier era when “China” 
was Taiwan, being “Chinese” meant being a ROC national, and the Philippine military and police 
victimized innocent members of the community in the name of anticommunism. Julio Tan, whom 
I interviewed in June 2016, worked for the Great China Press and remembers Koa Chun-te as the 
“nicest” of all his employers, Shih I-Sheng as someone whom people laughed at, and Hsin Kwan-
chue as “very fond of girls.”17 
 Nationalist China’s history of anticommunist qiaowu in the Philippines and the Philippine 
state and huaqiao society’s contributions to this enterprise can also be reconstructed from a textual 
corpus that spans Taiwan, the Philippines, and the United States and that integrates state archives 
on the one hand with those of the Philippine-Chinese community on the other. Making use of these 
                                                 





and other materials, this dissertation has argued for the centrality of diasporic nation-building and 
intra-Asian connections, rather than US-Taiwan relations, to understanding the ROC in the Cold 
War world; that the relationship between its principal actors in opposition to the largely imaginary 
threat of Chinese communism constituted a form of what I call shared, non-territorial sovereignty; 
and that anticommunist social and cultural practices enabled individuals whom scholars typically 
consider as uninterested in Cold War politics to perform their ideological credentials and come to 










American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University, Manila 
 
Asian Library, Ramon Magsaysay Foundation, Manila 
 Ramon Magsaysay Papers 
 
Chinben See Memorial Library, Kaisa Heritage Center, Manila 
 
National Library, Manila 
 
Filipinas Heritage Library, Ayala Museum, Manila 
 Elpidio Quirino Papers 
 
University Archives and Records Depository, University of the Philippines Diliman, Manila  




Academia Historica, Taipei 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives 
 
Institute of Modern History Archives, Academia Sinica, Taipei 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives 
 
Kuomintang Archives, Taipei 
 
Kuo Ting-yi Library, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei 
 
National Archives Administration National Development Council, Taipei 
 Ministry of National Defense Archives 
 Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission Archives 
  




National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland 
 Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool 
 Record Groups 59, 165, 306, 319, 331, 338, 407, and 496 
 




 Asia Foundation Records, 1951-1996 
Charles T. R. Bohannan Papers, 1915-1985 
Committee for a Free Asia Collection, 1951-1953 
Kuomintang Records 
 Mah Soo-Lay Papers, 1941-2000 
















Philippine Diary Project [http://philippinediaryproject.wordpress.com] 
 
Taiwan Review (formerly the Free China Review) [http://taiwantoday.tw] 
 






Chinese Commercial News [Huaqiao shangbao 華僑商報] 
Chungking Times 
Daily News 
Fookien Times [Xinmin ribao 新閩日報] 
Great China Press [Dazhonghua ribao 大中華日報] 
Guerrilla 
Kong Li Po [Gongli bao 公理報] 
Manila Times 





Central Daily News [Zhongyang ribao 中央日報] 




Economic Daily News [Jingji ribao 經濟日報] 








New York Times 
 
Published primary sources 
 
“Agenda of 19th IPI Assembly, Hong Kong, May 17-20, 1970.” IPI Report: Monthly Bulletin of 
the International Press Institute, Vol. 18 (December 1969): 5. 
 
Aguilar, Filomeno V., Jr. “Interview with Benito Lim: Philippine Citizenship through Mass 
Naturalization, a Dictator’s Largesse?” Philippine Studies 60.3 (2012): 391-415.  
 
Ang See, Carmelea. Interview with Go Bon Juan. http://www.china-studies.taipei/comm2/Go 
Bon Juan.pdf. July 28, 2016. 
 
Ang See, Teresita, and Carmelea Ang See. “Navigating Cultures, Forming Identities.” Kritika 
Kultura 21 / 22 (2013 / 2014): 353-372. 
 
Cai, Jingfu 蔡景福. Liuzai ZhongFei menghuan jian 六載中菲夢幻間. Taipei: Zhaoming 
chubanshe, 1978. 
 
Cai Wenhua xiansheng jinian ji 蔡文華先生紀念集. Taipei: Zhonghua caise yinshua gufen 
youxian gongsi, 1980.  
 
Chang, Tsun-wu張存武, Chu Hong-yuan朱浤源, Dory Poa潘露莉, and Lin Shu-hui林淑慧, 
ed. The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines菲律賓華僑華人訪問記錄. 
Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1996.  
 
Chao, Ching Win 周鯨文. Fengbao shinian: Zhongguo hongse zhengquan de zhen mianmao風
暴十年: 中國紅色政權的真面貌. 1959. https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-
books/zjw1959/.  
 
Chen, Chu-Pei. “Chinese and the War in the Philippines.” Ms. submitted to Institute of Pacific 
Relations, c. 1948. Available at Library of Congress, Washington, DC.  
 
Chen, Hsiao-yu 陳笑予, ed. Philippine Chinese Chronicle 菲律賓語華僑事蹟大觀. Vols. 1-2. 





Chen, Lieh-fu 陳烈甫. Feilübin huaqiao jiaoyu 菲律賓華僑教育. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 
1958. 
 
Chen, Lieh-fu 陳烈甫. Feiyou guangan ji 菲遊觀感記. Xiamen: Nanyang tongxunshe, 1948. 
 
Cheng, Stanway. “Free press must walk legal tightrope.” IPI Report: Monthly Bulletin of the 
International Press Institute, Vol. 13 (November 1964): 7. 
 
Chiang, Kai-shek. Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-up at Seventy. New York: Farrar, Strauss, 
and Kudahy, 1957.  
 
Chou, Hsiu-huan 周琇環, ed. Zhanhou waijiaobu gongzuo baogao: minguo 39 nian zhi 42 nian 
戰後外交部工作報告: 民國三十九年至四十二年. Xindian: Guoshiguan, 2001.  
 
Commission of the Census, Commonwealth of the Philippines. Census of the Philippines: 1939, 
Vol. II: Summary for the Philippines and General Report for the Censuses of Population 
and Agriculture. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941. 
 
Cua, Siok Po 柯叔寶. Fendou rensheng 奮鬥人生. Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gufen youxian 
gongsi, 1982. 
 
Cua, Siok Po 柯叔寶. Song dahan hun: Ke Shubao lü Fei shiwen cun 頌大漢魂: 柯叔寶旅菲詩
文存. Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1980. 
 
Dahan hun yuekan 大漢魂月刊. Vol. 1, No. 1 (1946). 
 
Du, Ai 杜埃. Fengyu Taipingyang 风雨太平洋. Vol. 1. Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 1985. 
 
Du, Ai 杜埃. Fengyu Taipingyang 风雨太平洋. Vol. 2. Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 1988. 
 
Du, Ai 杜埃. Fengyu Taipingyang 风雨太平洋. Vol. 3. Zhuhai: Zhuhai chubanshe, 2002. 
 
Dulles, John Foster. “Policy for the Far East.” The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 39, No. 
1017 (December 22, 1958): 989-994. 
 
Dy Sun, Vicente 李峻峰. Li Junfeng liushi huiyi李峻峰六十回憶. Taipei: Kenye Co., [1976].  
 
Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The Philippine Chinese 
Decennial Book 1954-1974 [Shang Zong ershi nian: Feihua shanglian zonghui chengli 
ershi zhounian jinian tekan 商總二十年: 菲華商聯總會成立二十週年紀念特刊]. 
Manila, 1974. 
 
“Feidao huaqiao yu gongdang baozhi zaoyao zhongshang Shi Yisheng fouren yu souchashi 
youguan 菲島華僑與共黨報紙造謠中傷施逸生否認搜查事有關.” Jiaotongbu Jinpuqu 





Feilübin Minlila zhonghua shanghui wushi zhounian jinian kan 菲律賓岷里拉中華商會務實周
年紀念刊. Manila: Feilübin Minlila zhonghua shanghui, 1955.  
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Vol. VIII: The Far East. Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1947. 
 
Free China Magazine. Vol. I, No. 2 (October 10, 1951).  
 
Gongfei dui huaqiao zhi yinmou 共匪對華僑之陰謀. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1954. 
 
Gongfei huoqiao shilu 共匪禍僑實錄. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1955. 
 
Gong, Taoyi龚陶怡, ed. Feilübin huaqiao guiqiao aiguo danxin lu 菲律宾华侨归侨爱国丹心
录. Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 2002.  
 
Gong, Taoyi龚陶怡, ed. Feilübin huaqiao kangri aiguo yinghun lu菲律宾华侨抗日爱国英魂
录. Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 2001.  
 
Gong, Taoyi龚陶怡, ed. Feilübin huaqiao kangri douzheng jishi 菲律宾华侨抗日斗争纪实. 
Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1997.  
 
Hack, Karl, and C. C. Chin. Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on Malayan Communist 
Party. Singapore: NUS Press, 2004. 
 
Hawkins, John. “U.S. Intervenes in Chen Yu-hsi Case.” The Roach, Vol. 1, No. 8 (August 28-
September 11, 1968): 1-2. https://evols.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10524/ 
47907/1/RoachV1no8.pdf. 
 
Hernandez, Jose Ma. And the Day But One: An Autobiography. Manila: Aljun Printing Press, 
2000. 
 
Hing, Reynard. Interview with Teresita Ang See. http://www.china-studies.taipei/comm2/ 
Teresita Ang See2.pdf. September 13, 2016. 
 
“History of Chinese Commercial News.” Undated. http://web.archive.org/web/20050503203257/ 
http://www.siongpo.com/ history2.htm. 
 
Hsin, Kwan-chue邢光祖. Jingli de rensheng鏡裏的人生. Taipei: Great Han Publishing 
Company, 1976. 
 
Huang, Wei 黄薇, and Gong Taoyi龚怡淘. Fengyu rensheng 风雨人生. Beijing: Zhongguo 
wenshi chubanshe, 2000. 
 
Huaqiao shehui de luxiang: Shangbao yanlun xuanji 華僑社會的路向: 商報言論選輯. Manila: 





“IPI Committee for Taiwan but Board expects greater press freedom.” IPI Report: Monthly 
Bulletin of the International Press Institute, Vol. 18 (July-August 1969): 6. 
 
In Re Chin Sang, et. als., Respondents, Case No. R-489: Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum. 
Manila: Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar, January 4, 1954.  
 
Journal of Philippine Statistics. Volume XV, No. 1 (January-March 1962). 
 
Kotah, Sining. Interview with Florencio Mallare. http://politics.ntu.edu.tw/RAEC/comm2/ 
Florencio Mallare.pdf. November 29, 2016. 
 
Kubek, Anthony. Communism at Pearl Harbor: How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl 
Harbor and Open Up Asia to Communization. Dallas: Teacher Publishing Company, 
1959. 
 
Li, Pusheng 李樸生. Wo ke pei de huaqiao pengyou 我可佩的華僑朋友. Taipei: Zhengzhong 
shuju, 1958.  
 
Liang, Shang Yuan [Leong Siong Yuen], and Cai Jian Hua [Chua Kian Hua]. The Wha Chi 
Memoirs. Trans. Joaquin Sy. Manila: Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, 1998. 
 
Liu, Haoran 刘浩然, ed. Xu Li tongzhi zhuisi jinian kan 许立同志追思纪念刊 1905-1995. 
Quanzhou: Feilübin Xushi zongqin zonghui, 1995.  
 
Leong, Siong Yuen梁上苑. “Feihua baoye hua cangsang 菲华报业话沧桑.” Nanya yu 
dongnanya ziliao 5 (1983): 90-104. 
 
Leong, Siong Yuen 梁上苑. Feilübin 菲律賓. Hong Kong: Xin Zhongguo shuju, 1949.   
 
Leong, Siong Yuen 梁上苑, and Chua Kian Hua 蔡建華. Huazhi huiyi lu: ji Feilübin huaqiao 
kangri youji zhidui 華支回憶錄: 記菲律賓華僑抗日游擊支隊. Hong Kong: Bada 
chubanshe, 1996. 
 
“Memorandum to Executive Council. Policy Towards the KMT.” Colonial Office Records 1022 
/ 198. National University of Singapore Library.  
 
“Motto: Professionalism – Chinese Language Press Institute Inaugurated.” IPI Report: Monthly 
Bulletin of the International Press Institute, Vol. 17 (February 1969): 7. 
 
Navarro, Nelson A., ed. Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir. Quezon City: ABS CBN Publishing, 
2012. 
 
New China Review. Vol. I, No. 2 (October 1, 1945). 
 





New China Review. Vol. I, No. 5 (November 16, 1945).  
 
Ong, Santos 王文汉. Fengchen wushinian 风尘五十年. Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban 
gongsi, 1989.  
 
Pao, Shih-tien 鮑事天. Yang hao ji 養浩集. Manila: Feilübin Zhongzheng xueyuan Shitian 
wenjiao jijin hui, 1996. 
 
Philippine-Chinese Business Guide & Pictorial Directory. Cebu City: Philippine Konghooy 
Publication, 1953.  
 
Philippine Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. Golden Book 1955: Commercial Almanac 
and Yearbook 1904-1954 [Feilübin Minlila zhonghua shanghui wushi zhounian jinian 
kan 菲律賓岷里拉中華商會五十周年紀念刊]. Manila: Fookien Times Publishing 
Company, 1955. 
 
Pomeroy, William J. Bilanggo: Life as a Political Prisoner in the Philippines, 1952-1962. 
Diliman: University of the Philippines Press, 2009.  
 
Qiaobao huiguo guanguang zhinan 僑胞回國觀光指南. Taipei: Qiaowu weiyuanhui, September 
1958.  
 
Qiaowu tongji 僑務統計. Taipei: Qiaowu weiyuanhui tongjishi, 1962-1969.  
 
Qiao zi gongchang zai Ziyou Zhongguo 僑資工廠在自由中國. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1958. 
 
Quick, Craig. “Student-Faculty Union Observer Leaves to Chen Trial.” The Roach, Vol. 1, No. 6 
(July 30-August 12, 1968): 10. https://evols.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10524/ 
47906/1/RoachV1no6.pdf. 
 
“Recognition suspended.” IPI Report: Monthly Bulletin of the International Press Institute, Vol. 
20 (November 1971): 1. 
 
Roxas, Manuel, and Chen Chih-ping. “Sino-Philippine Treaty of Amity, April 1947.” The 
International Law Quarterly 2.1 (1948): 132-134.   
 
Shen, Fushui 沈福水. “Feilübin huaqiao ge laogong tuanti lianhehui de zhanmen licheng 菲律宾
华侨个劳工团体联合会的战斗历程.” Guangdong wenshi ziliao 54 (1988): 100-133. 
 
Tang, Tack 鄧英達. Wo zai Shang Zong sanshinian: Deng Yingda huiyi lu我在商總三十年: 鄧
英達回憶錄. Manila, 1988.  
 
Taruc, Luis. Born of the People. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1953.  
 
Ten Days in September: Imelda Romualdez Marcos in China. Manila: Department of Public 





The Fookien Times Yearbook 1952. Manila: The Fookien Times, September 1952.  
 
The Fookien Times Yearbook 1953. Manila: The Fookien Times, September 1953. 
 
The Fookien Times Yearbook 1957. Manila: The Fookien Times, September 1957. 
 
Wang, Tih-wu 王惕吾. Lianhe bao sanshinian de fazhan 聯合報三十年的發展. Taipei: Lianhe 
bao she, 1981.  
 
Wang, Tih-wu 王惕吾. Wo yu xinwen shiye 我與新聞事業. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye 
gongsi, 1991. 
 
Yuyitung, Rizal, ed. The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers: Philippine Press Freedom Under Siege. 
Manila: Yuyitung Foundation, 2000. 
 
Yuyitung, Rizal 于長庚, ed. Liangdi yuanyu: Yu Changcheng Changgeng qianpei an huibian 兩
地冤獄: 于長城長庚遣配案彙編. Manila: Yu Yitong jijinhui, 2000. 
 
Yuyitung, Rizal 于長庚, ed. Zhong hun yi po: Yu Yitong lieshi yu Huaqiao shangbao 忠魂毅魄: 
于以同烈士與華僑商報. Manila: Yu Yitong jijinhui, 1997. 
 
“Zhe yizhou Huaqiao daobao shijian 這一周華僑導報事件.” Fengxia 風下, Vol. 42 (1946): 35. 
 
Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai yibai nian 中國國民黨在海外一百年. Taipei: Haiwai 
chubanshe, 1994. 
 
Zhonggong zenyang duidai qiaosheng 中共怎樣對待僑生. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1956. 
 





Abinales, Patricio N., and Donna J. Amoroso. State and Society in the Philippines. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.  
 
Agpalo, Remigio E. The Political Process and the Nationalization of the Retail Trade in the 
Philippines. Diliman: University of the Philippines, Office of Coordinator of Research, 
1962. 
 
Aguilar, Filomeno V., Jr. “Between the Letter and Spirit of the Law: Ethnic Chinese and 






Akashi, Yoji. The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941. Lawrence, KS: 
University of Kansas Press, 1970.  
 
Alejandrino, Clark L. “The Population History of the Chinese in the Philippines: An Evaluative 
Historiography.” Philippine Population Review 9.1 (2010): 85-108. 
 
Alexander, Garth. Silent Invasion: The Chinese in Southeast Asia. London: Macdonald & 
Company, 1973.  
 
Alip, Eufronio M. Ten Centuries of Philippine-Chinese Relations (Historical, Political, Social, 
Economic). Manila: Alip & Sons, 1959.  
 
Amyot, Jacques. The Chinese and the National Integration in Southeast Asia. Bangkok: Institute 
of Asian Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, October 1972. 
 
Amyot, Jacques. The Manila Chinese: Familism in the Philippine Environment. Quezon City: 
Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, 1973. 
 
An, Thomas S. “The Overseas Chinese in South Vietnam: A Note.” Vietnam Perspectives 2.4 
(1967): 13-19. 
 
Appleton, Sheldon. “Communism and the Chinese in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 32.4 
(1959): 376-391. 
 
Bachrack, Stanley K. The Committee of One Million: “China Lobby” Politics, 1953-1971. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1976.  
 
Barrett, Tracy C. The Chinese Diaspora in South-East Asia: the Overseas Chinese in Indochina. 
London: I. B. Tauris, 2012. 
 
Bayly, C. A. Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in 
India, 1780-1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Bayly, Susan. Asian Voices in a Post-Colonial Age: Vietnam, India and Beyond. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Bekker, Konrad, and Charles Wolf, Jr. “The Philippine Balance of Payments.” Far Eastern 
Survey 19.4 (1950): 41-43. 
 
Benite, Zvi Ben-dor, Stefanos Geroulanos, and Nicole Jerr, ed. The Scaffolding of Sovereignty: 
Global and Aesthetic Perspectives on the History of a Concept. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2017.  
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Trans. Richard Nice. 





Blaker, James Roland. “The Chinese in the Philippines: A Study of Power and Change.” Ph.D. 
diss., The Ohio State University, 1970. 
 
Blaker, James Roland. “The Chinese Newspaper in the Philippines: Toward the Definition of a 
Tool.” Asian Studies 3.2 (1965): 243-261.  
 
Bolt, J. Paul. China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary 
Asia. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 
 
Brazinsky, Gregg. Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a 
Democracy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
 
Brett, Judith, and Mei-fen Kuo. Unlocking the History of the Australasian Kuo Min Tang 1911-
2013. North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2013.  
 
Brubaker, Rogers. Ethnicity Without Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
 
Bullard, Monte R. The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan’s 
Development. Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997. 
 
Camiling, Alejandro. “Brig. Gen. Marcos G. Soliman.” http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~camiling/bio/ 
solimanm.htm. October 19, 2001. 
 
Carino, Theresa, ed. Chinese in the Philippines. Manila: China Studies Program, De La Salle 
University, 1985.  
 
Carino, Theresa Chong. Chinese Big Business in the Philippines: Political Leadership and 
Change. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998.  
 
Celoza, Albert F. Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of 
Authoritarianism. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. 
 
Chan, Shelly. “The Disobedient Diaspora: Overseas Chinese Students in Mao’s China, 1958-66.” 
Journal of Chinese Overseas 10.2 (2014): 220-238.  
 
Chan, Shelly. “The Case for Diaspora: A Temporal Approach to the Chinese Experience.” 
Journal of Asian Studies 74.1 (2015): 107-128. 
 
Chan, Shelly. Diaspora’s Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration. Durham, 
NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2018. 
 
Chan, Shelly. “The Overseas Chinese (Huaqiao) Project: Nation, Culture, and Race in Modern 





Chang, Cheng David. “To Return Home or ‘Return to Taiwan’: Conflicts and Survival in the 
‘Voluntary Repatriation’ of Chinese POWs in the Korean War.” Ph.D. diss., University 
of California, San Diego, 2011. 
 
Chang, David W. “Current Status of Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia.” Asian Survey 13.6 
(1973): 587-603.  
 
Chang, David W. “U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan.” Asian Survey 5.3 (1965): 152-
1960.  
 
Chang, Hui-Ching, and Richard Holt. Language, Politics and Identity in Taiwan: Naming China. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2015. 
 
Chang, Pao-min. Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian 
Studies, 1982.  
 
Chang, Pao-min. “The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Over the Ethnic Chinese.” The China Quarterly 
90 (1982): 195-230. 
 
Chang, Te-Tsui. “Land Utilization on Taiwan.” Land Economics 28.4 (1952): 362-368. 
 
Chang, Tsun-wu 張存武 and Ong Kok-Chung 王國璋. Feihua shanglian zonghui zhi xingshuai 
yu yanbian 菲華商聯總會之興衰與演變. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan yatai yanjiu 
jishu, 2002. 
 
Chen, Horng-Yu 陳鴻瑜. Zhonghua minguo yu dongnanya geguo waijiao guanxi shi 中華民國
與東南亞各國外交關系史, 1912-2000. Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 2004.  
 
Chen, Ketty W. “Disciplining Taiwan: The Kuomintang’s Methods of Control during the White 
Terror Era (1947-1987).” Taiwan International Studies Quarterly 4.4 (2008): 185-210. 
 
Chen, Kuan-Hsing. Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization. Durham, NC, and London: 
Duke University Press, 2010. 
 
Chen, Jian. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001. 
 
Cheung, Shing Kit. “Immigrating Visitors: the Case of Overstaying Chinese in the Philippines, 
1947-75.” M.Phil. thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1997.  
 
Chiang, Bo-wei. “A Special Intermittence and Continuity in Local History: The Chinese 
Diaspora and Their Hometown in Battlefield Quemoy during 1949-1960s.” Journal of 
Chinese Overseas 7 (2011): 169-186. 
 
Chinvanno, Anuson. Thailand’s Policies Towards China, 1949-54. Basingstoke and London: 





Chirot, Daniel, and Anthony Reid, ed. Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern 
Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1997. 
 
Chu, Richard T. Chinese and the Chinese Mestizos of Manila: Family, Identity, and Culture, 
1860s-1930s. Leiden: Brill, 2010. 
 
Chu, Yun-han, and Jih-wen Lin. “Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, 
Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity.” The China Quarterly 
165 (2001): 102-129. 
 
Chun, Allen. “From Nationalism to Nationalizing: Cultural Imagination and State Formation in 
Postwar Taiwan.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 31 (1994): 49-69. 
 
Chun, Allen. “Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity and Culture as Identity.” 
boundary 2 23.2 (1996): 111-138.  
 
Chui, Kwei-chiang. “The Response of the Malayan Chinese to Political and Military 
Developments in China, 1945-1949.” Research Project Series 4 (October 1977). Institute 
of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Graduate Studies, Nanyang University 
 
Claudio, Lisandro E. “The Anti-Communist Third World: Carlos Romulo and the Other 
Bandung.” Southeast Asian Studies 4.1 (2015): 125-156.  
 
Clinton, Maggie. Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925-1937. Durham, 
NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2017. 
 
Clymer, Kenton. A Delicate Relationship: The United States and Burma / Myanmar since 1945. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 
 
Cochran, Sherman. “Capitalists Choosing Communist China: The Liu Family of Shanghai, 1948-
56.” In Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China, edited 
by Jeremy Brown and Paul Pickowicz, 359-386. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2007. 
 
Cook, Alexander, ed. Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013. 
 
Connelly, Matthew. “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the 
Algerian War for Independence.” The American Historical Review 105.3 (2000): 739-
769. 
 
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley: University 





Copper, John. Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009. 
 
Cortés, Irene G. “Mass Naturalization by Legislation and the Chinese in the Philippines.” 
Philippine Law Journal 52.4 (1977): 353-373. 
 
Craft, Stephen G. American Justice in Taiwan: The 1957 Riots and Cold War Foreign Policy. 
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014.  
 
Cullather, Nick. Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippine 
Relations, 1942-1960. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. 
 
Culp, Robert. Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and Student Politics in Southeastern 
China, 1912-1940. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007. 
 
Cushman, Jennifer, and Wang Gungwu, ed. Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese 
since World War II. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1986. 
 
Dikötter, Frank. The Age of Openness: China before Mao. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2008. 
 
Dirlik, Arif. “The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in 
Counterrevolution.” Journal of Asian Studies 34.4 (1975): 945-980. 
 
Doronila, Amando. The State, Economic Transformation, and Political Change in the 
Philippines, 1946-1972. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992.  
 
Duara, Prasenjit. “Nationalists among Transnationalists: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 
1900-1911.” In Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese 
Transnationalism, edited by Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, 39-60. New York: 
Routledge, 1997.  
 
Duara, Prasenjit. “The global and regional constitution of nations: the view from East Asia.” 
Nations and Nationalism 14.2 (2008): 323-345.  
 
Duara, Prasenjit. “Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945,” 
American Historical Review 102.4 (1997): 1030-1051. 
 
Durham, Martin, and Margaret Power, ed. New Perspectives on the Transnational Right. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.  
 
Eagleton, Terry. Ideology: An Introduction. London and New York: Verso Books, 1991. 
 
Efimova, Larissa. “Did the Soviet Union instruct Southeast Asian communists to revolt? New 
Russian evidence on the Calcutta Youth Conference of February 1948.” Journal of 





Felix, Alfonso, ed. The Chinese in the Philippines. Vol. II. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing 
House, 1969. 
 
Fineman, Daniel. A Special Relationship: the United States and Military Government in 
Thailand, 1947-1958. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997. 
 
Fitzgerald, John. Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. 
 
Fitzgerald, Stephen. China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking’s Changing Policy, 
1949-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 
 
Friedman, Jeremy. Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Split and the Third World. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015. 
 
Garver, John. China’s Quest: A History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of 
China. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.  
 
Gibson, Richard Michael, and Wenhua Chen. The Secret Army: Chiang Kai-shek and the Drug 
Warlords of the Golden Triangle. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2011.  
 
Glosser, Susan. Chinese Visions of Family and State, 1915-1953. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003. 
 
Gold, Thomas B. State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986. 
 
Goodman, Bryna. Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 
1853-1937. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 
 
Goscha, Christopher. Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 
1885-1954. London: Curzon Press, 1999. 
 
Greene, J. Megan. The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the 
Quest for Modernization. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2008.   
 
Guingona, Phillip B. “Crafted Links and Accidental Connections of Empires: A History of Early 
Twentieth Century Sino-Philippine Interaction.” Ph.D. diss, State University of New 
York, Buffalo, 2015. 
 
Guingona, Phillip B. “The Sundry Acquaintances of Dr. Albino Z. Sycip: Exploring the 
Shanghai-Manila Connection, circa 1910-1940.” Journal of World History 27.1 (2016): 
27-52. 
 
Hanssens, V. “The Campaign against Nationalist Chinese.” In Indonesia’s Struggle, 1957-1958, 






Hara, Fujio. Malayan Chinese and China: Conversion in Identity Consciousness, 1945-1957. 
Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003.  
 
Hau, Caroline S. “Becoming ‘Chinese’ in Southeast Asia.” In Sinicization and the Rise of China: 
Civilizational processes beyond East and West, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 175-206. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2012.  
 
Hau, Caroline S. Necessary Fictions: Philippine Literature and the Nation, 1946-1980. Quezon 
City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000. 
 
Hau, Caroline S. The Chinese Question: Ethnicity, Nation, and Region in and Beyond the 
Philippines. Singapore: NUS Press, 2014.  
 
Hau, Caroline S., and Kasian Tejapira, ed. Traveling Nation-Makers: Transnational Flows and 
Movements in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 
2011. 
 
Hernandez, Eduardo F., and Oscar A. Domingo. Philippine Immigration Law and Procedure. 
Mandaluyong, Rizal: SMA Printing Company, 1970. 
 
Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From principle to pragmatism. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2007.  
 
Hillman, Ben, and Gray Tuttle, ed. Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in 
China’s West. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016. 
 
Ho, Ming-sho. Working Class Formation in Taiwan: Fractured Solidarity in State-Owned 
Enterprises, 1945-2012. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
 
Hsia, Chen-hwa 夏誠華. Feihua zhengce dui huaqiao jingji zhi yingxiang菲化政策對華僑經濟
之影響. Taipei: Zhonghua minguo haiwai huaren yanjiu xuehui, 2003. 
 
Hsia, Chen-hwa 夏誠華. Minguo yilai de qiaowu yu huaqiao jiaoyu yanjiu民國以來的僑務與
僑教研究 (1912-2004). Hsinchu: Xuanzang daxue haiwai huaren yanjiu zhongxin, 2005.  
 
Hsiao, Shi-ching. Chinese-Philippine Diplomatic Relations 1946-1975. Quezon City: Bookman 
Printing House, 1975. 
 
Hsiao, Shi-ching 蕭曦清. ZhongFei waijiao shi 中菲外交史. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1995.  
 






Hsu, Madeline Y. Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration 
between the United States and South China, 1882-1943. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000.  
 
Huang, Ching-Yi. “Performing an Absent China: Cultural Propaganda in Anti-Communist 
Taiwan in the 1950’s and 1960’s.” Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 2013. 
 
Huang, Jianli. “Umbilical Ties: The Framing of the Overseas Chinese as the Mother of the 
Revolution.” Frontiers of History in China 6.2 (2011): 183-228. 
 
Iriye, Akira. Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California 
Press, 2002.  
 
Jackson, Robert. Sovereignty. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. 
 
Jiang, Xingshan 姜兴山. Zhanhou Feilübin huawen jiaoyu yanjiu 战后菲律宾华文教育研究
(1945-1976). Guangzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe, 2013. 
 
Johnson, Matthew D. “Propaganda and Sovereignty in Wartime China: Morale Operations and 
Psychological Warfare under the Office of War Information.” Modern Asian Studies 45.2 
(2011): 303-344.  
 
Kerkvliet, Benedict J. The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.  
 
Khin Khin Myint Jensen. “The Chinese in the Philippines During the American Regime, 1898-
1946.” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1956. 
 
Koen, Ross Y. The China Lobby in American Politics. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 
 
Koh, Ernest. Diaspora at War: The Chinese of Singapore Between Empire and Nation, 1937-
1945. Leiden: Brill, 2013.  
 
Kramer, Paul A. The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the 
Philippines. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. “The Case for Shared Sovereignty.” Journal of Democracy 16.1 (2005): 69-
83. 
 
Kuhn, Philip A. Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times. Lanham, MD: Rowman 





Kwon, Heonik. The Other Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
 
Lary, Diana. China’s Civil War: A Social History, 1945-1949. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015. 
 
Lawson, Konrad Mitchell. “Wartime Atrocities and the Politics of Treason in the Ruins of the 
Japanese Empire, 1937-1953.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2012. 
 
Lee, Hock Guan. “Shades of Citizenship: Betwixt the Civic and the Ethnic.” Southeast Asian 
Affairs (2013): 168-188. 
 
Liang, Ziheng 梁子衡. Huaqiao shehui yanjiu 華僑社會研究. Hong Kong: Haichao chubanshe, 
1958. 
 
Liao, Shubert S. C., ed. Chinese Participation in Philippine Culture and Economy. Manila, 1964. 
 
Lim, Benito. “The Political Economy of Philippines-China Relations.” Philippine APEC Study 
Center Network Discussion Paper No. 99-16 (September 1999): 1-26. 
 
Lin, Hsiao-ting. Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and the Making of 
Taiwan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.  
 
Lin, James. “Sowing Seeds and Knowledge: Agricultural Development in Taiwan and the 
World, 1925-1975.” East Asian Science and Technology: An International Journal 9 
(2015): 127-149.  
 
Lipkin, Zwia. Useless to the State: “Social Problems” and Social Engineering in Nationalist 
Nanjing, 1927-1937. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 
2006. 
 
Liu, Chi-tien 劉芝田. ZhongFei guanxi shi 中菲關係史. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1964.  
 
Liu, Jennifer. “Indoctrinating the Youth: Guomindang Policy on Secondary Education in 
Wartime China and Postwar Taiwan, 1937-1960.” Ph.D. diss., University of California, 
Irvine, 2010. 
 
Liu, Hong. China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965. Singapore: NUS Press, 2011. 
 
Lu, Fang-Shang 呂芳上, ed. Zhanhou chuqi de Taiwan 戰後初期的台灣 (1945-1960s). Taipei: 
Guoshiguan, 2015. 
 
Lupke, Christopher. “Reflections on Situating Taiwan in Modern Chinese Cultural Studies.” 
Journal of Asian Studies 71.1 (2012): 57-61.  
 
Luthi, Lorenz. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton: Princeton 





Mabon, David W. “Elusive Agreements: The Pacific Pact Proposals of 1949-1951.” Pacific 
Historical Review 57.2 (1988): 144-177. 
 
MacKinnon, Stephen R. “Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period.” 
Modern China 23.1 (1997): 3-32. 
 
MacNeil, Neil, and Richard A. Baker. The American Senate: An Insider’s History. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 
 
Maier, Charles. “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the 
Modern Era.” American Historical Review 105.3 (2000): 807-831. 
 
Mao, Joyce. Asia First: China and the Making of Modern American Conservatism. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015.  
 
Marks, Thomas A. Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang. London and 
Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998.  
 
Masuda Hajimu. Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World. Cambridge, 
MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2015. 
 
McBeath, Gerald A. Political Integration of the Philippine Chinese. Berkeley: Center for South 
and Southeast Asian Studies, 1973. 
 
McCarthy, Charles, ed. Philippine-Chinese Profile: Essays & Studies. Manila: Pagkakaisa Sa 
Pag-unlad, 1974.  
 
McCoy, Alfred W. Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise 
of the Surveillance State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.  
 
McKeown, Adam. “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1840 to 1949.” Journal of Asian Studies 
58.2 (1999): 306-337. 
 
Miller, Edward. Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam. 
Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2013.  
 
Moon, Yumi. Populist Collaborators: The Ilchinhoe and the Japanese Colonization of Korea, 
1896-1910. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013. 
 
Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, MA, and London: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.  
 






Myers, Ramon, and Hsiao-ting Lin. Breaking with the Past: The Kuomintang Central Reform 
Committee on Taiwan, 1950-52. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2007. 
 
Nedostup, Rebecca. “Burying, Repatriating, and Leaving the Dead in Wartime and Postwar 
China and Taiwan, 1937-1955.” Journal of Chinese History 1 (2017): 111-139. 
 
Nedostup, Rebecca. Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity. 
Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009. 
 
Ngoei, Wen-Qing. “The Domino Logic of the Darkest Moment: The Fall of Singapore, the 
Atlantic Echo Chamber, and ‘Chinese Penetration’ in U.S. Cold War Policy toward 
Southeast Asia.” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 21 (2014): 215-245.  
 
Nkrumah, Kwame. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. New York: International 
Publishers, 1966. 
 
Nonini, Donald M. “Getting By”: Class and State Formation among Chinese in Malaysia. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 
 
Omohundro, John T. Chinese Merchant Families in Iloilo: Commerce and Kin in a Central 
Philippine City. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1981.  
 
Ong, Soon Keong. “‘Chinese, but not quite’”: Huaqiao and the Marginalization of the Overseas 
Chinese.” Journal of Chinese Overseas 9 (2013): 1-32. 
 
Oyen, Meredith. “Communism, Containment, and the Chinese Overseas.” In The Cold War in 
Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds, edited by Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu, and 
Michael Szonyi, 59-94. Leiden: Brill, 2010.  
 
Oyen, Meredith. The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-
Chinese Relations in the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 
 
Pan, Meizhi潘美智. “1960 niandai Feilübin huaqiao lai Tai touzi baoxianye zhi yanjiu – yi Shi 
Xingshui ji Yang Yinglin wei li [1960] 年代菲律賓華僑來臺投資保險業之研究 – 以施
性水及楊應琳為例.” M.A. thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 1991.  
 
Peterson, Glen. Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2012.  
 
Phillips, Steven E. Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter 
Nationalist China, 1945-1950. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.  
 
Plummer, Mark. “Taiwan: Toward a Second Generation of Mainland Rule.” Asian Survey 10.1 





Png, Poh Seng. “The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941.” Journal of Southeast Asian History 
2.1 (1961): 1-32.  
 
Purcell, Victor. The Chinese in Southeast Asia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980.  
 
Quanzhou shi huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed. Quanzhou shi huaqiao zhi 泉州市華僑志. 
Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1996. 
 
Quisumbing, Purificacion C. Valera. Beijing-Manila Détente Major Issues: A Study in China-
ASEAN Relations. Quezon City: Bookman Printing House, 1983. 
 
Rawnsley, Gary D. Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000. 
 
Reid, Anthony. Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
 
Rempel, William C. Delusions of a Dictator: The Mind of Marcos as Revealed in His Secret 
Diaries. Boston: Little, Brown, 1993. 
 
Ren, Na 任娜. Feilübin shehui shenghuo zhong de huaren (1935-1965): cong zuji guanxi de 
jiaodu suo zuo de tansuo菲律宾社会生活中的华人: 从族际关系的角度所作的探索. 
Guizhou: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 2004.  
 
Righter, Rosemary. IPI The Undivided Word: A History of the International Press Institute, Part 
I: 1951-1976. London and Zurich: International Press Institute, 1976.  
 
Rosenberg, David. “The End of the Freest Press in the World.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars 5.1 (1973): 53-57. 
 
Rossinow, Doug. “The Dirty War Network: Right-Wing Internationalism through Cold War 
America.” In Outside In: The Transnational Circuitry of US History, edited by Andrew 
Preston and Doug Rossinow, 230-246. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.  
 
Rubinstein, Murray, ed. Taiwan: A New History. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.  
 
Sacks, Milton. “The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia.” Pacific Affairs 23.3 (1950): 
227-247.  
 
See, Chinben. “Chinese Clanship in the Philippine Setting.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 
12.1 (1981): 224-247. 
 
See, Chinben. “Chinese Organizations and Ethnic Identity in the Philippines.” In Changing 
Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II, edited by Jennifer Cushman 





See, Chinben. “The Ethnic Chinese in the Philippines.” In The Ethnic Chinese in the ASEAN 
States: Bibliographic Essays, edited by Leo Suryadinata, 203-220. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1989.  
 
See, Chinben, and Teresita Ang See. Chinese in the Philippines: A Bibliography. Manila: 
Chinese Studies Program, De La Salle University, 1990.  
 
Shalom, Stephen Rosskamm. The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism. 
Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1981. 
 
Shao, Dan. “Chinese by Definition: Nationality Law, Jus Sanguinis, and State Succession, 1909-
1980.” Twentieth-Century China 35.1 (2009): 4-28. 
 
Shen, Zhihua. After Leaning to One Side: China and its Allies in the Cold War. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011. 
 
Shih, Shu-mei, Chien-tsin Tsai, and Brian Bernards, ed. Sinophone Studies: A Critical Reader. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. 
 
Sidel, John T. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Simpson, Bradley R. Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian 
Relations, 1960-1968. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.  
 
Skinner, G. William. Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1958.  
 
Skinner, G. William. “Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia.” Southeast Asia Program, 
Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, December 1950. 
 
Skinner, G. William. “Chinese Assimilation and Thai Politics.” Journal of Asian Studies 16.2 
(1957): 237-250. 
 
Skinner, G. William. “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 321 (1959): 136-147. 
 
Song, Ping 宋平. Chengji yu shanbian: dangdai Feilübin huaren shetuan bijiao yanjiu承继与嬗
变: 当代菲律宾华人社团比较研究. Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 1995.  
 
Steinberg, David Joel. Philippine Collaboration in World War II. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1967. 
 
Stern, Lewis M. “The Overseas Chinese in Vietnam, 1920-75: Demography, Social Structure, 





Stern, Lewis M. “Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards the Overseas Chinese, 1960-75.” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 7.4 (1986): 277-291. 
 
Strauss, Julia C. Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 1927-
1940. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
Suryadinata, Leo, ed. Southeast Asian Personalities of Chinese Descent: A Biographical 
Dictionary. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012.  
 
Szonyi, Michael. Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Szonyi, Michael, and Hong Liu. “Introduction: New Approaches to the Study of the Cold War in 
Asia.” In The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds, edited by Zheng 
Yangwen, Hong Liu, and Michael Szonyi, 1-14. Leiden: Brill, 2010. 
 
Tan, Antonio S. The Chinese in the Philippines, 1898-1935: A Study of Their National 
Awakening. Quezon City: R. P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1972. 
 
Tan, Antonio S. The Chinese in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945. 
Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press: 1981. 
 
Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China. 
Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.  
 
Taylor, Jeremy E. “The Production of the Chiang Kai-Shek Personality Cult, 1929-1975.” The 
China Quarterly 185 (2006): 96-110. 
 
Tilly, Charles. Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1984. 
 
Tilman, Robert O. “Philippine Chinese Students.” Unpublished mss. 
 
Tilman, Robert O. “The Philippines in 1970: A Difficult Decade Begins.” Asian Survey 11.2 
(1971): 139-148. 
 
To, James Jiann Hua. Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese. Leiden: 
Brill, 2014.  
 
Tozer, Warren. “Taiwan’s ‘Cultural Renaissance’: A Preliminary View.” The China Quarterly 
43 (1970): 81-99. 
 
Tsui, Brian Kai Hin. “China’s Forgotten Revolution: Radical Conservatism in Action, 1927-





Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.  
 
Uhalley, Stephen, Jr. “Taiwan’s Response to the Cultural Revolution.” Asian Survey 7.11 (1967): 
824-829. 
 
Ungar, E. S. “The Struggle Over the Chinese Community in Vietnam, 1946-1986.” Pacific 
Affairs 60.4 (1988): 596-614. 
 
van der Kroef, Justus M. “Philippine Communism and the Chinese,” The China Quarterly 30 
(1967): 115-148.  
 
van Dongen, Els. “Behind the Ties that Bind: Diaspora-making and Nation-building in China 
and India in Historical Perspective, 1850s-2010s.” Asian Studies Review 41.1 (2017): 
117-135. 
 
Villanueva, Angelino Z. “Deportation of Aliens Under Philippine Law.” Philippine Law Journal 
45.2 (1970): 470-500.  
 
Vogel, Ezra, and Byung-Kook Kim, ed. The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South 
Korea. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
 
Vu, Tuong. “Cold War Studies and the Cultural Cold War in Asia.” In Dynamics of the Cold 
War in Asia: Ideology, Identity, and Culture, edited by Tuong Vu and Wasana 
Wongsurawat, 1-16. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.  
 
Wakeman, Frederic., Jr. “A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism.” The 
China Quarterly 150 (1997): 395-432.  
 
Walker, Richard. “Taiwan’s Development as Free China.” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 321 (1959): 122-135.  
 
Wang, Gungwu. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003. 
 
Wang, Horng-Luen. “National Culture and Its Discontents: The Politics of Heritage and 
Language in Taiwan, 1949-2003.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 46.4 
(2004): 786-815.  
 
Wang, Joan. “In the Name of Legitimacy: Taiwan and Overseas Chinese during the Cold War 
Era.” China Review 11.2 (2011): 65-90. 
 
Wang, L. Sophia. “The Independent Press and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of the Dagong 





Wang, Xiaojue. Modernity with a Cold War Face: Reimagining the Nation in Chinese Literature 
Across the 1949 Divide. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 
2013. 
 
Weightman, George Henry. “The Philippine Chinese: A Cultural History of a Marginal Trading 
Community.” Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1960. 
 
Westad, Odd Arne. Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press: 2003. 
 
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Wong, Kwok-chu. The Chinese in the Philippine Economy, 1898-1941. Quezon City: Ateneo de 
Manila University Press, 1999. 
 
Woods, Colleen P. “Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Rosary Beads: The United States, the Philippines, 
and the Making of Global Anticommunism.” Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2012.  
 
Wickberg, Edgar. “Anti-Sinicism and Chinese Identity Options in the Philippines.” In Essential 
Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and 
Central Europe, edited by Anthony Reid and Daniel Chirot, 153-186. Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1997. 
 
Wickberg, Edgar. “Notes on Contemporary Chinese Organizations in Manila Chinese Society.” 
In China, Across the Seas: The Chinese as Filipinos, edited by Eileen S. P. Baviera and 
Teresita Ang See, 43-66. Quezon City: Philippine Association of Chinese Studies, 1992. 
 
Wickberg, Edgar. The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 2000. 
 
Wilson, Andrew R. Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant Elites in Colonial Manila, 1880-
1916. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. 
 
Wu, Chun-hsi. Dollars, Dependents, and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist 
China. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967. 
 
Xia, Yun. Down with Traitors: Justice and Nationalism in Wartime China. Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 2017. 
 
Yang, Hsiu-chin楊秀菁. “Feilübin ‘Huaqiao shangbao’ an yu xinwen ziyou wenti菲律賓《華
僑商報》案與新聞自由問題.” Zhengda shicui 9 (2005): 145-179. 
 
Yang, Hsiu-chin楊秀菁. Taiwan jieyan shiqi de xinwen guanzhi zhengce 台灣戒嚴時期的新聞





Yang, Meng Hsuan. “The Great Exodus: Sojourn, Nostalgia, Return, and Identity Formation of 
Chinese Mainlanders in Taiwan, 1940s-2000s.” Ph.D. diss., University of British 
Columbia, 2012. 
 
Yen, Ching-hwang. The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond: Socioeconomic and Political 
Dimensions. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2008. 
 
Yong, C. F. Tan Kah Kee: The Making of An Overseas Chinese Legend. Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing, 2013. 
 
Yong, C. F., and R. B. McKenna. The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949. 
Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990. 
 
Yung Li, Yuk-wai. The Huaqiao Warriors: Chinese Resistance Movement in the Philippines, 
1942-1945. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1996. 
 
Zarrow, Peter. Educating China: Knowledge, Society, and Textbooks in a Modernizing World, 
1902-1937. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
 
Zhai, Qiang. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001. 
 
Zhao, Zhenxiang 赵振祥, Yan Lifeng 阎立峰, Jiang Xiding 蒋细定, Hou Peishui 侯培水, Wu 
Jiansheng 吴建省, and Chen Huayue 陈华嶽. Feilübin huawen baoshi gao菲律宾华人
报史稿. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2006.  
 
Zhou, Taomo. “Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960-1965.” The China 
Quarterly 221 (2015): 208-228. 
 
Zhu, Dongqin 朱东芹. Chongtu yu ronghe: Feihua shanglian zonghui yu zhanhou Feihua shehui 
de fazhan 冲突与融合: 菲华商联总会与战后菲华社会的发展. Xiamen: Xiamen daxue 
chubanshe, 2005.  
 
Zhuang, Guotu 庄国土. Huaqiao huaren yu zhongguo de guanxi 华侨华人与中国的关系. 
Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001.  
